Mastrangeli v Workers' Compensation Regulator - [2025] QIRC 263

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Mastrangeli v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 263
PARTIES:	Cesira, Mastrangeli (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2020/28 WC/2020/29 WC/2020/30
PROCEEDING:	Interlocutory proceeding
DELIVERED ON:	3 October 2025
HEARING DATE:	3 October 2025
MEMBER:	Dwyer IC
HEARD AT:	Brisbane
ORDER:	*1. Pursuant to s 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld)* the appeals are dismissed; or alternatively 2. Pursuant to s 541 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the appeals are dismissed.**
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION – APPEAL AGAINST DECISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION REGULATOR – psychological or psychiatric injury – where appellant previously conducted proceedings under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) – where appellant filed statements of facts and contentions alleging certain facts as stressors – where same facts wholly or substantially considered in discrimination proceedings – where findings made by Commission about alleged facts – where appeal of decision in discrimination proceedings to Court – where appeal dismissed for appellant’s non-compliance with directions of Court – where findings of the Commission undisturbed - whether the act or omission the subject of appellant’s appeals has been dealt with by the Commission in the discrimination proceedings – duplication of factual controversies – appeals dismissed.
LEGISLATION:	Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 456, s 541. Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 32
CASES:	Ant Projects Pty Ltd v Brooks & Ors [2019] QCA 259 Blackwood v Pearce [2015] ICQ 12 Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18 Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 089 Hennessy v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 081 Keating v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 058 Liao v Metro South Hospital and Health Service [2025] QIRC 260 Mastrangeli v Girle and Anor [2023] ICQ 024 Mastrangeli v Girle & Anor [2023] QIRC 175 McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2022] QIRC 110 Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251 State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited [2015] HCA 28
APPEARANCES:	Ms Cesira Mastrangeli, the Appellant Mr P. Rashleigh of Counsel, instructed by Ms R. Moroney of the Workers' Compensation Regulator

Reasons for Decision

Background to Appeal

These reasons assume familiarity with the decision of Mastrangeli v Girle & Anor[1] ('Mastrangeli').
[1] [2023] QIRC 175.
Ms Cesira Mastrangeli commenced her employment with the Queensland Police Service ('QPS') in 2011. In or around August 2011, Ms Mastrangeli transferred to the role of Intelligence Support Officer (Administration Officer O2).
In early 2018 Ms Mastrangeli made three applications pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ('the WCR Act'), for workers' compensation in respect of a psychological injury sustained when she was employed by the QPS. The claims were lodged on 8 January 2018, 22 January 2018, and 27 February 2018.
WorkCover Queensland ('WorkCover') subsequently advised Ms Mastrangeli on various dates between 12 September 2018…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Mastrangeli v Workers' Compensation Regulator and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2025] QIRC 263
Decision Date: 3 October 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mastrangeli v Workers' Compensation Regulator, the appellant sought compensation for a psychological injury sustained during her employment. The matter was before the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) on appeal from the Workers' Compensation Regulator's decision to deny compensation. The appellant had previously engaged in proceedings under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) where similar facts were considered and findings were made by the Commission. The appeal in the discrimination proceedings was dismissed due to the appellant's non-compliance with the court's directions, leaving the Commission's findings undisturbed. The appellant argued that the Workers' Compensation Regulator's decision should not be based on the findings from the discrimination proceedings.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Workers' Compensation Regulator was correct in dismissing the appellant's appeal on the basis that the same act or omission had already been dealt with by the Commission in the discrimination proceedings. The court had to determine if there was duplication of factual controversies, and if so, whether this justified the dismissal of the appeal under section 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld). The court also needed to consider the nature and scope of the discretion conferred by section 456, particularly whether it extends to matters pursued under different statutory frameworks.

The court held that section 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) provides a discretion to the Commission to dismiss proceedings where there is a duplication of controversy that has already been dealt with by the Commission in another proceeding. The court emphasised that the section is not limited to matters before the Commission under the same statutory framework. It noted that while the practical application of the section is analogous to the doctrines of issue estoppel or res judicata, it is a unique statutory provision. The court concluded that the appellant's allegations in the discrimination proceedings and the current appeal were substantially the same, and thus, the Regulator was justified in dismissing the appeal based on the findings from the earlier proceedings. The court also highlighted that the section calls for a consideration of the act or omission in question and any alleged facts relied upon by the party. The findings of the Commission in the discrimination proceedings were deemed to have adequately addressed the same factual issues that formed the basis of the appellant's current appeal.

The court dismissed the appeals on the basis that the same act or omission had been dealt with by the Commission in the discrimination proceedings, and there was a duplication of factual controversies. The appeals were dismissed pursuant to section 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), or alternatively, under section 541 of the same Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the appeals are dismissed; or alternatively

2. Pursuant to s 541 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) the appeals are dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Following mentions on 3 June and 28 August 2025, I directed the parties to file submissions as to why the appeals should not be dismissed pursuant to s 456 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (‘the IR Act’). Submissions and evidence Each of the parties filed submissions in accordance with my directions. In addition, the Regulator filed an affidavit of Ms Ruth Moroney, a Senior Appeals Officer with the Regulator.[4] The affidavit attaches the medico-legal report of Dr Vladan Ljubisavljevic, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 14 June 2019 (‘the medical report’).[4] Exhibit 1. The affidavit of Ms Moroney states that the medical report was supplied to the Regulator by Ms Mastrangeli on 20 January 2025 and its author was included by her on her list of witnesses for the appeals. I do not intend to restate the submission of the parties in these reasons. I have read the submissions in full and will address the salient portions in my consideration that follows. The Act and the relevant legal principles Section 456 of the IR Act relevantly provides:456 Commission may stay or dismiss applications in certain circumstances(1) The commission may stay or dismiss an application or complaint if the act or omission the subject of the application or complaint is being, or has been, dealt with by the commission in another proceeding.(Emphasis added) The wording of s 456 of the IR Act plainly confers a discretion on the Commission to dismiss proceedings where, in the Commission’s view, there is a duplication of controversy, and where that controversy has already been dealt with by the Commission in another proceeding. While the practical application of the section is (in some ways) analogous to the operation of the doctrines of issue estoppel or res judicata, it is a statutory provision of its own unique character. Moreover, the words ‘dealt with by commission’ confine its use exclusively to matters that are (or have been) before the Commission. It is noted that s 456 of the IR Act has been the subject of consideration by the Commission previously. The conclusions in those matters are largely confined to the unique facts of each of those matters.[5] [5] See for example Hennessy v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 081 in which McLennan IC declined to exercise the discretion on the basis a Dispute was not an ‘application’. Having regard to those matters, I note generally that I do not consider the fact that duplicated controversies in separate applications or complaints pursued under different statutory frameworks will, of itself, give rise to a barrier to the use of the discretion.[6] [6] Compare with Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC at [34] and McDowell v Cash Converters (Stores) Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2022] QIRC 110. The section calls for a consideration of ‘the act or omission the subject of the application…’. It is the potential for duplication of those matters that inform the discretion. This undoubtedly includes consideration of alleged facts relied on by a party to form allegations that are the basis for the application under consideration. It would, for example, be entirely proper in my view to consider an exercise of the discretion where a party alleges that a certain factual scenario constitutes ‘less favourable treatment’ in proceedings under the AD Act and subsequently alleges that the identical factual scenario constitutes ‘unreasonable management action’ in proceeding under the WCR Act. This is so regardless of the functions and purposes of those respective statutory regimes.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having identified the alleged events on 4 December 2017 and 8 January 2018 as the ‘act or omission the subject of the appeal’ it is now necessary to consider whether they have been ‘dealt with by the Commission in another proceeding’. The Mastrangeli decision In the proceedings before Power IC, Ms Mastrangeli’s supervisor was named as the First Respondent. The supervisor gave evidence about the allegation that he had reprimanded Ms Mastrangeli on 4 December 2017, the same allegation she now makes as being causative of her injury. The Commission heard evidence about the allegation and dealt with it as follows:[12][12] Mastrangeli at [89]-[94]. [89] The Complainant claims that on the 4 December 2017 she received a reprimand from the First Respondent after he found that she was absent from her desk. The First Respondent’s evidence was that he had allocated one person at any time to perform IPND duty in two-hour blocks. The First Respondent stated that the roster would require one person to give their full attention for two hours per day and during that time they were not to answer phones or schedule their break. Breaks were to be arranged around the rostered duty.[90] The Complainant confirmed in cross-examination that she had seen the email to the team from the First Respondent dated 21 July 2017 which stated:Don’t go wandering off to socialise, have a smoke break, grab a coffee or whatever. We’re drowning in this stuff, I need you all to focus closely, please.[91] The First Respondent states that on 4 December 2017 the Complainant was rostered to perform IPND duty from 9.00-11.00am. The First Respondent’s evidence was:I noticed when returning from a meeting at 9.20am that Ms Mastrangeli was absent and when I asked around was told that she had gone out at 9.00am. I amended the roster by swapping her roster duties with another member so that continuity was maintained. ...When Ms Mastrangeli returned at 9.30am I informed her of this swap, and that she would now be performing duty from 11.00am to 1.00pm. Ms Mastrangeli asked when she could take her lunch and I advised that she was to take her lunch break either before 11.00am or after 1.00pm but that she was now covering the roster period from 11.00am to 1.00pm.At approximately 11.10 I saw that Ms Mastrangeli was again not present and asked others in the team where she was. I was advised that Ms Mastrangeli left at 11.00am. On Ms Mastrangeli ’s return at 11.30 I asked where she had been and she replied that she had taken her lunch. I specifically asked her why she had left the roster arrangement as I had made it clear to her what those arrangements were. Ms Mastrangeli claimed she was entitled to a lunch break to which I responded that she was however as she was rostered on to the 11.00am to 1.00pm shift and the lunch period was as I had already directed and that was before 11.00am or after 1.00pm.[92] The Complainant states that when the First Respondent asked why she was not at her desk at 9.15am she told the First Respondent that her computer had been dismantled and she was waiting for IT to fix it. The First Respondent replied that another officer was rostered to take over her time slot to process IPNDs and the Complainant was then rostered to do the IPNDs between 11.00am and 1.00pm.[93] The Complainant's evidence continued:I said that I was rostered to have lunch at 11.30am and finish work at 2.00pm, to which Sergeant Girle said, “that’s another issue. You have to manage your time and work to the set roster” and walked off.I felt faint from hunger at around 11.00am. [The First Respondent] wasn’t at his desk so I messaged Kim O’Brien, the administrative officer in charge of rosters, to say I would do the IPNDEs from when I got back from lunch until the end of my shift.I then took lunch at around 11.00am and returned at 11.30am, upon my return, Sergeant Girle again approached and scolded me loudly in front of my co-workers and other staff members in the floor asking where I had been and why I was not at my desk.[94] It does not appear that any further action was taken by the First Respondent regarding this matter and as such there was no formal 'reprimand' given to the Complainant. The evidence of the First Respondent was that he 'responded' to the Complainant whilst the Complainant's evidence was that he 'scolded' her. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the First Respondent scolded the Complainant, however I accept that it was more likely than not that the First Respondent tone was strained in circumstances where he had given a clear direction that the Complainant perform a certain task between set hours and this direction was not followed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.