McCormack v Commonwealth

Case [2007] FMCA 1245


FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McCORMACK v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2007] FMCA 1245
HUMAN RIGHTS – Disability discrimination in employment – harassment in relation to disability – applicant with cancer and anxiety condition – questions at job interview – referee reports – placement on return from sick leave – harassment by fellow employee – employer’s complicity in harassment – higher duties – request for transfer – failure of temporary employer to find permanent position – refusal of voluntary redundancy/job swap – alleged corporate knowledge and opinion – alleged reputation of applicant as health risk – discrimination because of disability not proved – complicity in harassment not proved –  applications dismissed.
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss.4, 5, 10, 15, 35, 122, 123, 124
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s.3
Public Services Act 1999 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules (Cth)

Federal Magistrates Court Rules2001 (Cth) r.1.03

Commonwealth of Australia v Humphries (1998) 86 FCR 324
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
O’Grady v The Northern Queensland Company Limited (1990) 169 CLR 356

IN CAG 34 OF 2003

Applicant: PATRICK McCORMACK
Respondent: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (DEPARTMENT OF THE SENATE)
File number: CAG 34 of 2003
Judgment of: Mowbray FM
Hearing dates: 15, 16, 17, 18 November 2005
Date of last submissions 10 February 2006
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 14 August 2007

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr W Sharwood
Solicitors for the Applicant: Higgins Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R M Henderson
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN CAG 28 OF 2004

Applicant: PATRICK McCORMACK
Respondent: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE ARTS)
File number: CAG 28 of 2004
Judgment of: Mowbray FM
Hearing dates: 15, 16, 17, 18 November 2005
Date of last submissions 10 February 2006
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 14 August 2007

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr W Sharwood
Solicitors for the Applicant: Higgins Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R M Henderson
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

IN CAG 34 OF 2003

  1. The application filed on 22 December 2003 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under Order 62 of the Federal Court Rules and calculated at 85 per cent of the costs payable under those Rules.

  3. The Court certifies that this was an appropriate case for each party to be represented by counsel.

IN CAG 28 OF 2004

  1. The application filed on 4 August 2004 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under Order 62 of the Federal Court Rules and calculated at 85 per cent of the costs payable under those Rules.

  3. The Court certifies that this was an appropriate case for each party to be represented by counsel.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
CANBERRA

CAG 34 OF 2003

PATRICK McCORMACK

Applicant

And

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (DEPARTMENT OF THE SENATE)

Respondent

CAG 28 OF 2004

PATRICK McCORMACK

Applicant

And

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE ARTS)

Continue reading McCormack v Commonwealth

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
McCormack v Commonwealth [2007] FMCA 1245
Case
[2007] FMCA 1245
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of McCormack v Commonwealth, the applicant, Mr. McCormack, sought to challenge the Commonwealth's decision not to grant him a permanent position, which he had hoped to attain through a job swap arrangement with another employee, Mr. Nugent. The proceedings were heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where Mr. McCormack argued that his disability had been a factor in the decision not to make his position permanent, contrary to the provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Commonwealth's actions constituted discrimination under the Act. Mr. McCormack's argument hinged on the assertion that an able-bodied comparator would have been treated more favourably in his position. The court examined the evidence regarding the job swap arrangement, the communications between Mr. McCormack and the Department of Senate and the Office of the Secretary (DOS), and the context in which Mr. Nugent's decision was made. The court found that while Mr. McCormack had anticipated a permanent position, DOS had consistently communicated that this was not guaranteed and was contingent upon Mr. Nugent's decision. Additionally, the court noted that DOS had a policy against making temporary transfers permanent without merit selection, and this policy was further complicated by ongoing negotiations for a new enterprise agreement which had raised concerns among staff about promotion prospects.

After considering all the evidence, the court concluded that the Commonwealth's decision did not amount to discrimination as Mr. McCormack had not demonstrated that an able-bodied person in a similar situation would have been treated differently. The court rejected the argument that the staff issue raised by DOS was an ex post facto justification for their decision, finding that it was a legitimate and pre-existing policy. Therefore, the court dismissed Mr. McCormack's application, finding that the Commonwealth had not contravened the Disability Discrimination Act.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that Mr. McCormack pay the Commonwealth's costs. The court also certified that this was an appropriate case for each party to be represented by counsel.

Orders

Orders of the court

IN CAG 34 OF 2003

1.

The application filed on 22 December 2003 be dismissed.

2.

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under Order 62 of the Federal Court Rules and calculated at 85 per cent of the costs payable under those Rules.

3.

The Court certifies that this was an appropriate case for each party to be represented by counsel.

IN CAG 28 OF 2004

1.

The application filed on 4 August 2004 be dismissed.

2.

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed under Order 62 of the Federal Court Rules and calculated at 85 per cent of the costs payable under those Rules.

3.

The Court certifies that this was an appropriate case for each party to be represented by counsel.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

But on the evidence it is stretching things to conclude that an able bodied comparator would have been treated differently:·Mr McCormack certainly entertained an expectation of a permanent position·DOS officers had always said that this was never more than a possibility. Ms Avery says in a letter of 10 April 2001:The exchange currently in place between you and the Senate employee concerned has been agreed between this department and the Department of Communications for a period of approximately 12 months. The Senate employee has been given undertakings in relation to the exchange arrangement that if, at the end of the agreed period, his preference is that he return to duties with the Senate Department, he will be able to do so, If that Senate employee states a preference for a move to the Department of Communications as an ongoing employee, consideration can be given by both departments to a possible exchange between you and the Senate employee on an ongoing basis. (emphasis added)·the evidence of the other DOS witnesses is completely consistent with this letter·it was always pointed out to Mr McCormack that any consideration of a permanent position was dependent on what Mr Nugent finally decided to do·because of some difficulties Mr Nugent had had with one of his supervisors at DOS, senior officers at DOS were adamant that they did not want anything done which might suggest to Mr Nugent that he was being pushed out·Mr Nugent appears to have reserved his position until very late – he did not advise DOS until 19 December 2001 that he wished to stay at DCITA – and changed it on a number of occasions·Mr Nugent did not stay at DCITA but returned to DOS although the precise circumstances surrounding his return are unclear – it appears it was when the twelve month temporary transfer/job swap ended·a number of DOS witnesses made it clear that it would be out of the ordinary at DOS for a person on temporary transfer becoming permanent without merit selection ·Mr McCormack applied for DOS advertised vacancies and was unsuccessful in a merit selection·the possibility of a permanent transfer at level became more difficult at the time because of negotiations for a new certified or enterprise agreement during which staff had expressed concerns about the implications for their prospects of promotion·a permanent transfer “would undermine undertakings given to staff”. I reject Mr McCormack’s contention that the staff issue amounts to an ex post facto justification. He submitted that if the proposed permanent job swap had taken place “there could never be the suggestion that Mr McCormack took someone’s position.” I agree with DOS that this is erroneous:The applicant would have been taking Mr Nugent’s position. If Mr Nugent had simply transferred from DOS to DCITA, his position would have been advertised. Other PEL 1 officers at DOS, and any APS 6 officers at DOS who aspired to promotion, would have had the opportunity to compete for the position that Mr Nugent had vacated. Had it proceeded, the proposed job swap would have foreclosed that opportunity for DOS staff.