Mcinerney v Hest Australia Ltd No. DCCIV-97-299 Judgment No. D3753

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VALERIE MARGARET MCINERNEY v HEST AUSTRALIA LTD

Civil
Judge Lunn

The defendant is the trustee of the Health Employees Superannuation Trust Australia, and is sued in that capacity.  The plaintiff was a beneficiary of this trust by virtue of having been employed by Anglican Community Services as a nurse’s assistant at the Karingal Nursing Home at Welland where she worked between about 13 October 1989 and June 1990.  The defendant took out an insurance policy with National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (“National Mutual”) for the benefit of the members of the trust.  The terms of that policy are contained in a proposal document (“the proposal”).

The plaintiff alleges that she was injured in the course of her employment in June 1990 and has been unfit for any work ever since.  In this action she seeks declarations, and consequential relief, that she is entitled to certain benefits as a member of the trust under the proposal because she has become “totally and permanently disabled” within the meaning of the proposal.  It was common ground that she could only be entitled to such benefits if she was a “Full Time Employee” as defined in the proposal.  By consent, a Master made an order for the trial of the preliminary issue of whether she was a “Full Time Employee”.  Counsel agreed this meant that I had to determine whether she was entitled to the relief sought in para 15(a) of the Statement of Claim, namely “a declaration that the plaintiff is and was at all material times a full time employee within the meaning of the Rules”.  It was agreed that for these purposes the “Rules” meant the proposal.  As will be seen later the issue arising under the third schedule of the proposal is slightly narrower in that it is whether the plaintiff was a full time employee at the time of becoming totally and permanently disabled.  Regrettably, the preliminary issue was not defined with sufficient precision by the order of 20 October 1997.

At the outset I indicated that I was not prepared to consider granting any declaratory relief unless all parties who may be affected by the declaration in the plaintiff obtaining any payment under the policy were before the Court: Associated Grocers Ltd v Hubbard Properties Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 321. Although National Mutual is not a party to the action, I am informed that it has agreed to be bound by my decision. The plaintiff was content with this and did not seek that it be made a party to the action in order to bind it to the result.

Under clause 14(a) of the proposal it is to be governed and construed under the law of Victoria.  There is a rebuttable presumption that it is the same law as in this State: Wright Heaton & Co v Barrett (1892) 13 LR NSW (L) 206  Nothing was put forward to suggest that it differed from the applicable law in this State.  I decide the matter…

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Details
Case
[1998] SADC 3953
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mcinerney v Hest Australia Ltd, numbered DCCIV-97-299 and Judgment No. D3753, involves Valerie Margaret Mcinerney, the plaintiff, who was a beneficiary of the Health Employees Superannuation Trust Australia. Mcinerney was employed by Anglican Community Services as a nurse’s assistant at Karingal Nursing Home at Welland between October 13, 1989, and June 1990. The defendant, Hest Australia Ltd, is the trustee of the superannuation trust and was insured by National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd. Mcinerney claims she became "totally and permanently disabled" in June 1990 and seeks benefits under the insurance policy, contingent on her status as a "Full Time Employee" as defined in the policy proposal. The court's task was to determine whether Mcinerney met the definition of a "Full Time Employee" at the relevant time, specifically six months after her injury.

The primary legal issue was whether Mcinerney qualified as a "Full Time Employee" under the proposal's definition, which stipulates that such an employee must be employed to work at least 30 hours per week. The court had to interpret the phrase "at least 30 hours per week" and determine if Mcinerney's employment met this criterion at the time of her disability. This required an assessment of the terms of her employment rather than the actual hours she worked post-injury.

The court examined the proposal's definition and the context in which it was used, noting that "at least" generally means exactly the specified amount unless the context dictates otherwise. The court found that the phrase "at least 30 hours per week" was satisfied by Mcinerney's employment to work exactly 30 hours per week, rejecting the defendant's argument that it required more than 30 hours. The court also considered the relevant Industrial Award which governed the employment contract and found that Mcinerney's employment terms, including meal breaks, did not alter her status as a full-time employee. Thus, the court concluded that Mcinerney was indeed a "Full Time Employee" at the relevant time.

The court granted a declaration that Mcinerney was a "Full Time Employee" at the relevant time and ordered that the action be referred back to a Master for further directions to resolve the remaining issues. The court noted that it had not yet addressed these issues.

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