MAV Pty Ltd v Buyo Pty Ltd
[2021] VCC 1572
•19 October 2021
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE COMMERCIAL DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
BUILDING CASES LIST
Case No. CI-21-03211
| MAV Group Builders Pty Ltd (ACN 603 180 454) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| Buyo Pty Ltd (ACN 129 178 918) (as trustee for Buyo Trust) | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Her Honour Judge Burchell | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | On the papers | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 19 October 2021 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | MAV Pty Ltd v Buyo Pty Ltd | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VCC 1572 | |
RULING
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Subject: CONTRACTS
Catchwords: Building contract – payment claim – proceeding discontinued – costs
Legislation Cited: Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act2002 (Vic) ss4, 9, 10A, 10B, 12, 14(2), 15, 16(2) and 48; County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 r25.05 and r63A.31
Cases Cited:Yuanda Vic Pty Ltd v Façade Designs International Pty Ltd [2021] VSCA 44; Seabay Properties Pty Ltd v Galvin Construction Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 183; Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225; IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC [2011] VSCA 248; Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola [2001] VSC 189
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | - | Melbourne Legal Chambers |
| For the Defendant | Mr R Andrew with Mr J Silver | Tasiopoulos Lambros and Co |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
1In this proceeding, the plaintiff (“MAV”) initially applied for judgment against the defendant (“Buyo”) pursuant to s16(2) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act2002 (Vic) (“SOP Act”). MAV issued an application by summons on originating motion dated 2 August 2021. The application concerned construction works that MAV performed at 199-203 Union Road, Ascot Vale.
2MAV submitted that it was entitled to judgment because Buyo failed to make payment in response to its payment claims.
3In opposition to the claim, Buyo contended that:
(a) despite claiming for 100% of the work, neither payment claim was a “final payment claim” (clause 37 of the contract).
(b) the payment claim dated 30 April 2021 is invalid because it is identical to the 31 March 2021 claim (contra s14(8) of the SOP Act);
(c) the payment claim dated 30 April 2021 claim does not include any new work; and
(d) the payment schedules were valid.
4On 30 August 2021, MAV discontinued these proceedings. On 30 and 31 August 2021, consent orders were made for programming orders that included the discontinuance of the proceedings and the filing of submissions on the issue as to costs which was reserved to be determined on the papers.
5The defendant seeks orders that the plaintiff pay its costs on an indemnity basis. The plaintiff submits that there should be no order as to costs or alternatively that the costs of this proceeding should be reserved pending the determination of proceeding CI-21-02601 between the parties (“the Writ Proceeding”).
The Facts
6MAV relies upon an affidavit of Michael Gandolfo, its director, sworn 2 August 2021. In opposition, Buyo relies upon an affidavit of Gregory Cairns, the contract superintendent, sworn 23 August 2021.
7By a written contract dated 26 October 2018, Buyo engaged MAV to construct a mixed-use development at 199-203 Union Road, Ascot Vale.[1]
[1]Exhibit MG-1 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
8Pursuant to clause 21 of the “Head Contract”:
(a) MAV was to claim payment progressively, in accordance with item 28 (“on the last business day of each month”);
(b) an early progress claim shall be deemed to have been made on the date for making the claim in accordance with item 28;
(c) MAV was to submit claims in writing to the Superintendent no later than the close of business of the last working day of each month;
(d) claims were to include a “full break up of items of work and percentage (%) complete for each item of work to the satisfaction of the Superintendent and financiers Quantity Surveyor for assessment”;
(e) within 10 business days of receiving a progress claim, the Superintendent was to issue a progress certificate;
(f) Buyo was to make payment “no later than 35 days after the end of the month in which the claim is made”.
9On 31 March 2021, Mr Cassera emailed a purported payment claim to Buyo in the sum of $181,177.71 (including GST) (“The 31 March 2021 Claim”).[2] The suggestion of Mr Gandolfo that this was submitted on 1 April 2021 is erroneous. Relevantly, the purported payment claim:
(a) was named “Progress Claim #27”;
(b) claimed for: “Approved variations” in the sum of $73,131.81;
(c) indicated: “This is a payment claim made under the Building and Construction Security of Payment Act (2002) Vic”; and
(d) attached a detailed breakdown of the works in a spreadsheet titled: “Contract Works Trade Breakdown” (which revealed that 100% of the works were complete).
[2]Exhibit MG-2 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
10Mr Cairns alleges that by mid-April 2021, MAV abandoned the site.[3]
[3]Affidavit of Greg Cairns dated 23 August 2021 [27].
11On 14 April 2021, Mr Cairns emailed a purported payment schedule, payment certificate, progress claim trade breakdown, and variation summary to Mr Arzenti of MAV, scheduling a sum of $112,186.00 (including GST).[4]
[4]Exhibit MG-3 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
12Relevantly, the payment schedule deducted an amount of $695,081.00 for liquidated damages. Buyo set-off the liquidated damages against the claimed amount, and certified an amount of -$582,895.08.
13On 27 April 2021, Mr Galdolfo sent an email to Mr Cairns indicating (emphasis added): “Until our final progress payment is made Mav Group will not be responding to time lines”.[5]
[5]Exhibit MG-4 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
14On 30 April 2021 at 2.45pm, Mr Galdolfo emailed a purported payment claim to the Mr Cairns in the sum of $181,177.71 (“The 30 April 2021 Claim”).[6]
[6]Exhibit MG-4 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021; Affidavit of Greg Cairns dated 23 August 2021 [4(b)].
15The purported payment claim was effectively identical to the 31 March 2021 Claim.
16Indeed, it:
(a) was headed “Progress Claim #27”;
(b) claimed for: “Approved variations” in the sum of $73,131.81;
(c) indicated: “This is a payment Claim made under the Building and Construction Security of Payment Act (2002) Vic”; and
(d) attached a detailed breakdown of the works in a spreadsheet titled: “Contract Works Trade Breakdown”. This was identical to the 31 March 2021 Claim spreadsheet. It sought the same percentages for line items. This brought the total claimed for each line item to 100%. No new work was claimed.
17On 3 May 2021, Mr Cairns emailed Mr Arzenti a purported payment schedule, progress payment certificate 1, progress payment certificate 2, and a trade breakdown of the works.[7]
[7]Exhibit MG-5 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
18The payment schedule and payment certificates erroneously indicated (emphasis added): “Payment Claim No.: 28”. However, it indicated “Month/Year: April Claim 2021”. The covering email also clarified that the payment schedule was the “April 21 Progress Claim BCISPA Payment Schedule”.
19Again, the payment schedule deducted an amount of $852,000.00 for liquidated damages. Buyo again set-off the liquidated damages against the claimed amount, and certified an amount of nil.
20On 4 May 2021, Mr Cairns sent Mr Arzenti an email attaching a further copy of the payment schedule, payment certificate 1, payment certificate 2, and the trade breakdown. The documents amended a failure to add the GST to the subtotal of payment certificate 1.[8]
[8]Exhibit MG-6 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
21Between 19 May 2021 and 21 June 2021, further and escalating correspondence passed between the parties in relation to the disputed issues.[9] It is neither necessary nor relevant to elaborate upon that correspondence.
[9]Exhibit MG-7 – MG-12 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
22It suffices to say that on 21 June 2021 at 3.04pm, Buyo’s solicitors sent Mr Merlo a letter in terms: “With all due respect, we do not propose to engage in a “correspondence battle” between us, or to attempt to convince you that your instructions or understanding of the law are misconceived. Our client is confident of its position”.[10]
[10]Exhibit MG-12 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
23What transpired thereafter was somewhat unorthodox. On 24 June 2021, MAV filed and served a writ and statement of claim seeking payment in the sum of $181,177.71 (including GST), under s16(2)(a)(i) of the SOP Act.
24On 2 July 2021, Buyo filed and served an unconditional appearance.
25On 27 July 2021 at 4.21pm, Buyo’s solicitors sent Mr Merlo an email advising him that the proceeding had been erroneously commenced by writ. They proposed that at the first directions hearing on 30 July 2021, the pleadings be struck out, and an originating motion and affidavit in support filed and served.[11]
[11]Exhibit MG-14 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
26On 27 July 2021 at 5.47pm, Mr Merlo sent an email to Buyo’s solicitors proposing consent orders to the effect that the plaintiff file and serve an amended statement of claim on or before 13 August 2021 (to instead pursue damages for breach of contract).[12]
[12]Exhibit MG-15 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
27On 28 July 2021 at 1.13pm, Buyo’s solicitors responded in terms: “we do not see why you would be amending the Statement of Claim” (since this was not the practice in the BCL). Buyo’s solicitors proposed orders for the filing and service of affidavits and submissions, consistently with the BCL.[13]
[13]Exhibit MG-16 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
28On 28 July 2021 at 6.19pm, Mr Merlo informed the court that the parties had agreed to adjourn the first directions hearing for one week; that he intended to file and serve a summons on originating motion; and that he would amend MAV’s statement of claim.
29On 29 July 2021, I ordered that by 2 August 2021 at 4.00pm, MAV file and serve its originating motion, summons, and affidavit to be made returnable on 6 August 2021 at 9.30am before the Judge in Charge of the Building Cases List.
30On 2 August 2021, MAV filed and served a summons on originating motion, claiming the sum of $146,000.00 under s16(2) of the SOP Act.
The Legal Context
31The SOP Act seeks to ensure that people who undertake to carry out construction work can recover progress payments for the performance of that work.[14] Section 4 defines construction contract as a “contract or other arrangement under which one party undertakes to carry out construction work, or to supply related goods and services for another party”. The SOP Act applies to any construction contract whether written or oral, or partly written and partly oral.[15] “Construction work” is defined by s5. There is no dispute that the works the subject of this proceeding is “construction work” within the meaning of s5.
[14]SOP Act s3.
[15]SOP Act s7.
32Section 16(2)(a) of the SOP Act provides that a claimant may recover from a respondent any unpaid portion of an amount claimed in a payment claim where the respondent fails to submit a payment schedule within time (or at all) in response to the payment claim. Section 17(2)(a) provides that where a respondent provides a payment schedule within time, a claimant may recover from the respondent any unpaid portion of the amount which the payment schedule states the respondent proposes to pay to the claimant.
33This court has endorsed the hearing of applications under the SOP Act on a summary basis by summons on originating motion with affidavit evidence.[16] Such claims are properly assessed on the balance of probabilities,[17] with the quality of the evidence weighed having regard to the fact that the legislation seeks to facilitate a swift but temporary remedy.[18] Occasionally, a plaintiff nevertheless applies for relief under s16 by bringing a proceeding commenced by writ and statement of claim, then issuing a summons seeking summary judgment pursuant to s61 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (“the CPA”).[19] This can add an additional layer of complexity in determining the test to be applied to any defences raised.[20]
[16]3D Flow Solutions Pty Ltd v LTP Armstrong Creek Pty Ltd [2018] VCC 674 [39]-[54]. See also SJ Higgins v The Bays Healthcare Group Inc [2018] VCC 805 [26].
[17]Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449, 449-450 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ).
[18]3D Flow Solutions Pty Ltd v LTP Armstrong Creek Pty Ltd [2018] VCC 674 [51]-[54].
[19]John Beever v Roads Corporation [2018] VSC 635; see also Best Fab Pty Ltd v Australian High Bay Installations Pty Ltd [2018] VCC 1053.
[20]SJ Higgins v The Bays Healthcare Group Inc [2018] VCC 805 [31].
34Under r25.05 of the County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 (“the Rules”), read together with r63A.15, states that unless the court otherwise orders, a party who withdraws a proceeding shall pay the costs of the party to whom the withdrawal relates to at the time of the withdrawal. By reason of r63A.10, these costs may be taxed without an order for taxation. Under r63A.31, the costs are usually taxed on a standard basis.
35The discretion to make a special costs order is an unlimited one. In Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Limited[21], Shepherd J set out many categories of circumstances that will warrant the making of a special costs order. This includes proceedings that were commenced or continued with wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law and the making of allegations which ought to have never been made or the undue prolongation of a case on groundless contentions.
[21](1993) 46 FCR 225 at [23]-[24].
36In IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC[22], the Court of Appeal observed that special circumstances must be determined in light of the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Instances included where a party has made serious unfounded allegations, wasted the court’s time or some other improper conduct.
[22][2011] VSCA 248 at [325].
Costs application
37The defendant argues that it ought to be awarded indemnity costs for the following reasons:
(a) the plaintiff and its solicitors had no proper basis to assert that the defendant's payment schedule 28 was not a payment schedule within the meaning of the SOP Act;
(b) the plaintiff through its discontinuance conceded, in effect, that it should not have commenced the proceeding; and
(c) up until the discontinuance, the plaintiff behaved in a high-handed manner with reckless disregard towards the law, using the processes of this Court as an improper bargaining chip, without proper basis and commenced contrary to the overarching obligations.
38The defendant claims that the plaintiff could not reasonably have satisfied itself that:
(a) serving payment claim 27 (March) a second time (as payment claim 27* in April) was permissible under the SOP Act;
(b) a further reference date arose on 30 April 2021, given the 31 March claim previous claim for 100% of the work performed;
(c) there was a proper basis to deny payment schedule 28 was a payment schedule within the meaning of the SOP Act;
(d) there was a proper basis for issuing a proceeding (on either payment claim 27 or payment claim 27*).
39The Court has not been called upon to make a final determination in this matter given the plaintiff’s withdrawal against the defendant. The matter was discontinued prior to MAV filing written submissions on the SOP application. However, in my view, the discontinuance of the proceeding does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the plaintiff did not have an arguable claim.
40In my view, it was open for the plaintiff to argue that the first contention of Buyo -that despite claiming for 100% of the work, neither payment claim was a “final payment claim” (cf clause 37 of the contract) - was not a ground on which to resist a payment claim. Indeed, the trade breakdowns show that both payment claims claim for 100% of the work, as they show that 0% is outstanding. It would have been open to the plaintiff to argue that is a defence in relation to matters arising under the construction contract. It concerns final payment claims in the context of clause 37 of the contract. Indeed, Buyo’s submissions expressly cite clause 37.
41The second contention of Buyo was that the 30 April 2021 Claim is invalid because it is a repeat of the 31 March 2021 Claim (contra s14(8) of the SOP Act). Section 14(8) of the SOP Act provides that a claimant cannot serve more than one payment claim in respect of a reference date. In my view, it would not have been hopeless for the plaintiff to seek to argue that s14(8) is subject to the proviso in s14(9) of the SOP Act: “However, subsection (8) does not prevent the claimant from including in a payment claim an amount that has been the subject of a previous claim if the amount has not been paid”.
42There is evidence that MAV was not paid for the 31 March 2021 Claim. On 27 April 2021, Mr Galdolfo sent an email to Mr Cairns indicating (emphasis added): “Until our final progress payment is made Mav Group will not be responding to time lines”.[23] That evidence was uncontradicted. Buyo has not adduced any evidence that it paid the amounts claimed. Nor has MAV adduced any evidence that it was paid.
[23]Exhibit MG-4 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
43Further, the authority of Commercial Industrial Construction Group Pty Ltd v King Construction Group Pty Ltd & Anor (“King Construction”) (on which Buyo relies),[24] is analogous to this proceeding. As Vickery J notes:
“In the present case, the exception in s 14(9) would apply to any unpaid portions of the payment claims represented by the four invoices being Invoice 1203 dated 21 November 2014; Invoice 1206 dated 26 November 2014; Invoice 1211 dated 28 November 2014; and Invoice 1223 dated 23 December because in each case the full amount as claimed was not paid either in full, or at all. Thus the exception in s 14(9) applies to these four invoices claimed as part of the 21 January Payment Claim, but only to the extent of the unpaid portions of those payment claims.”[25]
[24][2015] VSC 426.
[25]Ibid [92] (Vickery J).
44The third contention of Buyo is that the 30 April 2021 claim does not include any new work, and is therefore invalid. In support of that proposition, Buyo again relies upon the decision of Vickery J in King Construction.
45In King Construction, the plaintiff submitted that the “21 January Payment Claim” was invalid also because no further construction work had been carried out between the previous reference date (which it claimed to be 22 December 2014 but in fact was 5 January 2015) and the date of the claim.
46Consequently, the plaintiff said King Construction was not entitled to issue the 21 January Payment Claim containing the Invoice 1226, even though Invoice 1226 had not previously been claimed, because it was in respect of work performed to which the earlier reference date (of 5 January 2015) was applicable.
47Importantly, however, Vickery J noted that:
“However, in my opinion, the fact that an item of work could have been claimed as part of a payment claim served in respect of an earlier reference date, but was not, is not a bar to it being claimed in a later payment claim made in respect of a later reference date, provided that s 14(8) is not breached. The time when the work is done may be relevant to a determination as to the correct reference date which applies to a payment claim served in respect of that work. However, the time when the work is done is not a factor which per se determines the validity of the payment claim.’[26]
[26]Ibid [100].
48Bearing that excerpt in mind, King Construction is arguably distinguishable from this proceeding. It concerned the discrete issue of an item of work which could have been claimed as part of a payment claim served in respect of an earlier reference date, but was not. In this proceeding, the work claimed in the 30 April 2021 invoice was claimed in respect of the 30 March 2021 payment claim, a claim in respect of the previous reference date.
49Further, it was unnecessary for the Vickery J to determine the question.[27] Accordingly, it was potentially open to the plaintiff to contend that King Construction is of minimal weight on this issue.
[27]Ibid [112].
50Finally, to interpret King Construction in the manner alleged by Buyo could arguably circumvent the operation of s14(9) of the SOP Act. It would have the result that any time a claimant claimed an amount for a previous unpaid payment claim, and did not claim new work, the claim would be invalid despite falling within the ambit of s14(9) of the SOP Act.
51The fourth contention of Buyo is that it validly served the payment schedules in accordance with s15 of the SOP Act. To determine that question, it is necessary to examine whether the requirements of s15 of the SOP Act are satisfied.
52First, the payment schedules were served (s15(1) of the SOP Act). MAV admits that on 14 April 2021, Mr Cairns emailed a purported payment schedule to Mr Arzenti of MAV, scheduling a sum of $112,186.00 (including GST).[28] MAV also admits that on 3 May 2021, Mr Cairns emailed Mr Arzenti a purported payment schedule.[29]
[28]Exhibit MG-3 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
[29]Exhibit MG-5 to the affidavit of Michael Gandolfo dated 2 August 2021.
53Secondly, on a fair reading of the payment schedules, they indicates the claim to which they relate (s12(2)(a) of the SOP Act). The 14 April 2021 payment schedule correctly indicated that it related to “Payment Claim No.: 27”.
54The payment schedule and payment certificates erroneously indicated (emphasis added): “Payment Claim No.: 28”. However, this is ameliorated by the fact that the covering email clarified that the payment schedule was the “April 21 Progress Claim BCISPA Payment Schedule”. Further, the schedule also indicated “Month/Year: April Claim 2021”. I observe that the requirements of the SOP Act are not to be interpreted in an unduly technical manner.
55Thirdly, the payment schedules indicated the scheduled amounts (s12(2)(b) of the SOP Act). Fourthly, none of the claims identifies excluded amounts (s 12(2)(c) of the SOP Act).
56The primary issue that could have been relied upon by the plaintiff is that each payment schedule contained excluded amounts, namely liquidated damages.
57Buyo contends that there is no authority to the effect that a payment schedule containing excluded amounts is invalid. It contends that the authorities are to the contrary. It refers to Yuanda Vic Pty Ltd v Facade Designs International Pty Ltd (“Yuanda”);[30] and Seabay Properties Pty Ltd v Galvin Construction Pty Ltd (“Seabay”).[31]
[30][2021] VSCA 44 [34] (McLeish and Niall JJA).
[31][2011] VSC 183 [65]-[69] (Vickery J).
58However, in my view, it would be open to the plaintiff to argue that the above authorities do not support the position of Buyo. The phrase in Yuanda relied upon by Buyo (at [34]) that “… while the Act enables a respondent to a payment claim to identify excluded amounts”, refers to the ability of a respondent to identify excluded amounts in the payment claim, as a basis for refusing payment. That interpretation is reinforced by the phrase that follows: “… it does not provide for a respondent who identifies an excluded amount to avoid payment of the whole claimed amount” (emphasis added). Taken at its highest, the excerpt permits a payment schedule to identify excluded amounts in payment claims as a basis for refusing payment.
59The other excerpt on which Buyo relied was from Seabay at [65]-[69] which arguably in its context otherwise reveals that the prohibition against excluded amounts extends to payment schedules.
60Seabay concerned a payment schedule which scheduled an amount of nil, as the respondent set-off liquidated damages against the claimed amount.
61The adjudicator found that the set-off of liquidated damages was impermissible, because it was an excluded amount.
62It therefore would not have been futile for the plaintiff to argue that if a defendant could set-off liquidated damages in a payment schedule against the claimed amount, this would be contrary to the pay now argue later policy of the SOP Act. It would permit defendants to agitate claims which are properly made at a trial such as in the Writ Proceeding. It would disrupt the cashflow of the construction industry, a cashflow which is its lifeblood. On that basis, to hold that s10B extends to payment schedules would facilitate the purpose of the SOP Act.
63MAV contends that, on 26 August 2021 in its written submissions, Buyo for the first time raised the issue that notwithstanding that the payment schedules served by the Buyo contained excluded amounts, they were valid, and MAV, having failed to seek adjudication under s18 of the SOP Act, could not press its claim in the proceeding (“the Adjudication Issue”). Buyo’s submissions relied upon the decision of Vickery J in Seabay. This appears to be the basis for the withdrawal of the proceeding.
64MAV claims that, in breach of the provisions of the CPA, Buyo failed to bring to the attention of MAV the Adjudication Issue at the earliest possible time and by their conduct acquiesced in conduct which has resulted in unnecessary delay and the parties incurring significant and unnecessary legal costs in both this proceeding and in the Writ Proceeding.
65Buyo says that the "Adjudication Issue" argument is a clear mischaracterisation of the defendant's submission, as nowhere is it argued adjudication is a pre-condition to a sub-s16(2)(a)(i) proceeding.
66All that Buyo does is point out that it was open to MAV to challenge the scheduled amount in payment schedule 28 through the adjudication process, it did not do so, twice, and that the analysis is that Seabay concerned an adjudication application.
67MAV’s reliance on the Adjudication Issue as the basis for the withdrawal of this proceeding does not mean that the material in the originating motion did not have a proper basis on the factual or legal material available to the plaintiff at the time of making the claim for the reasons set out above. It was a forensic decision on the part of MAV to pursue its claims in the Writ Proceeding and not the present case.
68In my view the circumstances do not fall within the categories to warrant the making of a special costs order: Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola.[32]
[32][2001] VSC 189 at [7]-[8].
69However, given the plaintiff discontinued the proceeding, the usual costs orders ought to follow.
Conclusion
70The Court orders that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding on a standard basis to be taxed in default of agreement.
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Certificate
I certify that these 14 pages are a true copy of the judgment of Her Honour Judge Burchell on 19 October 2021.
Dated: 19 October 2021
Andrea Ko
Associate to Her Honour Judge Burchell
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