MAXFIELD & ELIOT

[2017] FamCA 196

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MAXFIELD & ELIOT

[2017] FamCA 196

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – interim orders – best interests of the child – where the child spends supervised time with the father – where the father seeks unsupervised time with the child – where consideration is given to the best interest of the child – where the need to protect the child from environmental harm outweighs the benefit of the child spending unsupervised time with the father – where the application is dismissed. FAMILY LAW – EVIDENCE – self-incrimination – privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings – where evidence is produced which suggests there is an investigation into the harm of a child – where the father is advised that his evidence in respect of this matter may not carry the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination – where the father does not give evidence in respect of this matter.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 128 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC(2), 62G
APPLICANT:	Ms Maxfield

RESPONDENT: Mr Eliot

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr I. Field

FILE NUMBER: BRC 2474 of 2013

DATE DELIVERED: 27 March 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Berman J

HEARING DATE: 27 March 2017

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Walker-Munro

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Legal Aid Queensland

THE RESPONDENT:	Litigant in person
COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:	Mr I. Field

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Aylward Game Solicitors

Orders

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the Contravention Application filed by the father on 14 December 2016 be dismissed.

2. That orders 8, 16 and 17 of the orders made 25 February 2015 be discharged.

1. That the father be permitted to speak with B born … 2010 (“the child”) by telephone each Monday and Thursday with the call to commence on or about 7.00 pm upon the following conditions:-

   (a)       The father is to call the mother’s mobile telephone;

   (b)      The telephone call shall be for a duration of 30 minutes;

   (c)The mother shall facilitate the child speaking with the father in a room separate from distraction or excessive noise.

2. That in respect of the child’s treating doctors and the school at which the child attends, the mother shall provide an authority that will enable the father to separately and independently contact the said child’s school or treating doctors PROVIDED that the father is not able to attend the child’s school,

   
   

   extra-curricular activity or event that the child shall attend.

1. The mother be at liberty to attend at the child’s school or any extra-curricular activity or event that would ordinarily attract a parent’s participation.

2. That the parties are restrained and an injunction granted restraining each of them from referring to the proceedings, the parties or the child in any social media format or platform.

3. The parties do all things necessary to attend upon a family consultant as may be directed by the Director of Child Dispute Services Brisbane Registry for the preparation of a family assessment report pursuant to s 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), with such report to be prepared and published by no later than 28 July 2017.

1. That leave is granted for the family consultant to inspect subpoenaed materials produced in relation to these proceedings.

1. That paragraphs 6 to 17 of the father’s Application in a Case are dismissed.

(10)  That paragraphs 2 to 5 inclusive of the Father’s Application in a Case are          adjourned for hearing in the duty list on 21 August 2017 at 10am.

(11)That order 12 of the orders made on 25 February 2015 be amended to include the words “serious or emergency” after the word “any” and before the word “illness”.

(12)That the materials tendered by the Independent Children’s Lawyer headed “Interim Medical Report” shall be Exhibit 1 in the proceedings.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Maxfield & Eliot has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 2474 of 2013

Ms Maxfield

Applicant

And

Mr Eliot

Respondent

EX TEMORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The parties are in dispute in respect of the parenting arrangements in relation to the child B born in 2010.  As discussed, there were two matters before the Court today:  the first being the father’s application for contravention filed on 14 December 2016 and the application in a case filed on the same date. 

2. In relation to the contravention proceedings, they have been dealt with by the dismissal of the five nominated counts earlier today.  The focus of the proceedings then has turned to the application in the case.

3. I made certain remarks in respect of some of the orders that may or may not be able or be likely to be made by me.  There were some orders that I did not consider I had jurisdiction to make and there are some aspects of the proposed orders that I would not make.  The intention was to focus the parties on what was really the central issue, that is whether the father’s time should alter from being the subject of supervision to being unsupervised.  That requires some consideration of the history of the matter.

4. The parties reached agreement on 25 February 2015.  That provided for them to have the equal shared parental responsibility for the child; that the child should live with the mother and spend time with the father on an unsupervised basis.  The arrangements in respect of the time to the father were extensive and they would fall into the category of significant and substantial time. 

5. Some of the matters raised in the father’s application today are matters that are dealt with in terms of the orders in particular, under the heading of “Communication and Specific Issues”.  A good example is that order 16 entitles the parties to “be at liberty to attend any child care centres and extracurricular activities [of the child] which would ordinarily attract a parent’s participation”.  It is clear in respect of the current orders that if supervision remains, then that order has no focus and should be suspended.

6. Equally, order 17 provides for the parties to utilise a communication book.  Whilst there is no objection in respect of the communication book, whilst the father’s time with the child is the subject of supervision, the mechanics involved are such that a communication book would have no utility.  The parties have indicated a willingness to communicate by email providing, of course, that communications are civil and appropriate.

7. On 12 October 2015, orders were made by Judge Howard of the Federal Circuit Court that orders 5 and 6 of the orders of 25 February 2015 be suspended.  Those orders are what might be described as the operative orders which provide for the father’s time with the child. 

8. In their place, order 2 made 12 October 2015 provides that the father shall spend supervised time with the child at the C Supervision Contact Centre for a minimum of two hours one day per week on such days and times that may be able to be facilitated by the contact centre.  Much of these issues are matters relating to the normal practice and procedure within this State and Registry, but I am told, and I accept, that there has been a change to the identity of the contact centre and it is now an organisation known as the D Contact Service. 

9. What is surprising, but I accept again is representative of the local arrangements, is that notwithstanding the order for supervision was made on 12 October 2015, that order is still extant and the relevant children’s contact service is still prepared to assist this family in providing supervision for the father’s time pursuant to the order.

10. The father brought a further amended application in a case on 31 March 2016 and sought orders that the child live with him and spend time with the mother.  The father sought orders that the mother attend counselling and there were allegations made by the father that the mother suffered from difficulties with alcohol and drug use and abuse.  The simple response of the mother was that the father’s application be dismissed. 

11. There were matters raised before the Registrar which required him to consider the risks that may be associated with the child remaining in the unsupervised care of the father.  Significantly, those issues were raised by a complaint of the father’s then partner, Ms E, in respect of the father’s conduct.  To the extent that ultimately she withdrew or attempted to withdraw the contents of her affidavit in terms of the allegations made, she did, but the Court was aware of the matters raised.  An example or a summary of this is to be seen at [16] of the Registrar’s reasons for judgment delivered on 26 July 2016.

12. Ms E has filed two affidavits in these proceedings – one in the mother’s case and the second in the father’s case.  Ms E’s first affidavit was filed on 29 October 2015.  Ms Walker-Munro summarised Ms E’s evidence as raising the following issues of harm to the child whilst in the care of the father:-

    a)Excessive physical discipline of the child;

    b)Failing to properly supervise him;

    c)Exposing the child to domestic violence between Ms E and the father;

    d)Anger management issues in relation to the father;

    e)Regular drug use by the father;

    f)Concerns about the father’s mental health;

    g)Verbal threats of physical harm to the mother, the mother’s partner and the maternal grandmother. 

13. The Registrar agreed with the summation of the evidence.

14. The matter was not so much that following the withdrawal of the allegations by Ms E, that the Registrar was able to determine on the balance of probabilities the evidence that should be considered.  The Registrar’s position was that he was not obliged, nor indeed should it be necessary in most cases for a judicial officer, to determine the truth or otherwise of an allegation of above unless it is necessary to do so. 

15. In most cases, it is not necessary to do so. The issue is one of risk and reference must be given to the primary considerations in s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).

16. The primary considerations, as determined by s 60CC(2)(a) are that the Court should take into account:-

    (a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and

    (b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.

17. In applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the Court is to give greater weight to considerations as set out in paragraph (2)(b).  That, of course, does not mean that where there are aspects of risk that are identified, that that should be the end of any order which would see a party spending time with a child.  Rather it means that the Court is obliged to consider the appropriate orders that should be made. 

18. If an order can be made which preserves as best as possible the relationship but puts in place the necessary protections, then that is an appropriate and acceptable outcome.  It may be, of course, that where the risk has reached a significant level, an unacceptable level, then there should be no time.  That is, however, not the case here and that is not the case that confronted the Registrar.

19. The Registrar also had the advantage of a report prepared by family consultant Ms F, and she identified the issues in the case in terms of the parties’ relationship; the reference to domestic violence; the impact, negative or otherwise, in respect of the child attachment to each of the parties.  The child’s age and developmental needs were also brought to account. 

20. This matter has been placed into the Magellan list of cases and that arises because of some concern at that stage in respect of matters relating to sexual abuse.  It is helpful that the mother’s concerns are not now in respect of any issue that the father may have sexually interfered with or abused the child or indeed that there is risk of same, but rather that the risk is of physical harm and an inappropriate environment that might not appropriately protect and keep this child safe, unless the father’s time is supervised.

21. The family consultant recommended that the child live with the mother; that the child spend supervised time with the father at a contact centre each alternate weekend for the next six months; that the father commence spending unsupervised time with the child thereafter; and that during the period of six months supervised time, the father would engage in a “Men Stopping Violence” course, would engage in therapeutic counselling with “Mr G” at Uniting Care in H Town.  It was after those hurdles had been overcome by the father that the Court could be in the position to properly consider unsupervised time.

22. As is often the case in these proceedings and in this Court where the lists are busy, significant time passes.  The Registrar’s order was made on 26 July 2016 dismissing the father’s amended application in the case.  The father’s current application now comes before the Court in late March 2017. 

23. The father’s application is supported by an affidavit of 14 December 2016, but again I indicated to the father at the commencement of the proceedings that I considered, given that he was a self-represented litigant, that there may well be matters contained in his affidavit filed technically in support of the contravention proceeding which may have some resonance in respect of the parenting orders that he seeks.

24. It is perhaps an unfair summary of the father’s position that he says he has abided by the recommendations of the family consultant; he has attended various domestic violence courses and other parenting courses; that he has had now significantly longer – indeed nearly a year of supervised time; and that there is no good reason why the Court would not consider moving to what is the next logical step as far as he sees it, which is to return to some form of unsupervised time. 

25. He says that it is his observations of the child in the child’s interaction with him which causes him to think that the child would like longer and more satisfying time with the father.  The mother concedes that within the parameters and confines of the current order and arrangements, that the child has a demonstrably good relationship with the father and appears strongly attached.

26. The issue therefore is not one of relationship but one of safety.  Again, it may be an unfair summary of the father’s position but he considers that the mother is acting out of malice towards him and that if she had her way, she would do all that she could to disrupt and terminate any relationship between the father and the child.  That is, her opposition is motivated by that desire, rather than in respect of any proper evidence or foundation for the mother opposing the father resuming time with the child on an unsupervised basis.

27. The relationship between the parties is demonstrably dysfunctional.  There is significant mistrust. Whilst the parties may indicate that they can possibly communicate via email and other non-personal methods of communication, I suspect that that is a view borne of hope rather than based upon a reality of the manner in which these parties interact.

28. An issue arose during the course of the contravention proceedings as to whether orders in respect of the father being able to communicate with the child either by telephone or by Skype were effective, and the ability of the father to obtain information from either the child’s mother or indeed from the school or any other organisation which the child attends as to how that child is going. 

29. There is no opposition to some orders being made, which would see the father being able to access information, falling short of the father being able to attend, as is currently the case in the orders.  I propose to amend the orders to reflect those matters.

30. The parties also agree that there are Facebook and other social media postings that relate to each of them and the child.  Whilst not much has been said today, the parties understand that certainly during the currency of these proceedings, that conduct has no advantage to the child.  It may well put the parties at risk of providing information publicly which would assist in identifying the proceedings and the child involved and, accordingly, I propose to make orders that would see the parties being restrained from being engaged in social media in respect of anything that would refer to the proceedings or identify the child. 

31. If that had been where the matter rested, it might be considered that there was much merit in the father’s application.  He says that he has done all that has been asked of him and there is no good reason why the Court should not consider relaxing the stringent conditions that currently attach to his time with the child.

32. The mother is opposed to that occurring and the mother’s counsel makes the point that it would be premature to do so because, whilst the father may have attended the courses that he says that he has, and that seems to be accepted, it is one thing to attend; it is another thing for the father to satisfy the mother, the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”) and the Court, that he has gained insight into the very strong and clear message that those programs and parenting courses are intended to convey.

33. But again, that is a submission made by counsel for the mother in circumstances where there is no further report and the process by which the Court might gain some assistance in respect of the impact of these courses on the father is uncertain.  I consider it to be the very antithesis of the proceedings that important information of that sort is likely only to be gained by device of a subpoena being issued. 

34. That requires, a subpoena, compliance and interpretation of documents that may or may not lend themselves to ready consideration.  If that was where the matter rested, it might be that I would consider that the mother’s response was inadequate. 

35. The ICL has issued a subpoena that was directed to the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services.  There was compliance with the subpoena.  The next step was to consider the inspection, the copying and, potentially, ultimately, the tender of those documents in respect of an appropriate hearing. 

36. The notation to the order confirms that the mother was represented by counsel.  The father appeared by telephone and the ICL was also in attendance.  The father and Ms E were objectors to the subpoena and both lodged their objections. 

37. Whilst I am not aware of what then transpired, the orders of 23 March 2017 reflect that notwithstanding the objections filed by the father and Ms E, those objections were dismissed and the ICL was given leave to inspect and copy the documents produced under subpoena, whereas the mother’s legal representative and the father in person have leave to inspect the documents only.

38. I am advised by the ICL that the documents produced in answer to the subpoena are voluminous and may well comprise of about 1,000 pages.  He has taken the time and made the effort to inspect those documents and, at least to some extent, has extracted and photocopied what he considers would be documents relevant to the proceedings today.

39. The mother’s counsel and legal representatives have not yet had an opportunity to inspect the documents, but have been provided with what might be considered a summary by the ICL of the content of the documents. 

1. The father was neither provided with a summary nor has he had an opportunity to inspect the documents.  He has asked me what would be the appropriate procedure for him to do so and with the corroboration of ICL, the father is able to inspect those documents in the subpoena room in the Registry of the Family Court of Australia at Brisbane.

2. The submissions of the ICL are to strongly oppose any alterations to the orders that would see the child remain in the unsupervised care of the father. 

3. The ICL has extracted certain key documents and they have been produced to me in a bundle.  I propose to give the bundle a status and they will become Exhibit 1 in the proceedings. 

4. The father has had an opportunity to peruse those documents during a break in the proceedings this afternoon.  The ICL read extensively from the documents and I accept that there are matters raised in those documents which are relevant to the general considerations that I need to give the matter today, but also in respect of the matters raised by counsel for the mother, which go to the extent to which the Court can be satisfied that the father has gained some insight from the courses that he has undertaken.

5. Before I deal with the documents and highlight the relevance to the proceedings, inquiries have been made as to whether there can be a report prepared pursuant to s 62G(2) of the Act. The family consultant, who has prepared two reports, is a private family consultant and there is some uncertainty as to whether a report can be prepared in terms of the funding. I am told, and I accept, that if I set this matter down for trial, make trial directions – and observing that it has now been more than a year since the last report was prepared – that in those circumstances, it is likely that a grant of Legal Aid could be made.

6. I am told this matter is number 35 in the trial list and that at this stage there is little chance that it will be listed for hearing in 2017, but is likely to reach its place sometime in 2018.  I am in two minds as to whether a report should be ordered.

7. Obviously, if I could give the parties some better news in terms of when this matter would be listed for trial, then as part of the normal trial directions that I would make, if the matter were to remain before me, I would order an updated report to be prepared.  It is not intended, however, that this matter will remain with me.  My only involvement is limited to dealing with the contravention application and then the subsequent application in the case.  I do not know who will ultimately have this matter in their docket.

8. It is a concern, however, that irrespective of the issues that have been raised by each of the parties and the ICL, that the Court has no current evidence from a family consultant which might assist in bringing the threads together and providing timely recommendations in respect of where the parties are currently at.  That is not to suggest that what is on the file is of no assistance to me.  It clearly is.  It seems to me that there are matters that could benefit from an overview and, in circumstances where there is likely to be a lengthy delay before this matter reaches trial, it may be appropriate for the father’s application to be given more detailed consideration in the sense that whatever interim orders are in place are likely to be in place for a considerable period of time and that may raise a range of issues in terms of the ongoing availability of supervision.

9. Accordingly, I propose to order that there be a report prepared pursuant to s 62G(2) of the Act and I am told that that report can be published in July and I propose that this matter be listed in an appropriate list for argument as soon thereafter as is practicable. The question then is what to do with the current application?

10. The extracts of documents presented by the ICL require careful consideration.  The first document is an interim medical report of 7 February 2017 and it relates to a child of the relationship between the father and Ms E, namely, J, born in 2016.  As at the date of the report J was eight weeks of age. 

11. The report suggests that there is an investigation ongoing in relation to findings considered suspicious of harm and subject to police and statutory investigation. Upon me understanding the extent to which issues in respect of potential harm to J are the subject of police consideration, I have provided an advice to Mr Eliot that anything he would wish to say in respect of this matter might be a matter about which he would be best advised to take some advice in case anything said that does not have the protection of an evidence certificate under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) might incriminate him.

12. Mr Eliot had an opportunity to consider the documents and he decided to make no submissions in respect of the matters contain therein.  Obviously, matters that I may raise from the documents are not matters about which an evidence certificate is required.  I am not looking for an admission or a statement or any position that the father may adopt in respect of these matters. 

13. The report notes that it is issued at the request of the police and will provide and contribute to the decision-making of the agency in relation to the child’s ongoing safety.

14. Page 10 of the first document is a forensic opinion stating that the admission in respect of J had been triggered by a collapse at home, interpreted by his father as a cessation of breathing.  Upon QAS arrival the baby had an altered level of consciousness with poor perfusion, which means poor blood flow to the body, which quickly improved. 

15. SAH is recognised in the context as a neuro-trauma involving application of applied force to the head.  The SAH as observed was considered to be derived from trauma and would explain encephalopathic symptoms as reported.  It is opined in the report that even though the infant did not have any direct evidence of impact from examination or imaging, impact is thought to be involved in the causative mechanisms to produce SAH.

16. Whilst there are a number of potential explanations for encephalopathy and the SAH that is observed, paragraph 9 on page 18 suggests that the presentation of this child was not in keeping with a benign explanation. Nor was it considered that the presentation of the child was consistent with a birth-related condition and it was thought in the report that the cause of the collapse could be a loss of consciousness that followed the application of force to the head.  It was also reported that the child had multiple rib fractures on both sides of the chest. 

17. Paragraph 16 on page 14 says as follows:-

    [16]With regards to the amount of force required, based on clinical examination findings, investigations (radiology and biochemistry) this baby does not appear to have bones that are predisposed to fracture in the context of routine handling/day-to-day care.  The amount of force therefore needed to cause these rib fractures is such that it exceeds the natural compliance of the chest when being held then squeezed… 

18. The explanation given by the father – namely, of the application of two finger cardiac expression – did not account for the rib fractures.

19. The forensic conclusion was that the SAH, the RH and the encephalopathy remain unexplained and the suspicion is that they are inflicted.  The rib fractures were unexplained.  The bruising remains unexplained. 

20. The investigation is ongoing and it is noted that the author of the report is a Senior Paediatrician from Child Protection and Forensic Medicine at the I Hospital being Dr K.

21. A child from a relationship between Ms E and another person was also the subject of consideration.  Page 32 of the documents refers to the Department’s position in respect of a protective supervision order in relation to the child L, who is reported to have suffered two incidents of physical abuse on 15 December 2014 and 26 December 2015 whilst in the care of Ms E and Mr Eliot.  The report says as follows:

    ·It has been assessed that it is probable that both incidents of injury were inflicted by the same person and so has been inflicted by a person who has had contact with [L] on both occasions of injury.  Based on information provided by [Ms E], she and her previous partner [Mr Eliot] are the only people to have had contact with [L] on both of these occasions, indicating that the abuse must have been perpetrated by either [Ms E] or [Mr Eliot]. 

    ·[Ms E’s] account of the evidence surrounding [L] receiving the injuries appears to show a pattern of dishonesty and efforts to blame others for the injuries.

22. The report also suggests that a second child of Ms E namely, M was also the subject of recent concerns of physical abuse and Ms E has been the suspect of that abuse.  It is thought that Ms E has a volatile temper and is often verbally and physically abusive towards her children.  It was assessed back then that without intervention, L will be at very high-risk of suffering further physical abuse.

23. Further consideration was given to L, M and an application by Ms E to resume unsupervised time with her daughter N.  The Department was concerned that Ms E had provided inconsistent explanations of how L came to be injured on 15 December 2015, and following various complaints, it was determined that the records would support the contention that Ms E and Mr Eliot were in a domestically violent relationship.  At paragraph 15 on page 54, the following is said:-

    …The above information suggests that [Mr Eliot] is a violent man with poor emotional regulation possibly exacerbated by a history of substance abuse.  He is also a man who will behave violently in front of children, his own son.  The collateral information leads to me to have grave concerns regarding [Mr Eliot] having any children in his care.

24. A further concern relates to a historical allegation in June of 2000 where Mr Eliot, then known as “Mr O”, was alleged to have physically and emotionally abused N for at least six months.  The mother, Ms E, had been aware of what had happened and had failed to protect the child.

25. Today is an interim hearing.  It is not for me to determine matters of guilt, nor to decide that a particular incident or event has been established upon the balance of probabilities.  As I have indicated, my primary obligation is not to cast guilt or blame, but rather to ensure that whatever orders are made, they are orders that are necessary to protect the child from a risk of physical or psychological harm or from being objected to or subjected to abuse or neglect or family violence. 

26. Obviously, the matters that I have raised today resonate in particular in terms of the primary considerations, but in doing so it should not be assumed that I have ignored the matters raised in respect of s 60CC(3). An interim hearing, however, usually makes it difficult to provide much assistance in terms of the additional considerations.

27. I also acknowledge the remarks of the Full Court that I am not obliged to consider either the primary considerations or the additional considerations in terms of each and every subparagraph, but rather I am entitled to deal with the matters in what might be considered a general way, providing it is clear from my remarks that I have given appropriate attention to the important issues in respect of s 60CC.

28. At this stage, I am not able to accede to the orders that the father seeks.  That is not to suggest that they do not have merit.  But at this stage, the matters raised in the documents as present by the ICL, being extracts from the subpoenaed materials, raise serious allegations and distinctly raise the issue of the need to protect the child in respect of matters of physical or psychological harm. 

29. There is a long way to go in this matter.  And it may be that the father will feel that a number of organisations and agencies have taken a set against him and indeed Ms E. But, again, this is not a matter where I am obliged to forensically determine the truth or otherwise of the allegations and assertions.  What I am obliged to do is to act out of an abundance of caution in all cases and to ensure that orders that I make are orders that are in the best interests of this child. 

30. I do not consider acceding to the orders that the father would seek in respect of matters relating to the removal of any supervision to be in the best interests of the child and, indeed, until more is determined, may well have the effect and consequence of placing the child at significant risk. 

31. The disposal of the matter today is made more palatable by the orders that are currently in place, which whilst not as sought by the father, nonetheless are orders that retain a relationship between the child and the father that, according to the mother, are demonstrably enjoyed by the child, and whilst it must be considered and recognised that time spent between a parent and a child in a supervision contact centre lacks a certain reality and spontaneity, nonetheless, until this matter can be more comprehensively dealt with by the receipt of evidence and the cross-examination of the relevant parties, it seems to me that that is the best that can be achieved.

32. I also note that the orders of 25 February 2015 and 12 October 2015 do not alter the equal shared parental responsibility and the obligation that the parties have to consult in respect of a range of activities relating to the child. 

I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Berman delivered on 27 March 2017.

Associate:

Date:  31 March 2017