McJANNETT v Armstrong
[2010] WASC 3
•13 JANUARY 2010
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: McJANNETT -v- ARMSTRONG [2010] WASC 3
CORAM: LE MIERE J
HEARD: 25 AUGUST 2009
DELIVERED : 13 JANUARY 2010
FILE NO/S: CIV 2196 of 2008
BETWEEN: ROBERT PAUL McJANNETT
Plaintiff
AND
PAUL ARMSTRONG
Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Defamation - Application to strike out paragraphs of statement of claim - Whether the meaning pleaded is reasonably capable of being conveyed by the article complained of - Whether pleading is embarrassing or will prejudice the fair pleading of a defence - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 20 r 13A(1)
Result:
Paragraphs 5(b), 5(c) and 6 of the statement of claim be struck out
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr H N H Christie
Defendant: Mr R J Anderson
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Henry Christie
Defendant: Edwards Wallace
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Cruise v Express Newspapers Plc (1999) QB 931
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135
O'Hara v Simms [2009] QCA 186
Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16; (2009) 238 CLR 460; (2009) 83 ALJR 654
Sergi v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1983) 2 NSWLR 669
LE MIERE J: The plaintiff is a crane driver by occupation. In 2008 he stood for election to office in the Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU). In September 2008 the defendant was the editor of The West Australian newspaper. On 3 September 2008 an article was published in the newspaper under the headline 'Reynolds challenger seeks to bar rivals'. The plaintiff says the article defames him and claims against the defendant damages and an injunction restraining further publication. The defendant now applies to strike out paragraphs of the plaintiff's substituted statement of claim on the grounds that they plead imputations that are not capable of arising from the article, or otherwise may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action.
The article
The critical part of the article is the first sentence:
A renegade unionist who is seeking to win control of the powerful Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union is making a legal bid to disqualify other election candidates.
The plaintiff is identified as the 'renegade unionist'. The balance of the article says the following things. The plaintiff is taking on heavyweight Kevin Reynolds and every other member of the union executive. The plaintiff is also seeking to disqualify other candidates including Darren Kavanagh. The plaintiff says that both Reynolds and Kavanagh have 'breached union rules by electioneering before the official start of the campaign'. The plaintiff claims that Reynolds has engaged in misconduct by using union resources to support his candidature. Kavanagh accused the plaintiff of trying to manipulate the democratic process of the union and says it is 'Reynolds‑style tactics'.
Statement of claim
The hearing proceeded in relation to the plaintiff's substituted statement of claim filed 30 June 2009. I will refer to the substituted statement of claim as the statement of claim. The plaintiff pleads the first three paragraphs of the article and that the words 'renegade unionist' refer to the plaintiff. In [5] the plaintiff pleads that in their natural and ordinary meaning, the words 'renegade unionist' meant and were understood to mean:
(a)a unionist who had deserted the union cause;
(b)a unionist who rejected the constraints of the law;
(c)a unionist who was an outlaw, meaning thereby a unionist who was a habitual criminal.
In [6] the plaintiff pleads that the words 'renegade unionist', by way of innuendo, meant and were understood to mean a unionist who was accused of being involved in illegal activity. The plaintiff gives particulars entitled 'particulars of innuendo'.
In [7] the plaintiff pleads that he has been defamed and has suffered distress, hurt to his feelings, embarrassment and illness. He further pleads that he has been damaged in his trade as a crane driver and as a union member and shop steward and in his attempts to be elected as a paid union official.
Imputation 5(a) - a unionist who had deserted the union cause
The defendant objects to this imputation on two grounds. The first ground is that the imputation is not capable of being conveyed as a reasonable reader could not infer from the words the meaning that the plaintiff was a person who had deserted the union cause. The second ground is that the imputation is pleaded with imprecision which makes it embarrassing and prejudices a fair pleading of a defence.
The plaintiff concedes that the alleged defamation must be considered in the context of the whole of the document in which it was published but submits that the defamation comprises just two words, 'renegade unionist'. The meaning of those two words depends upon the rest of the article in which they appear. For example, the possible meanings of unionist in the online Oxford English dictionary include a member of the political party which advocated or supported maintenance of the parliamentary union between Great Britain and Ireland, a supporter or advocate of the federal union of the United States of America and a person who desires or advocates the union of churches or congregations. The balance of the article shows that none of those meanings is the meaning of unionist in the article. The meaning of unionist in the article is a member of a trade union, someone who favours trade unions, someone who promotes or advocates trade unions or an adherent of, or believer in, the system, principles or practice of trade unions.
The online Oxford English dictionary meanings of renegade include a person who renounces his faith. That is obviously not the meaning of the word in the article complained of. The meanings of the noun 'renegade' in the online Oxford English dictionary that are relevant to the article include:
•a person who deserts, betrays, or is disloyal to an organisation, country, or set of principles; a turncoat, a traitor;
•a person who abandons or turns his back on an activity, way of life etc;
•a person who rejects authority and control or behaves in an unconventional manner; a rebel, a nonconformist.
The word 'renegade' appears to be used as an adjective in the phrase 'a renegade unionist'. The online Oxford English dictionary definitions of renegade as an adjective include: 'having treacherously changed allegiance; rebel'.
The defendant submits that the pleaded imputation is not sufficiently precise. The defendant asks: 'What is "the union cause" when it is a term not raised by the article? Is it the unstated principles of the entire union movement; or the written rules; or those rules, whether stated or unstated, of just the CFMEU?'
The imputation is ambiguous in so far as it is not clear whether 'the union cause' refers to the cause of the CFMEU or of trade unionism. An ordinary reader might understand 'the union cause' to refer to the aim, object or purpose of the CFMEU or trade unionism.
The imputation does not identify the cause, that is the aim, object or purpose, of the CFMEU or trade unionism. The objection that the imputation is insufficiently precise raises questions about the degree of specificity needed in pleading. The necessary degree of precision is a matter of judgment. In Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135 Gleeson CJ said:
Almost any attribution of an act or condition to a person is capable of both further refinement and further generalisation. In any given case a judgment needs to be made as to the degree of particularity or generality which is appropriate to the occasion, and as to what constitutes the necessary specificity. If a problem arises, the solution will usually be found in considerations of practical justice rather than philology (137).
Gleeson CJ said that it is to avoid confusion and uncertainty that the requirement of specificity is directed and the practical content of the requirement for specificity is to be determined in that light (140).
The defendant's complaint is that imputation 5(a) lacks clarity because the words 'the union cause' are ambiguous. If so, that deficiency flows from the words published. It was the defendant who used the words 'renegade unionist' to describe the plaintiff. This is not a case where other parts of the article limit the meaning of the word 'unionist' in that phrase.
The defendant submits that the article does not refer to any conduct by the plaintiff that a reasonable reader would consider to be contrary to union principles or to give rise to the notion that he had 'deserted the union cause'. The article says that the plaintiff is 'a renegade unionist'. That imputation is at a high level of generality. Sometimes an attribution of an act or condition to a person is capable of further refinement. However, in this case it is reasonably arguable that it is not. To the extent that the article says that the plaintiff has deserted or been disloyal to an organisation or set of principles the article does not say whether the organisation is the CFMEU or trade unionism as a whole or whether the plaintiff has deserted or been disloyal to the principles of the CFMEU or trade unionism as a whole.
The defendant says that there is nothing in the remainder of the article which conveys to the reader that the plaintiff has deserted or been disloyal to the CFMEU or the union movement. That misses the point. The plaintiff says that the first sentence of the article conveys the meaning that he has deserted the union cause. If it does it is not to the point that no other part of the article conveys the same meaning.
A publication may convey a bane and antidote, that is, a possible defamatory meaning is removed by other parts of the publication so that no defamatory sting is conveyed by the publication overall. In this case it might be argued that the possible defamatory meaning of 'renegade unionist' is removed by the rest of the article. The defendant says that the rest of the article does not refer to any conduct by the plaintiff that a reasonable reader would consider to be contrary to any principles or to give rise to the notion that he had deserted the union cause. The defendant says that the article refers to conduct of the plaintiff consistent with faithful membership of the union. The article refers to the plaintiff's bid to win control of a powerful union in a democratic election and to the plaintiff's complaints about other members breaching union rules.
There may be cases in which it is open to a judge to consider that the alleged antidote so obviously extinguishes the alleged bane that there is no issue which can properly be left to a jury. But that would be a rare situation. Only in the clearest of cases would it be proper for a judge to rule that the sting of words, which are capable of a defamatory meaning, is drawn by the surrounding contexts so that in the result those words cease to be capable of a defamatory meaning. In general, though not as an invariable rule, the matter should be left for the jury and not for the judge to decide on a strike out application: Sergi v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1983) 2 NSWLR 669, 670 (Hutley JA), 674 (Glass JA); Cruise v Express Newspapers Plc (1999) QB 931, 939 - 941, (Brooke LJ, Sir John Knox and Stewart‑Smith LJ agreeing).
In this case, the defamatory sting of the words 'renegade unionist' is not so clearly removed by the rest of the article that the article taken as a whole is incapable of conveying the meaning that the plaintiff was a renegade unionist in the sense of a person who deserted or was disloyal to the union or unionism.
The question on a strike out application is not whether the article bears the meaning alleged by the plaintiff. The question is whether the meaning alleged by the plaintiff falls within the range of legitimate meanings. It is a matter of impression of what a jury could sensibly think the words 'renegade unionist' in the context of the article as a whole meant. The meaning that the plaintiff deserted the union cause is within the legitimate range of meanings. Imputation 5(a) should not be struck out.
Imputation 5(c) ‑ a unionist who is an outlaw, meaning thereby a unionist who was a habitual criminal
The defendant submits that this meaning is not reasonably capable of being conveyed by the article. There is no reference in the article to any criminal behaviour by the plaintiff. Further, the defendant says the imputation is embarrassing because it offers a meaning to the prologue of the imputation. The defendant says that it is embarrassing to include the imputations that the plaintiff is an outlaw and the plaintiff is a habitual criminal within the same imputation.
The plaintiff submits that the original and best known meaning of renegade, when used as a noun, is a person who deserts his party, cause or faith for another. However, the plaintiff says that renegade has another quite separate meaning of 'outlaw'. The plaintiff says that this meaning appears to have originated in the USA. The plaintiff then says that outlaw is also a word that has more than one meaning but 'the primary present meaning of outlaw' is habitual criminal. The plaintiff submits that the allegation that the plaintiff was a 'renegade unionist' would therefore be understood by many readers of the article to mean that the plaintiff was an outlaw and therefore a criminal.
It is not legitimate to derive the meaning of a word that forms part of a phrase by substituting for it a synonym of a synonym. Nor is it legitimate to frame an imputation by that process. Different words that are similar in meaning may be synonyms in one usage but not in others. The danger that a synonym for a synonym of a word may not have the same meaning as the original word is heightened when, as here, the original word and the synonyms are different parts of speech.
The same word may have a different usage in different parts of the English speaking world. The authors of the 11th edition of Gatley on Libel and Slander say at [3.28] that it is 'current, general usage which should be looked to in determining meaning and the jury should take into account the current general usage of the words'. The authors say:
Similarly, the law has to take into account that English words have different meanings in different places, though nowadays the 'internationalisation' of television, films and advertising has probably given the ordinary person a fairly wide knowledge of, say, American and Australian colloquial English. The question of whether a slang expression has become of part of ordinary usage is a matter of degree. If the expression has not become part of ordinary usage it may still be defamatory because the meaning was known to those to whom the words were addressed, but in this case it will be an innuendo and the claimant will have to prove publication to persons who had knowledge of the meaning of the expression so that they could have understood it in the defamatory sense [3.28].
The question is not whether 'outlaw' is a meaning of 'renegade' and whether 'habitual criminal' is a meaning of 'outlaw'. The question on this application is whether the article is capable of conveying the meaning that the plaintiff is, or was, a habitual criminal. That is not the natural and ordinary meaning of the words 'renegade unionist' in contemporary Australia. At the core of the meaning of the word 'renegade' is the notion of a person who is disloyal to or deserts his cause, religion, organisation or group. It might be that in a particular context the word 'renegade' may connote being a criminal or an outlaw. However, there is nothing in the context in which the words 'renegade unionist' appears that gives rise to that meaning. The imputation that the plaintiff is a habitual criminal can only emerge as the product of some strained or forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation of the article. It is not enough to say that some person might understand the words in that sense. 'Mere conjectures which some person might possibly, though unreasonably, form are not enough': Gatley [3.24]. The article is not reasonably capable of giving rise to the imputation pleaded. The imputation should be struck out.
Imputation 5(b) ‑ a unionist who rejected the constraints of the law
The defendant objects to this imputation on two grounds. The first ground is that the imputation is incapable of being conveyed. The second ground is that the term 'rejected the constraints of the law' is vague and embarrassing.
The plaintiff submits that one meaning of renegade is a person who has rejected the constraints of the law. The plaintiff submits that this meaning is intermediate between the two main meanings of 'renegade' which give rise to imputations 5(a) and 5(c).
I agree with both of the defendant's grounds of objection. The imputation is too vague. Its meaning is uncertain. The uncertainty does not arise from the words published by the defendant. The defendant does not refer to the plaintiff having rejected the constraints of the law.
The natural and ordinary meaning of 'renegade unionist' in contemporary Australia is not a person who has rejected the constraints of the law. There is nothing in the article which could be understood by a reasonable reader to mean that the plaintiff had rejected the constraints of the law. Imputation 5(b) will be struck out.
Imputation 6 ‑ innuendo meaning: involved in illegal activity
Paragraph 6 of the statement of claim pleads in the alternative, that by way of innuendo, the words 'renegade unionist' meant and were understood to mean a unionist who was accused of being involved in illegal activity. The following 'particulars of innuendo' are then given:
(a)The word 'renegade' has the alternative meanings in American English of:
i.a person who has rejected the constraints of the law;
ii.an 'outlaw', thereby meaning a habitual criminal;
which meanings were known to many readers of the said article.
(b)Newspapers and news organisations in Australia, including The West Australian, had, on numerous occasions prior to 3 September 2008, referred to certain unions, union activity and/or unionists (including unions and unionists in the construction industry) as 'renegade' in circumstances where those unions and/or unionists were accused of illegal activity or were known to have been accused of illegal activity.
(c)By reason of the use of the word 'renegade' in the context as particularised in 6(b) above, it was widely understood by those who read such newspapers and/or were aware of such news reports that a reference, in a newspaper or in a news report in Australia, to a 'renegade' union, to 'renegade' union activity, or to a specific 'renegade' union member, meant and was intended to mean that such union and/or unionist was accused of being involved in illegal activity
(d)these matters were known to many readers of the said article.
Subjoined to particular (b) are further particulars that are described as 'particulars of newspaper and news organisation references to "renegade" unions and/or unionists in the context of allegations of illegal activity'. Those particulars consist of passages from articles published in the following news editions of the following newspapers or websites: Daily Telegraph 10 July 2001, WA Business News 16 September 2003, The Age.com.au website on 6 June 2004, The West.com.au website on 19 June 2007, The West Australian newspaper on 19 or 20 June 2007, ABC Online 8 April 2008.
Where the plaintiff alleges a meaning by way of innuendo, that is that the words complained of were used in a defamatory sense other than their ordinary meaning, he must give particulars of the facts and matters on which he relies in support of that sense: Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia 1971 (WA) O 20 r 13A(1).
These facts or matters will generally incorporate either a special definition of the words known only to a limited class of persons … or facts extrinsic to the publication which, if known about, affect the way the words complained of are understood. In either case, the plaintiff must identify the person or persons to whom the words were published and who are alleged to have had knowledge of the special meaning or the extrinsic facts: Gatley on Libel and Slander (11th ed) [28.22] and footnote 89.
Paragraph 6 of the statement of claim pleads a special definition of the words 'renegade unionist'. It does not plead facts extrinsic to the article which, if known about, affect the way the words complained of are understood.
The particulars pleaded in [6] are both insufficient and impermissible. Particular (a) pleads alternative meanings of the word 'renegade' but neither of them are the meaning which gives rise to the imputation pleaded in [6], that is 'a unionist who was accused of being involved in illegal activity'. The plaintiff identifies two alternative meanings of the word 'renegade'. If the word has two alternative meanings then the plaintiff should plead two, alternative, imputations. In its present form it is embarrassing. The defendant, and the court, does not know which meaning is relied upon to establish the imputation. Furthermore, as I have said, neither of the alternative meanings is the same as the meaning in the imputation pleaded.
Particular (b) pleads five articles unrelated to the article complained of in which the words 'renegade union' or 'renegade unionist' were used. The plaintiff argues, in effect, that in the context of each of those articles the words 'renegade union' and 'renegade unionist' meant a union and a unionist that, or who, was accused of being involved in illegal activity. That is an impermissible form of pleading and argument. The plaintiff cannot establish that the words 'renegade unionist' have the meaning submitted in the article complained of because in other unrelated publications it can be seen from the context of those publications that the words 'renegade unionist' bore the alleged meaning. To permit the plaintiff to give evidence of the use of the relevant words in a prior publication and argue that the context of the prior publication shows that the words there bore the pleaded meaning would give rise to a multiplicity of issues. The jury would have to determine the meaning of the words in the other publications. The defendant might then lead evidence of other publications and argue that the context of those publications shows that the words bear a different meaning. Such a process would be productive of endless collateral issues. It is for the jury to determine the meaning of the words complained of based upon their ordinary knowledge and experience.
This is not a case where the plaintiff pleads that the word 'renegade' has some slang or colloquial meaning. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not identified the persons to whom the words were published who knew of the special meaning.
Particulars (c) and (d) relate to particular (b) and do not advance the plaintiff's case any further. Accordingly, the particulars are insufficient to make out the pleading in [6]. Paragraph 6 should be struck out. If the plaintiff wishes to plead that 'renegade' has some special meaning known to a particular group of people then his pleading must identify that special meaning and the persons to whom the special meaning is known.
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7 of the statement of claim pleads that the plaintiff has been defamed and has suffered distress, hurt to his feelings, embarrassment and illness. Further, [7] pleads that the plaintiff has been damaged in his trade as a crane driver and as a union member and shop steward and in his attempts to be elected as a paid union official. The plaintiff gives particulars of damage. The particulars include:
(h)by reason of the defamation, the plaintiff's ongoing and future employment prospects have been diminished
(i)by reason of the defamation, the plaintiff's immediate and ongoing prospects for election as a paid union official of the CFMEU (WA Branch) and/or the CFMEUW and to thereby influence the said unions have been diminished.
The defendants submit that [7] and particulars (h) and (i) plead that the plaintiff has been hurt in his trade and in his prospects of being elected as a paid union official. The defendant submits that to do so introduces irrelevancies to the issue that ought be struck out. The defendant submits that to be defamatory of a person means to injure their reputation, rather than their business, trade or profession as such: Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16; (2009) 238 CLR 460; (2009) 83 ALJR 654; O'Hara v Simms [2009] QCA 186 at [37].
Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton raised questions as to whether the general test for defamation has application to imputations concerning a person's business or professional reputation, or whether it is limited to those concerning the character or conduct of that person and whether injury to a person's business or professional reputation is to be judged having regard to different considerations. Their Honours emphasised the difference between the cause of action for defamation and the cause of action for injurious falsehood and that a publication will be defamatory only if it injures the person's reputation. However, their Honours did not hold that a person may not be defamed in his business reputation. French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ said:
It is not in dispute that persons may be defamed in their business reputation. The common law has for some time recognised that words may not only reflect adversely upon a person's private character, but may injure a person in his or her office, profession, business or trade. This may be so where the words reflect upon the person's fitness or ability to undertake what is necessary to that business, profession or trade. But in each case the injury spoken of is that to the person’s reputation.
The remedy which the law provides for injury to a person's business or professional reputation must be distinguished from that for malicious statements which result in damage not to the reputation but to the business or goods of a person. The former is provided by an action for defamation, the latter by that for injurious falsehood. Lord Esher MR explained the distinction in South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd. A false statement that a wine merchant's wine is not good, which is intended to and does cause loss to the wine merchant's business, is an injurious (or 'malicious') falsehood. A statement reflecting upon that person's judgment about the selection of wine, and therefore upon the conduct of his business, may be defamatory of him. Gummow J observed in Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons that the action for injurious falsehood is more closely allied to an action for deceit [10] ‑ [11]. (footnotes omitted)
In O'Hara v Sims, Mr O'Hara brought an action for damages for defamation against Mr Sims arising out of a letter published by Mr Sims to the members of the Gold Coast Turf Club in October 2007 during the election for membership of the Committee of the Turf Club. Keane JA said that counsel for the plaintiff had rightly conceded that ordinary reasonable people would not necessarily think less of Mr O'Hara simply because the letter was apt to lead members of the Turf Club to prefer another candidate for office as a member of the Committee [37]. His Honour said that in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton the members of the High Court emphasised the difference between the cause of action for defamation and the cause of action for injurious falsehood and that a publication will be defamatory only if it damages a person's reputation. Keane JA said that the 'difference between disparagement of, and damage to, Mr O'Hara's candidacy on the one hand, and damage to his reputation in the eyes of ordinary and reasonable members of the community must be borne steadily in mind' [38].
The two particulars of [7] of the statement of claim that are attacked by the defendant relate to the diminution in the plaintiff's employment prospects and the diminution in his prospects for election as a paid union official. The publication complained of is not necessarily defamatory of the plaintiff merely because it lessens his prospects of obtaining employment as a crane driver or election as a paid union official. However, the publication is defamatory of the plaintiff if an ordinary reasonable person would think less of him because of what was said about him in the publication. If the publication is defamatory of the plaintiff and caused a diminution in his future employment prospects that is likely to be productive of loss to the plaintiff then that is relevant to his claim for damages.
The plaintiff need not allege that actual damage has resulted from the publication complained of. The law presumes that some damage will flow in the ordinary course of things from the defamation. 'However, where the plaintiff claims to have suffered an injury going beyond the normal damage which is presumed to follow in the ordinary course from a defamatory publication, he must give particulars of the facts and matters relied upon in support of that claim': Gatley (11th ed) [28.28]. Where the plaintiff claims to have 'suffered financial loss, he must allege such damage, including a general falling off of business, with reasonable particularity, otherwise he will not be able to give evidence of such damage at the trial': Gatley (11th ed) [28.29]. Where the plaintiff alleges that as a result of the defamatory publication his prospects of obtaining employment have been diminished and that is likely to be productive of loss to him then he must plead that damage.
The first sentence of [7] of the statement of claim pleads that 'the plaintiff has been seriously defamed and has suffered acute distress, hurt to his feelings, embarrassment and illness'. The second sentence pleads that the plaintiff has been damaged in his trade as a crane driver and as a union member and shop steward and in his attempts to be elected as a trade union official. Particulars (h) and (i) refer to the diminution in the plaintiff's employment prospects and his prospects for election as a paid union official by reason of the defamation. Paragraph 7 of the statement of claim means that the plaintiff has been defamed in the sense that an ordinary reasonable person would think less of him because of what was said about him. The remainder of [7] is concerned with the loss and damage the plaintiff has suffered as a result of that injury to his reputation. The loss and damage includes acute distress, hurt to his feelings, embarrassment, illness and diminution in his prospects of obtaining employment as a crane driver and as a paid union official.
A publication is not defamatory of a person merely because it diminishes his prospects of obtaining employment or his prospects of being elected. In Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that persons may be defamed in their business reputation. That is different from being defamed in their business in the sense that a publication has caused injury to a person's business. Paragraph 7 and particulars (h) and (i) do not plead that the plaintiff has been defamed in his trade as a train driver or as a union member and shop steward. I decline to strike out [7].
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