Mastrangeli v Workers' Compensation Regulator
[2025] QIRC 263
•3 October 2025
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
| CITATION: | Mastrangeli v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 263 |
PARTIES: | Cesira, Mastrangeli v Workers' Compensation Regulator |
CASE NO: | WC/2020/28 |
PROCEEDING: | Interlocutory proceeding |
DELIVERED ON: | 3 October 2025 |
| HEARING DATE: | 3 October 2025 |
MEMBER: | Dwyer IC |
| HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
ORDER: | 1. Pursuant to s 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the appeals are dismissed; or alternatively 2. Pursuant to s 541 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the appeals are dismissed. |
CATCHWORDS: | WORKERS' COMPENSATION – APPEAL AGAINST DECISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION REGULATOR – psychological or psychiatric injury – where appellant previously conducted proceedings under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) – where appellant filed statements of facts and contentions alleging certain facts as stressors – where same facts wholly or substantially considered in discrimination proceedings – where findings made by Commission about alleged facts – where appeal of decision in discrimination proceedings to Court – where appeal dismissed for appellant’s non-compliance with directions of Court – where findings of the Commission undisturbed - whether the act or omission the subject of appellant’s appeals has been dealt with by the Commission in the discrimination proceedings – duplication of factual controversies – appeals dismissed. |
LEGISLATION: | Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 456, s 541. Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 32 |
CASES: | Ant Projects Pty Ltd v Brooks & Ors [2019] QCA 259 Blackwood v Pearce [2015] ICQ 12 Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18 Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 089 Hennessy v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 081 Keating v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 058 Liao v Metro South Hospital and Health Service [2025] QIRC 260 Mastrangeli v Girle and Anor [2023] ICQ 024 Mastrangeli v Girle & Anor [2023] QIRC 175 McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2022] QIRC 110 Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251 State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited [2015] HCA 28 |
| APPEARANCES: | Ms Cesira Mastrangeli, the Appellant Mr P. Rashleigh of Counsel, instructed by Ms R. Moroney of the Workers' Compensation Regulator |
Reasons for Decision
Background to Appeal
These reasons assume familiarity with the decision of Mastrangeli v Girle & Anor[1] ('Mastrangeli').
[1] [2023] QIRC 175.
Ms Cesira Mastrangeli commenced her employment with the Queensland Police Service ('QPS') in 2011. In or around August 2011, Ms Mastrangeli transferred to the role of Intelligence Support Officer (Administration Officer O2).
In early 2018 Ms Mastrangeli made three applications pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ('the WCR Act'), for workers' compensation in respect of a psychological injury sustained when she was employed by the QPS. The claims were lodged on 8 January 2018, 22 January 2018, and 27 February 2018.
WorkCover Queensland ('WorkCover') subsequently advised Ms Mastrangeli on various dates between 12 September 2018 and 27 June 2019 that each of her applications for compensation was rejected (‘the WorkCover decisions’).
On or around 24 September 2019, Ms Mastrangeli applied for a review of each of the WorkCover decisions with the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator').
On 6 December 2019, the Regulator confirmed in three separate decisions that the WorkCover decisions were upheld ('the decisions').
On 3 April 2020 Ms Mastrangeli appealed to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission') against the decisions by way of three separate notices of appeal (‘the appeals’). The appeals were numbered WC/2020/28, WC/2020/29, and WC/2020/30.
The appeals have been joined.[2]
[2] The respondent’s consent on record to the matters being joined is reflected in the transcript of the Mention before Vice President O'Connor on 1 December 2023 (T 1-21 to T 1-22).
On 4 March 2021, Ms Mastrangeli filed and served her Statement of Facts and Contentions (‘SOFCs’) for each of her appeals. The appeals were subsequently placed in abeyance pending the conduct and resolution of the discrimination proceedings filed by Ms Mastrangeli.
The discrimination proceedings
In or around August 2019, the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission') received a referral pursuant to s 166 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (‘the AD Act’) of a discrimination complaint from the Queensland Human Rights Commission ('the complaint'). The complaint was made on the basis that Ms Mastrangeli had been the subject of unlawful direct and indirect discrimination in contravention of the AD Act.
On 20 April 2022, the Commission heard the complaint. The discrimination complaint was dismissed in the decision of Mastrangeli delivered by Power IC on 13 June 2023.
Ms Mastrangeli subsequently appealed the decision in Mastrangeli. On 30 October 2023, Deputy President Merrell dismissed the appeal pursuant to r 45(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 on the basis that Ms Mastrangeli failed to comply with the directions of the Commission.[3]
[3] Mastrangeli v Girle and Anor [2023] ICQ 024.
Progress of the appeals before the Commission
Following the release of Mastrangeli by Power IC on 13 June 2023 and the subsequently dismissed appeal to the Court, the appeals were listed for mention to ascertain Ms Mastrangeli’s intentions. During a mention before Vice President O'Connor on 1 December 2023 (almost five years after she first filed her Workers' Compensation Applications with WorkCover) Ms Mastrangeli advised she wanted to proceed with her appeals.
On 30 January 2024 further directions were issued in respect of the appeals. Those directions subsequently had to be vacated. Thereafter there was a series of directions orders vacated and replaced with further directions. The appeals proceeded through the balance of the case management phase throughout the remainder of 2024 and on into the first quarter of 2025.
In or about April 2025 the appeals were allocated to me for hearing. Having reviewed the SOFCs and being familiar with the decision in Mastrangeli I considered the appeals may have contained a duplication of controversies with the matters dealt with in the discrimination proceedings.
Following mentions on 3 June and 28 August 2025, I directed the parties to file submissions as to why the appeals should not be dismissed pursuant to s 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (‘the IR Act’).
Submissions and evidence
Each of the parties filed submissions in accordance with my directions. In addition, the Regulator filed an affidavit of Ms Ruth Moroney, a Senior Appeals Officer with the Regulator.[4] The affidavit attaches the medico-legal report of Dr Vladan Ljubisavljevic, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 14 June 2019 (‘the medical report’).
[4] Exhibit 1.
The affidavit of Ms Moroney states that the medical report was supplied to the Regulator by Ms Mastrangeli on 20 January 2025 and its author was included by her on her list of witnesses for the appeals.
I do not intend to restate the submission of the parties in these reasons. I have read the submissions in full and will address the salient portions in my consideration that follows.
The Act and the relevant legal principles
Section 456 of the IR Act relevantly provides:
456 Commission may stay or dismiss applications in certain circumstances
(1) The commission may stay or dismiss an application or complaint if the act or omission the subject of the application or complaint is being, or has been, dealt with by the commission in another proceeding.
(Emphasis added)
The wording of s 456 of the IR Act plainly confers a discretion on the Commission to dismiss proceedings where, in the Commission’s view, there is a duplication of controversy, and where that controversy has already been dealt with by the Commission in another proceeding. While the practical application of the section is (in some ways) analogous to the operation of the doctrines of issue estoppel or res judicata, it is a statutory provision of its own unique character. Moreover, the words ‘dealt with by commission’ confine its use exclusively to matters that are (or have been) before the Commission.
It is noted that s 456 of the IR Act has been the subject of consideration by the Commission previously. The conclusions in those matters are largely confined to the unique facts of each of those matters.[5]
[5] See for example Hennessy v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 081 in which McLennan IC declined to exercise the discretion on the basis a Dispute was not an ‘application’.
Having regard to those matters, I note generally that I do not consider the fact that duplicated controversies in separate applications or complaints pursued under different statutory frameworks will, of itself, give rise to a barrier to the use of the discretion.[6]
[6] Compare with Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC at [34] and McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2022] QIRC 110.
The section calls for a consideration of ‘the act or omission the subject of the application…’. It is the potential for duplication of those matters that inform the discretion. This undoubtedly includes consideration of alleged facts relied on by a party to form allegations that are the basis for the application under consideration. It would, for example, be entirely proper in my view to consider an exercise of the discretion where a party alleges that a certain factual scenario constitutes ‘less favourable treatment’ in proceedings under the AD Act and subsequently alleges that the identical factual scenario constitutes ‘unreasonable management action’ in proceeding under the WCR Act. This is so regardless of the functions and purposes of those respective statutory regimes.
The eschewing of duplication of factual controversies, especially before different members of the Commission, is not just about avoiding the inefficient use of public resources. The common law has long recognised the fundamental importance of finality in litigation and avoiding the ‘scandal of conflicting decisions’.[7] Consistent with those principles, s 456 of the IR Act is plainly intended to operate inter alia to allow the Commission the discretion to avoid having to consider and resolve the same factual controversy twice.
[7] See Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited [2015] HCA 28; Ant Projects Pty Ltd v Brooks & Ors [2019] QCA 259 at [69]-[70]; Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251 at 273-274.
Further, it ought to be noted that the discretion can only be exercised in relation to an ‘application or complaint’. However, that confined scope only applies to the matter that is liable to consideration of the Commission to be stayed or dismissed. The ‘act or omission’ being considered is an act or omission alleged in another ‘proceeding’ dealt with or being dealt with by the Commission. The term ‘proceeding’ carries a much broader meaning and likely captures all manner of matters before the Commission.
There is no question in this matter that the appeals I am considering each constitute an ‘application’ within the meaning of s 456 of the IR Act.[8] There can be no dispute that the proceedings before Commissioner Power were ‘another proceeding’ within the meaning of the term as it appears in s 456 of the IR Act.
[8] Blackwood v Pearce [2015] ICQ 12.
In those circumstances, the question to be determined before exercising the discretion is whether the ‘act or omission the subject of the appeals’ has been dealt with in Mastrangeli.
The act or omission the subject of the appeals
In order to consider the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 456 of the IR Act, the Commission must inter alia identify the ‘act or omission the subject of the application’. In my view, this phrase does not compel a consideration of every allegation raised by an applicant in their application. While an ‘act or omission’ being considered will need to be identified by reference to particular factual or legal propositions pleaded, it is only those acts or omissions that are ‘the subject of’ the application that warrant consideration.
Identifying the ‘act or omission the subject of the application’ involves having regard to the nature of the application and then objectively identifying matters of material controversy. While matters included by an appellant cannot be capriciously ignored, some objective practicality must be applied to delineate between matters of a material nature to the proceedings, and matters that are plainly irrelevant, incidental, or antecedent to the material issues.
Before considering what acts or omissions are the subject of the appeals in this matter, something must briefly be said about the general nature of SOFCs, particularly in the context of workers' compensation appeals.
SOFCs filed by appellants in appeals of that type are separated into three broad sections, namely: facts, contentions, and a list of stressors. Workers’ compensation appeals proceed by way of hearing de novo and as such the SOFC serves as a guide to the Commission and parties as to the substance of the appeal, including the identification of material facts and the contentions arising from them. Because appeals proceed by way of hearing de novo the compulsory provision of a list of stressors is a practice that evolved some years ago to remedy the problem of appellants introducing new issues during their evidence at hearing.
In an ideal scenario, the facts, contentions, and list of stressors contained in an SOFC will be consistently identified across the document. But more commonly, especially where an appellant is self-represented, there will invariably be incidental or antecedent matters characterised as e.g. material facts or as stressors. While the matters identified by an appellant are not irrelevant to a consideration pursuant to s 456 of the IR Act, in order to identify the ‘subject’ of an appeal by reference to an SOFC, the document ought to be read as a whole and with a view to objectively delineating the acts or omissions material to the application from those that are not.
Ms Mastrangeli filed SOFCs in respect of each of the appeals. In respect of matters material to my consideration in this matter, each of the SOFCs is identical. Relevantly, each of them contains the following passage at paragraphs 11 and 12 of the ‘facts’ portion of the document:
11. On 4 December 2017, the Appellant sustained a psychological injury, as a result of the Appellants supervisor reprimanding her on two separate occasions in front of other staff.
12. On 8 January 2018, the Appellant sustained a separate psychological injury, as a result of the Appellant finding someone had broken into her locked drawers after an ongoing history of them being tampered with.
(Emphasis added)
In her written submissions filed on 15 July 2025 Ms Mastrangeli expressly states that two of the three appeals that constitute the appeals relate exclusively to either the incident on 4 December 2027 or 8 January 2018. Further, the third of the appeals relates (in part) to the events on those dates.[9]
[9] Appellant’s submissions filed 15 July 2025, at pages 4-5.
Ms Mastrangeli plainly identifies the dates upon which she contends she sustained an injury for the purposes of s 32 of the WCR Act. Ms Mastrangeli nominates 4 December 2017 and also 8 January 2018 (as a separate injury).
In the contentions portion of the SOFCs Ms Mastrangeli purports to assert these factual assertions by reference to the opinion of Dr Ljubisavljevic dated 14 June 2019. She contends that his opinion supports a conclusion that she has sustained an injury within the meaning of the WCR Act on those dates.
Importantly, Ms Mastrangeli does not nominate any other dates of ‘injury’ within the meaning of the WCR Act in her SOFC. She also does not contend her injury arose over a period of time.
The SOFCs also contain the list of stressors. While it is fair to note that Ms Mastrangeli’s list of stressors itemise a longer list of alleged incidents that date back many years preceding 4 December 2017, none of these are particularised in the facts portion of the SOFC nor referenced in the contentions portion.[10]
[10] The oldest stressor dates back to October 2015.
Ms Mastrangeli’s alleged injury arises in a setting of long-standing mental illness that is wholly unrelated to her employment. Ms Mastrangeli’s own medical expert witness addresses the causative factors of her illness and, to the extent he concludes any of her symptoms relate to her employment, he says in his report dated 14 June 2019:[11]
The clinical notes indicate that Ms Mastrangeli has a long history of depressive disorder, a prejudicial upbringing and multiple adversities throughout her life. I note that the psychiatrist at Princess Alexandra Hospital diagnosed her with borderline personality disorder and the history is suggestive of someone with Cluster B personality vulnerabilities.
The notes indicate ongoing depressive symptoms on and off since 2014. It appears that the main stressors throughout that time, 2015 and 2016, were difficulties with her son…and relationship difficulties with the father of her son…
Up to June 2017 there is not enough evidence to support that work was the significant contributing factor to her ongoing psychiatric symptoms.
The clinical notes from 2 June 2017 indicate workplace bullying. Workplace bullying was then mentioned repetitively in the notes and appeared to be a predominant stressor by the end of 2017. I would consider that the event on 4 December 2017 led to an aggravation of her pre-existing psychiatric condition. I consider that the reported yelling by the supervisor and reprimanding her in front of the other staff was the major factor in the aggravation of her condition. She suffered a further aggravation of her condition on 8 January 2018. I would consider that the major factor was Ms Mastrangeli’s belief that her locker was deliberately targeted and tampered with.
(Emphasis added)
[11] Exhibit ‘RAM 1” to the affidavit of Ruth Moroney filed 14 August 2025, at page 13.
The SOFCs filed by Ms Mastrangeli in the appeals plainly focus on the dates 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018 as being the dates material to the acquisition of her injury. Ms Mastrangeli asserts in the facts and contentions that the workplace events on these dates caused her injury. She does this to the exclusion of any other events identified in her list of stressors. This assertion is entirely consistent with the opinion of Dr Ljubisavljevic dated 14 June 2019.
There can be no dispute that the SOFCs in the appeals squarely focus on the incidents on 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018. That focus is established by Ms Mastrangeli. It is further solidified by the opinion Dr Ljubisavljevic dated 14 June 2019 to which Ms Mastrangeli refers to in her contentions. Ms Mastrangeli restates these assertions in respect to the individual appeals in her submissions in these proceedings filed on 15 July 2025.
Despite other events dating back to 2015 referred to in the list of stressors, Ms Mastrangeli makes no attempt at all to argue that those events are causative of her injury and, if the opinion Dr Ljubisavljevic is accepted, nor could she.
The singular purpose of the appeals is to determine whether Ms Mastrangeli sustained an ‘injury’ within the meaning of the WCR Act. That inquiry involves consideration by the Commission of events at the workplace said to be causative of the ‘injury’. In those circumstances I consider that the ‘act or omission’ the subject of the appeals are the events in the workplace that are alleged to have occurred on 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018. While there will inevitably be historical events antecedent to an injury in an appeal of this type, they will often have little material effect on the application. In my view, such antecedent matters would not warrant characterisation as ‘the subject’ of the application.
With respect to the list of stressors contained in the SOFCs, with one exception, I regard the stressors predating 4 December 2017 to be incidental or antecedent to the matters in issue in the appeals, and not ‘the subject’ of the application.
The exception I refer to relates to the injury alleged to have arisen on 8 January 2018. I note the opinion of Dr Ljubisavljevic dated 14 June 2019 notes references to ‘workplace bullying’ in clinical notes after June 2017. There are seven stressors identified by Ms Mastrangeli in her list of stressors that are alleged to have occurred at or after June 2017 (but before 4 December 2017). Of those seven stressors, five relate to allegations of her desk being tampered with. One of these includes an allegation that her supervisor deliberately placed a rotten strawberry on her desk.
While I am not inclined to a conclusion that any events listed as stressors predating 4 December 2017 are capable of being characterised as the ‘act or omission the subject of’ the appeals, the description of the injury Ms Mastrangeli alleges occurred on 8 January 2018 does allude to ‘an ongoing history’ of desk tampering. The stressors identified between June 2017, and January 2018 might have some incidental inclusion in consideration of the ‘act’ alleged to have occurred on 8 January 2018.
Applying a generous reading of Ms Mastrangeli’s contentions contained in her SOFC, the alleged ‘ongoing history’ of tampering with her desk might be regarded as part of the ‘act’ that is the subject of the appeals.
Having identified the alleged events on 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018 as the ‘act or omission the subject of the appeal’ it is now necessary to consider whether they have been ‘dealt with by the Commission in another proceeding’.
The Mastrangeli decision
In the proceedings before Power IC, Ms Mastrangeli’s supervisor was named as the First Respondent. The supervisor gave evidence about the allegation that he had reprimanded Ms Mastrangeli on 4 December 2017, the same allegation she now makes as being causative of her injury. The Commission heard evidence about the allegation and dealt with it as follows:[12]
[12] Mastrangeli at [89]-[94].
[89] The Complainant claims that on the 4 December 2017 she received a reprimand from the First Respondent after he found that she was absent from her desk. The First Respondent’s evidence was that he had allocated one person at any time to perform IPND duty in two-hour blocks. The First Respondent stated that the roster would require one person to give their full attention for two hours per day and during that time they were not to answer phones or schedule their break. Breaks were to be arranged around the rostered duty.
[90] The Complainant confirmed in cross-examination that she had seen the email to the team from the First Respondent dated 21 July 2017 which stated:
Don’t go wandering off to socialise, have a smoke break, grab a coffee or whatever. We’re drowning in this stuff, I need you all to focus closely, please.
[91] The First Respondent states that on 4 December 2017 the Complainant was rostered to perform IPND duty from 9.00-11.00am. The First Respondent’s evidence was:
I noticed when returning from a meeting at 9.20am that Ms Mastrangeli was absent and when I asked around was told that she had gone out at 9.00am. I amended the roster by swapping her roster duties with another member so that continuity was maintained. ...
When Ms Mastrangeli returned at 9.30am I informed her of this swap, and that she would now be performing duty from 11.00am to 1.00pm. Ms Mastrangeli asked when she could take her lunch and I advised that she was to take her lunch break either before 11.00am or after 1.00pm but that she was now covering the roster period from 11.00am to 1.00pm.
At approximately 11.10 I saw that Ms Mastrangeli was again not present and asked others in the team where she was. I was advised that Ms Mastrangeli left at 11.00am. On Ms Mastrangeli ’s return at 11.30 I asked where she had been and she replied that she had taken her lunch. I specifically asked her why she had left the roster arrangement as I had made it clear to her what those arrangements were. Ms Mastrangeli claimed she was entitled to a lunch break to which I responded that she was however as she was rostered on to the 11.00am to 1.00pm shift and the lunch period was as I had already directed and that was before 11.00am or after 1.00pm.
[92] The Complainant states that when the First Respondent asked why she was not at her desk at 9.15am she told the First Respondent that her computer had been dismantled and she was waiting for IT to fix it. The First Respondent replied that another officer was rostered to take over her time slot to process IPNDs and the Complainant was then rostered to do the IPNDs between 11.00am and 1.00pm.
[93] The Complainant's evidence continued:
I said that I was rostered to have lunch at 11.30am and finish work at 2.00pm, to which Sergeant Girle said, “that’s another issue. You have to manage your time and work to the set roster” and walked off.
I felt faint from hunger at around 11.00am. [The First Respondent] wasn’t at his desk so I messaged Kim O’Brien, the administrative officer in charge of rosters, to say I would do the IPNDEs from when I got back from lunch until the end of my shift.
I then took lunch at around 11.00am and returned at 11.30am, upon my return, Sergeant Girle again approached and scolded me loudly in front of my co-workers and other staff members in the floor asking where I had been and why I was not at my desk.
[94] It does not appear that any further action was taken by the First Respondent regarding this matter and as such there was no formal 'reprimand' given to the Complainant. The evidence of the First Respondent was that he 'responded' to the Complainant whilst the Complainant's evidence was that he 'scolded' her. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the First Respondent scolded the Complainant, however I accept that it was more likely than not that the First Respondent tone was strained in circumstances where he had given a clear direction that the Complainant perform a certain task between set hours and this direction was not followed.
While the terms ‘reprimand’ and ‘scolded’ appear to be used interchangeably by Ms Mastrangeli, it is plain that the allegation made by her regarding the events of 4 December 2017 has been presented, tested, and dealt with by the Commission. The findings of the Power IC, having heard evidence from both Ms Mastrangeli and her supervisor, are that there was no reprimand and insufficient evidence that he scolded her.
It is plain from those findings (and the hearing that gave rise to them) that the factual controversy around the events of 4 December 2017 has been dealt with by the Commission.
The decision of Mastrangeli also deals with the events of 8 January 2018 and the allegations of desk tampering more broadly:[13]
[109] SC Miller's evidence was that when he arrived at work on 4 January 2018, he realised that he did not have his keys or his token to complete the IPND checks on the computer system as his token was in his set of drawers. SC Miller had been relieving at a PCYC for a period and when he was away his set of drawers had been moved. SC Miller's evidence was that he found two sets of drawers under one of the desks.
[110] SC Miller gave the following evidence:
Not having my keys to open the drawer I used a paper clip to open it. Once I realized that it was not my drawer and immediately shut the drawer and endeavoured to lock it with the paper clip. Unfortunately when trying to lock the drawer the paper clip got stuck.
I used another paper clip to open the other set of drawers and this was my set of drawer and I retrieved the token to answer the IPNDe.
...
On returning to work on the Wednesday Andrew Girle the Sergeant in Charge and Supervisor and I had a meeting to bring me up to date with what had been occurring in IST while I was away. Andrew told of the paper clip incident and I immediately advised him of what had occurred.
Andrew advised that I should advise Inspector Mulo who was undertaking an enquiry into the incident. I sent an email to Inspector Mulo and one to Andrew Girle reiterating what I had told him at the earlier meeting.
[111] In circumstances where the Complainant attends work for one day a week in an open plan arrangement it would reasonably be expected that there may be changes to the workplace furniture during that time. These changes, including the incident involving Sgt Miller and the paper clip, may often have an innocent explanation. The Complainant indicated that she sat at a colleague's desk at one point when her computer was not working and it appears that the workstation arrangement is quite fluid. This would not be unusual in a work unit that operates over seven days with both full time and part time employees. Without more cogent evidence, it is not reasonable to conclude that someone was intentionally moving the Complainant’s drawers to 'confuse or annoy' her as alleged. There is no evidence that the First Respondent left a strawberry or removed notes from the Complainant's desk.
[13] Mastrangeli at [109] – [111].
Having heard the allegations about desk tampering made by Ms Mastrangeli, and having heard evidence countering them, the Commission did not accept the allegations could be proven. However much Ms Mastrangeli might disagree with the conclusions reached by the Commission in Mastrangeli, she cannot contend that the Commission has not ‘dealt’ with the allegation of being reprimanded or the allegations of desk tampering.
It ought to be noted that the Commissioner, in dealing with those allegations, prefaced her conclusions in each case with the phrases “There is insufficient evidence to conclude…” and “Without more cogent evidence…”. This language merely reflects that, on the evidence presented by Ms Mastrangeli, her allegations cannot be made out to the requisite standard. One must presume that Ms Mastrangeli understood she had the onus of proof in those proceedings and that she presented her case comprehensively. Nothing about this language can be construed as a characterisation of an inconclusive resolution to the factual controversies. More importantly, the language cannot lead to a conclusion that the Commission has other than ‘dealt’ with the allegations.
For completeness I note that with respect to the allegation of desk tampering, the Commissioner dealt with not just the incident complained of on 8 January 2018, but also the allegation more broadly.
Conclusion
Ms Mastrangeli filed SOFCs in the appeals on 4 March 2021. The facts pleaded identify her alleged ‘injury’ arising on 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018. The contentions pleaded identify the events on those dates as giving rise to her alleged ‘injury’. The independent medical evidence of Dr Ljubisavljevic identifies those dates as the dates of injury with respect to any work-related component of her psychiatric illness. Despite the reference to other alleged events in the list of stressors, for reasons already stated, I consider those matters secondary or antecedent to the appeals.
For the purpose of my consideration of the discretion conferred by s 456 of the IR Act, I have concluded that the events of 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018 are the ‘acts or omissions’ the subject of the application. In reaching that conclusion I am willing to incorporate the allegations of desk tampering alleged to have occurred between June and December 2017.
The reasons for decision in Mastrangeli plainly demonstrate that the act or omission the subject of the appeals have, without question, been dealt with by the Commission in those proceedings.
Accordingly, I consider that I ought to exercise the discretion to dismiss the appeals.
Other matters
There are two remaining matters to address. Firstly, having regard to the language of s 456 of the IR Act I can see no limitation on the discretion being exercised to partially dismiss an application. In those circumstances, if I am incorrect in my conclusion that the list of stressors pre-dating 4 December 2017 are not ‘the subject of the application’, their inclusion should not disturb my conclusion to dismiss the appeals insofar as they relate to the allegations of the events on 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018.
Secondly, as an alternative to my conclusions set out above, there is a compelling case to dismiss the appeals in accordance with the discretion conferred by s 541 of the IR Act. Section 541 of the IR Act relevantly provides:
541 Decisions generally
The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following—
(a) make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause;
(b) dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers—
(i) the cause is trivial; or
(ii) further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;
In Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[14] Martin J in dealing with the application pursuant to s 541 of the IR Act wrote:
[14] [2019] ICQ 18, [27] – [30].
[27] Insofar as it may confine the exercise of discretion under s 541, the purpose of the Act is stated as follows:
"3 Main purpose of Act
The main purpose of this Act is to provide for a framework for cooperative industrial relations that -
(a) is fair and balanced; and
(b) supports the delivery of high quality services, economic prosperity and social justice for Queenslanders."
[28] The process for consideration of an application under s 541 does not require that the respondent's case be taken at its highest. The cognate provisions in federal legislation were frequently considered by Full Benches of the federal tribunal, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia. The accepted approach was that the applicant bore the onus of making the claim for relief. But the ascertainment in any particular case of where the public interest lay often depended on a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and was very much a question of fact and degree.
[29] As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials. A "proper consideration" cannot be made where the case for the respondent is simply taken at its highest. While the onus remains on an applicant, the requirement to consider the "public interest" cannot be satisfied if an artificial inflation of the respondent's case is applied. Indeed, to take a respondent's case at its highest would almost always result in the dismissal of an application under this section. On an application of this type, a respondent is not relieved of any requirement to advance a case.
[30] In considering the public interest, regard must be had to the legislative basis of the principal relief sought and the evidence before the Commission …
(Emphasis added)
Section 541 of the IR Act is indistinguishable from its predecessor, namely s 331 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld). Section 331 relevantly provided:
The court or commission may, in an industrial cause -
…(b) dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers -
(i) the cause is trivial; or
(ii)further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.
In State of Queensland v Lockhart,[15] the then Deputy President O’Connor summarised the meaning of 'public interest' in relation to the exercise of discretion under s 331 in the following terms:
[15] [2014] ICQ 006, [21] – [22].
[21] In O'Sullivan v Farrer, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ considered the expression 'in the public interest'. Their Honours wrote:
'Indeed, the expression, 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view'.'
[22] In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in considering what constitutes 'the public interest' wrote:
'Appeals have lain on the ground that it is in the public interest that leave should be granted in the predecessors to the Act for decades. It has not been considered useful or appropriate to define the concept in other than the most general terms and we do not intend to do so. The expression 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question.
Although the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters, it seems to us that none of those elements is present in this case.' (citations omitted)
(Emphasis added)
The public interest test involves a balancing of the respective interests of each party and, more broadly, the public.[16]
[16] Keating v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 058.
As I noted recently in Liao v Metro South Hospital and Health Service:[17]
There is, in my view, an obligation for the Commission to be stringent in its approach to the litigation it oversees. The Commission resources are public resources. While the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 541 of the IR Act calls for a judicious approach, the Commission must equally and actively guard against the squandering of public resources that will occur if it entertains demonstrably futile arguments.
[17] [2025] QIRC 260.
For all of the reasons already set out above, the major controversies giving rise to Ms Matrangeli’s appeals were dealt with wholly or substantially in Mastrangeli. The witnesses called in respect of the alleged events of 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018 gave their evidence in relation to those matters, that evidence was evaluated by the Commission, and the appeal of the decision was dismissed. The controversy has been settled. It is over.[18]
[18] Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited [2015] HCA 28 at [20].
In those circumstances, not only would it be imprudent to allow such an improper re-opening of the dispute, it would be an egregious waste of public resources to compel those witnesses to return to the witness box, over three years after they last gave evidence, and have them give the same evidence, all over again, about matters that occurred seven years ago. The fact that many witnesses would likely be employees of the Queensland Police Service, who would be drawn away from their duty at public expense, only further exacerbates the waste of public resources.
Additionally, there is significant prejudice to the Regulator given the time that has passed since the relevant alleged events occurred. The availability of witnesses and relevant documents is likely to be impeded by the passage of time. More significantly, the effect of the passage of time on the memories of witnesses will undoubtedly prejudice the Regulator.
The discretion conferred by s 541 of the IR Act is informed by numerous considerations. I must also consider any prejudice to Ms Mastrangeli. To dismiss the appeals would be to deprive her of the right to pursue her claim for compensation. During submissions given at the hearing of this matter it was put by Counsel for the Regulator that I ought to take into account the minor nature of Ms Mastrangeli’s claim in considering the exercise of a discretion to dismiss the appeals.
It was stated that, were her claims accepted, the medical evidence supports compensation to Ms Mastrangeli only for a period of 6 months. Ms Mastrangeli was, at the relevant time, employed to perform work for one day per week. Thus, her compensation would equate to approximately 26 days wages. While I can appreciate the point Counsel for the Regulator seeks to make, there are other features and rights arising from an accepted claim. However, even being cognisant of those other features and rights, I do not consider they outweigh the unnecessary cost to the public and the prejudice likely to be suffered by the Regulator
In all of those circumstances, if I am incorrect in exercising my discretion pursuant to s 456 of the IR Act, then I would exercise my discretion pursuant to s 541 of the IR Act on the basis that further proceedings are not in the public interest.
Orders
I make the following orders:
(a)Pursuant to s 456(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the appeals are dismissed; or alternatively
(b)Pursuant to s 541(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the appeals are dismissed.
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