[2010] HCATrans 331
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M111 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
MAURICE BLACKBURN CASHMAN
Applicant
and
FIONA HELEN BROWN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 10 DECEMBER 2010, AT 3.00 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR M.F. WHEELAHAN, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.A. O’MEARA, for the applicant. (instructed by Minter Ellison)
MR S.G. O’BRYAN, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR S.R. McCREDIE on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by Lennon Mazzeo)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Wheelahan.
MR WHEELAHAN: Your Honours, this application raises new aspects with a recurring problem, and the recurring problem is the relationship between the determination of rights to statutory compensation, or workers compensation, by reference to the issues defined by a statute and the trial of common law causes of action and, in particular, the extent to which the former affects the latter. In this case my client, the applicant, disputes that the respondent suffers from psychiatric injury, severe or otherwise. It does not accept that the respondent is totally incapacitated for work.
FRENCH CJ: Your argument is with the proposition that you are, as it were, stuck with the medical panel’s assessment.
MR WHEELAHAN: Yes, and there were two reasons for which the Court of Appeal held that to be the case; the first as a result of its construction of the relevant provisions of the statute, and I want to make three points about that, and, secondly and tentatively, issue estoppel, and I want to make three points about that. So if I turn to the statutory construction firstly. If subsection (15) of 134AB deems the plaintiff, the respondent, to have suffered a serious injury for all purposes and not simply for the purpose of engaging the gateway in subsection (2), then that is a very important component of the plaintiff’s case.
One would expect at trial plaintiff’s counsel will want to open that to the jury. Plaintiff’s counsel will want to say to the jury, the first thing to bear in mind about this case is you must assume that as at 28 June 2006 my client suffered a severe psychiatric injury, and it is severe as to consequences for pain and suffering and severe as to loss of earning capacity consequences. Plaintiff’s counsel would want to open to the jury in that way.
BELL J: But could not. Is that not your point?
MR WHEELAHAN: Yes. Similarly, the judge would be required to instruct the jury as to the effect of subsection (15). When we look at subsection (23)(b) there is a prohibition on mentioning the fact that the plaintiff is deemed to have suffered a serious injury.
BELL J: How did the Court of Appeal deal with that?
MR WHEELAHAN: The court took a very literal…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 331
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the transfer of property by Mr. Brown to his wife, for no consideration, constituted a "disposition of property" that could be avoided under section 120 of the *Bankruptcy Act*. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the section applied to a gratuitous alienation of property by a bankrupt, even if the bankrupt was not insolvent at the time of the disposition.
The High Court, by majority, held that section 120 of the *Bankruptcy Act* applied to gratuitous alienations of property by a bankrupt, irrespective of whether the bankrupt was insolvent at the time of the disposition. The Court reasoned that the purpose of section 120 was to protect the interests of creditors by ensuring that property available for distribution upon bankruptcy was not dissipated through voluntary transfers. The language of the section, particularly the phrase "disposition of property," was interpreted broadly to encompass any act by which a bankrupt parts with property. The Court affirmed that the focus was on the effect of the disposition on the bankrupt's estate, not on the bankrupt's solvency at the time of the transfer.
The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Court for further orders consistent with the High Court's judgment.
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