| IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA | ) | ||
| ) | |||
| VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY |
| ||
| 1 | |||
| INDUSTRIAL DIVISION | ) | ||
| B E T W E E N : |
STEVEN McGEE
Applicant
A N D :
J. H. SANDERS, C. KEILY. K. WISE. H. E. WEIR, G. R. NEWMAN, R. J. HORE. B. R. AGG. D. CRUMP. K. J. CONNORS. G. WOOD. J. M. BILTRIS, J. B. WHITE, D. A. PORTER and P. POWER - .
Respondents
| 22 APRIL, 1991 | KEELY J. |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DELIVERED EX TEMPORE
As to order 1 of the interlocutory orders sought, it has
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| been conceded by counsel for those respondents who have entered an appearance (whom I shall call "the respondents") that there is "a serious question to be tried in relation to whether or not rule 37 has been complied with" (transcript p. 31). However, he has submitted that the applicant's prospects of success on that question "are not great". Since the matter was adjourned last Wednesday, 17 April, I have read the transcript of the arguments on that question and I have heard | advanced by the parties I am unable to accept the respondents' | further argument today. Having considered the submissions |
| submission that the applicant's prospects of success "are not great". | ||
| In my opinion his prospects of success on that serious question to be tried are sufficiently strong for the court in the exercise of its discretion, to make the interlocutory order sought, the court having formed the opinion that the "balance of convenience" test supports the making of the order. |
Accordingly I shall make the order sought in paragraph 1
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of the applicant's claim for interlocutory relief.
I am not satisfied that it is necessary to make the second order sought i.e. as to the applicant's attendance at meetings; in addition, as drafted it might have unintended effects. Accordingly that proposed order will not be made but
| liberty to apply will be reserved to the parties. | - |
| As to the third order sought by the applicant, I am not satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried as to whether the rules impose an obligation on the respondents, or any of them, to permit the applicant to have access to and to inspect the large number of documents, dating back to 27 September 1989, described in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the proposed order. Further, I am not persuaded that the balance of convenience supports the making of that proposed order. |
An additional matter tending against the making of that order is the fact that approximately 18 months has elapsed since the applicant first became "concerned as to whether the Rules were being observed ... in particular in relation to the financial administration and management of the Branch" - taking those words from paragraph 5 of the applicant's
affidavit sworn 5 April 1991. Although he has been active
during that period in seeking documents, he did not seek any order from the court until April 1991, which was after the decision of the Branch Management Committee to suspend him from his office as Branch Trustee. In all the circumstances in my opinion the court should decllne to make the o?d&r
sought in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 3 of
the applicant's claim for interlocutory relief.
The respondents' counsel in the course of his submissions this afternoon stated that he would not oppose an order in the terms of sub-paragraph (d) of the applicant's proposed order 3, as amended during the address by the applicant's counsel.
| Accordingly that order will be made. |
The orders will only be made against those respondents who have filed a notice of appearance. I have noted that the Registrar has received letters, apparently from the other four respondents, consenting "to the Court making the orders". I do not consider that those letters are a sufficient basis for making orders binding on them.
The orders of the court are that the respondents, J. H. Sanders, C. Keily, K. Wise, H. E. Weir, B. R. Agg, K. J. Connors, G. Wood, J. M. Biltris, D. A. Porter and P. Power and each of them:-
1. Perform and observe the rules of the Transport Workers'
Union of Australia ("the organisation") by desisting from
implementation of the purported resolution of the
Committee of Management of the Victorian Branch of the
organisation at its meeting on 12 March, 1991 suspending
the applicant from the office of Branch Trustee within
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the Victorian Branch of the organisation.
2. Perform and observe the rules of the organisation by
ceasing to deprive the applicant of access to and inspection of all minutes of meetings of the Committee of Management held in 1991 and all reports tabled at such
meetings. -
| I certify that this and the foregoing |
three pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour Mr. Justice Keely delivered on 22 April, 1991.
| Associate: / l ~ d | G |
Dated: 22 April, 1991.
| Dates of Hearing | 17 and 22 April, 1991 |
| Date of Judgment | 22 April, 1991 |
| Solicitor for Applicant | Holding Redlich |
| Counsel for Applicant | M. Hickey |
| Solicitor for Respondents | Harry Nowicki & Co. |
| Counsel for Respondents | H. Borenstein |
- AGLC
- McGee, S. v Sanders, J.H [1991] FCA 208
- Case
- [1991] FCA 208
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Justice Keely addressed the application, focusing on three specific orders sought by McGee. Regarding the first order, the court found that there was a serious question about whether the union's rules were followed in suspending McGee, and McGee's prospects of success were strong enough to warrant the court's intervention. Consequently, the court granted the first order, requiring the respondents to cease implementing the suspension. On the second order, which sought to mandate the respondents' attendance at meetings, the court declined to make the order due to potential unintended effects and insufficient evidence of its necessity. For the third order, concerning access to documents, the court determined that no serious question existed about the respondents' obligation to provide these documents and that the balance of convenience did not support granting this order. However, the court did make a modified version of the fourth sub-paragraph of the third order, as the respondents did not oppose it.
The final orders of the court required the respondents to desist from implementing McGee's suspension and to provide him access to minutes of meetings and reports from 1991. The orders were binding only on those respondents who had formally appeared in court, not on the others who had merely given consent in writing. This decision provided McGee with interim relief pending further deliberation on the substantive issues in the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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