McDonald (as Administratrix of Boundy) v Spargo

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No Al8 of 1992

B e t w e e n -

GLENYS IRENE McDONALD (as

Administratrix of the estate

of the late BRIAN ALLAN BOUNDY)

Applicant

and

SHAUN DERRICK SPARGO and SCOTT

SUMMERS

Respondents

Application for special leave

to appeal

DEANE J

DAWSON J

TOOHEY J

McDonald 1 12/3/93

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 12 MARCH 1993, AT 9.44 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR K.R. McCARTHY, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear

with my learned friend, MR P.W. ERICKSEN, for the

applicant. (instructed by Angela Bentley and

Associates)

MRS. WALSH, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear with

MR A.M.J. HILDITCH, for the respondent.

(instructed by Ward and Partners)

DEANE J:  Thank you, Mr McCarthy.
MR McCARTHY:  If the Court pleases, we have sent a book of

authorities and an outline of submissions to the

Court. I very much hope it has been received.
DEANE J:  We certainly have the outline; yes, and we also

have the book of authorities.

MR McCARTHY:  Thqnk you, Your Honour.

DEANE J: Yes, Mr McCarthy.

MR McCARTHY:  If the Court pleases, the issues of importance

upon which special leave is sought relate to the

principles of damages, once and for all, and the

use of actuarial evidence by a judge as opposed to

a jury, and conflicting decisions of the Court of

Appeal of New South Wales and the Full Court of the

Supreme Court of South Australia.

If the Court pleases, if I can take you to

page 86 of the application book, starting at about

line 10. Of course, what happened here is that

when the appeal was called on the plaintiff had

already died and the administratrix had already

been appointed. There was argument as to whether

or not the evidence as to death could be received

by the court and then the matter was adjourned to

enable parties to obtain any evidence they might

want to put before the court should the court

decide to exercise its discretion.

His Honour Justice Mullighan has, in that

paragraph commencing on page 10, put the matter

somewhat the other way around in that it was indeed

after the court decided that it would hear the

evidence of death that the agreement as to the fact

that the plaintiff was dead and died on

9 November 1991 and that he had been working on the

previous day, was put into evidence, as it were, by

the Full Court.

TOOHEY J: 

Mr McCarthy, do you challenge the power of the

court to receive the evidence as opposed to an
argument that in its discretion it ought not to

have received it?
McDonald 2 12/3/93
MR McCARTHY:  No, I did not.

TOOHEY J: Well, I was not asking you whether you did, but

do you now?

MR McCARTHY:  No, if the Court pleases, I say that the rules

of court…

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Details
Case
[1993] HCATrans 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by Glenys Irene McDonald, as administratrix of the estate of the late Brian Allan Boundy, against Shaun Derrick Spargo and Scott. The dispute concerned the principles of damages, specifically the "once and for all" rule, and the use of actuarial evidence by a judge as opposed to a jury. The applicant sought to challenge conflicting decisions from the Court of Appeal of New South Wales and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The primary legal issues before the High Court were whether the court had the power to receive evidence of the plaintiff's death after the proceedings had commenced, and if so, whether that discretion was exercised on proper grounds. A further issue concerned the relevance and application of actuarial evidence in assessing damages, particularly when the plaintiff had died before the final determination of their claim. The applicant argued that the actuarial evidence presented to the Master, who assessed the damages, was based on an assumption that the plaintiff would live beyond retirement age, which proved to be incorrect.

The applicant contended that the Full Court erred in its approach to the actuarial evidence. The court was referred to an article by Wickens, which discussed the rationale of adding an annuity, suggesting that actuarial evidence is intended to account for the whole range of circumstances in which people may die. However, the applicant clarified that their argument was not that the actuarial evidence inherently accounted for the specific circumstances of this death, but rather that the Master had made an incorrect assumption about the plaintiff's life expectancy based on that evidence. The court considered whether the rules of court permitted the reception of evidence of death and whether such evidence was relevant to the assessment of damages.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established