FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McKay v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 1124
WARREN ALFRED McKAY v MOBIL OIL AUSTRALIA LTD & ANOR
N 7351 OF 1999
THE HON JUSTICE MARCUS EINFELD AO
4 AUGUST 1999
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 7351 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
WARREN ALFRED McKAY
ApplicantAND:
MOBIL OIL AUSTRALIA LTD
First RespondentJOE CASCONE
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
THE HON JUSTICE MARCUS EINFELD AO
DATE:
4 AUGUST 1999
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant seeks to annul a sequestration order made by a Registrar on 30 September 1998 on the ground that the petition was not served on him. The question that has arisen in the case is whether it was served on the applicant or on his brother. The applicant denied service of both the petition and the bankruptcy notice. The evidence on both sides is quite unsatisfactory.
The process server’s evidence
The process server’s evidence was, in many respects, quite unbelievable. It is quite clear that the applicant has not, for many years, lived at the Guildford address at which she claimed to have served the documents. Whilst it is true that he made short visits there on occasions for various purposes, and he was cross-examined to establish the number of occasions and the purposes for which he went there, he was not asked whether he had ever been there at 7:51 am on a Sunday morning, which is when it is suggested the petition was served. From the rest of the evidence, it would seem quite unlikely that he would have made a casual visit to the premises at such a time.
The evidence of the process server was quite unsatisfactory in other respects as well. From the work sheet produced in respect of the service of the bankruptcy notice, she made two entries for the evening of 25 April 1998, Anzac Day. A 6 pm entry had the response "not in", meaning that there was someone at the premises to whom she spoke at that time but the applicant was not there. The second entry for the same date was at 6:30 pm and was noted as "no-one at home". She said in evidence that 6 pm was an error for 6:30 pm, ie that the entry for 6.30 pm is correct. She said that she did not delete the other one because she thought that this work sheet was some sort of court document.
I reject that evidence completely. It is firstly inconceivable that she could now recall such a trivial event, having served thousands of documents in the intervening period. Secondly, no one could ever have thought or said that this was a court document. Even if it was, no-one would ever have thought that a court document can have been permitted to retain an entry which was false. Moreover, it is quite clear that the second entry on 25 April has itself been an alteration from another time. If it…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1124
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found the process server's evidence to be highly questionable and unreliable, noting inconsistencies in her account of the service, including the time and date of service and her inability to accurately identify McKay. Additionally, the court found discrepancies in McKay's and his brother's testimonies, although it concluded that these were not significant enough to undermine the main finding regarding the service of the petition. The court concluded that the bankruptcy notice and the petition were not served on McKay at the Guildford address claimed, leading to the decision that the sequestration order should not have been made.
Given the lack of proper service, the court annulled the bankruptcy. The trustee argued against annulment, suggesting that the court should exercise its discretion due to the absence of a genuine dispute over the debt. However, the court rejected this argument, finding that McKay did genuinely dispute the debt, as evidenced by his claims that the credit limit was $6000 and that the debt was incurred by another person. The court also noted McKay's offer to settle the debt at the $6000 limit, which was rejected by the creditor. The court ruled that the sequestration order should be set aside and the bankruptcy annulled. The trustee's request for costs was denied as his opposition to the annulment was deemed unreasonable. The court ordered that McKay's costs be paid by the respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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