| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 4788 of 2009
| CAROL ANN MATTHEWS | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| SPI ELECTRICITY PTY LTD (ACN 064 651 118) AND ORS | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | J FORREST J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 30 April 2013 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 3 May 2013 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Matthews v SPI Electricity & Ors (Ruling No 21) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2013] VSC 219 | |
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EVIDENCE – Admissibility – Court’s discretion to exclude evidence – Whether danger of undue waste of time outweighs probative value - Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), ss 55, 135(c).
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr R Richter QC with Mr T Tobin SC Mr A J Keogh SC Mr L W L Armstrong & Ms M Szydzik | Maurice Blackburn |
| For the First Defendant | Mr J BR Beach QC with Mr P H Solomon SC Mr B F Quinn SC Mr D J Farrands Mr C O Parkinson & Mr J H Kirkwood | Herbert Freehills Smith |
| For the Second Defendant | Mr R Ray QC with Ms E M Brimer | Holman Fenwick Willan |
| For the Third, Fourth and Fifth Defendants | Mr C M Caleo SC with Mr P E Anastassiou SC Ms W A Harris SC Mr S A O’Meara SC Mr P Zappia Ms A L Robertson Dr M D Rush Mr N McAteer & Mr A D Pound | Norton Rose |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
Counsel for Mrs Matthews seeks to tender 18 audit reports[1] of 11 inspectors employed by USC, the asset inspection company charged with the responsibility of inspecting the Pentadeen Spur SWER line on behalf of SPI.
[1](“the reports”).
The 11 inspectors were the subject of external audits carried out in 2006 and 2007 by Distribution Auditing Services Pty Ltd,[2] reports of which were submitted to SPI and USC.
[2](“DAS”)
None of these reports relate to inspections on the Pentadeen Spur. Not one of the eleven inspectors named have worked on a SWER line emanating from the Kilmore East substation.
The tender of these documents was opposed by counsel for SPI and USC on the basis that they are not probative to a fact in issue in this case. Alternatively, they contend that if the reports are probative I should exercise my discretion to refuse their tender pursuant to s 135(c) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic)[3] on the basis that the potential cost and delay to the trial is of such significance that it squarely outweighs the probative value of the reports.
[3](“Evidence Act”).
In my view, for reasons I shall now explain, the arguments of SPI and USC in relation to the application of s 135(c) should be accepted.
The reports
It suffices to take one example, that of Mr AR, an asset inspector employed by USC who inspected SPI infrastructure.[4]
[4]SPN.150.595.0083.
Mr AR was required, amongst many other things, to correctly identify service line maintenance issues, including items which would require urgent attention or follow-up action in order to…
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- Case
- [2013] VSC 219
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue the court had to address was whether the court should exercise its discretion to exclude the contested evidence under section 55 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). The court needed to balance the probative value of the evidence against the risk that its admission would result in an undue waste of time, as per section 135(c) of the Act. This required the court to assess the relevance and importance of the evidence in relation to the issues at hand and to determine whether the potential for unnecessary delay and expense outweighed its value in helping the court reach a just decision.
In ruling on the matter, the court carefully considered the nature and relevance of the contested evidence. It concluded that, while the evidence might have some probative value, the risk that its admission would lead to an undue waste of time was significant. The court determined that the evidence was unlikely to play a critical role in resolving the central issues of the case and that its inclusion could unnecessarily prolong the proceedings. As a result, the court exercised its discretion under section 55 of the Evidence Act to exclude the contested evidence from the trial. The court’s decision was based on a careful weighing of the probative value of the evidence against the risk of undue delay and expense, leading to the conclusion that the latter factor predominated.
The final orders of the court were that the contested evidence be excluded from the trial. This decision ensured that the proceedings remained focused on the most relevant and significant issues, avoiding unnecessary prolongation and resource expenditure. The court’s ruling exemplifies the careful balance required in determining the admissibility of evidence, particularly when considering the potential for an undue waste of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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