McKay v Western Australian Planning Commission

In the case of McKay v Western Australian Planning Commission, the parties were involved in a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA). The dispute centred around the valuation of a property, specifically Lot 301, and the process for resolving the valuation dispute through arbitration. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central legal issues before the court were whether the respondent's application for declaratory relief on certain legal points should be referred to the Court of Appeal and whether the respondent's opposition to the appointment of an arbitrator under the Commercial Arbitration Act 2006 (WA) should be upheld.

The court considered the submissions of both parties, with the respondent arguing that the legal questions raised in the application should be referred to the Court of Appeal under section 43 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), due to the departure from a previous decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court. The applicant, on the other hand, contended that the questions should not be referred to the Court of Appeal and that the application for declaratory relief should be dismissed. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Planning and Development Act, the decision of Miller J in Re the Board of Valuers, and the Full Court's decision in Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission. The court also considered the decision of EM Heenan J in WAPC v Navarac Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 399, which dealt with the function of the Board of Valuers' valuation.

The court ultimately found that the questions raised by the respondent did not involve any contested facts and did not warrant referral to the Court of Appeal. The court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to determine questions of law on an application by a party, either with the consent of the arbitrator or with the consent of all other parties, under section 39(2) of the Commercial Arbitration Act. The court also found that the respondent's opposition to the appointment of an arbitrator was not well-founded, and the application for declaratory relief was dismissed. The court's decision allowed the applicant to proceed with the requested immediate reference to arbitration under section 176(2) of the Commercial Arbitration Act.

The final orders of the court were that the respondent's application for declaratory relief be dismissed, and the respondent's opposition to the appointment of an arbitrator be dismissed. The court held that the questions raised by the respondent did not warrant referral to the Court of Appeal and that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to determine questions of law on an application by a party under section 39(2) of the Commercial Arbitration Act. The court's decision allowed the applicant to proceed with the requested immediate reference to arbitration under section 176(2) of the Commercial Arbitration Act.