SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
McEwan v Director of Public Prosecutions & Anor [2022] QCA 231
PARTIES:
JULIE McEWAN
(appellant)
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(first respondent)
EMILY McGREGOR
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6631 of 2022
SC No 971 of 2022DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QCA 81 (Martin SJA)DELIVERED ON:
22 November 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
11 October 2022
JUDGES:
Mullins P and McMurdo and Flanagan JJA
ORDERS:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. The judgment given for the first and second respondents on 11 May 2022 is set aside.
3. The first and second respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, limited to the appellant’s outlays.
4. By consent of the parties, set aside the order for indemnity costs made by the primary judge on 3 June 2022 insofar as it relates to the costs of the first and second respondents against the appellant.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES – POINTS AND OBJECTIONS NOT TAKEN BELOW – WHEN NOT ALLOWED TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL – QUESTIONS NOT RAISED ON PLEADINGS OR IN ARGUMENT – PARTICULAR CASES – QUESTION OF LAW – where the appellant makes allegations against the respondents for malicious prosecution – where the appellant appeals against an order granting summary judgment in favour of the first and second respondents – where the primary judge granted summary judgment on the basis that the respondents had immunity from liability pursuant to s 25 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) – where the appellant argues that the primary judge erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the immunity from liability extends to allegations of malicious prosecution or malfeasance in public office – where the respondents filed a notice of contention conceding the ground of appeal but sought to confirm the order for summary judgment on a ground other than that relied on by the primary judge – where the respondents contend that the primary judge ought to have held that the second respondent could not be liable for malicious prosecution or misfeasance in public office by reason of s 26C of the Public Service Act2008 (Qld) – where the respondents argue that any tortious liability would attach to the State of Queensland and not to the second respondent, a prosecutor at the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) – where the respondents argue that the first respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions, could not be vicariously liable for the conduct of its prosecutor – whether the Court of Appeal should entertain the notice of contention in circumstances where no application was made for summary judgment in reliance on s 26C of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld)
Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld), s 25
Public Service Act2008 (Qld), s 26C
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 69, r 293, r 766COUNSEL:
The appellant appeared on her own behalf
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read McEwan v Director of Public Prosecutions and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2022] QCA 231
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal held that it should not entertain the respondents' contention because the respondents did not apply for summary judgment under s 26C before the primary judge. The relief sought under s 26C was for the respondents to be removed as parties, not for summary judgment. The discretion to grant summary judgment is different from the discretion to remove parties. If the Court of Appeal considered the respondents' application for summary judgment on the basis of s 26C, the appellant would be deprived of a right of appeal. The appellant objected to the respondents raising this argument for the first time on appeal. Additionally, there was no application to amend the application before the primary judge. The Court was also unable to assess any challenge by the appellant to the assertion that the prosecutor was acting in an official capacity without the most current version of the statement of claim.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the summary judgment, and ordered the respondents to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. The order for indemnity costs made by the primary judge was also set aside by consent of the parties.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. The judgment given for the first and second respondents on 11 May 2022 is set aside.
3. The first and second respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, limited to the appellant’s outlays.
4. By consent of the parties, set aside the order for indemnity costs made by the primary judge on 3 June 2022 insofar as it relates to the costs of the first and second respondents against the appellant.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court of Appeal should entertain the notice of contention in circumstances where no application was made for summary judgment in reliance on section 26C of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) before the primary judge.
2. Whether the respondents can rely on section 26C of the Public Service Act as a basis for summary judgment on appeal, despite not having sought such relief before the primary judge.
3. Whether the first and second respondents can be held liable for malicious prosecution or misfeasance in public office under the circumstances of this case.
Held
1. The Court of Appeal held that it should not entertain the notice of contention in circumstances where no application was made for summary judgment in reliance on section 26C of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) before the primary judge.
2. The Court of Appeal held that the respondents cannot rely on section 26C of the Public Service Act as a basis for summary judgment on appeal, despite not having sought such relief before the primary judge.
3. The Court of Appeal held that the first and second respondents cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution or misfeasance in public office under the circumstances of this case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Bond JA further noted that the potential application of s 26C of the Public Service Act was, at the time of determining the application for security for costs, not part of the appeal. Counsel for the respondents before Bond JA did however intimate that the respondents intended to raise the argument on appeal by filing a notice of contention.Consideration There are, in my view, a number of reasons why this Court should not entertain the notice of contention. First, the respondents did not apply before the primary judge for summary judgment in reliance on s 26C of the Public Service Act. Secondly, the only relief sought before the primary judge in reliance on s 26C was the removal of the respondents as parties to the proceeding pursuant to r 69 of the UCPR. Rule 69(1)(a) provides that the court may at any stage of a proceeding order that a person who has been improperly or unnecessarily included as a party, or who has ceased to be an appropriate or necessary party, be removed from the proceeding. The discretion to be exercised under r 69 is distinctly different from the discretion to grant summary judgment under r 293. Rule 293(2) requires the court to be satisfied of two matters before exercising the discretion to give judgment. The court is to be satisfied that the plaintiff has no real prospects of succeeding on all or part of the plaintiff’s claim and that there is no need for a trial of the claim or part of the claim. Thirdly, if this Court was to consider the respondents’ application for summary judgment on the basis of s 26C, the appellant, not having the matter determined at first instance, would be deprived of a right of appeal to this Court. Fourthly, the appellant, who is self-represented, objects to the respondents seeking summary judgment before this Court in reliance on s 26C in circumstances where summary judgment was only sought before the primary judge on the basis of s 25 of the DPP Act. Fifthly, there has been no application by the respondents to amend the application that was before the primary judge. Sixthly, since the primary judge gave reasons for judgment on 11 May 2022, the appellant has filed a new version of the statement of claim. Neither the appellant nor the respondents sought to place the new version of the statement of claim before this Court. The Court, in considering any application for summary judgment based on s 26C, would not be informed as to the factual basis upon which the appellant may allege that the immunity in s 26C does not apply to the second respondent. Section 26C applies to State employees. It does not apply to the first respondent as the Director of Public Prosecutions is appointed by the Governor in Council: s 5(1) of the DPP Act. The immunity created by s 26C will only apply to the second respondent if she was engaging “in conduct in an official capacity”: s 26C(1) of the Public Service Act. This is a defined term and includes, for example, engaging in conduct under or purportedly under an Act. In an affidavit filed by the second respondent on 11 March 2022, she affirms that all her dealings with the appellant’s criminal matter was in her capacity as a legal officer assisting the Director. While this affidavit constitutes evidence of the second respondent engaging in conduct in an official capacity, the Court is unable to assess, without the most current version of the statement of claim, any challenge by the appellant to this assertion.