NEW SOUTH WALES LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
CITATION: Masterton Homes Pty Limited v Pittwater Council [2003] NSWLEC 44 revised - 27/02/2003
PARTIES:
APPLICANT:
Masterton Homes Pty Limited
RESPONDENT:
Pittwater Council
CASE NUMBER: 10667 of 2002
CATCH WORDS: Question of Law
LEGISLATION CITED:
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, ss 80 and 80A
Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88E
CORAM: Bignold J
DATES OF HEARING: 06/02/03
written submissions 10/02/03, 12/02/03, 18/02/03
DECISION DATE: 24/02/2003
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
APPLICANT:
Mr M Tobias QC with Mr P Clay, Barrister
SOLICITORS
A Maude
RESPONDENT:
Mr A Galasso, Barrister
SOLICITORS
Mallesons Stephen Jaques
JUDGMENT:
IN THE LAND AND
ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Matter No. . 10667 of 2002
Coram: Bignold J
24 February 2003
MASTERTON HOMES PTY LIMITED
Applicant
v
PITTWATER COUNCIL
Respondent
JUDGMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Applicant, in a pending class 1 proceeding, being an appeal pursuant to the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act), s 97 has raised for determination as a preliminary issue the validity of a condition of development consent for the erection on each of three proposed lots of land situate at Lakeview Parade, Warriewood, an attached “dual occupancy development”. The parties mutually seek the determination of the question of law in advance of the hearing on the merits of the class 1 proceeding which is listed on 28 February and 3 March 2002.
The s 97 appeal had originally been filed in respect of the Council’s deemed refusal of the Applicant’s development application (vide the EP&A Act, s 82(1) but whilst the appeal was pending the Council exercised the power conferred upon it by s 82(2) by determining the development application by granting development consent subject to a deferred commencement condition (s 80(3) ) and other conditions (s 80(1)). Such an outcome is expressed by s 82(3) to “not prejudice or affect the continuance or determination” of the pending appeal, subject to subsection (4) which provides that where development consent has been granted, the Council, with the consent of the Applicant is entitled to have the appeal withdrawn.
The Applicant’s response to the Council’s determination granting the development consent as expressed in the affidavit sworn 14 January 2003 by its Solicitor is that the Applicant “now proposes to appeal” against two specified conditions of the development consent (one of which is the subject matter of the Applicant’s preliminary question of law). Although leave to so amend the originating process has not formally been sought or granted, I do not understand there to be any objection to the appeal being converted from an appeal against the original deemed refusal of the development application to an appeal against the imposition of some specified conditions of the development consent. Whichever basis be relevant, the important fact to note is that the preliminary determination of the Applicant’s question of law occurs in the statutory context where the Court is seised of plenary jurisdiction with the power to determine…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWLEC 44
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the court was whether Condition D8 of the development consent was ultra vires. This involved two main questions: first, whether the proposed "company title" arrangement fell within the definition of "subdivision" as used in the Pittwater Local Environmental Plan 1993 (LEP) and, second, whether the requirement to create a restriction on the use of land exceeded the powers granted under the Conveyancing Act 1919.
The court found that the "company title" arrangement did fall within the definition of "subdivision" as it made the dual-occupancy development obviously adapted for separate disposition. Therefore, Condition D8 was valid as it related to a matter of relevance to the development under the EP&A Act, specifically prohibiting the separate disposition of the dwellings. Furthermore, the court held that the requirement to create a restriction on the use of land, as intended by Condition D8, was achievable under the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88E. The court rejected the Applicant's submission that such a condition could never be imposed, citing established authority.
In conclusion, the court held that Condition D8 of the development consent was not ultra vires. This decision focused solely on the validity of the condition, not its merits. The court also noted the recent authority on the enforceability of conditions of development consent, which take precedence over the indefeasibility of title provisions.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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