JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: McEWAN -v- DIRECTOR OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIRECTORATE [2013] WASC 355
CORAM: KENNETH MARTIN J
HEARD: 26 AUGUST 2013
DELIVERED : 26 SEPTEMBER 2013
FILE NO/S: CIV 1263 of 2012
MATTER :An application for a writ of certiorari against the Director of Dispute Resolution Directorate under the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA)
BETWEEN: KELLY ANN McEWAN
Applicant
AND
DIRECTOR OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIRECTORATE
First RespondentACEBROOK CORPORATION PTY LTD
Second RespondentINSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED T/A CGU WORKERS COMPENSATION
Third Respondent
Catchwords:
Prerogative relief - Certiorari - Workers' compensation - Extensions of termination day - Last day for extension - Statutory interpretation - Last day of one year period - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 61
Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 93L, s 93M
Result:
Application granted, order for certiorari quashing decision
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr M A Tedeschi
First Respondent : Submitting appearance
Second Respondent : Mr G R Hancy
Third Respondent : Mr G R Hancy
Solicitors:
Applicant: Waterside Legal
First Respondent : Submitting appearance
Second Respondent : SRB Legal
Third Respondent : SRB Legal
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Bird v Commonwealth (1988) 165 CLR 1
Bodrudazza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 14; (2007) 208 CLR 651
R v Electricity Commissioner Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co [1924] 1 KB 171
KENNETH MARTIN J: This is an application by originating motion of 17 February 2012 seeking orders absolute for certiorari, as well as for mandamus. Certiorari is sought to quash certain decisions of the Director of the Dispute Resolution Directorate's delegate (Ms Geary). Mandamus is sought to compel the Director to accept a notice of an election to pursue common law damages, lodged on 30 June 2011 behalf of the applicant.
Reference to the Dispute Resolution Directorate is to the organisation within WorkCover (WA) responsible for resolution of Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (Workers' Compensation Act) disputes. Ms Geary's communications to the applicant's solicitors were responding to various applications to extend time limits, including most relevantly, an application to further extend her 'termination day' (under s 93M of the Workers' Compensation Act) to 30 June 2011.
The applicant suffered spinal and other injuries when she fell off or through a roof whilst employed by the second respondent, when cleaning gutters at a property at Noble Falls on 18 May 2009. The Directorate is the first respondent to the applications. It advised (by writing on 14 May 2013) that it would abide the decision of the Court. It did not otherwise participate.
The second and third respondents (as employer and employer's insurer, respectively) were joined as parties at a subsequent directions hearing. Since joinder, they have participated through common solicitor representation and by counsel at the hearing. They are effectively the contradictors against this application.
The second and third respondents advise by…
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- Case
- [2013] WASC 355
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the court was whether the delegate had correctly interpreted the statutory provisions concerning the extensions of termination day. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the delegate had erred in finding that the last day for an extension was 29 June 2011, rather than 30 June 2011 as requested by the applicant. The court considered the language of s 93M(4) and s 93M(8) of the Workers' Compensation Act, which allowed for extensions even after the initial or extended termination day, subject to the terms of the Act. The court also had to assess whether the delegate's interpretation of the statutory provisions had led to a jurisdictional error.
The court found that the delegate had erred in interpreting the statutory provisions. The court held that the correct interpretation of the provisions allowed for an extension to be granted up until 30 June 2011, not 29 June 2011 as determined by the delegate. The court emphasised that the statutory language permitted extensions until the 'termination day', which in this case was clearly 30 June 2011. The delegate's finding that the last day for an extension was one day earlier was deemed to be an error of jurisdiction. Consequently, the court granted the applicant the prerogative relief of certiorari, quashing the delegate's decision and mandating a reconsideration of the application for an extension to 30 June 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The role of a superior court in controlling jurisdiction is to determine whether an underlying decision at issue may be tainted by jurisdictional error. The court acts as a judicial review institution, not a merits review body. That is, it will only exercise the prerogative jurisdiction when there is shown to be some error of jurisdiction made by the impugned decision maker. In Bodrudazza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 14; (2007) 208 CLR 651 the High Court observed that it held supervisory power in that presenting instance of a departmental officer acting as the Minister's delegate. However supervisory powers were restricted to instances of jurisdictional error. The matter not having been otherwise argued, I am satisfied here that there is a respectable edifice for me to assume this court may exercise its jurisdiction against impugned decisions made by a Director's delegate. Such decisions may deliver serious repercussions against the rights of an employee. In the circumstances, I will proceed on the basis the challenged decision of the Director's delegate in this action, is reviewable. However, I expressly reserve for another day, and for a more substantive argument, my underlying assumption. This decision sets no precedent in that arena. I will now set out below a chronology of the key events extracted from the tendered evidence on the application. From the chronology it may be observed that by reference to s 93M(4) of the Workers' Compensation Act, three extensions to the applicant's termination day were granted. A fourth was refused. As will emerge, the first extension to (30 June 2010) was unnecessary, but has sown the seeds for subsequent confusion of the applicant's correct termination day. By s 93M(8) of the Workers' Compensation Act it is open to grant an extension to the termination date even after the initial or extended termination day has passed (subject to the Act). Applications of that nature were made here. Here, the current termination day extension had been granted (on 24 August 2010) to 10 September 2010 (McEwan Affidavit, 'KAM10'). This date passed. At a section of a seven‑page letter of 14 July 2011 under a heading 'Application dated 30 June 2011 lodged under s 93M(4)(a) of the Act', the Director's delegate wrote:As the Application dated 30 June 2011 has been lodged under section 93M(4)(a) of the Act, and based on the information provided in the Form 35, the original termination day for this matter (prior to the extensions of termination day being granted) was 29 June 2010. Therefore the latest date an extension can be granted until is 29 June 2011.I am therefore unable to grant an extension of the termination day until the 30 June 2011 as requested. (my emphasis underlined) The advice above, and the adverse decision refusing a further extension seen therein, effectively meant that the application of 30 June 2011 of the applicant for another extension of time (ie, from 10 September 2010 to 30 June 2011) could not be and was not granted. In effect, the application was assessed as being late by one day. The delegate assessed 29 June 2011 as the last cut off day open to be the 'termination day'. As I explain, I disagree.