| IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
| Office of the Registry |
Adelaide No Al8 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
GLENYS IRENE McDONALD (as
Administratrix of the estate
of the late BRIAN ALLAN BOUNDY)
Applicant
and
SHAUN DERRICK SPARGO and SCOTT
SUMMERS
Respondents
Application for special leave
to appeal
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
| McDonald | 1 | 12/3/93 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 12 MARCH 1993, AT 9.44 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MR K.R. McCARTHY, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with my learned friend, MR P.W. ERICKSEN, for the
applicant. (instructed by Angela Bentley and
Associates)
| MRS. WALSH, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
MR A.M.J. HILDITCH, for the respondent.
(instructed by Ward and Partners)
| DEANE J: | Thank you, Mr McCarthy. |
| MR McCARTHY: | If the Court pleases, we have sent a book of |
authorities and an outline of submissions to the
Court. I very much hope it has been received.
| DEANE J: | We certainly have the outline; yes, and we also |
have the book of authorities.
| MR McCARTHY: | Thqnk you, Your Honour. |
DEANE J: Yes, Mr McCarthy.
| MR McCARTHY: | If the Court pleases, the issues of importance |
upon which special leave is sought relate to the
principles of damages, once and for all, and the
use of actuarial evidence by a judge as opposed to
a jury, and conflicting decisions of the Court of
Appeal of New South Wales and the Full Court of the
Supreme Court of South Australia.
If the Court pleases, if I can take you to
page 86 of the application book, starting at about
line 10. Of course, what happened here is that
when the appeal was called on the plaintiff had
already died and the administratrix had already
been appointed. There was argument as to whether
or not the evidence as to death could be received
by the court and then the matter was adjourned to
enable parties to obtain any evidence they might
want to put before the court should the court decide to exercise its discretion.
His Honour Justice Mullighan has, in that
paragraph commencing on page 10, put the matter
somewhat the other way around in that it was indeed
after the court decided that it would hear the
evidence of death that the agreement as to the fact
that the plaintiff was dead and died on
9 November 1991 and that he had been working on the
previous day, was put into evidence, as it were, by
the Full Court.
| TOOHEY J: | Mr McCarthy, do you challenge the power of the court to receive the evidence as opposed to an |
| have received it? |
| McDonald | 2 | 12/3/93 |
| MR McCARTHY: | No, I did not. |
TOOHEY J: Well, I was not asking you whether you did, but
do you now?
| MR McCARTHY: | No, if the Court pleases, I say that the rules |
of court…
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- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 63
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the High Court were whether the court had the power to receive evidence of the plaintiff's death after the proceedings had commenced, and if so, whether that discretion was exercised on proper grounds. A further issue concerned the relevance and application of actuarial evidence in assessing damages, particularly when the plaintiff had died before the final determination of their claim. The applicant argued that the actuarial evidence presented to the Master, who assessed the damages, was based on an assumption that the plaintiff would live beyond retirement age, which proved to be incorrect.
The applicant contended that the Full Court erred in its approach to the actuarial evidence. The court was referred to an article by Wickens, which discussed the rationale of adding an annuity, suggesting that actuarial evidence is intended to account for the whole range of circumstances in which people may die. However, the applicant clarified that their argument was not that the actuarial evidence inherently accounted for the specific circumstances of this death, but rather that the Master had made an incorrect assumption about the plaintiff's life expectancy based on that evidence. The court considered whether the rules of court permitted the reception of evidence of death and whether such evidence was relevant to the assessment of damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi