McKay v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McKay v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 1124

WARREN ALFRED McKAY v  MOBIL OIL AUSTRALIA LTD & ANOR

N 7351 OF 1999

THE HON JUSTICE MARCUS EINFELD AO
4 AUGUST 1999
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 7351 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

WARREN ALFRED McKAY
Applicant

AND:

MOBIL OIL AUSTRALIA LTD
First Respondent

JOE CASCONE
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

THE HON JUSTICE MARCUS EINFELD AO

DATE:

4 AUGUST 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant seeks to annul a sequestration order made by a Registrar on 30 September 1998 on the ground that the petition was not served on him.  The question that has arisen in the case is whether it was served on the applicant or on his brother.  The applicant denied service of both the petition and the bankruptcy notice.  The evidence on both sides is quite unsatisfactory. 

    The process server’s evidence

  2. The process server’s evidence was, in many respects, quite unbelievable. It is quite clear that the applicant has not, for many years, lived at the Guildford address at which she claimed to have served the documents.  Whilst it is true that he made short visits there on occasions for various purposes, and he was cross-examined to establish the number of occasions and the purposes for which he went there, he was not asked whether he had ever been there at 7:51 am on a Sunday morning, which is when it is suggested the petition was served.  From the rest of the evidence, it would seem quite unlikely that he would have made a casual visit to the premises at such a time. 

  3. The evidence of the process server was quite unsatisfactory in other respects as well.  From the work sheet produced in respect of the service of the bankruptcy notice, she made two entries for the evening of 25 April 1998, Anzac Day.  A 6 pm entry had the response "not in", meaning that there was someone at the premises to whom she spoke at that time but the applicant was not there.  The second entry for the same date was at 6:30 pm and was noted as "no-one at home".  She said in evidence that 6 pm was an error for 6:30 pm, ie that the entry for 6.30 pm is correct.  She said that she did not delete the other one because she thought that this work sheet was some sort of court document.

  4. I reject that evidence completely.  It is firstly inconceivable that she could now recall such a trivial event, having served thousands of documents in the intervening period.  Secondly, no one could ever have thought or said that this was a court document.  Even if it was, no-one would ever have thought that a court document can have been permitted to retain an entry which was false.  Moreover, it is quite clear that the second entry on 25 April has itself been an alteration from another time.  If it…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Warren Alfred McKay contested the validity of a sequestration order made by a Registrar on 30 September 1998, arguing that the petition was not served on him. Mobil Oil Australia Ltd, the petitioner, and Joe Cascone, the second respondent, were the other parties involved in this dispute. The central legal issue was whether the bankruptcy petition was properly served on McKay. McKay denied service of both the petition and the bankruptcy notice, while the process server, who claimed to have served the documents, provided unsatisfactory and contradictory evidence.

The court found the process server's evidence to be highly questionable and unreliable, noting inconsistencies in her account of the service, including the time and date of service and her inability to accurately identify McKay. Additionally, the court found discrepancies in McKay's and his brother's testimonies, although it concluded that these were not significant enough to undermine the main finding regarding the service of the petition. The court concluded that the bankruptcy notice and the petition were not served on McKay at the Guildford address claimed, leading to the decision that the sequestration order should not have been made.

Given the lack of proper service, the court annulled the bankruptcy. The trustee argued against annulment, suggesting that the court should exercise its discretion due to the absence of a genuine dispute over the debt. However, the court rejected this argument, finding that McKay did genuinely dispute the debt, as evidenced by his claims that the credit limit was $6000 and that the debt was incurred by another person. The court also noted McKay's offer to settle the debt at the $6000 limit, which was rejected by the creditor. The court ruled that the sequestration order should be set aside and the bankruptcy annulled. The trustee's request for costs was denied as his opposition to the annulment was deemed unreasonable. The court ordered that McKay's costs be paid by the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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