McGuire v DPP - [2001] VSC 11

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 6601 of 2000

DANIELLE MCGUIRE	Plaintiff
V
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS and COUNTY COURT		Defendant

---

JUDGE:	HEDIGAN, J.
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	5 December 2000
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	6 February 2001
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	McGuire v. DPP & Anor
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2001] VSC 11

---

Application for judicial review pursuant to Order 56 of the Supreme Court Rules – General principles applicable.

Trial – Application by co-accused to change guilty plea to plea of not guilty – Application refused – Order 56 applying to quash order and permit change of plea – Even if application properly based, no error by trial judge.

---

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Mr P. Tehan, Q.C.	Randles Cooper & Co
For the Defendant	Mr D. Trapnell	Victorian Government Solicitor

HIS HONOUR:

The proceeding before me is the hearing of an amended originating motion commenced pursuant to the provisions of Order 56 of the Rules of this Court arising from the refusal by a judge of the County Court of Victoria of an application made on behalf of the plaintiff Danielle Leigh McGuire, the plaintiff herein, for leave to change her pleas of guilty to three counts on presentment by the Director of Public Prosecutions concerning breaches by her of offences under the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 to pleas of not guilty. The remedies and relief sought by the plaintiff pursuant to the originating motion in respect of the County Court's refusal of the application for a plea change are four in number: (1) an order in the nature of certiorari that the order and determination of the County Court to refuse be quashed; (2) an order in the nature of prohibition to direct the Court that it not proceed upon the pleas of guilty entered by the plaintiff on arraignment in respect of the three offences on 13 June 2000 upon presentment C9800747.1; (3) an order in the nature of mandamus directing that the County Court provide re-arraignment of the plaintiff. I pause to state that mandamus does not lie in respect of the exercise of a discretionary power by a court. Mr Tehan, Q.C. who appeared for the plaintiff, accepted the correctness of this and it is not necessary for me to refer to the mandamus aspect again; (4) declarations that it would constitute a miscarriage of justice to proceed upon a plea of guilty in the case of the accused not intending to admit guilt or not appreciating the nature of the charge.

On the hearing of the motion on behalf of the plaintiff, the second defendant, the County Court, did not appear to present argument, adopting the conventional position of abiding the decision of the Court on the application.

I proceed to give a necessarily abbreviated description of the principal facts that underwrite the application made to this Court. The plaintiff McGuire and one Tyson James Young was jointly presented by the Director…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading McGuire v DPP

Details

AGLC: McGuire v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] VSC 11
Case: [2001] VSC 11
Decision Date: 6 February 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

McGuire was the applicant in a case brought before the court for judicial review. The matter involved a challenge to the decision of a trial judge who had refused the applicant's application to change his plea from guilty to not guilty. The application for review was brought pursuant to Order 56 of the Supreme Court Rules. The primary issue before the court was whether the trial judge had erred in refusing the application to change the plea. Additionally, the court considered whether the trial judge had properly applied Order 56 to quash the order and permit the change of plea.

The court examined the trial judge's decision and concluded that, even if the application had been properly based, there was no error in the trial judge's refusal to permit the change of plea. The court determined that the trial judge had correctly exercised their discretion under Order 56 and had not acted in a way that constituted a legal error. The court found that the trial judge's decision was well within the bounds of reasonable discretion and was not an error of law. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

In light of the court's findings, the application for judicial review was dismissed, and the orders of the trial judge were affirmed. The court found no error in the trial judge's application of Order 56 and held that the refusal to permit the change of plea was within the trial judge's discretion. The applicant's application for judicial review was accordingly dismissed with no orders made in favour of the applicant.

Orders