McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 3)

Case [2025] FCA 846


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 3) [2025] FCA 846  

File number(s): NSD 544 of 2025
Judgment of: JACKMAN J
Date of judgment: 21 July 2025
Catchwords:  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for disqualification on alternative grounds of apprehended and actual bias — application dismissed  
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Cases cited: McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 2) [2025] FCA 795
Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 3
Date of hearing: 21 July 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person

ORDERS

NSD 544 of 2025
BETWEEN:

SOPHIA MCGINN

Applicant

AND:

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JACKMAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for disqualification on the alternative grounds of actual and apparent bias be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript

JACKMAN J:

  1. The matter is listed before the Court today to deal with an interlocutory application dated 13 July 2025 in which Ms McGinn seeks an order to stay Orders 2 and 3, which I made on 3 July 2025. At the outset of the hearing, Ms McGinn applied for me to disqualify myself on the ground of apprehended bias from hearing the interlocutory application listed today, and on the ground of actual bias from hearing any aspect of these proceedings at all. As I indicated, in McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 2) [2025] FCA 795 at [7], the circumstances of the various hearings, which I conducted on 3 July 2025, appeared to me to raise a question whether the grounds might exist for the Court possibly to be satisfied that a vexatious proceedings order might be made against Ms McGinn under s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) with the effect of prohibiting Ms McGinn from instituting proceedings in the Court without first obtaining the leave of the Court.

  2. My state of mind was no different from that which I expressed at paragraph [7] of that judgment. Accordingly, I provided Ms McGinn with an opportunity to be heard in relation to whether the Court should make a vexatious proceedings order. I am not aware of any matter which would preclude me from hearing the stay application listed today, or any other issue arising in NSD544/2025. I do not have a personal interest in the matter, and I cannot see how a fair-minded observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the matter.

  3. Accordingly, I dismiss the application that I disqualify myself on the alternative grounds of actual and apparent bias.

I certify that the preceding three (3) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Jackman.

Associate:

Dated: 22 July 2025

Details
AGLC
McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 3) [2025] FCA 846
Case
[2025] FCA 846
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of Australia, the case of McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 3) arose between the applicant, McGinn, and the Court itself. The applicant sought the disqualification of a justice on the grounds of both apprehended and actual bias. The dispute centred on the perceived partiality of the justice in relation to matters that had come before the Court, specifically those involving the applicant's interests.

The central legal issues before the Court involved determining whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the justice had a bias that would prejudice the fair hearing of the case. The applicant argued that the justice's prior involvement in cases concerning McGinn created a situation where a reasonable observer might apprehend bias. Additionally, the applicant sought to establish that the justice's actions demonstrated actual bias.

In dismissing the application, the Court found no reasonable apprehension of bias existed based on the justice's prior involvement in cases involving McGinn. The Court emphasised the necessity of a strong evidentiary foundation to support such claims. It was also determined that there was no evidence of actual bias in the justice's conduct. The Court held that the applicant had not met the threshold for disqualification, and therefore, the application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for disqualification on the alternative grounds of actual and apparent bias be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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