McFarlane v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

MCFARLANE v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER

[2017] SASCFC 25

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Peek, The Honourable Justice Parker and The Honourable Justice Doyle)

7 April 2017

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS

PROCEDURE - INFERIOR COURTS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

The appellant appealed against the summary dismissal of a charge he laid on 27 May 2015 before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal against the respondent, the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner. The charge alleged unprofessional conduct by him concerning a complaint that the appellant had previously made to the Commissioner in October 2014 about the conduct of two practitioners in 2010 District Court proceedings. This conduct had been investigated by the now-defunct Legal Practitioners Conduct Board in late 2013 and early 2014, and the appellant asserted to the Commissioner that this investigation was unsatisfactory. The Commissioner’s January 2015 determination to close the complaint without further investigation pursuant to s 77C of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (the Act), constitutes the asserted unprofessional conduct.

On 4 July 2014, on application by the Commissioner, a member of the tribunal dismissed the charge as being frivolous or vexatious pursuant to s 82(5) of the Act. The appellant appealed against this decision.

Held (per Peek, Parker and Doyle JJ) (dismissing the appeal):

(1) There is no evidence of any professional misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct by the Commissioner concerning his determination to close the appellant’s complaint pursuant to s 77C of the Act.

(2) The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal correctly approached and determined the application for summary dismissal of the charge against the Commissioner pursuant to s 82(5) of the Act.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 ss 76, 77B, 82; Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA), referred to.
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioner (1948-1949) 78 CLR 62, discussed.
McFarlane v Reffold [2013] SASCFC 31, considered.

MCFARLANE v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER
[2017] SASCFC 25

Full Court:  Peek, Parker and Doyle JJ

  1. THE COURT.       Mr McFarlane (the appellant) appeals against the decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal of 4 July 2016 whereby pursuant to s 82(5) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 it summarily dismissed a charge (‘the subject charge’) laid by the appellant against Mr Greg May, the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner.

    Background

  2. The appellant was the unsuccessful plaintiff in South Australian District Court proceedings in June 2010 relating to a contract dated 7 December 2007 between himself and one Mr Reffold for the sale and purchase of real estate (‘the District Court proceedings’).

  3. The appellant had initially sought to delay settlement on the basis of a breach of a warranty that no improvements had been carried out on the land without the necessary approvals, but…

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Details
Case
[2017] SASCFC 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, McFarlane, appealed a decision of the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner to the Tribunal. The dispute concerned McFarlane's allegations that the Commissioner had acted improperly in handling a complaint McFarlane had lodged. The Tribunal was comprised of Peek, Parker, and Doyle JJ.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether McFarlane's complaint against the Commissioner disclosed any reasonable cause of action or was frivolous and vexatious, warranting summary dismissal. Specifically, the Tribunal had to determine if McFarlane's assertions regarding the Commissioner's conduct, including alleged falsification of grounds for closing a complaint, interference with legal procedures, and personal acquaintance with legal practitioners, constituted grounds for a charge of unsatisfactory or unprofessional conduct.

The Tribunal reasoned that several paragraphs of McFarlane's complaint lacked factual basis and did not allege any misconduct by the Commissioner. For instance, statements of fact without an allegation of misconduct, or allegations concerning third parties, were struck out. The Tribunal found McFarlane's explanations for his claims of "incompetent and unfounded" reasons for decision and that the Commissioner's "integrity is in question" to be vague and lacking in material support. Furthermore, the Tribunal concluded that McFarlane harboured a deep grievance against another practitioner, and his complaint against the Commissioner was a thinly disguised attempt to relitigate that grievance, constituting vexatious and multiple proceedings on the same issue.

Consequently, the Tribunal summarily dismissed the charge against the Commissioner, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and without apparent merit. The Tribunal noted that it did not need to determine the jurisdictional question of whether it had the power to consider a charge against the Commissioner, given the dismissal on other grounds.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

After a close analysis of both the Commissioner’s submissions and the appellant’s response to those submissions, the Tribunal Member concluded as follows:52.Having ascertained that the complainant appeared to accept the Commissioner’s submissions at least insofar as the first 3 paragraphs of the complaint were concerned, the Tribunal sought the complainant’s responding submissions with respect to paragraph 4 of the charge. Suffice to say it became increasingly difficult to comprehend the complainant’s train of thought and argument.53.The complainant referred the Tribunal to the written submission he filed on 9 September 2015 in response to the Commissioner’s submission for summary dismissal.54.In that document he set out his “particulars” with respect to paragraphs 4c and 4d of the charge. Without reciting in detail the particulars he referred to, the document relied on by the complainant as providing particulars asserts that the Commissioner“abused his advantage” by exercising the power contained within section 77C of the act and that he “abused his advantage by interfering with the law and administration procedures by falsifying his ground for decision to close the complaint under section 77C(1)(c) of the Act.”55.The Tribunal asked the complainant to elaborate on this statement. It was extremely difficult to follow the complainant’s reasoning but, to summarise, the Tribunal understands the basis of his complaint against the Commissioner is as follows:· The Commissioner stated in his determination that the complainant’s complaint had already been investigated by the Board being his predecessor Board. The complainant considers that to be the “falsification” by the Commissioner as in the complainant’s personal view the complaint was not investigated by the previous Board in the way that he would have like it to be investigated and questions were not asked of the practitioners by the Board that in the complainant’s view should have been asked.· That there was delay within the office of the Commissioner in the complaint being dealt with in that it was lodged on 30 October of 2014 and the final determination was not made until January of the following year.· The Commissioner did not ask MM further questions that the complainant thinks should have been asked of MM.· That he was prejudiced or aggrieved because in separate costs enforcement proceedings in the District Court arising out of the original litigation, the District Court awaited the outcome of the Commissioner’s determination before proceeding with a garnishee or charging order against the complainant’s estate that arose from a costs order made against the complainant in the original proceedings.· That he does not like the procedure set out in section 77C and considers it gives some unfair advantage to the Commissioner and that the procedure does not provide procedural fairness.· That the Commissioner declined to meet with the complainant personally when the complainant telephoned the Commission and requested to see him personally.· The Commissioner was personally acquainted with members of the legal profession with the inference being that had in some way affected his judgment.56.The other complaints ventilated by the complainant either verbally at the hearing or in the various documents that he filed contained broad generalised statements including accusations of negligence and lack of procedural fairness based on the Commissioner using his section 77C powers.Conclusion and application of the law57.The Tribunal accepts the Commissioner’s submission that the first three paragraphs of the charge should be struck out on the basis put forward by the Commissioner. The first two particulars are statements of fact and make no allegation of unsatisfactory or unprofessional conduct against the Commissioner.58.The third particular relates to a third party and is an allegation of impropriety against a person who is not the subject of this charge. It has no relevance to the Commissioner and it is the subject of separate proceedings before this Tribunal.59.The complainant also appeared to accept that argument when it was discussed with him in the course of the hearing. The tribunal is satisfied that there is nothing contained in the first three charges that could possibly provide any basis for a charge of unsatisfactory or unprofessional conduct against the Commissioner and the Tribunal will strike those paragraphs of the charge out on the basis that they show no good cause of action and are so obviously untenable that they cannot succeed. There are no factual matters contained in those paragraphs of the charge that could ground any investigation into the Commissioner’s conduct.60.With respect to paragraph 4(b) and (c) the Tribunal accepts the submission of the Commissioner. The particulars in those paragraphs could not form the basis of any ongoing investigation against the Commissioner, and the Tribunal will strike those paragraphs from the charge on the basis that they show no good cause of action and are so obviously untenable that they cannot succeed.61.The Tribunal is left to consider only paragraphs 4(a) and (d) of the charge and must determine whether they should be struck out on the basis of being frivolous or vexatious as set out in the relevant section.62.Paragraph 4(a) asserts that the reasons for decision are “incompetent and unfounded.”63.The Tribunal gave the complainant every opportunity to provide some factual basis to support this particular of the charge and to persuade the Tribunal that such an assertion could in any event may justify an investigation into a charge of unprofessional conduct. Paragraph 4(a) on its face appears to be a subjective opinion about the Commissioner’s Determination rather than any assertion of unprofessional or unsatisfactory conduct.64.Nevertheless, being mindful of the Tribunal’s obligation to proceed with the utmost caution when considering an application under section 82(5) of the Act and the need to consider any facts and inferences that could perhaps at their highest be taken from those facts, the Tribunal asked the complainant to explain what he meant by that particular of the charge.65.The complainant’s responses were vague, convoluted and rambling and did not point the Tribunal to any material in support of this particular that if investigated could give rise to a charge of unprofessional conduct, assuming of course that the Tribunal even has the power to deal with such a complaint against the Commissioner.66.The complainant’s oral submissions centred around his own fixed belief in the veracity of his complaint against MM and his lack of comprehension as to the Commissioner’s powers under section 77C. He could not understand that Parliament could legitimately give the Commissioner the power to close a complaint for any of the grounds set out under 77C of the Act. He could not otherwise point to any other fact or circumstance in support of this part of this charge other than his belief that a record of documents filed prior to the District Court Proceedings and provided by him to the Commissioner’s office had greater significance than had been attributed to it by the Commissioner.67.The Tribunal has already referred to the Commissioner’s determination which is clear and well-reasoned and sets out why he exercised his power under the provisions of section 77C to close the complaint. The Determination specifically refers to the record of outcome that the complainant puts such weight on. It was considered in the context of the Commissioner’s determination.68.The Tribunal is satisfied that there is no apparent factual basis sufficient to support the charge set out in paragraph 4(a) of the charge.69. Paragraph 4(d) states “integrity is in question”.70.The complainant covered the same ground when asked to explain the factual basis of this allegation. The Commissioner had closed the charge under the section 77C provisions. The complainant believed that the Commissioner had an obligation to more vigorously pursue the new complaint against MM. He also complained of a delay in dealing with his complaint.71.The Tribunal notes that the “delay” complained of was a period of 2.5 months from receipt of complaint to the determination. Even if this was considered an unreasonable delay, an internal delay in the Commissioner’s office is not a matter that could possibly ground a complaint of unprofessional conduct against the Commissioner.72.The Tribunal is satisfied that this particular of the complaint should also be struck out as being manifestly groundless and showing no good cause of action and as being so obviously untenable that it cannot succeed.73.In summary the Tribunal tried to ascertain whether the complainant could put forward any coherent basis or underlying facts that if taken at their highest may justify an investigation, assuming of course that the Tribunal would then have to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the Commissioner in any event. The Tribunal was mindful that the complainant was at a disadvantage in presenting his submission in that he is not legally trained and he claims to suffer from a disability of social phobia. The Tribunal was mindful of the obligation to proceed with caution and to ensure that he had a fair hearing.74.Nevertheless after careful consideration of all submissions and relevant material, the Tribunal is satisfied that the charges against the Commissioner are frivolous and within the meaning of that term namely“paltry, not warranting serious attention, manifestly futile” --- “groundless or as disclosing no cause of action”.75.The second submission of the Commissioner relating to the multiple proceedings being pursued by the complainant were put to him. He denied any link between this charge and his grievance against MM and he claimed to have a genuine belief that the Commissioner had acted in an unprofessional manner for the reasons already outlined.76.The Tribunal does not accept that submission. It is apparent to the Tribunal based on all the material available, that the complainant holds a deep grievance against MM and others involved in the District Court proceedings. Not satisfied with the LPCB’s decision and then the decision of the Commissioner, he had pursued independent proceedings in this Tribunal against MM. He has also appealed the determination but was unable to proceed based on jurisdictional issues. His oral and written submission to this Tribunal centred largely around his grievance with MM and the complainant’s inability to accept the way in which his grievance had been dealt with by first the LPCB and then the Commissioner and his determination to reopen the investigation.77.The current charge against the Commissioner is in the Tribunal’s view nothing more than another thinly disguised attempt to force a reconsideration by this Tribunal in a back handed way of his grievance against MM.78.The Tribunal is satisfied that he is bringing multiple proceedings to achieve the same outcome. I find that this is a second basis for making an order for summary dismissal of the charge.79.The Tribunal accepts the Commissioner’s submission that there is sound authority that the Tribunal should regulate its own processes and not tolerate multiple proceedings on the same issue.80.The Tribunal is therefore satisfied that the charge against the Commissioner should be summarily dismissed as being both frivolous and vexatious and without any apparent merit.81.I will not therefore go on to deal with the issue of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider a charge against the Commissioner.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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