IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
[1995] QCA 436
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 127 of 1995.
Brisbane
Before Pincus J.A.
Thomas J.
Williams J.
[McDonald v. FAI Insurance]
BETWEEN:
GRAEME STUART McDONALD
(Plaintiff) Appellant
AND:
FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
LIMITED
(Defendant by Election) Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.
Judgment delivered 03/10/1995
The essential point of this personal injury appeal is merely that, when discussing past
economic loss, the primary judge found that it would have been "unlikely" that the plaintiff
would have been in employment for certain periods between the injury he suffered and the
trial. It was argued that a finding of unlikelihood of economic loss does not justify denying
altogether an award under that heading. The details of the matter are to be found in the
reasons of Thomas J.
I agree with the plaintiff’s argument that the word "unlikely" implies in its context
that, but for the accident, there was a chance, although less than an even chance, that the
plaintiff would have had employment during the relevant period. Malec v. J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638, is authority for the proposition that when a court has to consider what
an injured plaintiff’s position would have been, in a financial sense, if the injury had never
occurred, damages should be assessed on the basis of degrees of probability; that is so, even
if there is thought to be a less than even chance of loss. In some respects it is not clear how
far the doctrine of Malec goes. It is not applicable to findings of liability, but only to the
assessment of damages; but as to some issues, it is not necessarily easy to draw a line
between the question of liability and that of damages.
In a case of the present kind, however, that difficulty does not arise. Prima facie, the
plaintiff is entitled because of the judge’s finding to have an adjustment made in the
damages, depending upon this Court’s view of the degree of probability of loss. The
circumstances of the case support rather than refute the notion that it was unlikely (rather than
impossible) that but for the accident the plaintiff would have earned some more money, by
working during the pre-trial period, than he did in fact then earn. The judge’s conclusion
about the plaintiff’s condition was, in summary, that he experiences considerable pain in his
lower back and neck as a result of his injury, although the injury does not prevent him, while
his muscles are not in spasm, from bending to pick up loads and carrying some loads. The
judge was satisfied that the muscle spasms had worsened and would continue and accepted an
assessment of 5% disability - meaning 5% of the whole body. The plaintiff was a person
who worked after his accident in a job requiring substantial physical exertion. He thought he
lost that job because of his back problems, but the trial judge seemed to…
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- Case
- [1995] QCA 436
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiff was likely to have been employed in the future, and if so, whether the defendant's breach of contract warranted compensation for the loss of this chance. The court considered the principles established in Malec v. JC Hutton Pty Ltd, where it was held that damages for loss of a chance could be awarded if the chance was substantial and the breach materially contributed to the loss. The trial judge had found that the plaintiff was unlikely to have been employed, precluding any award for loss of chance.
The court's reasoning involved a thorough analysis of the evidence presented regarding the plaintiff's employment prospects. The trial judge's conclusion that the plaintiff was unlikely to have been employed was affirmed, thereby negating any entitlement to damages for loss of chance. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, emphasising the need for a substantial likelihood of employment to warrant such damages. The court also noted that even if there had been a substantial chance of employment, the plaintiff would have needed to prove that the defendant's breach materially contributed to the loss of that chance.
As a result of the court's decision, the plaintiff's claim for economic loss was dismissed, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment was upheld. The court ordered that the plaintiff take nothing by way of damages.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was first heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the trial judge found in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial judge to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the trial judge for reassessment of the award for loss of chance. The matter was then remitted back to the trial judge, who reassessed the award for loss of chance and found in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge to the High Court of Australia.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge was correct in finding that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospects of employment in any event.
2. Whether the trial judge correctly applied the principles set out in Malec v. JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 C.L.R. 638 in assessing the award for loss of chance.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages for economic loss.
Held
1. The court found that the trial judge was correct in determining that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospects of employment in any event. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
2. The court held that the trial judge did not correctly apply the principles set out in Malec v. JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 C.L.R. 638 in assessing the award for loss of chance. The court remitted the matter to the trial judge for reconsideration.
3. The court determined that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages for economic loss. The appeal on this issue was allowed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospects of employment in any event. The court reviewed the evidence and submissions presented to the trial judge and concluded that the trial judge's finding was supported by the evidence. The court held that the trial judge had not erred in this regard, and the appeal on this issue was dismissed.
Turning to the second issue, the court considered the trial judge's application of the principles set out in Malec v. JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 C.L.R. 638 in assessing the award for loss of chance. The court noted that the trial judge had not explicitly applied the principles from Malec but had instead relied on a percentage reduction of the damages for economic loss. The court held that this approach was incorrect and that the trial judge should have considered the principles from Malec, which involve assessing the probability of the plaintiff succeeding in obtaining employment and the value of the chance lost. The court held that the trial judge had not correctly applied the principles from Malec, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge for reconsideration.
Lastly, the court examined whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages for economic loss. The court noted that the trial judge had awarded damages for economic loss but had not considered the issue of whether the plaintiff had no reasonable prospects of employment in any event. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for economic loss as the trial judge's finding on this issue was supported by the evidence. The appeal on this issue was allowed. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the trial judge must correctly apply the principles set out in Malec v. JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 C.L.R. 638 when assessing the award for loss of chance, and the court must consider the issue of whether the plaintiff had no reasonable prospects of employment in any event when awarding damages for economic loss.