SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
MCDONALD v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2020] SASC 112
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Lovell
26 June 2020
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - REGULATED COSTS: GROSS OR FIXED COSTS, LUMP SUM ORDERS OR CAPPING ORDERS AND LIKE MATTERS
The plaintiff brought two interlocutory applications. The first application was dismissed as an abuse of process. The plaintiff sought to withdraw the second application, after judgment was reserved.
The defendant applied for its costs to be awarded on a lump sum basis.
Held, granting the application:
1. This is an appropriate case in which the discretion to award costs on a lump sum basis should be exercised.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) s 264(5)(c), referred to.
Cornwall & Ors v Rowan (No 4) [2006] SASC 111; Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738; Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1995) 57 FCR 119, considered.
MCDONALD v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2020] SASC 112LOVELL J.
Background
These proceedings have a long history. The plaintiff, Mr McDonald, is an unrepresented litigant. He filed an originating summons and statement of claim in this action on 16 April 2004. The action proceeded to trial and Justice Anderson delivered judgment on 21 May 2008 in favour of the plaintiff. The judgment was successfully appealed to the Full Court. The plaintiff’s cross‑appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded against him. The plaintiff sought special leave to the High Court but was refused. The plaintiff has sought to litigate the same subject matter in other jurisdictions (including in the Federal Court and the Worker’s Compensation Tribunal).
FDN 160 – Application to set aside Justice Anderson’s judgment
On 12 February 2018, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory application seeking that the Court “re-open the Appeal … based on new, fresh, and compelling evidence which was not available to the Applicant at the time Justice Anderson gave his decision in 2008”. The defendant, the State of South Australia, applied for summary dismissal of that application on the bases that it was vexatious, oppressive and an abuse of process of the Court by re-litigation. The matter was argued before Justice Vanstone, who dismissed the plaintiff’s application as an abuse of process.[1] On 28 March 2018, Justice Vanstone ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs in relation to the application.
FDN 173 – Application for new trial
On 16 September 2019, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory application, dated 13 September 2019, seeking that the matter be set down for a new trial pursuant to s 48(2)(a)(i) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA). The defendant notified the plaintiff of its intention to apply for the application to be summarily dismissed.
On 26 November 2019, I heard argument as to whether the application should be summarily dismissed. I reserved my decision. On 11 December 2019, the plaintiff advised that he wanted to discontinue his application.…
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- Case
- [2020] SASC 112
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether costs should be awarded to the defendant against Mr McDonald for the applications that were dismissed, and if so, whether these costs should be assessed on a lump sum basis. The Court had to consider the principles governing the award of costs on a lump sum basis, including the need for the approach to be logical, fair, and reasonable, and the importance of avoiding both overestimation and arbitrary discounts.
In deciding these issues, the Court noted that Mr McDonald had withdrawn his application for a new trial after the defendant had argued for its dismissal, making him liable for the costs incurred by the defendant in responding to and arguing against the application. The Court also found that the lengthy history and complexity of the proceedings made a taxation process likely to be costly and protracted, and it was in the interests of efficiency to assess the costs on a lump sum basis. The Court concluded that the defendant's approach to estimating costs was logical, fair, and reasonable, and awarded the defendant costs in the amount claimed, exclusive of GST, on a party/party basis.
The Court ordered that Mr McDonald pay the State of South Australia the sum of $20,150.30 in costs, representing the fees of Crown Counsel and solicitor costs for the specified periods. This sum is exclusive of GST, as the defendant is registered with the Australian Taxation Office for any GST liability.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: LOVELL J
In exercising the discretion to award costs as a lump sum, the Court must be confident that the approach taken to estimate costs is logical, fair and reasonable. As was stated by von Doussa J in Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson,[6] and cited with approval by the Full Court in Cornwall:[7]… On the one hand the Court must be astute to prevent prejudice to the respondents by overestimating the costs, and on the other hand must be astute not to cause an injustice to the successful party by an arbitrary “fail safe” discount on the cost estimate submitted to the Court: Leary v Leary.(Footnotes omitted)Consideration[6] (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 123.[7] Cornwall & Ors v Rowan (No 4) [2006] SASC 111 at 5 [15] per Bleby, Besanko and Sulan JJ.Should costs be awarded against the plaintiff in respect of FDN 173? The plaintiff sought to withdraw his application for a new trial after the defendant provided written and oral argument as to why the application should be summarily dismissed. For this reason, the plaintiff is liable to pay the costs incurred by the defendant in responding to the application for a new trial and in bringing the application for its summary dismissal.Should costs be awarded on a lump sum basis? These proceedings commenced in 2004. Although the defendant is seeking costs for work completed in response to two interlocutory applications, the lengthy nature of these proceedings and the substantial volume of materials likely meant that the work required by the defendant was complex. Given the history and nature of these proceedings, the taxation process will, in all likelihood, be costly and protracted. The plaintiff is unlikely to meet the amount claimed by the defendant; the costs involved in a taxation of costs are unlikely to be recovered. It is in the interests of efficiency that this matter is dealt with without a lengthy taxation process. For those reasons, this is an appropriate case in which the discretion to award costs on a lump sum basis should be exercised.Assessment The defendant seeks an order for costs against the plaintiff in the sum of $20,150.30, representing:·costs of Crown Counsel for the period 28 February 2018 to 28 March 2018 to 8 October 2019 to 26 November 2019 equalling $7,800.00; and·solicitor costs for the period 15 February 2018 to 28 March 2018 and 16 September 2019 to 26 November 2019 equalling $12,350.30. The defendant seeks an award of costs on a party/party basis only. The amount claimed is exclusive of GST as SAicorp is registered with the Australian Taxation Office for any GST liability. In assessing the costs to be awarded on a lump sum basis, the Court need not undertake a lengthy taxation exercise. While it may be preferable to have an independent costs expert review the charges and perform some random sample checks, the absence of such evidence does not preclude an award of costs on a lump sum basis. The likelihood that an amount would be reduced on taxation may be translated into a discount. A natural starting point is the “actual detailed accounts rendered by the solicitor to the client”.[8] The defendant has provided an itemised bill of the services rendered by the solicitor in respect of the applications. The accounts for work performed by the solicitor were based on a time charging system by reference to the Crown Solicitor’s hourly rate. The difficulty in assessing a lump sum award where the Court has been provided with a bill prepared on a time charging system was explained in Cornwall:[9]… The accounts for work performed by solicitors, while giving a general description of the nature of the work performed, were based entirely on a time charging system, the rate depending upon which solicitor at which level performed the service. However, the relevant schedules of costs prescribed in the Supreme Court Rules are principally item-based. Relatively few are time-based. Without more, that presents an immediate difficulty for a Court asked to assess a lump sum which is logical, fair and reasonable.[8] Cornwall & Ors v Rowan (No 4) [2006] SASC 111 at 6 [19] per Bleby, Besanko and Sulan JJ.[9] Cornwall & Ors v Rowan (No 4) [2006] SASC 111 at 5 [17] per Bleby, Besanko and Sulan JJ.