Mate Ivancic v Nick Zardo

The Supreme Court of New South Wales considered an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a consent judgment entered into following a motor vehicle accident. The appellant, Mate Ivancic, had obtained a consent judgment against the respondent, Nick Zardo, for damages arising from personal injuries. However, subsequent surveillance revealed a situation inconsistent with the claimed disabilities, leading Mr. Zardo to seek relief from the judgment. The primary dispute revolved around whether Mr. Zardo was entitled to partial relief from the judgment sum on the basis that a portion of it represented a financial benefit procured by fraud, specifically through false or misleading statements made by Mr. Ivancic.

The court was required to determine the interpretation of section 66 of the *Motor Accidents Act 1998* (NSW). Specifically, the court had to decide whether the term "financial benefit" within section 66 referred to the entire lump sum awarded by the consent judgment or if it allowed for apportionment and partial relief where part of the sum was obtained by fraud. A further issue was whether the fact that the judgment sum represented a compromise settlement precluded such apportionment and partial relief. The court also considered whether liability for costs should be subject to relief under section 66, noting that costs had previously been made subject to relief.

The court dismissed the appeal brought by Mr. Ivancic. It allowed the cross-appeal brought by Mr. Zardo in relation to ground 2(b), but otherwise dismissed the cross-appeal. The reasoning applied by the court, though not detailed in the provided text, ultimately led to the conclusion that partial relief from the consent judgment was permissible under section 66 of the *Motor Accidents Act 1998* (NSW), even where the sum represented a compromise settlement, if a portion of that sum was demonstrably procured by fraud.

Consequently, the appellant, Mr. Ivancic, was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent, Mr. Zardo, for both the appeal and the successful ground 2(b) of the cross-appeal.