Maxwell (also known as Harley Robert Williamson) v Bruse
[2012] WASC 12
•12 JANUARY 2012
MAXWELL (also known as HARLEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON) -v- BRUSE [2012] WASC 12
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2012] WASC 12 | |
| Case No: | SJA:1058/2011 | 21 DECEMBER 2011 | |
| Coram: | HALL J | 12/01/12 | |
| 10 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Leave to appeal refused Appeal dismissed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | TUMEKE ROBBIE MAXWELL (also known as HARLEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON) MATTHEW DAVID BRUSE |
Catchwords: | Criminal law Leave to appeal against conviction Stealing a motor vehicle contrary to s 371A of the Criminal Code (WA) Whether appellant had a legal claim of right over the vehicle Whether magistrate erred in summing up Ground has no prospect of succeeding |
Legislation: | Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 9(1) Criminal Code (WA), s 371A, s 378 |
Case References: | Williamson v Hodgson [2010] WASC 95 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
- IN CRIMINAL
- Appellant
AND
MATTHEW DAVID BRUSE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram : MAGISTRATE WILSON
File No : NO 1155 of 2010
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Leave to appeal against conviction - Stealing a motor vehicle contrary to s 371A of the Criminal Code (WA) - Whether appellant had a legal claim of right over the vehicle - Whether magistrate erred in summing up - Ground has no prospect of succeeding
(Page 2)
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 9(1)
Criminal Code (WA), s 371A, s 378
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant : In person
Respondent : No appearance
Solicitors:
Appellant : In person
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Williamson v Hodgson [2010] WASC 95
(Page 3)
- HALL J:
Introduction
1 The appellant was convicted on 7 June 2011 in the Northam Magistrates Court of stealing a motor vehicle contrary to s 371A and s 378 of the Criminal Code (WA). The conviction followed a trial on 13 April 2011. The appellant now seeks leave to appeal against that conviction.
2 The appeal notice contains one ground of appeal. It reads as follows:
[The] magistrate erred in his summing up and ignored evidence that was pertinent to my defence.
3 The ground as stated is inadequate in that it fails to identify any specific error on the part of the magistrate. Accordingly, I had the matter listed for a hearing in order to determine whether leave to appeal should be granted. The respondent was not required to appear. The appellant was given an opportunity to make submissions as to why leave should be granted.
4 On 16 December 2011, the appellant filed a document which bore the title 'Particulars of grounds for appeal'. This document sets out in 44 numbered paragraphs a number of assertions regarding the conviction. These assertions are, in substance, a restatement of the defence arguments raised and rejected at the trial. The appellant's argument is that the magistrate was wrong to reject them.
5 It would serve no purpose to set out verbatim the appellant's arguments. They are expressed in ungrammatical form and are littered with references to legal terms and concepts that have no obvious application and of which the appellant clearly has no real understanding.
6 At the hearing I sought to summarise the appellant's contentions. He accepted that the following was an adequate summary of why he said the conviction should be set aside:
(1) that his identity as the offender was not properly established;
(2) that he is not liable for the offence because the acts alleged to constitute the offence were committed by a corporate entity with the name Harley Robert Williamson of which he is only an agent or representative;
(Page 4)
- (3) that he had a claim of right in respect of the motor vehicle, being a lien for a debt owed by the owner of it;
(4) that a transfer document which he had completed and which the prosecution relied on as being false could not be used as evidence against him because his signature on the form did not relate to the contents of it;
(5) that the prosecution had been initiated without proper cause and as a result of bias on the part of a police officer.
The prosecution case
7 The prosecution case was as follows. In 2008, the appellant met the complainant (the owner of the vehicle), Mr Charles Street. Mr Street needed accommodation and an arrangement was made with the appellant for Mr Street to live at the appellant's house in Toodyay. Mr Street agreed to undertake some regular work for the appellant in return for accommodation and was to contribute towards other costs, including food and utilities.
8 In about August 2008, the relationship between the appellant and Mr Street became strained. One factor that contributed to this was that Mr Street had a recurrence of a drinking problem. In this connection, he drank a bottle of bourbon belonging to the appellant without permission. He offered to replace it but the appellant insisted that Mr Street leave.
9 At this time, Mr Street owned a Toyota Hilux motor vehicle (the vehicle). He had purchased it for $3,500 and had also spent a further sum on repairs. This is the vehicle that was the subject of the stealing charge. The vehicle was left at the appellant's property when Mr Street moved out.
10 As Mr Street was leaving the appellant's property, the appellant said that Mr Street had not met his side of the accommodation arrangement and that he (Mr Street) owed the appellant $600 and that the appellant intended to keep the vehicle and sell it if the debt was not paid. Mr Street did not accept that he owed the money and refused to sign transfer papers for the vehicle. The appellant also produced a three-paged document addressed to Mr Street stating that the vehicle would be held in 'escrow' until moneys that he claimed to be owing were paid.
11 Shortly after these events, Mr Street entered into a residential alcohol rehabilitation programme in Rockingham. He completed that programme
(Page 5)
- and left Australia to travel to South Africa to stay with relatives in about March 2009. Before leaving, Mr Street discussed the vehicle with his brother, who also lived in Toodyay. He gave his brother a signed transfer form and authority to sell the vehicle and to deal with the appellant on his behalf.
12 Mr Street's brother contacted the appellant and was told that the vehicle had been disposed of. On or about 15 April 2009, a transfer document in respect of the vehicle was lodged with the Shire of Toodyay, who acted as agents for the Department of Planning and Infrastructure. The transfer stated that the appellant had purchased the vehicle on 8 April 2009 from an unknown seller at auction. The market value was stated to be $695. The lodgement date of the transfer form was the date of the alleged offence, that being the date when the car was said to have been fraudulently converted.
13 Mr Street returned to Australia in September 2009. On his return, he confirmed that he had not authorised the appellant to sell the car, nor had he signed any paperwork to enable the appellant to do so. The vehicle was not located and Mr Street has received nothing for the loss of it.
14 The prosecution evidence at the trial came from Mr Street, his brother, a number of police officers and the Shire officer who had processed the transfer form on 15 April 2009. The appellant did not give or call any evidence at the trial.
The magistrate's reasons
15 The magistrate reserved his decision following the trial. On 7 June 2011 he delivered written reasons in which he set out the evidence and his findings. The reasons also dealt with a number of objections and arguments raised by the appellant. The reasons are comprehensive, cogent, and clear.
16 His Honour accepted the evidence of Mr Street and his brother, which he described as credible and convincing. He similarly accepted the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses. His Honour made findings based upon that evidence, in particular:
(1) that Mr Street was the owner of the vehicle on the relevant date, 15 April 2009 and that the vehicle was valued at $3,000 at that time;
(Page 6)
- (2) that the vehicle had been left at the property of the appellant when Mr Street left following a dispute;
(3) that as a result of difficulties with alcohol, Mr Street had not been in a position to remove the vehicle;
(4) that the appellant had given Mr Street a document in August 2008 purporting to authorise possession of the vehicle as security for a debt but that Mr Street did not agree with this document or that he owed the debt;
(5) that Mr Street never entered into any agreement with the appellant that permitted the appellant to deal with the vehicle in any way. Nor did he consent to any such dealing or give any instructions that it was to be so dealt with;
(6) that at no time did Mr Street offer the vehicle as security for any debt to the appellant and that there was no basis for any particular or general possessory lien over the vehicle;
(7) in any event, even if such a lien existed, the appellant had no lawful authority to transfer ownership of the vehicle from Mr Street to himself in settlement of the alleged debt;
(8) that Mr Street did not abandon the vehicle and that, in fact, his brother had paid registration renewal fees on two occasions whilst Mr Street was overseas.
17 His Honour concluded that the appellant had fraudulently transferred the vehicle into his own name. His Honour noted in this regard that the transfer form falsely stated that the owner was unknown and that the vehicle had been purchased at an auction. His Honour found that the appellant had the intention of transferring the vehicle to himself and thereby permanently depriving the rightful owner of it and that he had no lawful basis for doing so.
Identity
18 The appellant asserts that at no time did he acknowledge or admit that he was a person named Harley Robert Williamson, or, indeed, a person by any name at all. He did not enter a plea to the charge and never accepted that he was the person with whom Mr Street had dealt. This issue was dealt with by the magistrate in his reasons.
(Page 7)
19 At the commencement of the trial, leave was granted to the prosecution to amend the name on the prosecution notice from Harley Robert Williamson to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell. In support of this change, the prosecution tendered a number of documents which established that the appellant had been born on 18 September 1946 and had been registered with the name Robert Paul Bailey. He changed his name by licence on 30 November 2000 to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell. He subsequently changed his name again on 13 January 2006 to Harley Robert Williamson. A further licence document was produced showing that he changed his name back to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell on 1 May 2007.
20 The appellant was identified by a number of the witnesses, including, most significantly, Mr Street. Other witnesses identified the appellant in court as the person that they had dealt with and who they knew either as Harley Williamson, Tumeke Maxwell or Mack. Unsurprisingly, the magistrate had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the person before the court, however he described himself, was the person who had committed the offence. His findings in that regard are unimpeachable.
21 Notwithstanding the amendment to the prosecution notice made at the trial, the appellant commenced these proceedings in the name of Harley Robert Williamson. On the basis of the evidence that was before the magistrate, it would seem that his legal name, at least at that time, was Tumeke Robbie Maxwell. There is nothing before this court to show that he has reverted to the name of Harley Williamson. In the circumstances, the appellant's name should be amended to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell, also known as Harley Robert Williamson. There can be no doubt on the evidence that they are one and the same person.
The 'corporate being'
22 The appellant raised another argument which sought to draw some distinction between the natural person who was before the court and some other legal entity that utilised the name Harley Robert Williamson. He referred to this other entity as a 'corporate being' or an 'admiralty vessel'. These arguments were manifestly absurd and should not be dignified with detailed consideration. The magistrate came to the inevitable conclusion that the appellant was a natural person and was not capable of being a registered corporation. There was simply no basis for suggesting that the appellant was not liable for his acts because he was acting in some other capacity.
(Page 8)
Claim of right
23 The appellant claimed that he had a security or lien over the vehicle. His basis for this claim was an undated document which he had prepared and signed in or around August 2008. That document was not signed by Mr Street. Mr Street did remember being shown the document but said that he did not take it seriously and thought that it 'seemed to be a bit ludicrous' (ts 28).
24 The document purported to be authorised by the legal authorities of something referred to as the 'principality of Pentecost'. This, apparently, is a reference to the appellant's property in Toodyay. The appellant's claims to have created a separate foreign state by seceding from Australia have been raised and dealt with in previous proceedings: Williamson v Hodgson [2010] WASC 95. It is unnecessary to deal with them again here other than to say they are entirely without merit and afford no valid basis for claiming that the laws of Western Australia have no application to the appellant. Nor does the document provide lawful authority to retain the vehicle or any basis for an honest belief in a right to do so.
25 The magistrate specifically considered and rejected the claim that the appellant had any lien or any other legal basis for possessing or dealing with the vehicle. He accepted Mr Street's evidence that no security or authority to deal with the vehicle had ever been given by him. The document was tendered into evidence in cross-examination of Mr Street on the basis that it had been shown to Mr Street. However, Mr Street said that he did not, and had never, accepted that the appellant had any lawful rights in respect of the vehicle. There was no evidence to contradict this.
The transfer form
26 The appellant did not contest that the transfer form lodged with the Toodyay Shire on 15 April 2009 had been completed and signed by him. He did, however, contest that his signature on the document had any relevance. His basis for that assertion is said to be the 'Styles Manual 6th Edition (pages 119 - 123)'. He asserts that the witness from the Shire admitted in cross-examination that 'anything enclosed on a document is not applicable and has no pertinence to the contents of the document'.
27 This argument can be disposed of shortly. Firstly, there are many style manuals in publication but the appellant did not produce one, either to the magistrate or on the appeal. Nor did he explain how any such manual could dictate the interpretation of a legal form. Secondly, if what the appellant is asserting is that his signature on the form did not relate to
(Page 9)
- the information contained in it, then he is plainly wrong. The signature box appears under the words 'Purchaser's Declaration' and 'I declare that all the above information is true and correct'. Thirdly, the witness from the Shire of Toodyay did not make any admission as asserted (ts 47). Indeed, understandably, she said that she did not understand the point that the appellant was making.
Bias
28 In cross-examination of one of the police officers, the appellant suggested that the officer was biased against him. He put to the police officer that the officer had failed to investigate an assault complaint made by the appellant. The officer said that he could recall a complaint having been made, but he could not recall the outcome.
29 It was also put to the officer that there had been a civil action in the District Court involving the officer and the appellant. The officer accepted that this was so. The appellant suggested to the officer that there were 'not very good relations between you and I'. The response was: 'I dealt with you in relation to the enquiry that was in front of me, that's all'. In re-examination the officer said that the action brought against him by the appellant in the District Court had been struck out.
30 The appellant also asserted that at one stage when the police contacted him about the vehicle he had been told that the dispute was a civil one (Particulars of Grounds for Appeal). The evidence of the officer concerned (Sergeant McComish) does not bear out this claim (ts 52 - 54) and the appellant gave no evidence in support of it.
31 There was no reasonable basis upon which a conclusion of bias on the part of the police could be reached. In any event, there was ample evidence from other witnesses, who were accepted as honest and credible by the magistrate, upon which a finding of guilt could be reached. There was therefore no basis for the exercise by the magistrate of any discretion to stay these proceedings as being an abuse of process.
Conclusion
32 Leave is required for each ground of appeal in an appeal from a Magistrates Court brought under pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA): s 9(1). The Act provides that leave must not be given unless the court is satisfied that a ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.
33 The ground in this case refers to the magistrate having erred in his 'summing up' and having ignored evidence. The reference to summing up
(Page 10)
- must be to the magistrate's reasons. This ground is entirely without merit. The magistrate carefully dealt with all of the evidence before him and also with the objections and arguments raised by the appellant.
34 It is clear from the appellant's submissions that his complaint is not in fact that the magistrate ignored evidence, but rather that his Honour did not accept the appellant's submissions in respect of it. Having read the transcript and the magistrate's reasons, it is apparent that his Honour's conclusions were entirely justified and the ground of appeal has no prospect of succeeding. In those circumstances, leave must be refused and the appeal dismissed.
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