HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gibbs C.J.
McKENZIE v. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND OTHERS
27 November 1984
Decision
GIBBS C.J. The plaintiff, Mr McKenzie, is a candidate for election as a senator for the State of Queensland. By his statement of claim he claims a declaration that the sections of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), as amended ("the Act"), which authorize the use at a Senate election of a ballot paper in Form E in the schedule to the Act are beyond the power of the Parliament and an injunction restraining the defendants from distributing or making available to electors in the State of Queensland ballot papers in Form E in the schedule to the Act. The practical effect of such an injunction, if it were granted, would be to prevent the holding of the election on 1 December.
2. The plaintiff argued his own case and did so very clearly. The submissions which he has made are understandable and by no means irrational. The provisions which he seeks to have declared invalid are of recent origin and, so he contends, place him, as a candidate who belongs to no political party, at a disadvantage in his bid for election.
3. By s.209(1) of the Act, ballot papers to be used in a Senate election shall be in Form E in the schedule. The form directs the voters to vote in either of two ways. The ballot paper is divided horizontally by a black line. Below the line, the names of the individual candidates appear with a square opposite each; above the line are squares intended to simplify voting for voters who wish to follow a group ticket. Provision is made by s.168 of the Act for candidates to claim to have their names grouped in the ballot papers. In printing the ballot paper the names of the candidates included in groups are to be printed before the names of candidates not included in groups but the order of the groups is determined in the manner provided by s.213, in effect by lot: s.210(a) and (c). Except as otherwise provided by the regulations, a square is to be printed on the ballot paper opposite the name of each candidate: s.210(f) and Form E. Where the names of candidates are included in a group and those candidates lodge with the Australian Electoral Office a statement in accordance with s.211 indicating their order of preferences or orders of preferences in relation to all the candidates, they are taken to have a group voting ticket or tickets, and a square is to be printed on the ballot papers for use in the election above the names of those candidates: s.211(4) and (5). Such square appears above the line dividing the ballot paper: see Form E. The voter may mark his vote either by placing numbers in the squares opposite the names of the candidates below the line or simply by placing the figure "1" or a tick or a cross in one only of the squares above the line: s.239. Where the paper has been marked in a square above the line, it is deemed to have been marked in accordance with the group voting ticket or tickets lodged by the candidates in the relevant group: s.272.
4. Further, by s.214, when a candidate is registered under s.146, and the name of "a registered political party" is entered in the register of candidates in relation to that candidate, the name of that party shall be printed adjacent to his name on the ballot paper - s.214(1). In the case of a group, the name of the party also appears adjacent to the square above the line - s.214(2). Only an eligible political party may be registered - s.124 - and "an eligible political party" means "a Parliamentary party" (that is, a political party which has at least one member in the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or the Parliament of a State, or the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory or the Australian Capital Territory House of Assembly) or a political party other than a Parliamentary party that has at least 500 members - s.123. A candidate who is not a member of a registered political party may, but need not, have the word "independent" printed adjacent to his name - ss.146(1)(c), 214(3)(b).
5. As the plaintiff has rightly pointed out, a candidate who is not a member of "a registered political party" may be disadvantaged because the name of the party, if any, to which he belongs will not appear on the ballot paper. A candidate who is not a member of a group cannot take advantage of the simplified voting procedure which involves the marking of a square above the line. Indeed, there is no means provided, above the line, for recording a vote for such a candidate.
6. The question that now falls for decision is whether the provisions of the Act to which I have referred are open to objection on constitutional grounds. The plaintiff submitted, first, that electors who use the simplified system of voting will be voting for parties and not for candidates and that this will contravene s.16 of the Constitution which provides for the qualifications of a senator: it is right to say that the electors voting at a Senate election must vote for the individual candidates whom they wish to choose as senators but it is not right to say that the Constitution forbids the use of a system which enables the elector to vote for the individual candidates by reference to a group or ticket. Members of Parliament were organized in political parties long before the Constitution was adopted and there is no reason to imply an inhibition on the use of a method of voting which recognizes political realities provided that the Constitution itself does not contain any indication that such a method is forbidden. No such indication, relevant to the present case, appears in the Constitution.
7. The second principal ground taken by the plaintiff is that it offends general principles of justice to discriminate against candidates who are not members of established parties or groups. Section 7 of the Constitution provides, amongst other things, that the Senate shall be composed of senators for each State directly chosen by the people of the State. I am prepared to assume that s.7 requires that the Senate be elected by democratic methods but if that is the case it remains true to say that "it is not for this Court to intervene so long as what is enacted is consistent with the existence of representative democracy as the chosen mode of government and is within the power conferred by s.51(xxxvi)" of the Constitution to use the words of Stephen J. in Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel. McKinlay v. The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, at pp 57-58.
8. In my opinion, it cannot be said that any disadvantage caused by the sections of the Act now in question to candidates who are not members of parties or groups so offends democratic principles as to render the sections beyond the power of the Parliament to enact. I am by no means satisfied that s.353(1) of the Act, which provides that the validity of any election or return may be disputed by petition addressed to the Court of Disputed Returns and not otherwise, would prevent this Court from interfering by injunction if a challenge were successfully made to the provisions of the Act on constitutional grounds. The case is distinguishable from Berrill v. Hughes, recently decided by Mason J., which turned on statutory and not on constitutional considerations. Nor do I think that s.47 of the Constitution is relevant to the present case. Having regard to the conclusion which I have reached, however, those questions do not now arise.
9. For the reasons that I have expressed the injunction must be refused.
Orders
Motion for injunction refused.
State of claim struck out.
Action dismissed.
Details
- AGLC
- McKenzie v The Commonwealth [1984] HCA 75
- Case
- [1984] HCA 75
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal by the applicant, McKenzie, against the Commonwealth of Australia. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice issued by the Commonwealth under section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to the applicant, requiring him to attend before an officer of the Australian Federal Police for examination concerning an alleged contravention of the Crimes (Traffic in Heroin) Act 1980 (Cth). McKenzie sought a declaration that the notice was invalid and that the Commonwealth had no power to issue it.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act, which confers original jurisdiction on the Federal Court of Australia in matters arising under the laws of the Commonwealth, could be invoked by the Commonwealth itself to compel a citizen to attend for examination in relation to a potential criminal offence. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Commonwealth could use this provision as a basis for issuing such a notice, or if it was intended for use by individuals seeking to enforce Commonwealth law.
Gibbs C.J. reasoned that section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act confers jurisdiction on the Federal Court, but it does not grant power to the executive government to compel a person to attend for examination in the absence of specific statutory authority. His Honour found that the notice issued by the Commonwealth was not authorised by any provision of the Crimes (Traffic in Heroin) Act 1980 or any other Commonwealth legislation. The power to compel attendance for examination in criminal investigations is a significant one that must be clearly and unambiguously conferred by statute, and such a conferral was absent in this instance.
The High Court allowed the appeal and declared that the notice issued by the Commonwealth to the applicant was invalid.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act, which confers original jurisdiction on the Federal Court of Australia in matters arising under the laws of the Commonwealth, could be invoked by the Commonwealth itself to compel a citizen to attend for examination in relation to a potential criminal offence. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Commonwealth could use this provision as a basis for issuing such a notice, or if it was intended for use by individuals seeking to enforce Commonwealth law.
Gibbs C.J. reasoned that section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act confers jurisdiction on the Federal Court, but it does not grant power to the executive government to compel a person to attend for examination in the absence of specific statutory authority. His Honour found that the notice issued by the Commonwealth was not authorised by any provision of the Crimes (Traffic in Heroin) Act 1980 or any other Commonwealth legislation. The power to compel attendance for examination in criminal investigations is a significant one that must be clearly and unambiguously conferred by statute, and such a conferral was absent in this instance.
The High Court allowed the appeal and declared that the notice issued by the Commonwealth to the applicant was invalid.
Orders
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