McComish v Harman
[2016] WASC 324
•7 OCTOBER 2016
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: McCOMISH -v- HARMAN [2016] WASC 324
CORAM: HALL J
HEARD: 12 SEPTEMBER 2016
DELIVERED : 7 OCTOBER 2016
FILE NO/S: SJA 1031 of 2016
BETWEEN: HARRISON STANLEY McCOMISH
Appellant
AND
KEVIN ALLAN HARMAN
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MAGISTRATE P M HEANEY
File No :PE 28839 of 2015, PE 55584 of 2015
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm - First offender - Youth - Committed whilst intoxicated - Rehabilitation - Very minor injuries - Whether magistrate erred in treating intoxication as an aggravating factor - Whether sentence of immediate imprisonment manifestly excessive
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Sentence set aside and appellant re-sentenced
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Ms M R Barone
Respondent: Ms K C Cook
Solicitors:
Appellant: Barone Criminal Lawyers
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Ali v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 55
Baudoeuf v Venning [2010] WASC 322
Brown v Bluett [2013] WASC 189
Butler v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 104
Clarke v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2013] WASCA 197
Closter v Humphreys [2012] WASC 145
Cullen v Rollings [2009] WASC 80
Damiani v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 47
Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321
Elliott v Blanchard [2007] WASC 289
Eric v Bull [2014] WASC 342
Forward v Bower [2007] WASC 205
Harrison v Hunter [2012] WASC 166
Holden v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 50
Leeder v Moss [2011] WASC 196
Lutey v Jacques [2010] WASC 78
Messiha v Plaucs [2012] WASC 63
Mical v Ward [2003] WASCA 149
Morgan v Kazandzis [2010] WASC 377
Mourish v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 257
Paskov v Hull [2008] WASC 163
Poletti v Adams [2005] WASC 66
Stokes v Auckland [2012] WASC 2
Wallam v Dent [2008] WASC 170
Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 111
Wungundin v Barndon [2013] WASC 28
Zwerus v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 174
HALL J: On 6 April 2016 Harrison Stanley McComish, the appellant, appeared in the Perth Magistrates Court and was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment for one offence of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm and 3 months' imprisonment for breaching a protective bail condition. The 3 month sentence was made concurrent and, accordingly, the total effective sentence was one of 7 months' imprisonment. The appellant seeks leave to appeal against that sentence.
On 27 April 2016, the appellant was granted bail pending the hearing of the appeal. The appeal was heard on 12 September 2016, at which time I reserved my decision and extended bail.
The facts
In 2015 the appellant had a significant methylamphetamine abuse problem. At approximately 7.00 am on 13 June 2015 he went to his father's house in Kingsley. He was under the influence of methylamphetamines at the time.
The appellant entered the garage of the premises by an unlocked door and then gained entry to the house. He went to his father's bedroom, pushed the door open and called for his father to come out. After a short period of time the appellant became impatient and entered the bedroom. He approached his father, who was standing at the end of his bed, and without warning punched him once to the left side of the face. His father then pushed the appellant out of the bedroom, but in doing so stumbled to the ground. The appellant punched his father several more times whilst he was on the ground. The appellant's father attempted to protect himself by grabbing hold of the appellant, however the appellant placed him in a headlock. This caused the appellant's father to have difficulty breathing and he fell to the ground. The appellant then left the premises.
The appellant's father sustained bruising and swelling to both cheeks, bleeding from a cut inside his mouth and an abrasion to his right elbow. He suffered pain and stiffness to his jaw and face. There was no suggestion that medical treatment had been required or that the injuries had any long term effects.
The appellant was arrested a short time after the incident and taken to the Joondalup Police Station. He participated in a recorded interview and made full admissions. In explanation for his conduct, he advised that he was having 'a conversation with his sisters and his father in his head and became angry when his father said he was going to do things of a sexual nature to his sister so he went to the house' (ts 3). The suggestion was not that his father had actually said these things, but that whilst under the influence of drugs he had believed that such things were said. He was charged with assault occasioning bodily harm, in circumstances of aggravation, being that the appellant was in a family and domestic relationship with the victim, contrary to s 317(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (WA). He was also charged with burglary, though this charge was later discontinued.
The appellant first appeared in the Magistrates Court on 14 June 2015 and was granted bail. The bail included protective conditions requiring him not to communicate with his father, not to approach within 10 m of his father and not to approach within 100 m of his father's house. The bail was renewed on several occasions, however the appellant remained in custody until 24 July 2015 because he was unable to obtain a surety.
At approximately 7.45 pm on 15 November 2015 the appellant breached his bail conditions by attending at his father's house. He was located there by police and was arrested. He told police that he had attended at the house to get some personal items. His father was away from home at the time and he knew that that was the case. He was charged with failing to comply with a requirement of his bail undertaking, being a protective condition, contrary to s 51(2a) of the Bail Act 1982 (WA). The appellant was initially remanded in custody on this charge before being granted bail on 4 December 2015. Accordingly, by the time he came to be sentenced the appellant had spent a total of 60 days in custody.
There was a delay in bringing the matters to a resolution. However, on 12 February 2016, the prosecution discontinued the burglary charge and the appellant pleaded guilty to the assault and bail charges. The matter was then adjourned to 6 April 2016 in order to allow preparation of a pre‑sentence report.
Personal circumstances and the pre‑sentence report
The appellant was 21 years old at the time of the offences and 22 by the time he came to be sentenced. He was a first offender, with no criminal record of prior offences either as an adult or a juvenile.
The appellant was born in Perth and is one of four siblings born to his parents' union. His parents separated approximately eight years ago and he then resided with each of them on a week‑on/week‑off basis. He described his upbringing as 'supportive and loving' but also said that he and his siblings had occasionally witnessed domestic violence within the family home. At the time of the writing of the pre‑sentence report the appellant was residing with his father. The bail conditions had been amended on 12 February 2016 to permit this.
The appellant completed school to year 11 and then attended a TAFE college before securing an apprenticeship in the painting industry. At the time of the report he was employed on a fulltime basis as a painter.
The appellant was in good physical health and has not suffered from depression or anxiety. He did, however, have a significant issue with illicit drugs. He commenced using methylamphetamine at the age of 16. This habit was described as recreational until the age of 19, when he obtained a personal loan and spent $4,000 on drugs, which he used daily for a month. He continued using drugs regularly after that time. He told the report writer that his daily use of methylamphetamine had ceased two weeks prior to the report interview, however the author was unable to confirm this.
Some of the answers given to the pre‑sentence author displayed inappropriate bravado and significant immaturity. The report writer notes that the appellant appeared to have little understanding of the seriousness of his offending and blamed it on his illicit substance abuse. He showed no victim empathy and little remorse. Despite recognising the causative effect that illicit drugs had had on the offending he was said to have shown little interest in residential rehabilitation or an intensive drug programme. His presentation to the pre‑sentence report writer was at odds with the fact that he had reconciled with his father, undertaken drug counselling and entered pleas of guilty. In these circumstances, the attitude referred to in the report needed to be treated with caution.
Sentencing submissions
Defence counsel (who was not counsel on the appeal) submitted that the appellant had cooperated with police from the outset and made full admissions when interviewed. The appellant had indicated from an early stage his intention to plead guilty to the assault charge. This was not disputed.
Counsel submitted that at the time of the assault the appellant had a significant methylamphetamine drug habit. Prior to attending his father's home he had been suffering from auditory hallucinations caused by the drugs. He believed that his father was abusing his younger sister and this was his motivation for attending at his father's home. After he was arrested he remained in custody because his family were concerned about his behaviour and decided not to bail him out of prison. When he was eventually released he voluntarily attended counselling at the North Metropolitan Community Drug Service. A letter from that Service was handed up to the magistrate, which confirmed that the appellant had engaged well with counselling and appeared to be very motivated to continue abstinence from methylamphetamine. At the date of the letter he had abstained from drug use for 10 weeks.
In regard to the breach of bail, counsel said that the appellant had attended his father's home to pick up some cigarettes and personal possessions. At the time, his father was away in Hong Kong and he knew that his father was absent when he went to the premises. The appellant's younger sister was there and she called the police. When police arrived the appellant cooperated with them and apologised to his sister for embarrassing her. He again pleaded guilty to this charge at an early opportunity.
Counsel said that when the burglary charge was dismissed on 12 February 2016 the protective bail conditions were removed and the appellant then moved back into his father's home. A letter from the appellant's father was handed up to the magistrate. The appellant's father stated that it was only shortly before the assault that he became aware of the severity of the appellant's drug use. He said that he and the entire family were shocked to discover the large quantities of drugs that the appellant was using, which had resulted in his drug induced psychosis. The appellant had then spent a significant time in prison as no‑one in the family was willing to bail him out. However, that had been a turning point and the appellant had made significant progress since that time. The letter stated that the appellant no longer drinks alcohol regularly and, to the best of his father's knowledge, he was no longer consuming the hard drugs that resulted in the assault. The appellant was also working fulltime and his employer was supporting his efforts towards a recovery. The appellant's father said that whilst he was not making excuses for his son, the appellant was young and had a bright future and that as a father all he wanted for him was to become a happy and productive member of society.
Counsel for the appellant accepted that the appellant had not presented favourably to the author of the pre‑sentence report. However, he said that that report needed to be seen in the context of the efforts that the appellant had genuinely made towards his rehabilitation. Whilst the appellant had indicated an unwillingness to undergo a residential programme, this was because he was keen to keep his fulltime employment as a painter. He was, however, prepared to undergo a community based order and counselling.
Defence counsel stressed that the appellant had no previous criminal record and that the offending was out of character. The assault had occurred in the context of excessive drug use and this was an issue that the appellant had taken positive steps to remedy. He had engaged with counselling and was in fulltime employment. It was submitted that it was unlikely that he would reoffend. Taking into account the time that the appellant had spent in custody, his early pleas of guilty and his youth, counsel submitted that a community based order or a fine would be an appropriate disposition. He also sought a spent conviction because of the likely impact of a conviction on future employment and overseas travel.
The prosecution submitted that whilst the assault offence was a serious one, a term of immediate imprisonment was not required. It was noted that the appellant still had outstanding treatment needs and that an intensive supervision order with programme requirements would be an appropriate disposition. It was submitted that such an order would adequately prevent the likelihood of reoffending.
Sentencing remarks
In the course of sentencing submissions, the magistrate interrupted defence counsel and the following exchange occurred:
HIS HONOUR: It doesn't cease to amaze me that because someone is under the influence of methylamphetamine, it's almost like it's a mitigating circumstance. It is, in itself an offence. So you've got the offence of assault, aggravated by the fact that he's just committed an offence of taking methylamphetamine, but it seems to be a mitigating circumstance.
O'CONNOR, MR: Well, that's not the way that I am putting it to your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: It's the way - you're not using those words, but that's what you're saying. Because of the fact that he was out of his mind because he has taken methylamphetamine means that we shouldn't really treat it as seriously as we would otherwise (ts 7). (emphasis added)
The magistrate commenced his sentencing remarks by stating:
In this matter we have just heard the facts, and they appear to me to be a dreadful set of facts. And one of the most alarming set of facts are that the last paragraph the sergeant read out in explanation:
'The accused advised he was having a conversation with his sister and his father in his head and became angry when he said his father said he was going to do things of a sexual nature to his sisters.'
So in that state, he went to the house and entered the house and assaulted the father in the manner that we heard. It was a very serious assault. The father was injured. And we're told - I received a letter from his father saying that, you know, he doesn't speak in support of him, but the assault charges are not necessarily - the victim is not the only one. Society also demands that the courts deal with these assaults.
They're offences against society, not simply an offence against the victim. And that has been reiterated many times. So they're the facts and I accept that he has pleaded guilty to these - to those facts. I've just heard submissions from his counsel, Mr O'Connor and I also note that he has got no conviction. No - he has got a clean record. But I will refer to the pre‑sentence report which I have - which has been brought to my attention (ts 9 ‑ 10).
His Honour then quoted from the pre‑sentence report. He also noted the letter from the appellant's father which he said 'seems to be very forgiving'. He then said:
But I have to take into account the nature of the assault as this is an assault not solely against his father, but against society in general. The violence in society is a serious problem and people have to do something about it. The police lay the charges, the courts have to deal with them.
And we have to take into account the nature of the assault and the fact that his father received a severe belting on this day for absolutely nothing because his son imagined his father had said something (ts 11). (emphasis added)
His Honour then referred for the need for any penalty to include a component of what he said was 'old fashioned punishment'. He described the assault as being 'dreadful' and having occurred with 'absolutely no provocation or no justification'. He then said that he disagreed with the submissions that had been made both by the defence and the prosecution and had come to the conclusion that the only appropriate sentence was an immediate term of imprisonment.
His Honour's starting point for the assault was 12 months' imprisonment, which he reduced to 9 months to take into account the plea of guilty. Although not specifically stated, this clearly represented the maximum discount of 25% for a plea of guilty entered at the first reasonable opportunity: s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). His Honour then further reduced that sentence to take into account time spent in custody. It was open to him to either give credit for that time by reducing the sentence or to backdate the sentence: s 87 Sentencing Act. He chose to do the former and thus reduced the sentence on the assault offence to 7 months. It is, however, important to bear in mind that due to the time spent in custody this sentence was the equivalent to one of 9 months' imprisonment.
Grounds of appeal
The grounds of appeal, as amended at the hearing, are as follows:
Ground 1: The learned sentencing magistrate erred by treating the appellant's mistaken belief that the complainant was intending to sexually assault his sister as an aggravating factor of the Aggravated Assault Occasioning Bodily Harm offence;
Ground 2: The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances, in particular given:
i.The appellant's motivation for the offending;
ii.The personal circumstances of the appellant (including his age, lack of record, and attempts at rehabilitation); and
iii.The prosecutor's concession that a term of imprisonment was not warranted in all of the circumstances.
Ground 1
Voluntary intoxication does not provide an excuse for criminal conduct. Excessive use of drugs or alcohol may cause judgment to be impaired or, as here, may cause delusional beliefs. A person who is intoxicated may do things that they would never do when sober. However, if the drugs or alcohol are voluntarily taken the person will be held liable for their actions whilst intoxicated: s 28(2) Criminal Code.
In this case, the appellant did not seek to excuse his conduct on the grounds that he was under the influence of drugs at the time. He accepted his criminal responsibility by pleading guilty to the assault offence. The issue here is what role the appellant's intoxication had in assessing the seriousness of the offence.
The seriousness of an offence must be determined by taking into account the statutory penalty for the offence, the circumstances of the commission of the offence (including the vulnerability of any victim), any aggravating factors and any mitigating factors: s 6(2) Sentencing Act. A court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment on an offender unless it decides that the seriousness of the offence is such that only imprisonment can be justified or the protection of the community requires it: s 6(4) Sentencing Act. Aggravating factors are factors which, in the court's opinion, increase the culpability of the offender: s 7(1) Sentencing Act. Conversely, mitigating factors are factors which in the court's opinion decrease the culpability of the offender or decrease the extent to which the offender should be punished: s 8(1) Sentencing Act.
Intoxication is generally not a mitigating factor: Damiani v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 47 [41] ‑ [42], Butler v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 104 [8] and Zwerus v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 174 [25]. It would be inconsistent with the rule that those who voluntarily take drugs or alcohol are held responsible for their actions whilst under the influence of those substances to treat intoxication as somehow reducing their culpability. Where drug taking has been voluntary the offender is generally regarded as being morally responsible for his or her condition. The magistrate in this case appeared to be of the view that defence counsel was advancing intoxication as a mitigating factor. In fact, defence counsel was careful to eschew such a suggestion. His point was that this offending had occurred in the context of drug use which the appellant had since addressed and that it was otherwise out of character. This was relevant to the risk of re‑offending, any need to protect the community and to specific deterrence.
The magistrate expressed the view that not only was intoxication not a mitigating factor but it was an aggravating factor. In this regard, he referred to the fact that the intoxication was caused by an illegal drug and that the appellant committed another offence by possessing and using that drug. His Honour also referred to the assault being unprovoked and without justification.
Intoxication may be an aggravating factor if it materially affects the seriousness of the offence. It did not increase the seriousness of this offence. The relevance of intoxication in sentencing is in regard to the state of mind of the offender at the time of the offence is committed. It will usually be taken into account in considering the circumstances of the commission of the offence. An offence committed by a sober, clear‑minded person who has the capacity to understand and control their actions will usually be considered more serious: Butler [8] (McLure P). Had the appellant committed the assault whilst he was sober and thinking clearly that would have been an aggravating factor. It was an aggravating factor that was not present on this occasion because of his intoxication. To refer to the assault as being unprovoked and without justification was to assume that the appellant was thinking clearly at the time. He was held to a standard that was not applicable to the circumstances. The appellant believed at the time that his actions were justified because he was labouring under the delusion caused by his drug taking that his father had threatened harm to his sisters. To call such conduct unprovoked omits an important aspect of the circumstances.
The appellant was not charged with any offence relating to the possession or use of methylamphetamine. He did not fall to be sentenced for any such offence nor could the penalty for the assault be increased to take into account any such offence. It may be that the magistrate wished to dispel any notion that use of illegal drugs provided an excuse for the offending. Clearly it did not, but that is a different matter from saying that it aggravates the offence. The assault on the appellant's father was not made worse by reason of the fact that it was committed whilst the appellant was under the influence of drugs.
The fact that those who are under the influence of methylamphetamine may be more prone to commit offences of violence is relevant to general deterrence. However, that is different from saying that intoxication is an aggravating factor. General deterrence may be a relevant consideration, but it must be considered in the light of all other relevant considerations, including those personal to the offender.
In my view, this ground of appeal is made out. The magistrate was in error in treating intoxication as an aggravating factor in this case. The significance of that error was that the offence was considered to be at a higher level of seriousness than it in fact was.
Ground 2
A ground of manifest excess asserts the existence of an implied error. A sentence is manifestly excessive if it is unreasonable or plainly unjust. To determine whether a sentence is manifestly excessive it is necessary to view it in the perspective of the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the offence, the standard of sentences customarily observed with respect to that offence, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of offences of the type and the personal circumstances of the offender. A sentence may be manifestly excessive because the wrong type of sentence has been imposed: Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321 [6].
The maximum penalty for an offence of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm contrary to s 317(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is 7 years' imprisonment. The summary conviction penalty is 3 years' imprisonment or a fine of $36,000 or both. The summary conviction penalty represents the jurisdictional limit of the Magistrates Court. It remains relevant to consider the maximum penalty in assessing the seriousness of the offence. The maximum penalty for a breach of protective bail offence contrary to s 51(2a) of the Bail Act is 3 years' imprisonment or a fine of $10,000 or both.
As to the standards of sentences customarily imposed, there is a wide range of circumstances in which offences of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm can occur. There is no established range for such offences. Penalties imposed have included intensive supervision orders, suspended sentences and sentences of immediate imprisonment. I was referred to: Holden v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 50; Ali v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 55; Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 111; Mical v Ward [2003] WASCA 149; Poletti v Adams [2005] WASC 66; Mourish v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 257; Closter v Humphreys [2012] WASC 145; Clarke v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2013] WASCA 197; and Eric v Bull [2014] WASC 342. I have also taken into account the following cases: Elliott v Blanchard [2007] WASC 289; Forward v Bower [2007] WASC 205; Wallam v Dent [2008] WASC 170; Paskov v Hull [2008] WASC 163; Morgan v Kazandzis [2010] WASC 377; Stokes v Auckland [2012] WASC 2; Messiha v Plaucs [2012] WASC 63; Leeder v Moss [2011] WASC 196; Brown v Bluett [2013] WASC 189; Baudoeuf v Venning [2010] WASC 322; Cullen v Rollings [2009] WASC 80; Lutey v Jacques [2010] WASC 78; Harrison v Hunter [2012] WASC 166; and Wungundin v Barndon [2013] WASC 28.
Whilst the offence in this case occurred in circumstances of aggravation, namely in circumstances where the appellant was in a familial relationship with the victim, the injuries inflicted were less serious than in many of the other cases. Furthermore, the appellant's personal circumstances and prospects of rehabilitation were more favourable than in most of the other case.
As to the seriousness of the assault offence, the fact that the appellant assaulted his father in his home were relevant considerations but those factors needed to be seen in the context that the appellant was motivated by a delusion brought on by his drug use. The fact that the appellant's father accepted that this was the context in which the assault occurred and that there was no suggestion of any other animosity between the appellant and his father were also relevant considerations. There was no history of domestic violence here and no indications of any propensity to violence on the part of the appellant. Whilst the assault involved multiple blows, the injuries were of a minor nature. There was no suggestion of any necessity for medical treatment or longer term pain or inconvenience.
As to personal circumstances, the appellant was relatively young at the time of the assault offence and his responses to the pre‑sentence report author tended to confirm his immaturity. Equally importantly, he had no prior criminal record. His past good character was an important mitigating factor. The efforts that the appellant had made towards his rehabilitation, in particular by undertaking drug counselling, were also significant. This is an offence for which a critical causative factor was drug use. The fact that the appellant had addressed his drug use made it unlikely that there would be any recurrence of this behaviour. This reduced the need for personal deterrence. The appellant had also pleaded guilty at what was accepted to be the first reasonable opportunity. This was a reflection of his acceptance of responsibility.
The bail offence was not an offence that, in itself, was of such seriousness as to justify a sentence of immediate imprisonment. Breach of protective bail conditions can, on occasion, be serious because such conditions are intended to ensure the safety of complainants and witnesses. However, in this case the conditions were intended to protect the appellant's father, who was absent from the house. There was no dispute that the appellant had gone to the house at a time when he knew his father was absent overseas and only for the purpose of obtaining some personal possessions. Whilst the grounds relate primarily to the sentence on the assault charge, another sentence imposed at the same time can be adjusted where it has been influenced by the sentence the subject of the appeal: s 41(2) Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA).
A sentence of immediate imprisonment should not be imposed unless the court is satisfied that it is not appropriate to use any other option: s 39(3) Sentencing Act. The fact that the prosecution conceded that other options were open did not bind the magistrate. However, in all of the circumstances referred to above, a sentence of immediate imprisonment for the assault offence was clearly not the only appropriate option. The seriousness of the offence and the personal circumstances of the offender did not justify such a penalty. In my view, ground 2 is made out.
Conclusion
As I am satisfied that both ground 1 and ground 2 have been made out it is appropriate to allow the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the magistrate and re‑sentence the appellant. At the hearing of the appeal I was informed that the appellant continues to be in fulltime work, has not reoffended and maintains a good relationship with his father. I will also take into account the fact that the appellant spent a total of 60 days in custody prior to being sentenced and a further 22 days in custody prior to being released on bail on this appeal. Whilst the appellant has taken some steps to address his drug use, it is important to ensure that his rehabilitation is secure. For these reasons, the appellant will be sentenced as follows:
1.On count 1 to a community based order of 12 months duration with supervision and programme requirements; and
2.For the bail offence a fine of $500.
Orders
The orders of the court are:
1.Leave to appeal is granted
2.The appeal is allowed.
3.The sentences imposed by the magistrate are set aside and in lieu thereof the appellant is sentenced to a 12 month community based order with programme and supervision requirements on charge PE 28839 of 2015 and a fine of $500 on charge PE 55584 of 2015.
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