Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: McCloy v The Honourable Megan Latham [2015] NSWSC 1782 Hearing dates: 12 November 2015 Date of orders: 12 November 2015 Decision date: 12 November 2015 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: McDougall J Decision: Reject tender of report of Parliamentary Committee.
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – parliamentary privilege – state parliament – where Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) declaratory of general law – whether statements made to parliamentary committee may be admitted into evidence – where purpose of tendering evidence is to enable consideration of what a reasonable bystander would infer from those statements – where the reasoning involved in that process might involve drawing inferences about the speaker’s state of mind or motives – contrary to the general law rule relating to parliamentary privilege – consequence that evidence is inadmissible Legislation Cited: Bill of Rights 1689
Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW)
Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth)Cases Cited: Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 19 FCR 223
Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321
R v Jackson [1987] 8 NSWLR 116
R v Murphy (1986) 64 ALR 498Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Jeffrey Raymond McCloy (Plaintiff)
The Honourable Megan Latham (First Defendant)
Independent Commission Against Corruption (Second Defendant)
Attorney-General for New South Wales (Third Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
ID Faulkner SC / RL Gall (Plaintiff)
NJ Williams SC / B Kremer / D Hume (Defendants)
Toomey Pegg (Plaintiff)
Corrs Chambers Westgarth (First and Second Defendants)
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Third Defendant)
File Number(s): 2015/263337
Judgment Application to reject evidence of matters said to a parliamentary committee; see transcript p 11
(ex tempore – revised 12 november 2015)
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HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff (Mr McCloy) is the subject of an inquiry conducted by the second defendant (the Commission) under the provisions of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) (the ICAC Act). The inquiry was conducted by the first defendant (the Commissioner). The Commissioner has not reported.
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In these proceedings, Mr McCloy seeks in substance orders that the Commissioner be recused from hearing further and reporting on the inquiry insofar as it concerns him. He relies on the well-known principles relating to reasonable apprehension of bias. That reasonable apprehension is said, in the further amended summons filed in court by leave today, to arise from a number of activities undertaken by the Commissioner both before and during the hearing, and from things arising in the conduct of the hearing itself. It is Mr McCloy's case that it is the cumulative effect of those matters that gives rise to the reasonable apprehension of bias.
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Chronologically, the starting point of the complaints made by Mr McCloy relates to what is called conduct by the Commissioner prior to the commencement of the relevant inquiry (which I should have said is known as Operation Spicer). The first matter relied upon is a speech that the Commissioner gave to members of the New South Wales Bar Association on 24 February 2014.
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- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 1782
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether statements made to a parliamentary committee could be admitted into evidence in a subsequent proceeding and, if so, under what conditions. The court had to determine whether the general law rule relating to parliamentary privilege, as declaratory of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), permitted the admission of such evidence. The court also needed to consider whether the proposed use of the evidence, which involved inferring what a reasonable bystander might have understood from the statements, was compatible with the protection afforded by parliamentary privilege.
The court found that parliamentary privilege was a fundamental principle of the Australian Constitution and that the general law rule protected statements made during parliamentary proceedings from being used in evidence in subsequent proceedings. The court held that the privilege extended to protect not only the content of the statements but also the reasoning processes involved in drawing inferences from those statements. Since the plaintiff intended to use the evidence to infer the speaker’s state of mind or motives, this was deemed contrary to the general law rule. Consequently, the court ruled that the statements were inadmissible.
As a result of the court's decision, the plaintiff was not permitted to tender the statements made by the defendant during the parliamentary committee proceedings as evidence in the separate proceeding. This ruling underscores the importance of parliamentary privilege in protecting the integrity of parliamentary processes and the independence of the legislative branch of government.
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