FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McGrath v HNSW Pty Limited (No 2) [2015] FCA 442
Citation: McGrath v HNSW Pty Limited (No 2) [2015] FCA 442 Parties: JOHN ALBERT BRUCE MCGRATH and VICKY ELIZABETH MCGRATH v HNSW PTY LTD, HORWATH MOTOR INDUSTRY SERVICES PTY LTD ACN 104 833 556 , DAVID ARTHUR COWPER, WAYNE KENNETH PEARSON and STAVROULA PAPADATOS File number: NSD 1867 of 2012 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 12 May 2015 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to set aside notice to produce – where discovery given of agreed categories of documents – where respondents sought certain documents to be included by discovery but applicants opposed inclusion – where respondents did not press for documents to be included in discovery order – whether documents satisfy apparent relevance test – whether notice to produce is abuse of process as impermissible substitute for application for further discovery – notice to produce not an abuse of process – documents sought relevant to question of loss suffered by applicants – application dismissed – Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 30.28(1) Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 30.28(1) Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Shell [1999] FCA 212; (1999) 161 ALR 686
Azzi v Volvo [2006] NSWSC 283
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd v BlueScope Steel Ltd [2010] FCA 739
Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 61
Diddams v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] FCA 497
Lucas Industries Ltd v Hewitt (1978) 18 ALR 555
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 5) [2005] FCA 510; (2005) 216 ALR 147
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) [1989] FCA 248; (1989) 88 ALR 90Date of hearing: 21 April 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 39 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr AP Spencer and Mr D Krochmalik Solicitor for the Applicants: MatthewsFolbigg Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr SA Lawrance Solicitor for the Respondents: Allens
Table of Corrections 22 October 2015 In the cover sheet and in paragraph 24, “Diddams v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] FCA 9497” has been replaced with “Diddams v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] FCA 497”
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1867 of 2012
BETWEEN: JOHN ALBERT BRUCE MCGRATH
First ApplicantVICKY ELIZABETH MCGRATH
Second ApplicantAND: HNSW PTY LTD
First RespondentHORWATH MOTOR INDUSTRY SERVICES PTY LTD ACN 104 833 556
Second RespondentDAVID ARTHUR COWPER
Third RespondentWAYNE KENNETH PEARSON
Fourth RespondentSTAVROULA PAPADATOS
Fifth Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 MAY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application to set aside the notice to produce dated 12 March 2015 be dismissed with costs.
2.The notice to produce be made returnable on 11 June 2015 at 9.30 am.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 442
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the notice to produce was not an abuse of process. The notice sought the production of 13 specified documents, which was not oppressive in scope. The court also rejected the contention that an application for further discovery was the only appropriate application in this case. The court held that the notice to produce was an appropriate and convenient tool to seek the production of documents which the applicants were not willing to produce voluntarily. The court further held that the question of relevance was a matter of degree and that the documents sought had apparent relevance to the question of the loss, if any, suffered by the applicants as a result of the restructure transaction.
The court dismissed the application to set aside the notice to produce with costs and ordered that the notice to produce be made returnable on 11 June 2015 at 9.30 am.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application to set aside the notice to produce dated 12 March 2015 be dismissed with costs.
2. The notice to produce be made returnable on 11 June 2015 at 9.30 am.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 61, the Court set aside a notice to produce issued pursuant to rule 30.28. The notice was served shortly before the commencement of the trial in the matter. The notice required production of several broad categories of documents. The proceeding had been the subject of an extensive agreed discovery process as well as court ordered discovery. Collier J expressed the view that the “potential disruption of a trial by unduly proximate service of a Notice to Produce may be a determinative factor in considering an application to set aside the Notice” (at [7]). Her Honour found that the timing of the service of the notice to produce was unreasonable, particularly in light of orders for discovery that had been made six weeks earlier. The notice was set aside because her Honour was not satisfied that the documents were sufficiently relevant to justify production.Consideration None of the cases referred to above supports a conclusion that the notice to produce in this case is an abuse of process. The notice to produce makes a request for 13 specified documents (in contrast to the notice to produce in Azzi which was said at [7] to cast “a considerable burden” on its recipient). It is not oppressive in its scope, and it was not served at a disruptive or otherwise inconvenient time. I do not agree that an application for further (or supplementary) discovery was the only appropriate application in this case where specific documents are sought. The essence of discovery is that it places an obligation on the discovering party to decide whether documents in that party’s possession are discoverable because they relate to the issues in the proceeding: Lucas Industries Ltd v Hewitt (1978) 18 ALR 555 at 569. In this case, the respondents are not seeking an order that would require the applicants to make such a decision: they simply want to see particular documents which they contend are of apparent relevance and which the applicants had resisted providing by way of discovery. Nor are the respondents seeking to go behind an affidavit of discovery. It is common ground that the documents now sought did not fall within the ambit of the discovery ordered by consent. I also reject the contention that the parties’ agreement as to categories for discovery operates as any kind of bar on a respondent’s entitlement, in an appropriate case, to seek documents by notice to produce. Rule 30.28(1) provides no support for such a contention. In my view, the notice to produce was an appropriate and convenient tool to seek the production of documents which the applicants were not willing to produce voluntarily. Accordingly, I do not accept that the notice to produce is an abuse of process. Turning to the applicants’ contentions concerning the lack of relevance of the documents sought, apparent relevance is a matter of degree: Azzi at [6]. Here, the question is whether the documents sought have apparent relevance to the question of the loss, if any, suffered by the applicants as a result of the restructure transaction.