McGrouther v Commissioner of Taxation

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McGrouther v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 1102

Citation: McGrouther v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 1102
Parties: TOD MCGROUTHER and VICKIE ISABELLE MCGROUTHER v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: NSD 687 of 2014
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 14 October 2014
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal against appealable objection decision pursuant to Pt IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“TAA”) – application for strike out or summary dismissal for want of jurisdiction, no reasonable cause of action or no reasonable prospects of success – whether jurisdiction to entertain appeal from appealable objection decision is enlivened by Pt IVC of the TAA – whether taxation objection disallowed by operation of s 14ZYA(3) – whether taxpayer who gave notice under s 14ZYA can withdraw such notice

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – estoppel – common assumption as between taxpayer and Commissioner that a notice under s 14ZYA of the TAA can be withdrawn – detrimental reliance by Commissioner – whether estoppel can suspend operation of s 14ZYA of the TAA

Legislation: Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 14ZY, 14ZYA, 14ZZC, 14ZZN
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 264
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 29
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33
Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 3) (Cth) 1991  
Cases cited:

Boal Quay Wharfingers Ltd v King’s Lynn Conservancy Board [1971] 1 WLR 1558 cited
Christie v Neaves (2001) 113 FCR 279 cited
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995–1997) 187 CLR 384 cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Wade (1951) 84 CLR 105 cited
Higgs v Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 2 FCR 556
McLaren v Deputy Commissioner for Taxation (2001) 46 ATR 421 considered
Re Federal Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Australena Investments Pty Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 577 cited
Uniden Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (1997) 74 FCR 190 cited

Sorensen H, “Part IVC: The New Objection Procedure” (1992) Vol 27 (No 4) Taxation in Australia 204  

Date of hearing: 1 October 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr THJ Hyde Page
Solicitor for the Applicants: Dormer Stanhope
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr SB Lloyd SC with Ms KC Morgan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 687 of 2014

BETWEEN:

TOD MCGROUTHER
First Applicant

VICKIE ISABELLE MCGROUTHER
Second Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 OCTOBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The orders sought in paras 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the interlocutory application filed 4 August 2014 be dismissed.

2.The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 687 of 2014

BETWEEN:

TOD…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read McGrouther v Commissioner of Taxation and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McGrouther v Commissioner of Taxation involved the applicants, McGrouther and his wife, contesting the disallowance of their objections against notices of amended assessment of income tax and notices of assessment of shortfall penalty issued by the Commissioner of Taxation. The primary legal issue was whether the disallowance of the applicants' objections was validly effected by the operation of section 14ZYA(3) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), which provides for the disallowance of an objection if the Commissioner fails to make a decision within 60 days of receiving a notice under section 14ZYA(2). Another issue was whether the Commissioner could rely on an estoppel argument, given a common assumption between the parties that the s 14ZYA notices could be withdrawn, to prevent the disallowance of the objections.

The court found that the disallowance of the objections was correctly made by operation of section 14ZYA(3) as the Commissioner did not make a decision on the objections within the required timeframe. The court further held that the statutory scheme under the TAA did not contain an implied power or right for a person to withdraw or revoke a notice under section 14ZYA. Additionally, the court rejected the Commissioner’s estoppel argument, stating that no conduct on the part of the applicants could operate as an estoppel against the operation of the TAA.

As a result, the court dismissed the orders sought by the Commissioner in paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the interlocutory application and ordered the Commissioner to pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application. The court proposed to stay the proceedings in accordance with the order sought in paragraph 3 of the interlocutory application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The orders sought in paras 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the interlocutory application filed 4 August 2014 be dismissed.

2. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants contend that the disallowance of their objections occurred as a result of the operation of s 14ZYA(3) of the TAA, while the Commissioner contends that he is not deemed to have made an objection decision pursuant to s 14ZYA(3) of the TAA because notices given by the applicants pursuant to s 14ZYA(2) of the TAA were withdrawn.FACTUAL BACKGROUND The factual background is not in dispute.Assessments and Objections On dates ranging from 9 to 12 November 2012, the Commissioner issued notices of amended assessment of income tax and notices of assessment of shortfall penalty to the applicants for the years of income ended 30 June 2000 to 30 June 2007 inclusive. On 2 January 2013, the applicants lodged objections against the assessments (“objections”). Over 14 months later, on 10 March 2014, the Commissioner served a notice on the first applicant pursuant to s 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“the 1936 Act”) requiring him to attend an examination on 11 April 2014. Evidence was filed in support of the Commissioner’s interlocutory application that his purpose in issuing the s 264 notice was to gather evidence concerning the applicants and their associated entities to assist the Commissioner in determining the objections, but no details of the evidence sought were provided. On 12 March 2014, the applicants served notices on the Commissioner pursuant to s 14ZYA(2) of the TAA in relation to the objections (“s 14ZYA notices”). On 26 March 2014, the applicants’ solicitors wrote to the Commissioner in relation to the proposed s 264 examination alleging that it was being conducted for improper purposes. On 28 March 2014, the Commissioner wrote to the applicants’ solicitors in response and advised that the examination would proceed on the appointed day, namely, 11 April 2014. Judicial Review Proceedings On 7 April 2014, the applicants’ solicitors informed the Commissioner that the first applicant intended to commence judicial review proceedings in relation to the proposed s 264 examination. They also wrote to the Commissioner’s solicitors on 7 April 2014 requesting that the s 264 examination be deferred until after the final determination of the proposed judicial review proceedings. On 8 April 2014, the Commissioner’s solicitors wrote to the applicants’ solicitors advising that any deferral of the s 264 examination would be subject to a condition that the first applicant withdraw his s 14ZYA notice. On 9 April 2014, the respective solicitors exchanged email correspondence in relation to the form of words of the proposed withdrawal of the s 14ZYA notice. On 9 April 2014, the respective solicitors conversed and Ms Whan of the Commissioner’s solicitors said words to the following effect: “I’m instructed that Vickie served a s 14ZYA notice as well as Tod. We need Vickie to withdraw her notice as well”. Later on 9 April 2014, the respective solicitors exchanged email correspondence about the requirement for the second applicant to withdraw her s 14ZYA notice.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The present (Pt IVC) proceedings were commenced on 10 July 2014. This was the 60th day after 11 May 2014, the latter date being the end of the period of 60 days after the day (12 March 2014) on which the Commissioner was given the s 14ZYA notices.OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS ON THE EVIDENCE The delay within the ATO in arriving at a decision on the objections has been considerable. As noted in [7] above, over 14 months elapsed from the time the objections were lodged on 2 January 2013 to the time that the s 264 notice was served on the first applicant on 10 March 2014; and there has been no subsequent decision on the objections absent their deemed disallowance by operation of s 14ZYA(3) on 11 May 2014. No evidence was put on by the Commissioner to explain the delay: cf., Re Federal Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Australena Investments Pty Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 577. Indeed, by email communication sent on 7 May 2012 from the ATO Case Officer to the applicants’ tax agent (Ex B) it was stated: “We are endeavouring to have responses to you by … 1 October 2013”, and on that latter date a further email communication was sent in the following terms:Both objections have been progressed significantly and are close to being finalised, currently they are in final checking with senior officers however there has been a delay there. We aim to have them to you by the beginning of November, if not earlier. My review of all the evidence filed in support of and in opposition to this interlocutory application leads me to make the following findings:(1)The only reason the applicants agreed to withdraw the s 14ZYA notices was to secure the Commissioner’s agreement to defer the s 264 examination of the first applicant.(2)The only reason the Commissioner has brought this interlocutory application is to try and preserve for himself the opportunity to examine the first applicant pursuant to the s 264 notice, or pursuant to a new s 264 notice if the existing one is held to be invalid, free of any risk of being in contempt of Court. Section 14ZY(3) of the TAA requires the Commissioner to serve on the person lodging the objection written notice of the Commissioner’s objection decision. Although it is far from being clearly expressed in s 14ZY or s 14ZYA, presumably it was intended that the s 14ZY(3) duty also apply in respect of a disallowance of an objection arising by operation of s 14ZYA(3). The Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 3) 1991 (Cth) circulated by the authority of the Treasurer of the day when the Bill was in the Senate, says as much (at 2, 3):If the Commissioner has not made a decision on the objection within 60 days of receiving a notice under subsection 14ZYA(2), the Commissioner is deemed to have made a decision under subsection 14ZY(1) to disallow the objection. The Commissioner will then be required to serve a notice of the objection decision on the person under subsection 14ZY(3).The significance of the service of an objection decision notice is this: s 14ZZN of the TAA provides:An appeal to the Federal Court against an objection decision must be lodged with the Court within 60 days after the person appealing is served with notice of the decision.See, too, s 29 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) as amended by s 14ZZC of the TAA.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Commissioner further submitted that he and the applicants adopted a common assumption that the s 14ZYA notices could and would be withdrawn, that the withdrawal would be effective and that no deemed disallowance of the objections would therefore arise by reason of s 14ZYA(3). He submitted that in reliance upon the common assumption, the Deputy Commissioner agreed to postpone the s 264 examination of the first applicant until after the determination of the judicial review proceedings. The Deputy Commissioner, on behalf of the Commissioner, thereby altered his position to his detriment in that, if he had not relied upon that common assumption, the Commissioner would have proceeded to conduct the s 264 examination pursuant to the notice in order that such examination be completed sufficiently within the 60 day period to allow the Commissioner to use any information obtained to make an objection decision. So much may be accepted. However, as Kitto J said in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Wade (1951) 84 CLR 105 at 117:No conduct on the part of the commissioner could operate as an estoppel against the operation of the Act: cf. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Brookes [(1915) A.C. 788 at pp 491, 492]; Maritime Electric Co., Ltd. v. General Dairies, Ltd [(1937) A.C. 610].The reference to “the Act” was, of course, a reference to the 1936 Act, but it equally follows that no conduct on the part of the applicants could operate as an estoppel against the operation of the TAA.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that s 14ZYA is not to be construed as containing an implied power or right, on the part of the person giving the s 14ZYA notice, to withdraw or revoke it. I therefore propose to dismiss the orders sought in paras 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the interlocutory application and order that the Commissioner pay the applicants’ costs of that application. At the time of pronouncing those orders, I will hear the parties as to why these proceedings should be stayed in accordance with the order sought in para 3 of the interlocutory application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established