enceinte such justice may issue his summons to such father to show cause why he should not pay confinement expenses to such woman." Sec. 5 provides that at the hearing of the complaint any two justices, upon proof that the woman is enceinte and upon proof sufficient to satisfy them that the defen- dant is the father of the expected child, may order him to pay a sum for confinement expenses. Sec. 8 provides that in any proceedings under the Act "no man shall be taken to be the father of a child the subsequent birth of which is probable upon the oath of the woman who is enceinte only."
The Supreme Court of Victoria having held that a pre-maternity order made under sec. 5 of the Marriage Act 1900 against the defendant for the payment of confinement expenses to a woman who subsequently gave birth to an illegiti- mate child, in addition to her statement on oath that the defendant was the father of the child, was sufficient evidence to justify an order against the defendant for the maintenance of the child under sec. 43 of the Marriage Act 1890,
Held, that special leave to appeal to the High Court should be refused. Special leave to appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (àBeckett J.): McKinley v. Delaney, (1915) V.L.R., 66 36 A.L.T., 106,
APPLICATION for special leave to appeal.
In the Court of Petty Sessions at Carlton, on a complaint under sec. 42 of the Marriage Act 1890, by Gertrude McKinley against Harold Delaney, for leaving his illegitimate child without means of support, an order was made against the defendant under sec. 43 for the payment of 7s. 6d. per week for the maintenance of the child. The defendant thereupon appealed to the Court of General Sessions at Melbourne, The Chairman of the Court dismissed the appeal, but, at the request of the appellant, stated a case for the determination of the Supreme Court, in which he set out the following facts (inter alia) :- On the hearing of the appeal the respon- dent (the mother of the said illegitimate child) gave evidence that satisfied me that the appellant was the father of such child, and had left it without means of support. The appel- lant gave evidence denying the respondent's allegations, but I did not believe him. By virtue of sec. 48 of the Marriage Act 1890 I was precluded from acting on the evidence without cor- roboration. The respondent's mother gave evidence that during the period which would cover the time of conception of the said child the appellant used to visit her house, and used to take the