McKay v The King

[2023] NSWDC 370

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

McKay v R [2023] NSWDC 370

Hearing dates:

On the papers.

Date of orders:

15 September 2023

Decision date:

15 September 2023

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

Mahony SC DCJ

Decision:

Certificate granted. For orders see [61].

Catchwords:

Criminal procedure – costs – application for certificate under Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967.

Legislation Cited:

Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967

Crimes Act 1900

Criminal Procedure Act 1986

Cases Cited:

Allerton v DPP (1991) 24 NSWLR 550

Constantinidis v R; Lazar v R (Costs) [2022] NSWCCA 248

Cox v R (No. 2) [2017] NSWCCA 129

Fejsa v R 1995 82 A Crim R 253

Higgins v R (No. 2) [2022] NSWCCA 82

Honeysett v Director of Public Prosecutions [2023] NSWCCA 215

Mordaunt v DPP & Anor (2007) 171 A Crim R 510; [2007] NSWCA 121

R v Johnston [2000] NSWCCA 197

R v Manley (2000) 49 NSWLR 203; [2000] NSWCCA 196

R v Turner (1980) 1 NSWLR 19

Rodden v R [2023] NSWCCA 202

Category:

Costs

Parties:

Darrell Lee McKay (Applicant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
Mr J Leaver (Applicant)

Solicitors:
Mr D Hoitink (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2019/112528

Publication restriction:

Section 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 prohibits publication of any matter which identifies the complainant or any matter which is likely to identify the complainant in the proceedings.

Judgment on costs application

1. The applicant applies by Notice of Motion filed on 28 March 2023 for a certificate pursuant to ss 2 and 3 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (“the Act”).

2. The applicant was arraigned in the Newcastle District Court on 28 November 2022 and pleaded not guilty to five counts on the Indictment. On 13 December 2022 the jury returned verdicts of not guilty in respect of all five counts on the Indictment.

3. The five counts on the Indictment related to three separate occasions which have been characterised as follows:-

1. The levee incident, between 5 July 2014 and 8 July 2014:-

1. Count 1 – attempting to have sexual intercourse with a child in circumstances of aggravation contrary to s 66D of the Crimes Act 1900.

2. Count 2 – having sexual intercourse with a child in circumstances of aggravation contrary to s 66C(2) of the Crimes Act 1900.

3. Count 3 – having sexual intercourse with a child in circumstances of aggravation contrary to s 66C(2) of the Crimes Act 1900.

2. The bedroom incident, between 5 July 2017 and 31 December 2017:-

1. Count 4 – having sexual intercourse with a child in circumstances of aggravation contrary to s 66C(2) of the Crimes Act 1900.

3. The BBQ incident, on 24 March 2019:-

1. Count 5 – a charge of intentionally sexually touching a child contrary to s 66DV(a) of the Crimes Act 1900.

4. The applicant relies on a detailed written outline of submissions dated 8 March 2023. The Crown responded with its own written outline of submissions dated 2 September 2023.

The applicant’s submissions

5. In his written outline of submissions counsel for the applicant set out the terms of ss 2 and 3 of the Act and the well established principles to be followed by the Court in determining whether it is satisfied of the two matters specified in s 3 before the granting of a certificate, namely:-

“(a) If the prosecution had, before the proceedings were instituted, been in possession of evidence of all the relevant facts, it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings, and

(b) That any act or omission of the defendant had contributed, or might have contributed, to the institution or continuation of the proceedings was reasonable in the circumstances.”

6. In so far as determining “all the relevant facts”, the applicant relies on the evidence adduced at trial. The applicant further submitted that it could not be said that the applicant contributed to the commencement of, or continuation of, the proceedings. From the outset he had denied his guilt and details of his case would have become clear to the Crown during the pre-recorded hearings of the complainant’s evidence that took place over four days on 12 April 2021, 13 April 2021, 18 May 2021 and 21 May 2021.

7. The applicant submitted that it was unreasonable for the prosecuting authority to institute proceedings. The complainant had given two recorded interviews to police on 27 March 2019 and 29 March 2019. She was the only person who gave evidence of the events that were subject of the counts on the Indictment and the jury was directed that they must be satisfied that she was a reliable witness in that she was both honest and accurate in vital respects. In addition the Crown relied on evidence of complaints made by the complainant to her step-mother Leanne Ayre on Monday 25 March 2019 in a car, and her school counsellor, Melissa Brown, on Tuesday 26 March 2019 at school. The applicant’s ultimate submission was that the complainant was a witness who was so lacking in credit that, assessed retrospectively, it was unreasonable to institute proceedings.

8. In relation to the levee incident (Counts 1 to 3) counsel for the applicant recited the relevant part of the Crown opening. The alleged offences took place adjacent to the Hunter River, opposite the complainant’s mother’s house at Muswellbrook, in a grassy area known to the family as the levee. On this particular day in July 2014 the complainant alleged that she had gone there with the accused, that he had produced a knife and threatened to slit her throat and her mother’s throat if she did not do exactly what he said. He then allegedly told her to take off her clothes and he pulled down his “footy shorts” as he knelt in front of her where she was now seated on a log, when he attempted penile-vaginal intercourse, at which point she started screaming and crying. Count 2 concerned an allegation of digital penetration and Count 3 was an allegation of fellatio which made up the first incident.

9. The applicant’s submissions rehearsed the evidence at trial concerning Counts 1 to 3 and a number of inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence to submit that the evidence demonstrated compellingly that the complainant was not at her mother’s home on Scott street on the occasion when Counts 1, 2 and 3 were alleged to have occurred.

10. The complainant had given two recorded interviews to the officer in charge (“OIC”) on 27 March 2019 and 29 March 2019. In the first she had made no allegation or suggestion supporting the allegation in Count 3. She did however make such an allegation in her complaint to the school counsellor on 26 March 2019 (Exhibit E). In her second police interview on 29 March 2019 the OIC had made repeated assertions to her that he had information of what she had told the school counsellor that was different from what she had told him in the first interview, and that he had a report from the counsellor. During the interview the recording had stopped for some 10 or 11 minutes and when the camera was turned back on the complainant made a strikingly similar allegation to the one she had made to the counsellor concerning the allegation of fellatio in Count 3. On this occasion however she said it happened in 2014 at the same time as Counts 1 and 2, rather than in March 2019 as she had told the counsellor. The applicant submitted that this inconsistency was so major it was not capable of being explained away by the usual jury direction concerning inconsistency in complaint. When viewed objectively it should be considered as having been fatal to the Crown’s prospects of proving Count 3 and would also have substantially damaged the complainant’s credibility and reliability in relation to Counts 1 and 2 and more generally.

11. The applicant also submitted that the complainant made inconsistent assertions about when she was first assaulted by the applicant. In her police interview on 27 March 2019 she told police that the allegation in Count 1 “caught me by surprise sort of thing”. That evidence contradicted the complaint to Ms Ayre that the applicant had been molesting her from age 8. It also contradicted a diary entry (Exhibit A9) in which she recorded that the first time he raped her she was only 8 years of age. These inconsistent assertions were incapable of being reconciled in a manner favourable to the Crown case and significantly damaged the complainant’s credit and reliability.

12. The applicant referred to other evidence at trial suggesting that the levee incident, as described by the complainant, was improbable, including the fact that the evidence established that Muswellbrook was particularly cold in winter, that the applicant would not have been wearing a shirt and footy shorts in winter, nor would the complainant have been near naked around 5pm near the river at that time. Other inconsistencies concerned evidence the complainant gave about where the applicant was wearing the knife on his pants, and her evidence that the family dog Zeus was present. In fact the evidence established the family did not own that dog in 2014 and it had not been to those premises.

13. The applicant also relied on evidence given by the complainant’s mother concerning the untruthfulness of the complainant’s evidence that the family would go rabbiting on the levee bank.

14. In respect of the bedroom incident (Count 4) the applicant recited the Crown opening, the allegation was that the applicant engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse with the complainant in her bedroom whilst her mother was in the adjoining bedroom. The complainant further alleged that the applicant had a gun held across his body before he assaulted her. She alleged that he had put the gun back in the back shed on the night of the incident and she had seen it there a month prior to her interview with police on 27 March 2019. Witnesses called in the trial who had lived at the house denied that they ever the saw the applicant storing a gun in the back shed and notably no gun was found in that shed when police executed a search warrant on 10 April 2019.

15. The applicant submitted that there was no evidence adduced to confirm or corroborate the complainant’s account in relation to Count 4 and the various inconsistencies effecting the complainant’s credit and reliability would lead to the conclusion that it was unreasonable to prosecute the applicant on this count.

16. In relation to the BBQ incident (Count 5) the applicant again set out the Crown opening. The allegation was that the complainant attended a BBQ on 24 March 2019 at her mother’s house, during which the applicant walked past her and grabbed her butt or bottom with his hand following which her mother told her older sister to take her home to her father’s house.

17. The applicant submitted that the complainant gave three different accounts of this incident in the three days following, namely on Monday 25 March she reported to her step-mother that “he smacked her on the arse”. On Tuesday 26 March she told the school counsellor that on this occasion the applicant had “approached her and told her to meet him across the road at the river.” She then told her mother she had to go home.

18. On Wednesday 27 March 2019 she told Detective Simms “I walked past him and he touched my butt”, and “nothing else happened”.

19. The applicant submitted that the differences in the three versions of events were contradictory and irreconcilable. Further, evidence from other witnesses at the BBQ, being her mother and two other witnesses, did not support the Crown case that something untoward happened, or that her mother arranged for the complainant to go home afterwards. It was submitted that the irreconcilable contradictions must have precluded the possibility of conviction on this count.

20. The applicant relied on other evidence adduced at trial to demonstrate the complainant was not a credible witness which cumulatively supported a finding that it was unreasonable to commence a prosecution based on the complainant’s uncorroborated allegations. That evidence was as follows:-

1. The fact of various admissions to an adolescent mental health unit in the time leading up to the complainant making allegations against the applicant, which was consistent with other evidence of a prolonged deterioration in her behaviour and mental wellbeing from around the time she had made sexual allegations against her grandfather in 2016.

2. The complainant's assertion that: "I don't have a good memory because I am drug fucked."

3. That she would engage in attention seeking behaviours.

4. That the complainant was capable of dishonesty and callousness, such as:

1. stealing $450 from a man she was helping at King of the Ranges in February 2019,

2. robbing a shop with a broken bottle, and

3. assaulting a woman to steal her purse and phone, who the complainant said "had no fucking money".

5. The complainant's assertion that the applicant had touched her on the leg while they were watching a Rabbitohs game with Sally McKay, Danielle McKay and MW. Those witness gave evidence to the effect that they did not recall any occasion when the complainant watched football with the applicant, and that was something that was unlikely to have occurred. To the extent that the complainant asserted that the incident may have happened while the Rabbitohs were playing in a Grand Final, the evidence was that the applicant was away on a hunting trip the weekend the Rabbitohs played their only Grand Final in the relevant years (in 2014). The complainant also suggested the incident might have happened during a game leading up to a Grand Final, but that evidence is significant because the 2014 Grand Final was the only occasion Sally, Miranda and Danielle dressed in Rabbitohs gear, which the complainant said they were wearing when the applicant touched her. The weight of the evidence suggests the incident could not have occurred.

6. Matters in respect of which it is open to conclude the complainant told lies, or at least gave evidence that was untrue, such as:

1. denying that she had stolen (and had admitted stealing) $450 from a man she was helping at King of the Ranges in February 2019,

2. denying that she had accused her father of bashing her,

3. denying she had made a phone call to her mother pretending to be a police officer, but subsequently admitting to doing that,

4. denying that she had a curfew when she left NEXUS,

5. denying she had every used a social media account called "Ya Gurl Rosie" and denying she had ever pretended Danielle McKay's child Harry was hers and that particular social media posts had been made by her,

6. denying she had made a false allegation that the applicant had breached his bail,

7. denying that she had told police that her mother had bashed her,

8. denying that she had threatened to slit her mother's throat,

9. asserting that she did not know what oral sex was,

10. denying ever talking to her mother about compensation and suggesting she did not know what compensation was, and

11. asserting that she wrote the supposed diary entry (which is Exhibit A9) in 2016 or 2017 in circumstances where other evidence suggested the art book wasn't purchased for her until after she'd moved back to her father's in 2018. It wasn't found by her father until August 2020, and the entry itself includes reference in past tense to "when I had a boyfriend", which tends to suggest the diary was written after 2018. The defence case was that the diary entry was written after the complainant had made her complaint about the applicant.”

21. The applicant also relied on evidence from other witnesses concerning their observations of the applicant and complainant. In her diary the complainant had asserted the applicant would regularly rape her and he did so over an extended period. To her counsellor she had said the applicant had assaulted her “too many [times] to remember”. The various witnesses however who lived in the family home when the complainant lived there, gave evidence that they did not observe anything untoward or inappropriate in the applicant’s behaviour towards the complainant.

22. In conclusion it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the extensive evidence demonstrated that the complainant was not an honest or reliable witness. In addition the applicant had the advantage of a direction to the jury that they must be satisfied that the complainant was a reliable witness, a limited good character direction and a liberato direction concerning the full denials he made in his ERISP interview. It was submitted that the evidence demonstrated that the complainant was “very substantially lacking in credit”.

23. Cumulatively, the evidence referred to above must be assessed as precluding the chance of conviction and had the Crown been in possession of all the relevant facts it would not have been reasonable to institute proceedings. It was submitted that it was therefore appropriate to grant a certificate pursuant to the Act.

The Crown’s submissions

24. The Crown set out the following propositions drawn from authorities that have considered s 3(1)(a) of the Act:-

1. “The section involves a hypothetical inquiry in which the prosecution is notionally put in the position of knowing all the facts which have since emerged: Allerton v DPP (1991) 24 NSWLR 550.

2. The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the Court that it was not reasonable to bring the prosecution. It is not for the prosecution to establish, nor for the Court to conclude, that the institution of proceedings was, or would have been in the relevant circumstances, reasonable: R v Turner (1980) 1 NSWLR 19; R v Manley (2000) 49 NSWLR 203.

3. “There is no single bright line test as to when it would not be reasonable for a prosecution to have been instituted. The reasonableness of a decision to institute proceedings is not based on any test of whether there is a reasonable prospect of conviction, whether a reasonable jury would be likely to convict, whether there was reasonable suspicion which might justify an arrest, or whether the prosecution was malicious. Nor is the fact that the applicant was acquitted, or that this Court allowed his appeal, necessarily determinative of the issue”, relying on Higgins v R (No 2) [2022] NSWCCA 82 at [21] (Payne JA, Rothman and Bellew JJ).

4. The section “calls for an objective analysis of the whole of the relevant evidence, and particularly the extent to which there is any contradiction of expert evidence concerning central facts necessary to establish guilt, or inherent weakness in the prosecution case. Matters of judgment concerning credibility, demeanour and the like are likely to fall on the other side of unreasonableness, being matters quintessentially within the realm of the ultimate fact finder, whether it be judge or jury”: Mordaunt v DPP & Anor (2007) 171 A Crim R 510 per McColl JA at [36(m)].

5. “It is not sufficient to establish the issue of unreasonableness in favour of an applicant for a certificate that, in the end, the question for the jury depended upon word against word; in a majority of such cases, it would be quite reasonable for the prosecution to allow those matters to be decided by the jury; it would be different where the word upon which the Crown case depended had been demonstrated to be one which was very substantially lacking in credit” Mordaunt v DPP & Anor (2007) 171 A Crim R 510 per McColl JA at [36(m)].

6. The fact a prosecution may be launched where there is evidence to establish a prima facie case does not mean it is reasonable to launch a prosecution; there may be cases where there is contradictory evidence and where it is reasonable to expect a prosecutor to make some evaluation of that evidence: Mordaunt v DPP & Anor (2007) 171 A Crim R 510 per McColl JA at [36(i)].”

25. The Crown submitted that while consideration must be given to contradictory evidence and inconsistencies, the Court is ultimately required to consider the evidence as a whole, rather than considering apparent inconsistencies and contradictions in a vacuum.

26. In response to the applicant’s submissions the Crown conceded there were a number of matters which had the capacity to negatively impact the assessment of the complainant’s credibility. However the Crown submitted that those issues did not rise to such a level as to establish that the complainant was substantially lacking in credit.

25. Having identified the inconsistencies relied on by the applicant, as set out above, the Crown made the following submissions in relation to Counts 1 to 3.

26. First, in relation to the timing issue the Crown conceded that the evidence at trial raised a reasonable possibility that the complainant stayed at her father’s house on the 5^th and 6^th of July 2014. However the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the charge conduct occurred on 7 July 2014, consistent with the complainant’s account. Whilst the complainant’s mother gave evidence inconsistent with that proposition, her credibility was also in issue in the trial and the evidence established that she had cut contact with the complainant and sided with the applicant. Further, timing was not an essential ingredient of the offence.

27. The Crown noted that the complainant always acknowledged her uncertainty as to the precise date of the relevant conduct and gave evidence to that effect. Thus, the issue of timing in respect of Counts 1 to 3 did not render the prosecution unreasonable. Rather the impact of the timing issue on the complainant’s credibility was a matter properly for the assessment of the jury.

28. Secondly, the failure of the complainant to mention the conduct the subject of Count 3 in the initial police interview on 27 March 2019 was explained by the complainant’s evidence that she had trouble speaking to a man about the subject matter. It was submitted that that was borne out by the initial interview in which the complainant was clearly reluctant to answer questions. This was supported by the complainant’s father BW who gave evidence that she had previously had difficulty talking to a male counsellor. Her step-mother also gave evidence that when the complainant spoke to a female counsellor she would wait outside but when the complainant spoke to a male counsellor she would be in the room at the complainant’s request.

29. The Crown submitted that the piecemeal disclosure of Count 3 was not a feature which rendered the prosecution unreasonable and that a plausible explanation had been given for it, supported by other evidence.

30. Thirdly, in relation to the inconsistencies contended for by the applicant, the Crown referred to the jury direction pursuant to s 293A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. The Crown submitted that the complainant was giving evidence about events which had occurred some five years earlier when she was aged 9 or 10 and in the circumstances some conflation of detail or inaccuracy in recollection might be expected. The significance of relevant inconsistencies to the assessment of the complainant’s credibility were matters properly left to the jury. The Crown relied on Higgins v R (No. 2) [2022] NSWCCA 82 at [31] where the Court said:-

“…it will generally be reasonable for a prosecutor to allow questions of credibility in a “word on word” case to be decided by a jury. This is not a case where the complainant’s account has been shown to be “plainly wrong” as was the case in Cox…”

33. Cox v R (No 2) [2017] NSWCCA 129 was a case where a certificate was granted on the basis that the principal Crown witness was found to be substantially lacking in credit. The Crown submitted it could be distinguished on its facts. It was submitted that the inconsistencies relied on by the applicant here were clearly of lesser gravity than those involved in Cox.

34. In relation to other matters raised by the applicant, the Crown submitted as follows:-

“a. The absence of corroboration is not an unusual feature in prosecutions of historical child sexual offences. In Higgins v R (No 2) [2022] NSWCCA 82, the Court (Payne JA, Rothman and Bellew JJ) said at [27]:

… the paucity of evidence corroborating the complaint of sexual assault does not render the institution of proceedings unreasonable in circumstances where the law expressly prohibits any warning to the tribunal of fact that there is a danger in convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant: Criminal Procedure Act, s 294AA(2).

b. The experience of the Courts is that it is not unusual for child sexual offences to be committed in brazen circumstances, where there is some risk of detection. In Smith (a pseudonym) v R [2022] VSCA 129, the Court said at [5]:

Arguments from improbability are also a recurrent feature of appeals of this kind. But, as has regularly been pointed out, sexual offending against children often takes place in circumstances where there is a high risk of discovery. And there are just the types of question which a jury is particularly well placed to decide, drawing – as defence counsel invited them to do – on their ‘common sense and collective experience of life’.

c. Under cross-examination the complainant denied that she had been screaming (18.5.21 T121, L48) and later clarified that she wasn’t “full-on screaming” (18.5.21 T123, L2). This evidence, if accepted, provides some explanation for the fact nobody came to assist her despite her mother being apparently within earshot. Whether that evidence was accepted, and the impact of the inconsistency with earlier evidence, was again a matter for the assessment of the jury.

d. The complainant did not describe any rabbits actually being caught on the occasion the subject of counts 1-3. It was open to the jury to conclude that ‘rabbitting’ was merely a pretext for the applicant to be alone with the complainant in that location at the relevant time. It is submitted that the unsuitability of the relevant area for the actual hunting of rabbits is therefore of reduced relevance, and not a matter that significantly undermines the complainant’s credibility.

e. The complainant was initially equivocal in asserting that the dog “Zeus” was present at the time of the incident, stating in her initial JIRT interview (MFI 4, JIRT of 27.3.19, Q & A 149):

…And I think we had a dog called Zeus. We had one called Jinx. And I think we had one called Jazz.

Moreover, this inconsistency between her evidence at the other evidence at trial concerned a detail peripheral to the charged offending, in circumstances where she was a 9 or 10-year-old child at the time of the alleged offending, was giving evidence many years after the event, and where it was uncontroversial that her family had owned a dog named Zeus at some point. Given these circumstances it is submitted that this was not an inconsistency that significantly detracted from the complainant’s credibility.”

35. The Crown submitted the complainant’s account of the incident subject of Counts 1 to 3 was compelling in some respects and there was some support for her account of the surrounding circumstances. Specifically, the Crown relied on the following:-

“a. She provided some compelling details about the charged conduct, and her state of mind at the relevant time. For example she described feeling scared, dirty and confused (MFI 4, JIRT of 27.3.19, Q & A 144).

b. She made concessions against her own interests about a number of matters, including her drug use, poor memory, shoplifting, anger issues, anti-depressant medication and previous incarceration. These concessions suggested she was giving an honest account

c. There was compelling evidence of a complaint to her step-mother, Ms Ayre, who described her becoming “really, really, upset” and complaining in response to some questioning when the two were alone in a car (T 80). There was also evidence of a complaint to a school counsellor.

d. The accused, in his police interview, initially admitted “we used to go [to the levee bank] and have a bit of a fish and muck around”, when asked if he’d taken the complainant rabbiting there (A 217), he later denied taking her there.”

36. In response to the applicant’s submissions concerning Count 4, the Crown submitted that the evidence of the proximity of the complainant’s mother and the unlikelihood that she did not hear the incident did not rise to such a level as to render the complainant’s account incapable of belief. Rather, this was characterised as “another classic credibility issue, appropriate for determination by the jury, drawing upon their experience and common sense and their assessment of the various witnesses”. Also the absence of corroboration is not an unusual feature in prosecutions of historical child sexual offences and in relation to the asserted inconsistencies, the jury direction pursuant to s 293A of the CPA had application. The impact of the asserted inconsistencies was plainly a matter for the jury’s determination.

37. Finally, in relation to Count 5 the Crown submitted that the inconsistencies in the three accounts relied on by the applicant, when viewed in context, did not rise to such a level as to demonstrate that the complainant’s evidence was “plainly wrong”. They related to the distinction between a “grab” and a “slap” and to more peripheral issues such as whether anything was said by the complainant and the applicant and how the complainant got home afterwards. These were credibility issues appropriately left to the jury.

38. The Crown rehearsed its submission in respect of the lack of corroboration of the evidence of the complainant relating to this count, noting that the credibility of the complainant’s mother was also squarely in issue at the trial.

39. The Crown submitted that the applicant has failed to establish that it would not have been reasonable to institute the relevant proceedings, and accordingly a certificate should not be issued.

Determination

40. The following are relevant provisions of the Act:-

“2 Certificate may be granted

(1) The Court or Judge or Magistrate in any proceedings relating to any offence, whether punishable summarily or upon indictment, may—

(a) where, after the commencement of a trial in the proceedings, a defendant is acquitted or discharged in relation to the offence concerned, or a direction is given by the Director of Public Prosecutions that no further proceedings be taken, or

(b) where, on appeal, the conviction of the defendant is quashed and—

(i) the defendant is discharged as to the indictment upon which he or she was convicted, or

(ii) the information or complaint upon which the defendant was convicted is dismissed,

grant to that defendant a certificate under this Act, specifying the matters referred to in section 3 and relating to those proceedings.

(2) For the avoidance of doubt, a certificate may be granted in accordance with subsection (1) (a) following an acquittal or discharge of a defendant at any time during a trial, whether a hearing on the merits of the proceedings has occurred or not.

(3) In this section, trial, in relation to proceedings, includes a special hearing conducted under the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 and also includes preliminary proceedings that form part of the trial, for example, a voir dire.

3 Form of certificate

(1) A certificate granted under this Act shall specify that, in the opinion of the Court or Judge or Magistrate granting the certificate—

(a) if the prosecution had, before the proceedings were instituted, been in possession of evidence of all the relevant facts, it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings, and

(b) that any act or omission of the defendant that contributed, or might have contributed, to the institution or continuation of the proceedings was reasonable in the circumstances.

(2) (Repealed)

3A Evidence of further relevant facts may be adduced

(1) For the purpose of determining whether or not to grant a certificate under section 2 in relation to any proceedings, the reference in section 3 (1) (a) to all the relevant facts is a reference to—

(a) the relevant facts established in the proceedings, and

(b) any relevant facts that the defendant has, on the application for the certificate, established to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge or Magistrate, and

(c) any relevant facts that the prosecutor, or in the absence of the prosecutor, any person authorised to represent the Minister on the application, has established to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge or Magistrate that—

(i) relate to evidence that was in the possession of the prosecutor at the time that the decision to institute proceedings was made, and

(ii) were not adduced in the proceedings.

(2) Where, on an application for a certificate under section 2 in relation to any proceedings, the defendant adduces evidence to establish further relevant facts that were not established in those proceedings, the Court or Judge or Magistrate to which or to whom the application is made may—

(a) order that leave be given to the prosecutor in those proceedings or, in the absence of the prosecutor, to any person authorised to represent the Minister on the application, to comment on the evidence of those further relevant facts, and

(b) if the Court, Judge or Magistrate think it desirable to do so after taking into consideration any such comments, order that leave be given to the prosecutor or to the person representing the Minister to examine any witness giving evidence for the applicant or to adduce evidence tending to show why the certificate applied for should not be granted and adjourn the application so that that evidence may be adduced.

(3) If, in response to an application for a certificate under section 2 in relation to any proceedings, the prosecutor or, in the absence of the prosecutor, any person authorised to represent the Minister on the application adduces evidence to establish further relevant facts that were not established in those proceedings, the Court or Judge or Magistrate to which or to whom the application is made may—

(a) order that leave be given to the defendant to comment on the evidence of those relevant facts, and

(b) if the Court or Judge or Magistrate think it desirable to do so after taking into consideration any of those comments, order that leave be given to the defendant to examine any witness giving evidence for the prosecutor or that authorised person.”

Principles to be applied

41. Section 3 imposes on an applicant the onus of establishing the facts that are to be stated in any certificate granted. In R v Johnston [2000] NSWCCA 197 at [16], Simpson J set out the circumstances in which a certificate may be granted as involving the following process:

“(i) An evaluation of all of the evidence as it emerged at trial;

(ii) An assumption that all that evidence was available to the prosecution before the proceedings were instituted;

(iii) A determination whether, if the prosecution had been in possession of all that evidence, it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings;

Where it is concluded that, in those circumstances, it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings;

(iv) A determination whether any act or omission of the accused contributed to the commencement of or continuation of the proceedings

and, where such an act or omission is found to exist;

(v) A determination whether that act or omission was, in the circumstances, reasonable.”

42. In Constantinidis v R; Lazar v R (Costs) [2022] NSWCCA 248 the Court of Criminal Appeal referred to R v Johnston and a number of other decisions of the Court. It noted the Court’s disinclination to formulate general rules concerning when “it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings” referring to Fejsa v R 1995 82 A Crim R 253 at 255 and R v Manley (2000) 49 NSWLR 203; [2000] NSWCCA 196 where Wood CJ at CL cited Fejsa v R and said:-

“[14] Given the wide variety of cases that might arise for consideration, I am similarly reluctant to attempt any exhaustive definition of the test. It seems to me that the section calls for an objective analysis of the whole of the relevant evidence, and particularly the extent to which there is any contradiction of expert evidence concerning central facts necessary to establish guilt, or inherent weakness in the prosecution case. Matters of judgment concerning credibility, demeanour and the like are likely to fall on the other side of the line of unreasonableness, being matters quintessentially within the realm of the ultimate fact finder, whether it be Judge or Jury.”

43. The court also referred to Cox v R (No. 2) [2017] NSWCCA 129 where the court referred to earlier decisions in which the complainant’s evidence was critical to the Crown case. In the majority of those cases the court had stated that it would be quite reasonable for the prosecution to allow those matters to be decided by the jury unless the word upon which the Crown case depended had been demonstrated to be one which was very substantially lacking in credit. In Higgins v R (No. 2) [2022] NSWCCA 82 the court held (at [31]) that “it will generally be reasonable for a prosecutor to allow questions of credibility in a “word on word” case to be decided by a jury. This is not a case where the complainant’s account has been shown to be plainly wrong as was the case in Cox v R (No. 2)”.

44. The Court in Constantinidis went on to find that the Crown was not in possession of an apparently credible complainant and a reasonable decision to prosecute the applicants would have required some independent corroboration of the complainant’s evidence. Taking into account evidence of surrounding circumstances that contributed to the complainant’s testimony being unbelievable in a number of respects, the court held that the word upon which the Crown has depended had been demonstrated to be one which was very substantially lacking in credit and thus the court held it was not reasonable to institute the proceedings and issued a certificate.

45. The operation of relevant provisions of the Act have also been the subject of two recent appeals. In Rodden v R [2023] NSWCCA 202 the Court held that even if the potential recipient of the certificate is legally aided, that was not a basis to refuse the grant of a certificate. In Honeysett v Director of Public Prosecutions [2023] NSWCCA 215 the Court set out the history of the Act, without departing from the principles applicable, as outlined above, holding that the discretion in s 2 should be exercised in a case where police had fabricated evidence and relied on it at trial.

Was it unreasonable for the prosecution to institute the proceedings?

46. This application falls to be determined on whether the Crown case depended on evidence which was found to be very substantially lacking in credit or was “plainly wrong”. It is common ground that no conduct of the accused can be said to be contributing conduct for the purposes of s 3A of the Act.

47. In making that determination and following the process articulated by Simpson J in R v Johnston, I am to evaluate all of the evidence as it emerged at trial. In doing so I have had regard to the transcript of evidence and my summary of both the Crown and the applicant’s case at trial in which I identified evidence relied on by the Crown in support of proof of the essential elements of the charges, and the evidence relied on by the applicant in his defence. The verdicts of the jury reflect that, given their need to find the complainant’s evidence to be honest, accurate and reliable in what was essentially a word-on-word case, the jury must have found that it was not.

48. In fact, the complainant’s evidence was riddled with inconsistencies in relation to the levee incident (Counts 1, 2 and 3). Those inconsistencies included the following:-

1. The evidence that the complainant had never been to the levee alone with the applicant.

2. That it was an area where a lot of people walked on a daily basis, including neighbours.

3. That there was also traffic that used a dirt road along that area, including trail bikes.

4. The evidence that the applicant had never gone rabbiting there.

5. That the dog the complainant referred to was not alive when the offences allegedly took place.

6. The implausibility of the applicant wearing footy shorts and a shirt in the middle of winter.

7. That on the weekend of the 5^th, 6^th and 7^th of July 2014 the complainant stayed with her father and stepmother.

1. The complainant’s uncertainty as to when the alleged incident in fact occurred.

2. The failure of the complainant to make the allegation contained in Count 2 during her first interview with the police, and her inability to recall it during the second interview until that interview was interrupted for a period of time during which she spoke to the investigating officer.

3. The evidence of the complainant as to the dysfunctional relationship with her mother and the fact that she was angry at her mother at the time she first complained about the applicant.

4. The fact established in the evidence that she had made false stories about her mother having bashed her and cut her with a knife. Further, that she had threatened to kill her mother.

49. The applicant also relied on his good character at trial. He had never been accused of an offence of a sexual nature nor had the records held by the NSW Police indicated that he had ever been accused of an offence of dishonesty.

50. The defence case was also supported by the complainant’s mother SM. That included that the complainant and the applicant did not go to the levee on any occasion and the fact of her troubled relationship with the complainant, including that on 6 May 2019 the complainant’s mother had taken out an AVO against the complainant, after an incident on 4 May 2019 when the complainant had made a throat slitting gesture towards her mother and then two days following had tried to break into her home.

51. The applicant also relied on evidence at trial from his step-daughter MW which established that he and the complainant had always had a positive relationship and contradicting the complainant’s evidence as to what occurred within the family home as context to Counts 4 and 5 on the Indictment. She also gave evidence of the applicant’s good character and the fact that he never acted inappropriately towards her. She contradicted the complainant’s evidence by stating that she had never seen guns in the back shed. Further, in respect of the BBQ incident she gave evidence that the complainant had stayed in the loungeroom by herself and had made no complaint to her about the applicant.

52. The applicant at trial had also relied on evidence of an independent witness Jaymess McGahen who had attended the BBQ on 24 March 2019. He gave evidence that he did not see any interactions between the complainant and the applicant on that night. He also described the applicant as a supportive step-father who had been a positive influence in his life. Others who gave evidence to similar effect as to the good character of the applicant were HB, who was in a relationship with MW and his step-daughters DM and BC.

53. Other evidence supporting the applicant’s case was given by other friends and neighbours which supported the applicant’s case.

54. The complainant had given three different versions of her allegations on three different days to her step-mother, school counsellor and investigating police officer. Each of the versions contradicted each other and it was established that during her life the complainant had received counselling and psychological assistance at regular and frequent intervals from different organisations. At no time during any of those counselling sessions had she made disclosures as to her allegations, notwithstanding that she had made various allegations of physical abuse by her own father in Exhibits 9, 10 and 11 which comprised clinical notes. In none of those documents was there any negative or adverse allegation reported about the applicant.

55. A report from NEXUS dated 15 March 2019 had noted the complainant’s deteriorating mental state “since the start of the school year largely surrounding bullying”.

56. Further, the applicant’s case at trial suggested that the evidence established a number of motives for the complainant to make the allegations against him. These included having the idea of compensation in her head as well as the antipathy she felt towards her mother, for whatever reason but perhaps because she felt abandoned. Leading up to March 2019 the evidence established the complainant’s behaviour continued to deteriorate and this involved self-harm attempts, suicide attempts, running away from home and allegations that her own father had bashed her, which were characterised as escalating and 0serious attention seeking behaviours.

57. All of the above matters, as well as the overall impression of unreliability that arose from the complainants demeanour, even taking into account the statutory direction given to the jury concerning inconsistencies, inevitably lead to a conclusion that the complainant’s evidence was substantially lacking in credit.

58. Assuming that all of the evidence was available to the prosecution before the proceedings were instituted, the question then to be determined was whether or not it was reasonable to institute the proceedings. Having regard to all of the evidence, a reasonable decision to prosecute the applicant would have required some independent corroboration of the complainant’s allegations, of which there was none.

59. I find that notwithstanding this was a word-on-word case where generally questions of credibility would reasonably be left to a jury, the Crown case depended completely on the complainant who was very substantially lacking in credit. It is a clear inference from the jury verdicts that she was not believed and having regard to all of the evidence I find that it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings.

60. Given that it is common ground that there is no act or omission of the accused which contributed to the commencement or continuation of the proceedings, I am satisfied that a certificate should be granted under the Act in respect of each of the counts on the Indictment.

Orders

61. I hereby order as follows:-

1. I grant the applicant a certificate under s 2 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (NSW) certifying:-

1. If the prosecution had, before the proceedings were instituted, been in possession of evidence of all the relevant facts, it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings based on the complaint of RW, and

2. That any act or omission of Mr McKay that had contributed, or might have contributed, to the institution or continuation of the proceedings was reasonable in the circumstances.

2. A certificate is attached.

Decision last updated: 15 September 2023