McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 15 min read

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION: McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd & Anor [2022] QIRC 099
PARTIES:

McDowell, Chantal
(Complainant)

v

Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd
(First Respondent)

AND

Inglis, Christopher
(Second Respondent)

CASE NO: AD/2020/15
PROCEEDING: Application in existing proceedings
DELIVERED ON: 23 March 2022
MEMBER: Knight IC
HEARD AT: On the papers
ORDERS:

1.      The application in existing proceedings filed 11 May 2021 is granted.

2.      The time for the Complainant to file and serve the expert report of Andrea Haddock is extended to 4.00 pm on 30 March 2022.

CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – ANTI-DISCRIMINATION – application in existing proceedings seeking leave to file and rely upon expert report out of time – application granted
LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld) rr 6, 45
CASES:

Cronin v Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry [2015] QIRC 018

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Lenijamar Pty Ltd and Ors v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) FCR 388

Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129

Paul Scott v State of Queensland & Ors [2019] QIRC 115

Sandhu v Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 182

Tonia Shelley v McRoberts Agency [2009] 190 QGIG 189

Ulowski v Miller (1968) SASR 227

APPEARANCES:

Alexander Law for the Complainant

HWL Ebsworth Lawyers for the Respondents

Reasons for Decision

  1. This is an application in existing proceedings filed by the Complainant to the substantive proceedings, Ms Chantal McDowell ('the Complainant'), seeking leave to file and rely upon an expert report out of time. The application is opposed by the Respondents to the substantive proceedings, Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd and Mr Christopher Inglis (together, 'the Respondents').

    Background

  2. On 15 September 2020 I made directions requiring the parties to supply to each other any expert reports to be relied upon at hearing by 27 November 2020. The parties were then required to file those reports by 11 December 2020. On 4 December 2020 the Complainant wrote to the Commission requesting an extension to the directions, noting she had recently instructed Counsel and COVID-19 restrictions and Christmas closures had contributed to her need for the extension.

  3. On 7 December 2020, I made directions vacating the earlier directions and ordering as follows:

    2.       That the parties supply to each other, but not file in the Industrial Registry, an outline of the evidence to be given by each lay witness at the Hearing (one A4 page per witness), as well as any expert reports that will be relied upon, by 4.00 pm 29 January 2021.

    3.       That the parties jointly file in the Industrial Registry by 4.00 pm on 12 February 2021:

    …

    (c)      expert reports.

  4. The Complainant did not supply any expert reports to the Respondents in accordance with Direction 2 above, nor did she file any such reports in the Industrial Registry in accordance with Direction 3(c).

    Relevant Principles

  5. The Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] QIRC 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd, the Complainant, Ms Chantal McDowell, sought leave to file and rely on an expert report that was submitted out of time in ongoing proceedings. The Respondents, Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd and Mr Christopher Inglis, opposed the application. The primary issue before the Court was whether the Complainant should be granted leave to file the expert report beyond the stipulated deadline and subsequently rely on it during the hearing.

The Court considered the principles governing extensions of time under the Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld). It noted that the power to extend time is discretionary and must be exercised according to rules of reason and justice. The relevant factors for determining whether to grant an extension included the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the conduct of the respondent, and the potential prejudice to either party. The Court highlighted that while special circumstances need not be shown, an acceptable explanation for the delay and fairness in the circumstances are crucial. Additionally, the merits of the substantive application and considerations of fairness between the parties were relevant.

The Court found that the Complainant had provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, considering the impact of COVID-19 restrictions and the recent instruction of Counsel. It also noted that the Respondents had not demonstrated significant prejudice due to the delay. Consequently, the Court granted the application, extending the time for the Complainant to file and serve the expert report of Andrea Haddock to 4.00 pm on 30 March 2022.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application in existing proceedings filed 11 May 2021 is granted.

2. The time for the Complainant to file and serve the expert report of Andrea Haddock is extended to 4.00 pm on 30 March 2022.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application in existing proceedings filed by the Complainant to the substantive proceedings, Ms Chantal McDowell ('the Complainant'), seeking leave to file and rely upon an expert report out of time. The application is opposed by the Respondents to the substantive proceedings, Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd and Mr Christopher Inglis (together, 'the Respondents').Background On 15 September 2020 I made directions requiring the parties to supply to each other any expert reports to be relied upon at hearing by 27 November 2020. The parties were then required to file those reports by 11 December 2020. On 4 December 2020 the Complainant wrote to the Commission requesting an extension to the directions, noting she had recently instructed Counsel and COVID-19 restrictions and Christmas closures had contributed to her need for the extension. On 7 December 2020, I made directions vacating the earlier directions and ordering as follows:2. That the parties supply to each other, but not file in the Industrial Registry, an outline of the evidence to be given by each lay witness at the Hearing (one A4 page per witness), as well as any expert reports that will be relied upon, by 4.00 pm 29 January 2021.3. That the parties jointly file in the Industrial Registry by 4.00 pm on 12 February 2021:…(c) expert reports. The Complainant did not supply any expert reports to the Respondents in accordance with Direction 2 above, nor did she file any such reports in the Industrial Registry in accordance with Direction 3(c).Relevant Principles The Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('the Rules') relevantly provide: As is apparent from the above, where a party fails to comply with a directions order, the Commission has broad powers to deal with the proceeding as it considers appropriate. The issue for determination, here, is solely whether leave ought to be granted for the expert report to be filed out of time and subsequently relied upon at hearing. The power to extend the time to do something is fundamentally an exercise of discretion, however it 'must be exercised judicially, according to rules of reason and justice, and not arbitrarily or capriciously or according to private opinion.'[1][1] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 503. The factors relevant to considering whether the Commission ought to exercise its power to grant an extension of time are generally well established.[2][2] Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129, [3]-[5] ('Lloyd'); Sandhu v Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 182, [31]-[32] ('Sandhu'). In Ulowski v Miller,[3] Bray CJ considered that in exercising its discretion to allow an extension of time, the Court should not be fettered by any absolute or inflexible rules. However, his Honour then observed that, generally, the five paramount factors the Court will have regard to are the:(a)length of the delay;(b)explanation for the delay;(c)conduct of the respondent;(d)prejudice to the applicant if the discretion is not exercised; and(e)prejudice to the respondent if the discretion is exercised.[4][3] (1968) SASR 227.[4] Ibid 280.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 7 December 2020, I made directions vacating the earlier directions and ordering as follows:2. That the parties supply to each other, but not file in the Industrial Registry, an outline of the evidence to be given by each lay witness at the Hearing (one A4 page per witness), as well as any expert reports that will be relied upon, by 4.00 pm 29 January 2021.3. That the parties jointly file in the Industrial Registry by 4.00 pm on 12 February 2021:…(c) expert reports. The Complainant did not supply any expert reports to the Respondents in accordance with Direction 2 above, nor did she file any such reports in the Industrial Registry in accordance with Direction 3(c).Relevant Principles The Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('the Rules') relevantly provide: As is apparent from the above, where a party fails to comply with a directions order, the Commission has broad powers to deal with the proceeding as it considers appropriate. The issue for determination, here, is solely whether leave ought to be granted for the expert report to be filed out of time and subsequently relied upon at hearing. The power to extend the time to do something is fundamentally an exercise of discretion, however it 'must be exercised judicially, according to rules of reason and justice, and not arbitrarily or capriciously or according to private opinion.'[1][1] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 503. The factors relevant to considering whether the Commission ought to exercise its power to grant an extension of time are generally well established.[2][2] Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129, [3]-[5] ('Lloyd'); Sandhu v Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 182, [31]-[32] ('Sandhu'). In Ulowski v Miller,[3] Bray CJ considered that in exercising its discretion to allow an extension of time, the Court should not be fettered by any absolute or inflexible rules. However, his Honour then observed that, generally, the five paramount factors the Court will have regard to are the:(a)length of the delay;(b)explanation for the delay;(c)conduct of the respondent;(d)prejudice to the applicant if the discretion is not exercised; and(e)prejudice to the respondent if the discretion is exercised.[4][3] (1968) SASR 227.[4] Ibid 280. Similar guiding principles were also referred to by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen,[5] namely, that:·special circumstances need not be shown, but an application for extension must show an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time;·action taken by the applicant, other than by making an application under the relevant Act, is relevant to the consideration of the question of whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;·any prejudice to the respondent, including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay, is a material factor militating against the grant of extension, although the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and·the merits of the substantive application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted; and considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position are relevant to the exercise of discretion.[6][5] (1984) 3 FCR 344.[6] Ibid 348-349.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established