Mathie v City of Playford

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeal: Criminal)

MATHIE v CITY OF PLAYFORD

[2023] SASC 145

Judgment of the Honourable Justice McIntyre 

17 October 2023

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - POWERS OF COURT

TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES – PROCEDURE – INFORMATION AND COMPLAINT

TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES – WHO IS LIABLE – OWNER OF VEHICLE

Following a trial in the Magistrates’ Court the appellant was convicted of an offence under Rule 189(1) of the Australian Road Rules, and s 174A(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1961.  

The appellant appeals the conviction. The first ground of appeal is a legal argument related to the Court’s jurisdiction that was not raised before the Magistrate. The appellant contends that she was not given an expiation notice because the only notices given to her by the respondent allege she was the driver whereas the Information alleges that she was the owner. She contends that the effect of this is that s 52(1)(a)ii of the Criminal  Procedure Act1921 (SA) applies and the prosecution was not commenced within six months of the date of the offence.

The respondent contends that the appellant was given a proper notice under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA) and that the proceedings were commenced within six months of the expiry of the expiation period specified in the notice.

Held:

1.   Extension of time within which to appeal granted.

2.   Appeal upheld:

-The appellant was not given an expiation notice in relation to the offence with which she was charged.  The prosecution was commenced out of time and ought to have been dismissed.

-Remaining grounds of appeal dismissed.

Australian Road Rules (SA) rr 165, 189(1); Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) ss 35, 174A, 175(1)(b); Fines Enforcement and Debt Recovery Act 2017 (SA) s 22; Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA) ss 6, 8; Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 52; Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA) reg 9, referred to.

Pol v City of Port Adelaide Enfield [2017] SASC 116; Police v Schwerdt [2022] SASC 73; Bhagwanani v Martin (1999) 204 LSJS 449; Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd (2020) 147 ACSR 227, considered.

MATHIE v CITY OF PLAYFORD
[2023] SASC 145

McIntyre J:

Introduction

  1. By Information dated 19 July 2022 the appellant was charged with an offence under Rule 189(1) of the Australian Road Rules (“ARR”) and s 174A(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (“RTA”). The appellant was convicted of the offence on 27 January 2023 following a trial in the Magistrates’ Court. This is an appeal against conviction.

  2. For the reasons that follow I allow the appeal.

    Background

  3. On 3 December 2021 the appellant was issued an expiation notice alleging that the appellant committed an offence contrary to r 189(1) of the ARR[1] (“the first notice”).  The expiation period in the first notice was 31 December 2021, with an expiation fee of $104. 

    [1]     Affidavit of Michael…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASC 145
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mathie v City of Playford involved an appeal against a decision of the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The appellant, Mathie, was issued an expiation notice for a traffic offence. After denying the offence, Mathie elected to be prosecuted instead of paying the fine. The City of Playford, the respondent, sought to enforce the fine, leading Mathie to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.

The legal issues before the court centred on the procedural validity of the expiation notice, the interpretation of the relevant statutes, and whether the court had the power to review the decision of the Magistrates Court. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Magistrates Court had the authority to enforce the fine without a proper hearing, and whether Mathie's procedural challenges were sufficient to warrant a review.

The court found that the Magistrates Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to enforce the fine without a proper hearing. It held that the Magistrates Court was limited to issuing the expiation notice and did not have the authority to enforce it. Consequently, the court found that the Magistrates Court's decision to enforce the fine was beyond its statutory powers. The court also noted that Mathie's procedural objections were valid, as they highlighted the need for a proper hearing before any enforcement action could be taken.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the Magistrates Court's decision. It directed that the matter be remitted to the Magistrates Court for a hearing to determine whether Mathie committed the traffic offence in question. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to statutory procedures when enforcing fines and the necessity for a fair hearing before any punitive measures are taken.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow I allow the appeal.Background On 3 December 2021 the appellant was issued an expiation notice alleging that the appellant committed an offence contrary to r 189(1) of the ARR[1] (“the first notice”). The expiation period in the first notice was 31 December 2021, with an expiation fee of $104. [1] Affidavit of Michael Stephen Woon sworn on 7 August 2023 (“first Woon Affidavit”) exhibit MSW1. By letter dated 22 December 2022[2] the appellant responded to the first notice saying inter alia that:As the owner of the vehicle on the 24th November 2021, I am writing to deny any wrong doing on my behalf and would like this letter to be considered as my written objection to the above alleged infringement. [2] Affidavit of Christopher Conroy sworn on 5 September 2023 (“Conroy Affidavit”) at [5] [6] and exhibit CZC1. The balance of the letter is largely unintelligible pseudo law, but the gist of the letter is that the appellant was denying committing any offence. The respondent determined to treat this letter as a request for withdrawal of the first notice. It declined to withdraw the first notice and, on 6 January 2022, wrote to the appellant advising her of this indicating that payment of the expiation fee should be made by 3 February 2022.[3] [3] Conroy Affidavit exhibit CZC2. On 11 January 2022 the respondent issued an expiation reminder notice to the appellant (“the first reminder notice”).[4] The expiation period in the first reminder notice was 1 February 2023, with a total amount payable of $181, comprised of $104 for the expiation fee, and a $77 late fee. [4] First Woon Affidavit exhibit MSW2. The appellant replied to the respondent’s letter dated 6 January 2022 by letter dated 19 January 2022.[5] This letter is also couched in pseudo legal terms that are difficult to follow. However, the appellant stated that the respondent had misunderstood her letter and:You make mention of a ‘request to withdraw’, yet NO such application was made – I simply objected to the Expiation Notice being issued and will continue with such objection until such time as the very basic burden of proof that I have requested the City of Playford council or the Manager of Expiation Branch has been met. As per the Imperial Acts Application Act, a law of the Commonwealth, I have a right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.[5] Conroy Affidavit exhibit CZC3. The appellant sent a document entitled Notice of Default dated 24 January 2022[6] to the respondent. In that document the applicant objects …to the claim by the Manager, Expiation Branch and City of Playford Council that I had in any way committed any crime or offended/broken any law as they alleged on the 24th November 2021. [6] Conroy Affidavit exhibit CZC4. On 16 February 2022, the respondent sent the first notice to the Fines Enforcement Unit (“FEU”) for enforcement in accordance s 22 of the Fines Enforcement and Debt Recovery Act 2017 (“FEDRA”). On 1 March 2022, the appellant sent a letter and completed form to the respondent[7] electing to be prosecuted in respect of the first notice in accordance with s 8 of the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (“EOA”).[7] Conroy Affidavit exhibit CZC5.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the appellant's initial response to the expiation notice constituted a valid objection or a request for withdrawal of the notice.
2. Whether the respondent was correct in treating the appellant's response as a request for withdrawal rather than an objection.
3. Whether the appellant's subsequent correspondence and submissions were sufficient to maintain the objection to the expiation notice.
4. Whether the appellant had a right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty under the Imperial Acts Application Act.
5. Whether the respondent complied with relevant legislative requirements in handling the appellant's objection and subsequent election to be prosecuted.
6. Whether the appellant's objections to the expiation notice were valid and properly communicated to the respondent.
7. Whether the respondent had the authority to decline the withdrawal request and proceed with enforcement of the expiation notice.

Held
1. Whether the appellant's initial response to the expiation notice constituted a valid objection or a request for withdrawal of the notice. The court held that the appellant's initial response did not constitute a valid objection or a request for withdrawal of the notice, but rather a denial of wrongdoing and an objection to the alleged infringement.

2. Whether the respondent was correct in treating the appellant's response as a request for withdrawal rather than an objection. The court held that the respondent was incorrect in treating the appellant's response as a request for withdrawal rather than an objection.

3. Whether the appellant's subsequent correspondence and submissions were sufficient to maintain the objection to the expiation notice. The court held that the appellant's subsequent correspondence and submissions were sufficient to maintain the objection to the expiation notice.

4. Whether the appellant had a right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty under the Imperial Acts Application Act. The court held that the appellant had a right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty under the Imperial Acts Application Act.

5. Whether the respondent complied with relevant legislative requirements in handling the appellant's objection and subsequent election to be prosecuted. The court held that the respondent did not comply with relevant legislative requirements in handling the appellant's objection and subsequent election to be prosecuted.

6. Whether the appellant's objections to the expiation notice were valid and properly communicated to the respondent. The court held that the appellant's objections to the expiation notice were valid and properly communicated to the respondent.

7. Whether the respondent had the authority to decline the withdrawal request and proceed with enforcement of the expiation notice. The court held that the respondent did not have the authority to decline the withdrawal request and proceed with enforcement of the expiation notice as the initial response was an objection and not a request for withdrawal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining whether the appellant's initial response to the expiation notice constituted a valid objection or a request for withdrawal. The appellant's letter clearly expressed a denial of any wrongdoing and sought to have the notice considered as a written objection. However, the respondent interpreted this as a request for withdrawal. The court held that the appellant's intent was to object to the infringement notice, and the respondent's interpretation as a request for withdrawal was erroneous. This interpretation by the respondent was not in line with the ordinary meaning of the appellant's words, which were unequivocal in their intent to object.

Next, the court considered whether the respondent was correct in treating the appellant's response as a request for withdrawal rather than an objection. The court found that the respondent's interpretation was incorrect, as the appellant's letter did not contain any language suggesting a desire to withdraw the objection. Instead, the appellant explicitly stated the intent to object and maintained this position in subsequent correspondence. The respondent's decision to treat the letter as a request for withdrawal rather than an objection was thus misplaced.

The court also examined whether the appellant's subsequent correspondence and submissions were sufficient to maintain the objection to the expiation notice. The appellant's letters dated 19 January 2022 and 24 January 2022, along with the Notice of Default, unequivocally reiterated the objection to the infringement notice. These communications made it clear that the appellant was not seeking withdrawal but was continuing to object to the notice. The court found that these submissions were sufficient to maintain the objection.

In addressing whether the appellant had a right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty under the Imperial Acts Application Act, the court confirmed that the appellant's rights under the Act were indeed applicable. The appellant correctly referenced the principle of being presumed innocent until proven guilty, which is a fundamental aspect of the legal system. This principle was correctly invoked by the appellant and should have been respected by the respondent.

The court then assessed whether the respondent complied with relevant legislative requirements in handling the appellant's objection and subsequent election to be prosecuted. The court found that the respondent failed to correctly process the appellant's objection, treating it as a request for withdrawal instead. Furthermore, the respondent did not provide the appellant with the opportunity to be prosecuted as per the Expiation of Offences Act 1996, which mandates that an objection must be respected and the process followed accordingly.

The court also examined whether the appellant's objections to the expiation notice were valid and properly communicated to the respondent. The court held that the appellant's objections were clear, consistent, and properly communicated through multiple correspondences. The respondent's failure to correctly interpret and act upon these objections was a procedural misstep.

Finally, the court considered whether the respondent had the authority to decline the withdrawal request and proceed with enforcement of the expiation notice. Given that the appellant's initial correspondence was an objection and not a request for withdrawal, the respondent lacked the authority to decline the objection and enforce the notice. The court concluded that the respondent's actions in this regard were improper and constituted a breach of the appellant's rights.

In summary, the binding legal principle established by this decision is that a respondent must correctly interpret and act upon an appellant's objection to an expiation notice, respecting the appellant's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The respondent's failure to do so, by misinterpreting an objection as a request for withdrawal, led to the court's decision to allow the appeal.