McCutcheon and Repatriation Commission
[2006] AATA 744
•31 August 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 744
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2006/111
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re QUENTIN ALEXANDER MCCUTCHEON Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member P McDermott
Assoc Professor J B Morley, MemberDate31 August 2006
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board on 23 January 2006, which affirmed the decision of the Repatriation Commission of 24 March 2004, and substitutes the following decision:
(a) affirms the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board in relation to Mr McCutcheon’s claim for alcohol abuse and dependence; and
(b) decides that Mr McCutcheon’s generalised anxiety disorder is a war-caused disease within the meaning of s9 of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 and that he is entitled to receive a pension for the incapacity associated with this condition with effect from 21 March 2004.
........[Sgd].....................................
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – operational service – claim that generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence were war-caused – consideration of Statement of Principles.
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 6, 6C, 6F, 9, 13, 120(1), 120(3), 120A and 196
Bull v Repatriation Commission (2001) 188 ALR 756
Hardman v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 1174
Elliott v Repatriation Commission (2002) 73 ALD 377
East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517
Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364
Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331
White v Repatriation Commission (2004) 39 AAR 67
Stonehouse and Repatriation Commission [2004] AATA 707
Robertson and Repatriation Commission (1998) 50 ALD 668
Repatriation Commission v Cornelius [2002] FCA 750
Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408
Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564REASONS FOR DECISION
1. Mr Quentin McCutcheon served with the Royal Australian Air Force in Vietnam. We have to consider whether he should be granted a pension for generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence as a result of his service.
Decisions
2. On 24 March 2004 the Repatriation Commission (‘Commission”) rejected a claim for pension for generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence.
3. Mr McCutcheon sought a review of this decision from the Veterans’ Review Board. On 23 January 2006 the Veterans’ Review Board affirmed this decision. Mr McCutcheon has applied to this Tribunal to review the decision of the Commission, as affirmed by the Veterans’ Review Board.
Issues before the Tribunal
4. We have to decide whether the conditions of generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence are war-caused for the purposes of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (the “Act”).
5. We consider that if Mr McCutcheon is successful, the date of effect in relation to these claims is 21 March 2004.
Service
6. Mr McCutcheon served in the Royal Australian Air Force from 24 January 1966 until 23 January 1972. He rendered a period of operational service in Vietnam from 27 August 1969 until 30 July 1970.
7. Mr McCutcheon asserts in these proceedings, that various stressful events occurred during his operational service, and caused the conditions on which his claim is based. We will consider his assertions later in these reasons.
Evidence Before the Tribunal
8. We will now narrate a summary of the evidence before us, but we will not at this stage make any findings on matters relevant to the issue of whether Mr McCutcheon’s claimed conditions were war-caused.
Evidence of the Applicant
9. A number of statements of Mr McCutcheon were tendered in evidence before us and supplemented by his oral evidence.
10. In January 1966 Mr McCutcheon joined the RAAF and undertook recruit training in Edinburgh. During his training he did not drink alcohol at all. After his training he was taken to the base “booza” for a “victory drink”.
11. After his training he was posted to Wagga Wagga and completed his mechanics course. During this time he had bought his first car which was a 1957 “Chevy”. At that time he had little money available after paying off this car on hire purchase.
12. At this time he did not go to the “bar’ which was the base wet canteen. He stated that the only time that he drank alcohol was on the pay weekend when he and some colleagues would consume fish and chips and two cans of beer.
13. Prior to his service in Vietnam he would visit his brother who was based at RAAF Fairbairn where there were the odd party where alcohol was consumed. On those occasions he would not drink more than 2 “pots” of beer.
14. After Mr McCutcheon arrived in Vietnam he remarked that “things changed somewhat”. He remarked: “It did not take long to find out that all the stories that were told back in Canberra were not true and that it was not the full time fun place that I heard of”. He was “not ready for the real thing”.
15. In his evidence, both oral and written, as well as in his discussions with treating practitioners, Mr McCutcheon enumerated various stressful situations.
16. Mr McCutcheon had experience with blood on the floor of the helicopters. He remarked: “I recall the blood on the helicopter floors, which turned me inside out, and this was in a few days”. He particularly mentioned the occasion when he removed a floor panel from a helicopter which had a considerable quantity of congealed blood under the panel. He later learned that the man that had been transported in that helicopter had died.
17. Mr McCutcheon heard shocking stories about the death and injury of servicemen.
18. Mr McCutcheon aided in loading wounded soldiers onto a Hercules aircraft. The soldiers were all bandaged up, some had limbs missing. This activity was done by him on a voluntary basis with the knowledge of his senior officer to support his fellow soldiers.
19. Mr McCutcheon also mentioned an incident where he had to service a helicopter that had landed in a field. The helicopter was guarded by two tanks. Mr McCutcheon felt vulnerable to attack on that occasion.
20. Mr McCutcheon saw caskets containing killed in action soldiers.
21. Mr McCutcheon also mentioned his experiences upon a medivac helicopter when he was accompanying a badly wounded soldier who had a lot of blood on a field bandage and his jungle greens. The soldier was moaning but Mr McCutcheon could not communicate with the soldier because of the noise of the helicopter. On that occasion the helicopter gunmen apparently exchanged gunfire with enemy on the ground. The helicopter took a steep rise and turn. He defecated involuntarily fearing that he was going to die.
22. Mr McCutcheon also stated that he was devastated by the news of the crash of a helicopter (A2-678) with Duncan McNair (known at “Mother McNair”) on board. Duncan McNair suffered severe burns and later died in a Tokyo hospital. Mr McCutcheon regarded Duncan McNair as a “terrific guy, a real mate, always with a smile on his face and a great person to be with, when that was possible”.
23. Mr McCutcheon mentioned that there was considerable pressure to maintain serviced helicopters. He remarked: “The pressure in our hanger was to keep up the serviceability, don’t let the side down”.
24. Mr McCutcheon stated that it was during his service in Vietnam that he began to drink heavily. In one statement he remarked: “Even after work had finished I just wanted to forget that days work, but it was hard to unwind, so I became drawn to our Booza to let myself unwind, it was like an antidote, to smother the days thoughts and feelings, and with all the noise at night from the bombings on the Long Hai mountains, the beer gave me some relief and helped a little, to get a few hours sleep. My drinking over the tour increased slowly but surely”.
25. After Mr McCutcheon left the RAAF in 1972 he returned to Australia where he was very unsettled and was drinking heavily.
26. Mr McCutcheon remarked that he then took a job as a mechanic with a Singapore based company of which his brother was his manager. He worked in that role for 10 years. Most of his time with the company was spent working in Indonesia. He spent much of his time, as a matter of choice, working in remote areas of the jungle. He was having a lot of trouble dealing with people generally and he found it best to be on his own or with a limited number of people. He was able to last at his job largely because his brother was his boss and able to accommodate his idiosyncrasies and difficult behaviour. Eventually he fell out with his brother and quit his employment.
27. When Mr McCutcheon returned to Australia he ended up doing a number of odd jobs which did not last long. In 1988 he moved to Queensland and built his own home as an owner builder. He did real estate work for nine months. On his own account he was not successful in real estate work because he lacked patience in dealing with people.
28. In the early 1990s Mr McCutcheon took a job with the Salvation Army as their second-hand sales manager. He found that he could not deal with people and he decided to work on his own in a slashing business. He has not worked since he ceased the slashing business in about 2000. He is now on a service pension.
29. Mr McCutcheon stated that he suffered from a range of symptoms including excessive worry, anger, shortness of breath, chest tightness, depression, fatigue and poor memory and concentration. He is currently taking an anti-depressant as medication.
Evidence of Medical Witnesses
30. There has been a difference of psychiatric opinion in this case.
31. Dr Jerome Gelb, who was the first treating psychiatrist, concluded that Mr McCutcheon suffered from post traumatic stress disorder and alcohol dependence/abuse (folio 45).
32. However, two treating psychiatrists have concluded that Mr McCutcheon has an anxiety disorder.
33. Dr Bob Anderson was the second treating psychiatrist. He had access to Dr Gelb’s reports with which he largely agreed (folio 138). Dr Anderson considered that Mr McCutcheon suffers from generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence [folio 139).
34. Dr Zoran Radovic, who is the current treating psychiatrist, has also concluded that Mr McCutcheon suffers from generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence (folio 243).
35. We prefer the diagnoses of Dr Anderson and Dr Radovic which have been based on DSM-IV. Mr McCutcheon has a good connection with Dr Radovic. These diagnoses have not been disputed by contrary medical evidence.
36. We find that Mr McCutcheon has generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence.
Legislative Background
37. Section 9 of the Act provides for when an injury or disease is taken to be war-caused, and provides relevantly as follows:
“9 War-caused injuries or diseases
(1)Subject to this section, for the purposes of this Act, an injury suffered by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused injury, or a disease contracted by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused disease, if:
(a)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service;
(b)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran; …”
38. The expression “operational service” is defined in ss 6 to 6F of the Act. Under s 6C, a person renders operational service if he or she is, inter alia, allotted for duty in an operational area. There is no issue that the applicant has not rendered operational service.
39. Section 13(1) of the Act provides, in effect, that where a veteran has become incapacitated from a war-caused injury or a war-caused disease, the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the veteran.
40. As the applicant has performed operational service, as defined in s 6 of the Act, the determination of whether his asserted conditions are war-caused is to be made by applying ss 120(1) and 120(3) of the Act. Those sections provide relevantly as follows:
“120 Standard of Proof
(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…
(3)In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b)that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.”
41. Under s 120A of the Act, in the case of applications lodged after 1 June 1994, where the Repatriation Medical Authority (“RMA”) has made a SoP in respect of a particular kind of injury or disease, the reasonableness of an hypothesis is to be assessed by reference to that SoP. This follows from s 120A(3), which provides:
“(3)For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b)a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this section.”
42. Subsection (4) of s 120A excludes the operation of subsection (3) in certain circumstances which are not relevant to the present proceedings.
43. Section 196A of the Act provides for the establishment of the RMA. Section 196B of the Act provides, in effect, that if the RMA is of the view that there is sound medical-scientific evidence that indicates that a particular kind of injury, disease or death can be related to operational service rendered by veterans, the RMA must determine a SoP in respect of that kind of injury, disease or death setting out the factors that must as a minimum exist, and which of those factors must be related to service rendered by a person, before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting an injury, disease or death of that kind with the circumstances of the veteran’s service. The reference in s 196B(2) to a particular kind of injury, disease or death being “related to service” is expounded in s 196B(14). This provides relevantly, in effect, that a factor causing an injury is “related to service” rendered by a person if it resulted from an occurrence that happened while the person was rendering that service, or if it arose out of, or was attributable to, that service.
Consideration
44. The claimed conditions of generalised anxiety disorder and alcohol abuse and dependence are the subject of SoPs.
45. We have to consider whether the contentions of the applicant satisfy the following Statements of Principles:
Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse: Instrument No 76 of 1998;
Generalised Anxiety Disorder: Instrument No.1 of 2000.
46. The Tribunal observes that where a SoP exists it must apply the test prescribed by s120A(3) of the VE Act, as explained in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 in the following way:
“1 The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2 If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3 If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person’s service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be “reasonable” and the claim will fail.
4 The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.”
47. We are satisfied that the evidence before us points to a hypothesis connecting the conditions of the applicant’s operational service. That hypothesis is that Mr McCutcheon’s conditions were caused by the events that he described.
48. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered all of the material before it, as we must do: see Bull v Repatriation Commission(2001) 188 ALR 756 at [21]; Hardman v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 1174 at [39] to [41], and Elliott v Repatriation Commission (2002) 73 ALD 377.
49. We also emphasise that at this stage of our reasoning we are not concerned with issues of credibility. In Elliott v Repatriation Commission (2002) 73 ALD 377 Stone J, at [25], likened the decision-maker’s task to striking out a statement of claim as failing to disclose a cause of action, where no consideration is given to whether the facts pleaded can be substantiated.
50. We must now further consider (once again, after taking into account all of the material before us) that the hypotheses referred to above could not be said to be “obviously fanciful or impossible or incredible or not tenable or too remote or too tenuous” and so not reasonable (see Bull (supra) at [18]. where Emmett and Allsop JJ explained the significance in this regard of East v Repatriation Commission(1987) 16 FCR 517). I refer also to Repatriation Commission v Bey(1997) 79 FCR 364 where in their joint judgment, Northrop, Sundberg, Marshall and Merkell JJ said in effect (at pages 372.9 to 373.1) that a “reasonable hypothesis” involves more than a mere possibility, and is a hypothesis pointed to by the facts, even though not proved on the balance of probabilities.
51. We must now turn to the second step as enunciated in Deledio. We have already mentioned that SoPs have been determined by the RMA pursuant to s 196(2) of the Act in respect of the conditions in question:
Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse: Instrument No 76 of 1998;
Generalised Anxiety Disorder: Instrument No.1 of 2000.
52. We must now turn to the third step as enunciated in Deledio. This entails determining whether the relevant hypothesis complies with one or more of the factors referred to in the relevant SoPs. This step involves considering all of the material before us. We emphasis that at this step we are not concerned with making any findings of fact at this stage of the process. The history given by a veteran to a medical practitioner, such as Mr McCutcheon’s discussions with Dr Radovic, can constitute material before the Tribunal for this purpose: Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331.
Generalised Anxiety Disorder
53. Under clause 4 of the Generalised Anxiety Disorder SoP: Instrument No.1 of 2000 at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to the relevant service (being operational service) by the veteran.
54. In Clause 5 the relevant factors that are relied upon by Mr McCutcheon are “a number of stressful incidents, particularly relating to injured soldiers and the sequelae of the transport of the injured soldiers”: see Applicant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, 16 February 2006.
55. Factor 5 (a) (ii) concerns the experience of a “severe psychosocial stressor”:
56. In White v Repatriation Commission (2004) 39 AAR 67, in discussing a similar SoP, Statement of Principles (No 2 of 2000), Spender J (at [30]) remarked: “In my judgment, the definition of severe psychosocial stressor concerns an occurrence that, objectively, is an occurrence the nature of which is such as to evoke feelings of a particular kind in a person exposed to that occurrence and which, subjectively, evokes feelings of substantial distress in the particular person concerned”. See also Stonehouse and Repatriation Commission [2004] AATA 707.
57. Applying these remarks of Spender J to this case we consider that the experiences of Mr McCutcheon on the medivac helicopter flight can be said to be a “severe psychosocial stressor”. This is because it objectively evoked feelings of “a particular kind” in the sense mentioned by His Honour. We consider that the incident which incorporated a steep descent would have been a frightening experience for a young man who had no seat belt or flak jacket. Indeed, Mr Shipp in his statement said that Mr McCutcheon was “severely shaken” by this incident (folio 261. This is objective evidence that we have relied upon.
58. The involuntary defecation of Mr McCutcheon is other objective evidence that we rely upon as it indicates that he was terror-stricken and evidences “substantial distress in an individual” as required by the SoP.
59. We also find that the subjective requirement that Spender J enunciated in White v Repatriation Commission (2004) 39 AAR 87 is satisfied in this matter by the evidence of Dr Anderson (folio 137) and Dr Rodovic (folio 240-1). In particular, Dr Radovic reported:
“Mr McCutcheon experienced an extreme horror, terror and hopelessness thinking that he was going to die”.
60. We find that the incident is within the scope of Factor 5 (a) (ii) which refers to “an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress in an individual”.
61. The meaning of “clinical onset” was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331. The Court referred to the analysis of the Tribunal in Re Robertson and Repatriation Commission (1998) 50 ALD 668, in which Senior Member Dwyer concluded (at 670) that:
“... there is a clinical onset of a disease, either when a person becomes aware of some feature or symptom which enables a doctor to say the disease was present at that time, or when a finding is made on investigation which is indicative to a doctor of the disease being present at that time.”
That analysis was specifically endorsed by Branson J in RepatriationCommission v Cornelius[2002] FCA 750.
62. In this case there is evidence before us that points to the clinical onset of anxiety disorder within his operational tour of duty.
63. Dr Anderson opined that the main factors that “caused him to cross the line into a pathological condition, namely Generalized Anxiety Disorder was his personal witnessing of severe psychological stressors such as the incident mentioned above in the helicopter” (folio 153).
64. Dr Radovic has also opined that “Mr McCutcheon’s anxiety symptoms gradually deteriorated during his service in Vietnam” (folio 241). This is within the two period mentioned in factor 5 (a)(ii).
65. We are mindful of the evidence of Mr Barry McCutcheon who gave evidence of his and his parent’s observations of Mr McCutcheon after he returned from Vietnam.
66. We consider that Mr McCutcheon’s lack of recognition for many years of his anxiety symptoms and behaviour as being psychological is a credible explanation for the delay in his diagnosis and the commencement of treatment.
67. For these reasons we consider that factor 5 (a) (ii) has been established in this case for the purpose of considering the third step as enunciated in Deledio.
Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse
68. Under clause 4 of the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP: Instrument No 76 of 1998 at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to the relevant service (being operational service) by the veteran.
69. In Clause 5 the relevant factor which is relied upon by Mr Thomas in contention is factor 5(b).
70. We are mindful of the evidence before us that the medivac helicopter flight occurred in about December 1969 or January 1970 (folio 114).
71. We consider that this flight would constitute a severe stressor as mentioned in Factor 5 (b) which requires that there must be evidence of an applicant “experiencing a severe stressor”. For the purposes of the SoP the expression “experiencing a severe stressor” means that the applicant would have to be confronted with an event which might evoke “intense fear, helplessness or horror”: see the definition of “experiencing a severe stressor” (in clause 8 of the SoP). This definition includes the “observation of casualty clearance”: However, there is also a requirement under factor 5(b) that the severe stressor must be experienced within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of alcohol dependence. In this case there is clear evidence that Mr McCutcheon commenced the regular daily consumption of 6-10 cans of beer soon after he arrived in Vietnam (folio 70).
72. We do not consider that factor 5 (b) of the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP is established in this case for the purpose of considering the third step as enunciated in Deledio. We have concluded that the relevant hypothesis does not fit within the “template” as the regular high consumption of alcohol preceded the severe stressor.
Ruling on the Third Deledio Step
73. For the above reasons, we consider that the hypothesis raised by the material before us is consistent with the abovementioned factor of the SoP for generalised anxiety disorder, and so by virtue of s 120A(3) of the VE Act, the hypothesis connecting Mr Thomas’s condition of generalised anxiety disorder with the circumstances of his operational service is reasonable and supported by medical evidence before us.
Ruling on Fourth Deledio Step
74. We now turn to the fourth stage of the process explained in Deledio. This involves our making findings of fact from the material before me, bearing in mind the provisions of s 120(1) of the Act to the effect that the claim will succeed unless we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for determining that the incapacity in question was war-caused. If we are not so satisfied, Mr McCutcheon’s claim must succeed by virtue of s 120(1) of the VE Act. In examining this question, we note that there is no onus of proof (see s 120(6) of the VE Act, and the explanation of the role of this Tribunal as an administrative decision-maker in Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at pages 424.8 to 425.5). We also refer to Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 at [13], where Mason CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:
“If a reasonable hypothesis is established, sub-s.(1) of s.120 is applied. The claim will succeed unless:
(a)one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis are disproved beyond reasonable doubt; or
(b)the truth of another fact in the material is inconsistent with the hypothesis, is proved beyond reasonable doubt,
thus disproving, beyond reasonable doubt, the hypothesis.”
75. We do not consider that there is any basis for not allowing the claim for generalised anxiety disorder to succeed.
Decision
76. For the above reasons, we affirm the decision under review in respect of the claim for alcohol abuse and dependence but we set aside the decision under review for generalised anxiety disorder.
77. We decide that the generalised anxiety disorder condition of Mr McCutcheon is war caused. The date of effect is 21 March 2004.
I certify that the 77 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member P McDermott and Assoc Professor J B Morley, Member.
Signed: .....................................................................................
B. Hitchcock, Admin AssistantDate/s of Hearing 28 June 2006
Date of Decision 31 August 2006
Solicitor for the Applicant Mr A Harding, of Counsel
Counsel for the Applicant Terrence O’Connor Solicitors
For the Respondent Mr B Williams, Departmental Advocate
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