Masters & Pedrosa (No 2)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 396
•7 June 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Masters & Pedrosa (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 396
File number(s): SYC 2451 of 2020 Judgment of: RIETHMULLER J Date of judgment: 7 June 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Allegations the child is being harmed in the mother’s care – Allegations of “Fabricated or induced illness in children” syndrome – Numerous reports to Police and child protection agencies – Father’s allegations not accepted – Child to live with the mother – Supervised time with the father – No matters of principle. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII, ss 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65AA, 65D Cases cited: Tully, Joanna et al, “Fabricated or induced illness in children: A guide for Australian health-care practitioners” (2021) 57 Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 1847–1852 Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 148 Date of hearing: 11-15, 28 September 2023 & 30 October 2023 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Lawson Solicitor for the Applicant: Boyce & Boyce Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Hegedus Solicitor for the Respondent: Vaikom Law Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Widjaja Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Brian Samuel & Associates ORDERS
SYC 2451 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS MASTERS
Applicant
AND: MR PEDROSA
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
RIETHMULLER J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 JUNE 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous parenting orders be discharged.
2.The mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, E, born 2018 (“E”).
3.E live with the mother and the mother be at liberty to relocate with E to the Town R region.
Spending time with the father
Period One
4.From the date of these Orders, and subject to Orders 5 to 26 inclusive, E spend time with the father supervised at a contact centre or by a professional supervision service for a period of up to three (3) hours each month (ordinarily during the first weekend of the month), or such other day as is nominated by the contact centre or supervision service after consultation with the parents, subject always to the availability of the centre or supervisor, AND FURTHER:
(a)Every second supervised contact shall take place at a supervision service within 40 kilometres of the Sydney 2000 postcode, AND the mother shall use her best endeavours to coordinate such contact so that it can occur contemporaneously with the father’s contact with his other child, X; and
(b)Every other supervised contact shall take place at a supervision service within 10 kilometres of the mother’s residence from time to time, such as at U Family Services Town R.
5.The costs of supervision be met by the father.
Period Two
6.Prior to the commencement of E’s second term of high school, the mother is to arrange and do all things necessary to facilitate E’s attendance upon a social worker or child psychologist with experience in family counselling on a fortnightly basis, or as recommended by the therapist, to commence no less than two months prior to the commencement of Term two (2).
7.For the purpose of giving effect to Order 6:
(a)The mother is to propose in writing to the father three (3) social workers or child psychologists by no later than 30 January of the year that E is to commence high school;
(b)By no later than 7 February of the year that E is to commence high school, the father is to select one of the three (3) appropriate social workers or child psychologists proposed by the mother and notify the mother in writing;
(c)If the father fails to make a selection or fails to advise the mother in accordance with Order 7(b) above, the mother be at liberty to select the social worker or child psychologist on which E is to attend.
8.The costs associated with E’s attendances in accordance with Order 6 be equally shared by the mother and the father.
9.The mother and the father are each restrained from engaging with the therapist except as requested by the therapist.
10.The mother is at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders and the Reasons for judgment to the therapist.
11.Upon E having attended in accordance with Order 6 on no less than two (2) occasions, the social worker or child psychologist is to provide a letter outlining E’s views with respect to supervision continuing.
Where E expresses that he wishes for his time to be unsupervised
12.Should the social worker or child psychologist record that E expressed that he wishes to transition to spending time with the father on an unsupervised basis (pursuant to Order 11), E spend time with his father on an unsupervised basis as follows:
(a)Should E be attending organised sport on a weekend, once a month with such time to coincide with E’s organised sport and for no more than four (4) hours; and
(b)In the event that E is not attending organised sport on a weekend in the month, on a Saturday or Sunday nominated by the mother in writing at least 14 days in advance, between the hours of 11.00 am and 3.00 pm.
Period Three
13.From the age of 14 years, E spend time with the father in accordance with his wishes (including unsupervised time if he so wishes).
Suspension of time
14.In circumstances in which the mother intends to travel with E on holiday and such holiday would interfere with the father’s time subject to Orders 4 to 12 inclusive:
(a)The mother is to provide the father with 21 days’ notice in writing;
(b)The father’s time be suspended during the holiday provided that the mother has provided notice in accordance with Order 14(a); and
(c)In the event that the father’s time pursuant to this Order is suspended on more than one (1) occasion in a calendar year, the mother arrange make up contact for the second and any subsequent suspension within three (3) weeks of E’s return from the holiday.
Changeovers
15.The contact centre or supervision service shall be chosen by the parties as follows:
(a)The father is to propose three contact centres or supervision services to the mother, providing the proposal in writing, within 14 days of the date of these Orders or becoming aware of an unavailability;
(b)The mother is to select a centre or service from the father’s proposal within 7 days of receiving the proposal from the father;
(c)If the mother fails to make a selection or fails to notify the father of her selection within 7 days in accordance with Order 15(b), the father be at liberty to choose from the list proposed by the father and thereafter inform the mother of his selection; and
(d)The centre or service chosen in accordance with this Order shall facilitate time between E and the father pursuant to Order 4.
16.The parties do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to complete any intake procedure required by the contact centre or supervision service.
17.Should E spend time with the father in accordance with Order 12(a):
(a)At the beginning of the father’s time with E, the mother will drop E to the location of his organised sport no later than 30 minutes prior to the commencement of the game; and
(b)At the end of the father’s time, the father will deliver E back to the mother’s residence, with the father to remain in the car and to remain outside of the mother’s residence until such time as he sees E enter the residence.
18.Should E spend time with the father in accordance with Order 12(b) above, changeovers are to be facilitated by the contact centre or supervision service last used by the parties in that region (or if that centre or service is unavailable, a centre or service chosen in accordance with Order 15) and the costs of changeovers be met by the father.
Communication
19.The mother shall assist the child to send cards, letters and gifts to the father should the child wish to do so.
20.The parties are to communicate using the parenting application “2 Houses” (and in the event this app ceases operation, such other app as nominated by the mother in writing) with both parties to take all reasonable steps to register for and pay for the application within 7 days of the date of these Orders.
21.The parties must notify each other as soon as is reasonably possible in writing with respect to:
(a)Any significant illness, accident or injury suffered by E;
(b)Any significant medical treatment provided to E.
School and information
22.The mother authorise E’s school to provide to the father copies of school reports, school photos and other information from E’s school at his own cost.
23.The father be restrained from attending E’s school until such time as E attains the age of 14 except as provided for in Order 24.
24.Upon E reaching 14 years of age, the father be at liberty to attend E’s school events as normally attended by parents if he is specifically invited by E, in writing.
25.If the father receives an invitation from E in accordance with Order 24, the father is to notify the mother in writing at least 48 hours prior to such attendance, or within 3 hours of receiving the invitation.
26.The mother authorise E’s medical practitioners to provide information concerning E’s health to the father at the father’s cost.
Other orders
27.In the event that the father makes a complaint or notification (or causes, requests, or directs another person to make a complaint or notification), in relation to the mother’s care of E to Police, a child protection agency, any medical practitioner, any other government agency, or a mandatory reporting body, he disclose in the complaint or notification these parenting Orders and the Reasons for judgment and that he provide a copy of these Orders and the Reasons for judgment.
28.The mother be at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders and the Reasons for judgment to Police, any child protection agency, any medical practitioner, any other government agency, or a mandatory reporting agency that has received a complaint or notification with respect to the child, AND FURTHER, to any medical practitioner or counsellor providing treatment or counselling to the child.
29.The parties be at liberty to provide a copy of the Orders and Reasons for judgment and report of Dr V dated 8 June 2022 to any psychiatrist, psychologist or counsellor from whom they or the child are receiving treatment or counselling.
30.Save as provided for in these Orders, the father is restrained pursuant to s 68B of Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), unless with the prior written consent of the mother:
(a)From entering upon or approaching within 500 metres of:
(i)The mother’s residence;
(ii)The mother’s place of employment;
(iii)The premises or grounds of the child’s school or extracurricular activities; or
(iv)Any other place where the mother and/or the child may be present.
(b)From contacting the mother, approaching the mother or from attending the mother’s residence or place of employment.
31.The father is restrained from denigrating the mother in the presence or hearing of the child and from permitting the child to remain in the presence or hearing of another person denigrating the mother.
Travel
32.Pursuant to s 11(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the mother is permitted to do all acts and things and sign all documents to apply for and retain Australian travel documents, including Australian passports for the child, without the father’s consent (written or otherwise) and to facilitate the order, leave is granted for the mother to provide a copy of these orders to the relevant statutory authority.
33.Pursuant to s 65Y of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the mother is permitted to travel internationally for holidays with the child without the father’s consent.
Hearing fees
34.The father pay the setting down fee and hearing fees in this matter, subject to any exemption he may be entitled to under the Family Law (Fees) Regulations 2022 (Cth).
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Masters & Pedrosa has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RIETHMULLER J:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant mother and the respondent father are the parents of one child (E, born in 2018). The child has a half-sibling (X, born in 2014) from a previous relationship between the father and a former partner. The parenting proceedings between the father and X’s mother were heard at the same time as these parenting proceedings and are subject the subject of a separate judgment
.On 22 April 2020, the mother commenced proceedings by filing an Initiating Application for Final Orders. On 31 March 2022, the mother filed an Amended Application for Final Orders seeking sole parental responsibility, that the child live with the mother and spend no time with the father. At the commencement of the final hearing, the mother’s position differed from her Amended Application in that she sought orders for the child to spend supervised time with the father for three hours, four times per year. By the conclusion of the final hearing, the mother’s position had changed.
On 9 August 2023, the father filed an Amended Response to Final Orders (seeking equal shared parental responsibility, that the child live with the mother, and that the child spend alternate Sundays with the father). At the conclusion of the parties’ evidence (but prior to submissions), the orders sought by the father were different from his Amended Response in that he sought:
(a)The mother have sole parental responsibility.
(b)The child live with the mother and spend supervised fortnightly time with the father, which graduated to unsupervised time twice per week.
The father’s proposal was structured so that time with E coincides with the time spent with his other son, X.
However, by the time of final submissions, the father’s position had again changed.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) proposes orders similar to the mother.
At present, the parties care for E in accordance with interim orders made 8 February 2022 which provide for the mother to have sole parental responsibility, and for E to spend supervised time with the father one day on each alternate weekend, for up to three hours (as can be facilitated by the supervision service). In accordance with the orders of 8 February 2022, the father is currently required to meet the costs of supervision.
A central feature of the father’s case was his claim that the mother suffers from fabricated or induced illness in children syndrome (“FIIC”), formerly described as Munchausen’s by Proxy syndrome. It is no longer appropriate to refer to FIIC as ‘Munchausen’s by Proxy’ as: first, the reference to the extravagant fictional tales of Baron Munchausen is a belittling description of a serious syndrome; and secondly, the exotic name tends to attract the attention of some litigants in cases where the facts do not fit the criteria for FIIC syndrome.
BACKGROUND
The mother (who is 45 years of age) and the father (who is 49 years of age) met on an online dating website established a relationship sometime in 2013. At the time, the father was expecting a child with his former partner, who is the mother in the proceedings heard concurrently. In 2014, the father’s child to his former partner was born (X).
The mother and father commenced cohabitation in 2013, and were married in 2016. They separated on a final basis on 9 July 2018, when the father left the former matrimonial home.
The mother says that she decided to end the marriage after the father claimed that she had postnatal depression (which was later confirmed by her general practitioner) and what she said was his ongoing controlling behaviour.
The mother has been the child’s primary carer since the child was born in 2018. From separation until October 2018, the child was spending two to three hours per week with the father.
THE PROCEEDINGS
In October 2018, the mother and child moved to reside in Town R with the maternal grandparents. Following an interim hearing in November 2018, orders were made on 1 February 2019 permitting the mother to continue residing with the child in Town R pending the final hearing. The orders also provided for the child to spend time with the father as agreed between the parties in writing, and failing agreement, each Saturday from 1:30pm to 5:30pm and each Sunday from 8:30am to 12:30pm.
Final orders were made in September 2019 (after a final hearing in June 2019) which required the mother to relocate back to the Sydney Metropolitan area. The 2019 final orders also provided for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility, the child to live with the mother and spend time with the father on a graduating basis towards five nights per fortnight, and half school holidays when the child reached five years of age. It is around this time that the mother says that the father’s behaviour began to escalate in relation to his beliefs that the child was being harmed in the mother’s care.
It is the mother’s case that the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the child due to his delusional worldview and narcissistic personality traits. The father contends that it is the mother who poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the child, alleging that she suffers from fabricated or induced illness in children syndrome (FIIC).
History of the father’s behaviour
In mid-2019, the father took E (then a toddler) to the hospital to assess bruises and scratches. E was discharged as the minor injuries were consistent with his age and mobility.
In late 2019, the father took E to the hospital again, this time in relation to an alleged cut or tear at the base of his nostril and a rash around the mouth. The father sent the mother a SMS message asking her to explain the cut and rash saying it may have been as a result of the mother introducing foods to E that were not age appropriate. The photos he produced showed what appeared to be a minor graze or tear to the skin on the side of the nostril similar to damage commonly caused by continuous use of tissues when one has a cold or flu. The rash appears to be a mild skin irritation from dryness or redness to the skin of the type that is common when suffering a cold or flu.
On one occasion in early 2020, the mother did not facilitate E’s time with the father due to illness. She contacted the father via SMS to let him know that E was not available to spend time with him, telling him the child had a fever, was having trouble swallowing, and was clingy. The father nonetheless presented himself at the mother’s apartment. The father sent the mother a picture of her front door (he had gained access to the building through the security door) which resulted in the mother feeling “intimated and… scared” (mother’s affidavit filed 30 June 2023, paragraph 47). The father sent the mother 28 SMS messages on that day regarding this issue.
In early 2020, the father sent the mother SMS messages regarding what he described as “raw red skin” between E’s toes, asking her if she intentionally let E’s toes get this bad. The father took E to the hospital, where he was given cream. The photos produced by the father show a rash on E’s toes (Exhibit 7), but not like the father’s description of it as “gaping oozing open lesion between his toes”.
On another occasion in early 2020 after E spent time with the father, the mother felt scared driving to the father’s place to collect E as she found the father’s behaviour and communication that day to be disturbing. The father refused to hand E over to her saying he was protecting his son. The mother left the father’s property and sat on the sidewalk and cried. The father’s brother-in-law was called to attempt to de-escalate the situation. Police were called and E was returned to the mother.
The father’s account of this incident is that the mother failed to comply with the orders, and he was “trying to balance out the time that had been missed” (father’s affidavit filed 9 August 2023, paragraph 51). The father said that the mother burst into his property, trespassing, lunged at him in rage and tried to rip E out of his arms. He said that he tried to protect E as the mother continued to come at them and came into his house. Nevertheless, the father agreed that there was a Court ordered pick up time for E and there were no orders for “make up time”. The father recounted how he called the police to report that the mother had assaulted him and E but said he does not remember asking the police to charge the mother for malicious damage. He also told the single expert, Dr V, that the mother had assaulted him and E and he used his body as “a shield” and remained calm (Family Report dated 8 June 2022, paragraph 92).
I do not accept that the father’s version of the early 2020 events as an objective account and prefer the mother’s version of the events.
Later that month, the mother, after speaking to a Family Referral service employee, stopped facilitating E’s time with the father due to concerns about E’s safety in the father’s care, given the recent incident.
In early 2020, the father was admitted into L Hospital due to psychiatric issues. He was discharged the following month after being treated with medication.
The mother commenced these proceedings in April 2020. Following an interim hearing on 4 June 2021, orders were made for E to have supervised time with the father once a week for a period of up to three hours.
In mid-2020, a worker from the Department of Community Justice (“DCJ”) attended at the mother’s home to conduct a welfare check on E after the father made a report about E having a bruise on his leg and scratch near his knee. The following month the DCJ informed the mother that the case had been closed.
The mother says that she has had at least 14 contacts with NSW Police in the 30 months leading up to the current orders and was subjected to four welfare checks and at least ten interactions with the DCJ.
On 19 October 2021, following a Dispute Resolution Conference before a Judicial Registrar, orders were made by consent for E’s time with the father to be supervised by either the father’s partner at the time, his brother-in-law, or his brother. The following day E commenced spending supervised time with the father. Between 20 October 2021 and 26 December 2021, the mother says that E’s time with the father was mostly supervised by the father’s then partner. The mother contends that the father drew his partner into his delusional worldview.
In late 2021, the mother was called by E’s preschool informing her that he had a temperature and she had to come and collect him. E told the mother that his “tummy was hurting” and she took him to Y Hospital. The mother informed the father via text messages that she was at the hospital with E. The father replied saying that he was on his way to the hospital (despite the COVID-19 restrictions then in place which only allowed for one parent to be present). The father told a doctor (Dr W) at the hospital that the mother may be suffering from “Munchausen by Proxy”.
Dr W
Whilst it is the father’s case that the mother suffers from FIIC, the only expert opinion the father relies on is alleged to come from Dr W. The father contends that Dr W advised the father that he “suspects” that the mother may have “Munchausen by Proxy”. Dr W did not attend upon E, but approached the mother and asked her for a copy of E’s medical records from the previous three years. Both in his affidavit and oral evidence, the father frames his case to suggest that Dr W supports his view that the mother has “Munchausen by Proxy”. The father says at paragraph 56 of his affidavit filed 9 August 2023 that the manager of Y Hospital told him that they had read Dr W’s “notes and confirm that [the mother] has FIIC” (fabricated or induced illness in children).
It is recorded in the Y Hospital notes (Exhibit 19) from the Child Protection Unit that in late 2021, the father called the emergency department multiple times and Dr W had a brief interaction with the father when he presented E to the emergency department team. The hospital notes record that the father had concerns for “Munchausen by Proxy” as E was presented multiple times to multiple physicians and the father wanted someone to look into this. Dr W notes he advised that he is not the doctor that was attending to E that night and he had no ongoing role with this family. In another Y Hospital note (Exhibit 19), it is recorded that the father requested a formal copy of the medical documentation from Dr W which the father believed indicated that the mother suffered from “Munchausen by Proxy” and it was the father’s belief that this would assist him in the parenting proceedings.
Dr W was not called by the father to give evidence. It is stated in Dr W’s addendum note that he had “not made a formal diagnosis of Munchausen by Proxy”. It does not appear on the evidence that Dr W affirmed the father’s view that the mother suffered FIIC. On the limited information available to Dr W, it would have been surprising had he formed the view that the father alleges. Considering the father’s evidence and the Y Hospital notes (Exhibit 19), it appears more likely that Dr W was doing no more than politely acknowledging the father’s concerns and reflecting upon them without being dismissive.
When cross-examined, the father agreed that it was not his time with E during the hospital incident and that only one parent was allowed with E. When asked how he was able to see E on this occasion, the father maintained that he told the hospital staff about the number of medical visits, and they facilitated his time with E.
Review of E’s medical history
In late 2021, the father attended upon Suburb M police station to report that the mother had taken E to doctors more than 60 times over a three-year period (Exhibit 16). The father said that he believes that this is an example of the mother’s mental health in relation to FIIC.
On the following day, the father returned to Suburb M police station to present a recording of what appeared to be E “upset” in the backseat of his car. Police were presented with a second recording which was a 30-minute audio file of a conversation between the father, his then partner and E. Police records indicate that E complained about having a tummy ache and the father questioning him on whether he was made to swallow anything. Despite the police records indicating that E was not distressed in the audio file, the father maintained that this was clear evidence that E was being abused by the mother. The father was observed by police to be pacing around the room, on the verge of tears, and re-enacting E’s complaints. The father asked the police to not conduct a welfare check on E and instead requested them to make an “urgent imminent child at risk” report to the DCJ (New South Wales Police Force COPS record – Exhibit 16).
On that day the mother was contacted by NSW police to conduct a welfare check on E, which was conducted on the following day. In the ensuing days, the father and his then partner took E to a doctor who made a mandatory report to the DCJ. The mother says she was then contacted by police on two occasions to conduct a welfare check on E. The mother says that the father’s former partner was present at the changeover that day and she observed her to hold her phone directed at the mother which led the mother to believe that she was filming her (not X’s mother). The mother also observed the father’s former partner appearing to film her when E was returned to her care after the father’s time. The mother ceased E’s time with the father (unless there was professional supervision) on 31 December 2021. The father contacted the police station a few days later to again request that police conduct a welfare check on E. The father did not call his former partner involved in these incidents to give evidence.
Following an interim hearing, orders were made in February 2022 for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for E, for E to spend professionally supervised time with the father, and that the father be restrained from complaining about the mother to police or child welfare agencies unless he also provided them with a copy of the interim orders and reasons. Two months later, the father commenced spending time with E supervised professionally on a fortnightly basis. The requirement that the father provide copies of the interim orders and reasons with any complaints concerning the welfare of E appears to have resulted in him making no further complaints to police, child welfare agencies or medical professionals.
The ICL requested an update from the DCJ on E’s risk assessment. In an email dated 3 February 2022 (Exhibit 20) it is recorded that the DCJ received E’s medical information and that none of the information reviewed raised any child protection concerns for E. The email indicates that E’s presentation to the general practitioner was reasonable and was due to “normal childhood illnesses, vaccine related, [COVID-19] related and required dental work”. In this email, it was also recorded that the medication prescribed to E included antibiotics, ear drops and topical creams, and that nothing indicated that E was subjected to any unnecessary tests or medications. Further, it is recorded that DCJ contacted the Child Protection Unit team at Y Hospital and were told there was no indication that the mother has FIIC.
The father’s conduct at supervised contact visits
In the supervision contact service report dated April 2022, it is recorded that the father refers to E’s preschool as a “good escape. A safe haven”. In another report dated June 2022, the father asks E to tell the supervisor “what you said about wanting to sleepover at Daddy’s house”. It is also noted in an August 2022 report that the father noticed “a small red mark” on the top of E’s ear which he questioned the child about. The staff did not believe it was an issue, but the report says that the father was concerned and wondering if anyone had been hurting E.
In June 2023 during a supervised visit between E and father, it is noted that E repeatedly said “my penis is flying” to which the father was observed to shake his head whilst looking at the supervisor. The father later asked E why he was holding his crotch area and E laughed and said, “because my penis is dancing”. The father was observed to have a concerned look on his face. After reading the contact service report, Dr V (the Family Report writer) said that children commonly make “toilet jokes or jokes about genitals” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.22 lines 29–30). He thought that if a parent repeatedly asks questions or expresses interest in a particular behaviour or phrase, it is likely that the child will repeat that behaviour or phrase because they are getting attention for it. Dr V viewed this interaction as E playing and thought it did not raise concerns of sexual abuse. There is nothing else in the evidence that would indicate any concern of this type.
Dr V said that when he read the contact reports, “there was evidence of the father’s narcissism in approaching the children in the contact visits” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.20 lines 10–11). In his view, this incident also evidenced the father’s reactivity on occasion. He acknowledged that there were positive interactions observed between the father and E but said that the father’s approach to E is reflective of particularly narcissistic parents who are prone to “idealising interactions and everything is awesome and everything is the best” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.20 lines 20–21).
Dr V also explained that it was evident from the contact service reports that the father needed guidance to follow E, to be child-centred in his approach and remain empathetic to E’s experience rather than focusing on his approach. Although, Dr V noted that this is common feedback for fathers who have had limited contact with their children.
THE MOTHER
The mother presented well while giving evidence and responded to questions as asked. One could not help but notice that she appeared worn down by the events since separation given her fairly flat demeanour. I found her an impressive witness.
The mother maintains that she has enabled a relationship between E and the father and there has been no attempt by her to alienate the father from E’s life or diminish his important role in his life. The mother says the orders sought by her reflect this.
The mother contends that the father’s delusional views that E is being harmed in her care interferes with E having a meaningful relationship with her.
THE FATHER
The father presented as a well-dressed man, eager to give evidence and eager to engage in the process of the trial. However, traits identified by Dr V were apparent in his evidence, particularly the grandiosity of his descriptions of E and the unshakeable confidence of his belief that the mother had been harming E. Early in his evidence he was overcome with emotion yet recovered to his normal composure and energetic engagement remarkably quickly.
The father was unable to admit that it was possible that the mother had not harmed E, nor that the small bruises and scratches may be consistent with the types of minor injuries that toddlers experience in the process of learning to walk and otherwise exploring their world. The father’s fixation upon injuries was obvious from his vivid recollections about injuries that appeared to be common childhood injuries and which the mother (quite understandably given their nature) had limited recollection.
When Dr V was shown colour photographs of E’s alleged injuries, he said he did not know what had happened at that particular time and said that it is common for children to have minor injuries. He further said that the father is looking for evidence to support his view that E is unsafe in the mother’s care, and in Dr V’s view, it is concerning that he holds such a view. He said:
… there was issues between the parents at that time…that was a volatile time within the family life and…for both the mother and for the father. And…my concern about the father’s way of relating his experience was that…just as the father used superlatives with regards to his own capacity with the children and his own interactions with the children, he spoke in a very dramatic tone with regard to the mother’s…behaviour towards [E].
…
Now, it was not that the father had not raised his expressed concerns regarding these types of circumstances before, and…he justifies over a almost two year period in paragraph 90 of [the Family Report dated 8 June 2022] between August 2018 and March 2020 that he had made numerous observations of, in his words, quite severe physical injuries to [E], “I took photos of all of them. There were some horrific injuries to baby [E] whilst in the care of his mother.” Now…as I’m recording this information, this is the way in which it was presented to me by the father. And so just before that, he was saying, “It was fantastic. The boys were just delightful. We were very happy,” talking about…his interactions with the boys in comparison to the experience with the mother.
…
Now, the point to make is that one does not make an assessment of children’s experience of alleged abuse and trauma on the basis of a photo. The photo could mean anything. It could be within the range of normal experience. It could represent non‑accidental injury. But what one does is one looks at the nature of the interactions between the…child and the mother, looks at…other sources of information as well, and what we see, in my submission, is that this is…the father’s narrative, the father looking for evidence, and what he doesn’t do is…look at the same time that actually the boys are [in], his words, “just delightful, very happy”. He…looks at the nature of the children’s interactions at times of stress, at times handovers and at times…experiencing the children in the context of stressful interactions between the parents. And then he, again, conflates…he conflates that information with his observations of the occasional injury.
(Transcript 14 September 2023, p.53 line 18 to p.54 line 14)
Particularly telling was the father’s reliance on a medical article (Joanna Tully et al, “Fabricated or induced illness in children: A guide for Australian health-care practitioners” (2021) 57 Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 1847–1852). There is no doubt that the article is written by experts and published in a reputable journal. The father maintained that the article contained guidelines for the investigation of FIIC and that the NSW authorities and hospitals had failed to inquire into the mother in accordance with these “guidelines”. As Dr V pointed out, and as is apparent on the face of the article, it does not purport to provide “guidelines” but rather provides paediatricians with assistance in analysing cases where they have concerns about FIIC. However, leaving aside this example of the father making a grandiose claim about the article, the text does contain useful information to assist in considering the evidence that may be available in cases of alleged FIIC. For example, the article lists common mechanisms of harm perpetration in FIIC by the method of harm:
•Producing false information;
•Withholding information;
•Exaggeration;
•Coaching;
•Simulation; and
•Induction.
The authors of the article also provide some very helpful tables listing issues for consideration. In Table 3, the authors list a range of factors that may raise concerns, which they describe as “Red flags for recognition”, first with respect to the child’s condition:
•Reported symptoms and signs are not independently observed
•Reported symptoms and signs are not fully explained by the child’s diagnosis
•Reported signs and symptoms are bizarre, for example, multiple allergies to environmental substances
•Reported symptoms and signs are not explained by test results (multiple normal results, especially for tests infrequently ordered)
•Inexplicable poor response to standard treatments
•Symptoms disappear or improve when carer is absent
•Unexplained impairment of child’s daily life
•Things just do not seem to make sense... it just does not add up...
The article also provides a list for care giver’s behaviours:
•Mother is the sole source of information – refuses to allow child to be seen alone, talks for child, viewed as strong and caring advocate, elicits public sympathy, father absent
•Repeated reporting of new symptoms that may be curious and intellectually challenging
•Insists/demands more tests, referrals, opinions, treatments but without improvement; cannot be reassured or follow recommendations
•Insists on referral to ‘top’ experts
•Denies and argues against normality – does not want child to be well, needs 2nd opinion, resists positive change to health, pleased with bad news, negative about good news ‘you must have got it wrong’
•Flatters doctors who comply but angry, threatening and disengages if challenged. May become litigious or threaten to report doctor to AHPRA
•Repeated attendance at medical settings, doctor shopping (can be in combination with FTA/cancellations)
•Objection to communication between professionals. Refuses permission to share information about child with previous or concurrently treating doctors
•Denigrates or makes frequent unflattering remarks or complaints about other health-care professionals
Despite the father’s heavy reliance upon this journal article, he was unable to point to any facts or circumstances in this case that fit the criteria for matters that even merely “raise concerns”. At best, the child’s medical records show a large number of attendances upon medical practitioners in 2018 and 2019 by the mother. There is no evidence of these attendances being inappropriate conduct by the mother. The father specifically conceded in a mention after the evidence was heard (on 28 September 2023), that the attendances were not inappropriate but then qualified this, saying “on the surface”, and that “it’s what’s under the surface… that’s the complexity”. At best, the evidence of numerous attendances on the general practitioner’s clinic may indicate that the mother fell within a category of parents that the authors advise must be carefully distinguished from those with FIIC, “The over-anxious or misguided parent, genuine misunderstanding and unintentional misattribution” which should be addressed by “Reassuring, educating and redirecting parents”. Notably, there is no basis to suggest that in recent years there has been an unusual number of doctor’s visits by the mother.
Remarkably, the father’s complete lack of ability to articulate any evidentiary basis for a conclusion that any of the items listed in the journal article has been established did not appear to have weakened his belief that there should be an “investigation” into this matter, relying upon the suggested approach within the article. The father continued to claim that a “multi-disciplinary approach” was required, yet there appeared to be no real basis for commencing an enquiry.
Indeed the father, whilst alleging that the mother attended upon doctors excessively in 2018 and 2019, did not subpoena the relevant doctors’ notes, relying merely upon a Medicare printout that shows the item numbers of fees, many of which have such small fees they could not be separate attendances. He appears to have a fixed view that remains unshakable despite the evidence. At best, he modified his claim from that of FIIC to a claim that the case requires “investigation” when it became apparent that there was a lack of evidence supporting the claim of FIIC. This alteration of the father’s position does not appear to show that he accepts that there is no FIIC, rather it appears to be a method of continuing his belief despite the lack of evidence to support that belief.
Dr V also explained that if the father approaches “certain groups online or certain support groups he will receive a lot of support” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.22 lines 8–9) and “every time such a conversation is held, every time he receives such report, he will be strengthened in his views” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.22 lines 15–17). As the father will likely question E in an unsupervised context about his experience, on occasion E may make comments that will “trigger” the father to go down the pathway of reporting to agencies. Ultimately, in Dr V’s view, the father is unlikely to change as he is a hypervigilant parent who has a particular conviction and cannot take a position of “radical acceptance”. Dr V explained that the concept of “radical acceptance” means getting to the “place of a deeply held conviction” where there is a need on “a very fundamental level to accept circumstances that are beyond your control” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.63 lines 6–8). Dr V thought that “radical acceptance” by the father is very relevant in the current circumstance, but Dr V finds it difficult to believe that it would result in such a change in the father’s views.
During the course of the hearing, an affidavit annexing a 2021 report concerning the father by a forensic psychologist, Ms Z, was tendered. The psychologist was not required for cross‑examination. The report was from some years ago and was without the more recent material. I am not persuaded that significant weight can be placed upon the findings and recommendations set out in the report.
Family Violence
Both parents make allegations of family violence perpetrated by the other parent. The father also contends that E is a victim of family violence.
The father says that he noticed that E was “visibly depressed”. He described the mother’s parenting style as “control and dictatorship”. The father believes that the mother is a highly accomplished “liar and manipulator”. He maintained that the mother, and X’s mother from the corresponding proceeding, were in “cahoots” to alienate him from his children. The father’s claims were not borne out by the evidence. I reject his claims that the mother has perpetrated family violence.
The mother asserts that the father’s behaviour towards her constitutes psychological abuse and systems abuse. The father’s behaviours were relentless and would have been very distressing for the mother. The conduct appears to have been as a result of genuinely held beliefs of the father, although the beliefs are without foundation in the evidence. The father on one occasion gained access to the mother’s building and sent her a photo of her front door, having gained access through the security door. It is unsurprising that this caused her to be fearful for her safety in the context of this case.
I therefore find that the father has committed family violence (as defined in s 4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”)).
FAMILY REPORT
The single expert, Dr V interviewed each of the parents and E in April 2022. He interviewed E in person and observed him with both the mother and the father. At the time, E was living with the mother and was attending preschool. E’s time with the father had been suspended on 26 December 2021 and he was on the waiting list for two supervision services to resume fortnightly supervised visits.
When interviewed, the father raised the issue of “Munchausen by Proxy” and Dr V identified that FIIC is a rare condition and informed the father that his observation of the mother’s interactions at handover would “most likely be the result of exposure to the stress of handovers” (Family Report dated 8 June 2022, paragraph 121). Dr V asked the father if this information has altered his opinion, to which the father informed Dr V about his own investigations regarding FIIC.
Dr V observed that the father presented with a narcissistic personality style and that the father’s primary focus was on his own needs and his capacity. During interview, the father minimised his history of mood disorder, and his medication was indicative of a diagnosis of a mental health disorder which is now in remission. Dr V was of the opinion that the father had no current mental illness impairing his parenting capacity, although he lacked insight into the impact of his previous mental health state and actions. He said that despite the father contending that he has an excellent level of capacity to attend to the children’s emotional and intellectual needs, he had failed to recognise the damaging nature of exposing the children to the parental conflict and how his behaviour of making allegations and notifications “had jeopardised the child’s wellbeing” (Family Report dated 8 June 2022, paragraph 143). However, in Dr V’s opinion, the father’s narcissistic personality style is indicative of an impaired capacity to attend to his sons’ emotional and psychological development (both E and X).
Dr V stated that the mother informed him that the father’s accusations of FIIC interferes with the parents’ capacity to care of E. This is results from the father’s lack of trust and his view that E has been physically abused and is at risk in the mother’s care.
The mother was said to have a history of psychological vulnerability and Dr V is of the opinion that she could benefit from an extended period of psychological support which would resolve her reactive mood symptoms. He did not observe any abnormalities in the mother’s mental state.
Dr V observed that E was comfortable and well cared for by the mother, and interacted with the father with enthusiasm, expressing his desire to maintain contact with him. There were positive interactions observed between E and both parents throughout the assessment. Dr V is of the opinion that E has already adapted to his separation from the father and that the maintenance of a relationship with his father would be in E’s long-term, best interests. However, E has been exposed to the parental conflict, in particular through the police interventions. He is likely to have been exposed to the father’s criticism of the mother in his care and the father’s view that he is at risk in her care, which should be viewed as a form of psychological harm.
Dr V recommended that the mother have sole parental responsibility for E, that E live with the mother and there be a maintenance of E’s ongoing contact with the father. It is Dr V’s view that there is a continued need for supervised contact until the father is able to “respect the role of the mother and accept that she is not a risk to the child” (Family Report dated 8 June 2022, paragraph 164). He noted that the father has not been challenged on his narcissistic worldview and there is no indication that the father has the capacity to maintain shared care in a stable and respectful manner. Dr V further recommended that there be an injunction restricting the father from notifying the authorities including the NSW Police and DCJ of his concerns of E’s welfare in the mother’s care (although such injunction may be beyond the power of the Court).
The expert’s Oral Evidence
Dr V agreed it is necessary for E’s time with the father to continue being supervised if the father cannot accept that E is safe in the mother’s care and accept that she does not pose a risk to E. When asked about the father’s narcissistic world view and how this may impact his capacity to maintain shared care in a stable and respectful manner, Dr V agreed that as the father has not undertaken psychological treatment since early 2022, it is likely that his perception of harm is likely to continue. He explained that:
From a general sense, I agree that such views would be unlikely to change without therapeutic intervention. Sometimes, of course, lived experience can result in significant changes in people’s point of views; however, from the additional material that I’ve read, I did not see evidence of a change in the father’s views. There were numerous references in the additional material that I’ve been presented with, which identifies that the father remains hypervigilant to the children’s communication regarding their experience.
…
He reiterates concerns…with regard to [E’s] medical history and revisits his previously expressed concerns around child abuse with regard to Munchausen’s by proxy, with regard to [the mother]’s mental health and wellbeing in that intake assessment that I perused and which demonstrated no signs of a change in his world view with regard to his perception regarding [E’s] care in particular in that situation.
…
I think it would be fair to say from his account of his own approach to his children’s care that he was an ideal parent, that he had much to offer both children, that he viewed himself to be the superior parent to the two mothers of his two sons and it was his view that it was a travesty that there were restrictions on his contact with his children, that his concerns regarding the lack of adequate care being provided by the mothers to his sons were not taken seriously by the courts, by the police, by Child Protection authorities and that he certainly when he saw me was convinced that there was evidence of Munchausen’s by proxy.
(Transcript 14 September 2023, p.18 line 44 to p.19 line 45)
When asked whether, if the father continues to believe there is FIIC, it is foreseeable for E to spend unsupervised time with the father, he said that “it’s difficult” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.21 line 7), as it is preferable that the father’s time shift from supervised to unsupervised contact, but it is likely that the father will continue to observe intermittent bruising and take the pathway of medical investigation and notifying authorities, which is not in the best interests of the child. Ultimately, Dr V remained concerned that if the father is not able to restrain himself from going down the pathway of constantly informing authorities, then a transition to unsupervised contact would be problematic. When I asked Dr V how this issue could be addressed, he said that in his view it is not a “changeable position” for the father as he has had “ample opportunity” to take the information received from his treating psychologist and psychiatrist, the Family Report and from legal counsel to reflect and shift his view (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.21 lines 34–36). Dr V’s opinion is that the father’s views are not a treatable medical psychiatric condition and there is no information to suggest that his approach to the parenting arrangement can be changed with a standard psychological treatment. I prefer the evidence of Dr V to that of Ms Z on the question of whether the father has the ability to change his views on the FIIC issues.
Dr V was asked to consider the situation if E was to form a view in the future that he does not want to interact with the father. He explained that the father would view this as alienation by the mother and it would be difficult for the father to “empathise with the child, to put himself in the child’s shoes and understand” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.24 line 47 to p.25 line 1). Dr V said that:
… Now, I think equally as the children reach a certain age and, certainly by the age of 14, if the boys did express a desire to have…unsupervised contact, because I think the age issue is, obviously, important. I certainly would not be recommending that supervised contact goes on forever. There needs to be an age limit, at which I think the boys should be given agency… They will know that he’s interested in them and wishes to have contact with them and, certainly by the age of 14, I think there’s no doubt that the boys…should have a choice on whether to have contact with their father. Certainly, I’m not suggesting that…after the age of 14 that the father is such a risk to them that they would need supervision. Now, there will be an interim period prior to that which would actually…depend on how things are going, because…once the boys are…reaching the age of…12, 13, if every time they saw their dad if all he was interested in…talking about did they go to the doctor…how did they…have that bruise or…quizzing them about what mum is doing. The boys will…not want to see him and…certainly by the age of 12 I think…the boys’ wishes should be respected about whether they’re wanting to have contact or not…and what sort of contact they want to have and so, certainly, if the boys are expressing the wish to see their dad and to…kick a football with him or have a age appropriate activity together, I think that should be respected.
(Transcript 14 September 2023, p.25 lines 13–35)
When asked if E would require professional support if his time with the father was to transition from supervised to unsupervised time, Dr V said that it “would really depend on at what age it was being ordered” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.25 lines 44–45). Dr V was of the opinion that if there was an order for transition from supervised to unsupervised contact over the next few years then it would be beneficial for E to be in a professionally supportive environment where he is able to express his views and any concerns E has can be addressed.
Dr V was asked about the mother’s proposal that E spend supervised time with the father on four occasions for up to three hours in the year for the identity purposes. In this regard, he said:
It’s generally considered…four times per year of three hours’ contact is sufficient to have a maintenance of the concept of identity for children and so if all we’re trying to achieve is for [E] to understand who his father is, that he has a father, this is who it is, that would be all that would be sufficient. It is, however, my view that if the child is receiving safe, stable, appropriate care with the mother, if the child is continuing well developmentally and thriving at school and in social activities and sporting activities and so on, as is identified in this situation, that the child would be able to cope with and potentially benefit from more than that, particularly if in to the future the child…decide to have more contact with that father. This is not the type of circumstances where I view the father to be an acute risk to the child.
(Transcript 14 September 2023, p.26 lines 27–38)
Dr V said that to maintain a meaningful relationship requires more contact than once a month where they are “kicking a ball around and supervised play” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.27 line 8) and in order to have a meaningful relationship it would require much greater involvement than is being proposed by the mother. Although, he agreed that when balancing the risks in this matter it is appropriate for E to spend a few hours per month with the father.
Dr V explained that it is possible that the father has a narcissistic personality disorder, but he did not make that specific diagnosis. He said that the father’s presentation has elements that are consistent with a narcissistic personality disorder and in the particular the way the father approaches his relationships with both mothers in the parenting proceedings. However, Dr V used “narcissistic personality style” or “narcissistic world view” because he did not have enough evidence to make a formal diagnosis of a personality disorder as he has not seen the father in other domains such as in the workplace.
When considering the father’s actions such as taking photos of potential bruising or injuries, repeatedly presenting E to authorities, subjecting the parties to recurrent interviews, causing stress to the mothers and the children, Dr V’s said this behaviour indicated that the father lacked the capacity to consider the impact of his actions because he was primarily concerned about his own view, which is representative of narcissism and a narcissistic approach to parenting. Importantly, as Dr V said, it is not the diagnosis that matters, but the father’s behaviours and how they affect E and the mother.
Dr V noted that only the father has identified the possibility of E suffering fabricated or induced illness at the hands of the mother. The father was unable to identify any health professional who had made similar observations or diagnosis. He said that this has become “a preoccupation for the father which had resulted in him repeatedly presenting to professionals, raising his concern that this was the case” (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.49 line 46 to p.50 line 1). In Dr V’s view, it is likely the father repeatedly raised these issues with people who would listen and give him sympathetic responses which had led him to form and to validate his views.
Under cross-examination, Dr V was asked about the benefits of the children jointly spending time with the father and he said that it can be gleaned from the reports that they have a good relationship with each other, and the potential benefit would be that they “will have a sense of familiarity with each other and greater sense of security” which would ultimately build the bond between the brothers (Transcript 14 September 2023, p.59 lines 22–23). Dr V viewed this bond as potentially beneficial for the children.
When considering E’s age and given that he has spent supervised contact with the father for some time and this supervised contact is to continue for a potentially significant period, Dr V is of the opinion that the restrictions imposed by limited frequency and supervised contact are significant and would result in an impediment to the evolution of a secure attachment relationship between father and E, impacting the capacity of E developing a sense of security with the father. Further, in Dr V’s view, this may limit the capacity for E to experience the father as a trusted, secure attachment figure in his developmental life and E would not have a meaningful relationship with him.
Dr V said that in his view it would be potentially beneficial for the E and X to spend time together with the father. Although he raised that one of the developmental problems relates to the ages of the children and if they are both at the same developmental stage then it would work well and if they are not then it may be more challenging. When considering the children’s age difference of four years, Dr V is of the opinion that it would potentially be beneficial for the children to have contact visits together when they are both in primary school. However, if they have different interest and needs in the future, it would depend on the nature of the sibling relationship and whether they enjoy spending time together. Ultimately, Dr V said that the only uncertainty is that it has not happened yet but said that the positive report from both mothers suggests that it would be a workable solution.
Dr V said that when considering the possibility of the father spending fortnightly time with the children at the same time it is important to consider not only the children’s experience but also their mothers’ experience. He acknowledged that although there is commonality between the mothers’ experience, there is not commonality for the mothers’ circumstances in his view to support such an arrangement.
When asked to consider the father’s allegation that there has been some collusion between the mothers, Dr V said that:
… They both reported related concerns regarding the nature of his behaviour towards them and, indeed, there was commonality in [the father]’s allegations towards both mothers regarding…the problematic nature of their responses to him and their problematic approaches to parenting his sons. There was a lack of trust, mutual respect and goodwill, communication with each of his former partners, and he made multiple allegations against both of them. Now…it was certainly my understanding that this was not a scenario where there were two ex-partners who were ganging up together against the father of their sons, making multiple allegations against him…based on…their concerns without…any actions on his behalf to create such responses. On the contrary, it was my understanding that it was the father who had been really…focusing very heavily on his allegations against both of the mothers and that they were responding to that in part. Now…these mothers did report a shared experience of…the father and, indeed, it was consistent with how the father presented to me.
…
And it was not simply based on…their statements, but it was based on the review of the documents…the review of police record…review of Child Protection records and…review of all the material…that had been provided to me. And…that was essentially what I made of it. So did I come to the conclusion that this was…a case of two ex-partners working in collusion against their former partner who was the father of each of their children? No, that was not my conclusion.
(Transcript 14 September 2023, p.65 line 40 to p.66 line 17)
FINDINGS AS TO SPECIFIC ISSUES
In submissions counsel for the mother sought specific findings on a number of important matters.
I am persuaded that the mother does not suffer from fabricated or induced illness in children (FIIC) syndrome and that she has not subjected the child, E, to unwarranted or unnecessary medical attendances. The evidence before the Court does not show that E suffered any illnesses or injuries that appeared to be induced by the mother or any other person. Whilst there were many attendances by the mother upon her general practitioner early in E’s life there was no evidence that any of those attendances were inappropriate. It appears that the father views any childhood illness or injury as either evidence of FIIC or at least a reason for investigation into the possibility of FIIC.
I am persuaded that the mother does not pose a risk of psychological or physical harm to E. Not only was there no evidence of any past behaviours harming E or placing him at risk, but the mother presented well in the witness box as a caring and devoted parent.
I am persuaded that the mother has provided E with safe, stable and loving care and is likely to continue to do so into the future.
The mother has been the subject of relentless complaints by the father, resulting in many notifications to the police and DCJ. The father’s concerns appear to be genuinely held, despite not having an evidentiary basis. On one occasion the father attended at the mother’s building and sent her a photo of her front door (having gained access through a security door in a secure apartment building). Unsurprisingly, she was fearful as a result of the conduct in the circumstances of this case. I am persuaded that this was an incident within the meaning of family violence under s 4AB of the Act.
I accept the evidence of Dr V that the father has a narcissistic personality style and/or worldview. I also find that the father has a fixated view that E has been harmed in the mother’s care, which is not supported by the evidence. He also appears to have a fixed view that the mother suffers from, or may suffer from FIIC, which is similarly unsupported by the evidence. The father has continued to unreasonably hold this view, despite evidence to the contrary, and is unlikely to be able to accept that the mother is not harming E. Unfortunately, the father’s fixed views have resulted in the mother and E being subjected to unnecessary interventions by the Police, DCJ, and others following complaints and disclosures by the father.
Sadly, the father lacks any real insight into the impact of his behaviours on E and the mother and these behaviours are unlikely to change in the future. Indeed, there is a risk that his behaviours will worsen if he is prompted by information from others (such as internet sites) or becoming aware of illnesses or injuries that E may suffer in the future as ordinary incidents of growing up. In these circumstances I am persuaded that the father presents an unacceptable risk of psychological harm to E.
RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE ACT
The relevant provisions with respect to children’s issues are contained in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The objects and principles of Part VII are set out in s 60B of the Act. Section 65D of the Act provides for the Court to make “such parenting order as it thinks proper”, however, despite the broad discretion afforded to the Court under this section, there are other relevant provisions in Part VII that require consideration. Section 60CA makes clear that the best interests of the child are the “paramount consideration” (which is repeated in s 65AA), and s 60CC of the Act provides a lengthy list of relevant considerations when determining the best interests of a child.
Best interests of the child
It is convenient to commence with the list of additional considerations set out in s 60CC of the Act first before turning primary considerations. It is necessary to consider the relevant factors outlined in s 60CC of the Act before determining what parenting orders are suitable in these circumstances.
Views of the Child
E is quite young. Dr V observed E express a desire to spend time with his father. E appeared comfortable with the mother. Dr V took the view that a maintenance of E’s relationship with the father would be in E’s long-term, best interests.
E has a strong attachment with the mother. It is clearly in the child’s best interest that this primary attachment be allowed to continue to enable E to enjoy the benefits of that relationship.
Relationship of the child with the parents and others
Dr V observed that E has a positive relationship with both parents, as well as with his older, half-brother, X. There were suggestions that E’s time and X’s time could be accommodated together.
Extent to which the parents have participated in the child’s life
In this case, there is no issue as to the desire of the parties to participate in the life of E. The mother has actively cared for E for the whole of his life. The father has sought to participate in E’s life, however, there have been limitations due to the parental conflict and the conduct of the father, as discussed above.
Extent to which the parties have fulfilled their obligations to maintain the child
The mother has been E’s primary carer since birth, meeting E’s day to day needs. The father has paid child support, although the extent that he has been able to contribute to the maintenance of E has varied depending upon his earnings from time to time. The father’s child support was only $38.25 per month at the time the mother prepared her trial affidavit (mother’s affidavit filed 30 June 2023, paragraph 210).
Likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstances
Any change in the primary care of E would not be in E’s interests as it would damage a strong primary attachment with a parent that has cared for him all of his life.
Dr V believes E should spend time with the father. If the mother relocates to Town R this will impose practical restrictions upon the father spending time with E (due to travel times) and make it more difficult to participate in E’s activities, such as sport.
Practical difficulties or expenses of spending time and communicating
There is a practical difficulty around the father spending time with E, due to the incidents that have occurred between the parents in front of E, particularly at changeovers. Dr V recommended supervised contact (whether the parties transition to unsupervised contact would depend on the father’s behaviour) which could be organised in a way to limit the interaction between the mother and father. A further practical difficulty will arise if the mother is permitted to relocate to Town R. This has the potential to limit time spent with the father, which, as Dr V testified, would harm E’s ability to have a meaningful relationship with him, and also presents the practical difficulty of the father or E having to travel to spend time together.
The costs of supervision, if supervision is ordered, will be a real burden for the parties (or the father if he is ordered to meet the entire costs of supervision).
Capacity to provide for the child’s needs
Dr V and the supervisor raised concerns about the father’s ability to place E’s needs above his own. It was suggested that the father needs to learn to follow the child’s lead during their interactions. The father’s past conduct (discussed above) gives rise to real concerns as to the father’s capacity to meet the child’s needs.
Dr V observed that E was well-cared for with the mother, illustrating how the mother is able to meet the child’s needs.
At the time of the proceedings, the father did not have his own home and was residing in a share house.
Maturity, sex, lifestyle and background of the child and parties
The age and gender of the parties and child are identified above. There is nothing further that must be noted about the parties with respect to their maturity, sex, lifestyle and background.
Cultural heritage
E is not said to be of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent nor identify as such, and there are no particular cultural issues that are significant in this case.
Attitude to the child and responsibilities of parenthood
Both parents take a proactive approach to the responsibilities of parenthood, and clearly love E. As already identified the difficulty is the father’s strong belief that the mother suffers FIIC and that she is conspiring with the mother of his half sibling to prevent his relationship with E.
Family violence and risks of family violence
The family violence in this matter has been discussed above.
A significant concern is the father’s attitude towards the mother, specifically psychological and systems abuse. It is appropriate that the Court give this aspect real consideration when making parenting orders.
E has been exposed to numerous police and welfare checks he and the mother were subjected to. The opinion of Dr V was that the father did not pose an acute risk to E, although he is unlikely to accept that the mother poses no risk to E. This raises concerns regarding E spending unsupervised time with the father as he may force E to engage with his theory of the mother having FIIC or lead him to continue to make reports to agencies. Dr V expressed that it is desirable that E’s time with the father transition from supervised to unsupervised, but that the father may observe, for example, a bruise on E, and seek medical intervention and report it to authorities, which would not be in the child’s best interest.
Whether orders preferable that are least likely to lead to further proceedings
It is necessary that the Court make orders that are clear and avoid the need for further court proceedings, due to the impact they have had on the mother and are likely to have on E.
I turn then to the primary considerations of s 60CC of the Act. Section 60CC(2A) of the Act provides that the need to protect the child should be given greater weight than the benefit of a meaningful relationship.
Benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with each parent
The mother recognises that time between E and the father is likely to be beneficial to E, despite the difficulties she has suffered due to the conduct of the father.
Whilst the mother previously proposed that E spend time with the father for three hours, four times a year, Dr V expressed that this is not a sufficient amount of time for E to build a meaningful relationship with the father. However, by the time of final submissions, the mother increased her proposal to 12 occasions per year.
Need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from abuse neglect or family violence
As discussed above, I am satisfied that the mother does not present a risk to the child. I am not persuaded that the father will be able to overcome his fixed, and in my view, unfounded views, that the mother is harming the child. The need to protect the child from ongoing investigations and welfare checks is significant in this case. It is also important for the benefit of the child that the mother not be placed in a position where she continues to be worn out by the constant complaints and allegations of the father, which are likely to ultimately reduce her capacity to care for E.
The parties proposals
The mother’s proposal at the end of trial was for orders that she have sole parental responsibility and that E live with her. She proposed E spend supervised time with the father for up to three hours on 12 occasions per year, supervised by a professional supervisor or contact service. As the mother wishes to reside some four hours’ drive from Sydney, she proposes that every second supervised contact take place at a supervision service that is within 40 kilometres of Sydney, NSW 2000 (to occur concurrently with the father’s time with X, where possible), and all other supervised contact take place at a supervision service within 10 kilometres of the mother’s residence. Upon E attaining the age of 14 years, the mother proposes E spend time with the father in line with the “express reasonable views and wishes of the child”. Further, that the father be at liberty to send E letters, gifts and cards (and the mother will facilitate E sending same to the father).
The mother seeks the father be solely liable for the costs of the supervision services. The father seeks that the costs of supervision and E’s attendance on a psychological be met by the mother. He also seeks that all costs of supervision paid by him to date be reimbursed to him by the mother. The ICL seeks the father be solely liable for the costs of the contact service.
By the end of the trial, the father’s proposal sought orders for E to live with him and for the father to have sole parental responsibility. The time he proposes E spend with the mother is as follows:
(a)For a period of six months, supervised time for up to three hours on a fortnightly basis;
(b)After a period of six months, weekly unsupervised time each Saturday during the school term for five hours, to coincide with E’s sport (otherwise between 10.00 am and 3.00 pm);
(c)From 12 months of orders being made, in addition to the weekly Saturday time, one night per week overnight.
The father also seeks that E be assessed for psychological harm, at the expense of the mother.
The ICL proposed the mother have sole parental responsibility for E and that E live with the mother. The ICL proposed E spend supervised time with the father on 12 occasions per year, being once per month for a period of up to three hours. Should the father be unable to afford or is otherwise unable to attend supervised time with E through P Contact Centre, the father spend supervised time with E at a public contact centre closest to the mother’s place of residence (up to three hours, on 12 occasions per year). Upon E attaining 14 years of age, the ICL proposed that any time that E spends with the father be unsupervised, subject to the child expressing that he wants to spend time with the father.
Mother’s proposed relocation to Town R
In the mother’s Case Outline filed 7 September 2023, the mother sought an order that she “may relocate the child’s residence anywhere in the Commonwealth of Australia, at her sole discretion”. This order does not appear in her Amended Minute of Order, provided prior to the parties’ final submissions. However, during submissions, counsel for the mother contended that the mother wants the option to relocate, and says will likely relocate to Town R. The mother’s intention to relocate to Town R is also apparent with respect to paragraph 7 of her Amended Minute of Order which sets out that “Every other supervised contact shall take place at a supervision service within 10 kilometres of the mother’s residence from time to time, such as [U Family Services Town R]”.
It is the mother’s case that she and E would benefit from relocating to Town R. The mother previously moved to Town R with E in late 2018 to reside with the maternal grandparents. The mother and E remained in Town R until final orders were made in September 2019 (after a final hearing in June 2019), which required the mother to return to the Sydney Metropolitan area within 8 weeks. The mother’s parents remain living in Town R. The mother and E would have family support in Town R.
The mother proposed that E spend supervised time with the father for up to three hours on 12 occasions per year, on a Saturday or Sunday being a day nominated by the mother to accommodate for E’s school, social and sporting commitments. It is her proposal that if she relocates to Town R, that the parents share travel with the father to make the journey every other month so that E is not required to travel every month (a drive of approximately four hours each way). The mother has historically facilitated E spending time with his half-brother, X, and has expressed her intention to continue to do so, but if the mother is permitted to relocate to Town R the children will not be spending all monthly contacts together. The mother’s counsel contends that the father should have no issue with such arrangement as he had maintained under cross-examination that he “will do anything for [his] kids”.
The mother also relies on Dr V’s oral evidence as to the benefits of relocating to Town R. The expert said that when considering the maintenance of monthly supervised visits between E and the father against time spent four times a year, the expert would support the relocation to Town R if it resulted in a significant improvement in the mother’s mental health functioning and support network. When I asked Dr V if it would impact on the mother’s capacity to parent if she was ordered to remain living in Sydney, Dr V explained that:
… I was very aware that the mother had previously left Sydney to go to [Town R] and that she was – that was her preference, that she was forced to return to Sydney. Now, it was my understanding that the mother was managing well. I did not identify when I saw her that she had significant mental health issues or functional issues that were impairing her by remaining in Sydney. The other issue, obviously, which was germane to my assessment was that there were a lot of issues for this family, which were amplified by the COVID pandemic restrictions, which placed stress on everyone in the context of the family circumstances and the contact arrangements. Unfortunately, at the time, I did not conduct a specific assessment and I don’t have additional material as to whether that would – to provide clear guidance to the court regarding that. It’s interesting, in paragraph 35 of [the Family Report dated 8 June 2022] regarding [the mother]’s family, I did actually ask her whether she still wished to relocate to [Town R], and what she told me when I just asked some question about that was that she was uncertain as to whether she still wished to relocate. Things were going well for [E]. He was enrolled in the local school. He was [close to] their home. I think – it was my understanding it wasn’t her primary concern to relocate to [Town R].
(Transcript 14 September 2023, p.37 lines 31–47)
When Dr V was asked how he would weigh up the benefits of E having time with the father on a monthly basis or E spending time with the father on a quarterly basis in Town R or in Sydney, he said that if E was going to lose a significant and substantive contact arrangement with the father as a result of the mother’s relocation to Town R, in his view, the maintenance of the significant and substantive relationship with the father would be the priority.
When asked about the frequency of contact between E and the father, Dr V maintained that he supports monthly contact and agreed that there are difficulties with the parents coming into direct contact with each other. When the mother’s counsel suggested that a solution to prevent the parents from directly contacting each other is to have family members facilitating handover, Dr V agreed and acknowledged that the mother’s family lives in Town R. He agreed that if the mother is permitted to relocate to Town R, and the father is unable to visit E there and the mother is compelled to travel to Sydney, then it is appropriate for E to spend time with the father four times a year.
I am persuaded that there are real benefits to the mother and E living in Town R primarily because they will be nearer to relatives for support. I also accept that whilst it is some distance from Sydney, some distance between the mother and the father will ease her concerns about the levels of intrusion of the father into her life (either directly or through reporting to agencies). I note, however, that the distance is such that if there is to be regular contact it imposes a burden upon the father and child to travel, and the distance is such that it would tell against the father having shared or substantial time with E.
Parental responsibility
With respect to parental responsibility, s 61DA of the Act relevantly provides:
61DA Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility when making parenting orders
(1) When making a parenting order in relation to a child, the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
(2) The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child (or a person who lives with a parent of the child) has engaged in:
(a) abuse of the child or another child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family (or that other person’s family); or
(b) family violence.
…
(4) The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
On the father’s case, the presumption was rebutted as he alleged that the mother had harmed the child, however, I have rejected the father’s claims that the mother committed family violence. I have accepted that the father committed family violence as defined in s 4AB of the Act (above at [59]), and therefore the presumption in s 61DA of the Act is rebutted and does not apply in this case. Even if I were incorrect as to the finding concerning family violence and the presumption were not rebutted pursuant to s 61DA(2) of the Act, I am nonetheless satisfied that equal shared parental responsibility is not in the best interests of E as the conduct of the father in this case makes it impossible for the parties to be able to communicate effectively and to share parental responsibility for E. E’s best interests are clearly served by the mother having sole parental responsibility.
I am persuaded that it is in E’s best interests that the mother have sole parental responsibility for him.
I am persuaded, for the reasons set out above that it is in E’s best interests that he live with the mother.
I am not persuaded that it is in E’s best interests that he have unsupervised time with the father. I accept the proposals by the mother and the ICL that supervised time once per month is in E’s best interests as this allows him to have a relationship with the father in circumstances where the father’s behaviours can be supervised, and the psychological risks to the child as a result of those behaviours can be ameliorated.
I have reflected upon whether it is in E’s interests to have supervised time with the father in the long term. This is an unusual case in that the father is clearly deeply committed to E, however, unable to control his behaviour, nor overcome his fixed view that the mother is a risk to the child. I do not accept that the father’s fixed views are likely to abate in the future. Whilst it is possible that the father’s fixed views may abate it appears most unlikely. Once E is of a sufficient age to understand the nature of the father’s difficulties, he will be able to make a decision as to whether the relationship is meaningful and beneficial for him. I accept that when E is 14 years of age it is appropriate for him to make that decision. The mother has been supportive of E having a relationship with the father and I am not persuaded that she would attempt to undermine that relationship. The real risk to the father’s relationship with E is the father’s own conduct in his interactions with E and whether he continues to make reports to authorities.
The question arises as to what changes in time should follow as E becomes older. I am persuaded that should E seek unsupervised time with his father at events such as sporting fixtures, that would be appropriate once E has commenced high school. I am not persuaded that should E wish to spend less time with the father that time should be reduced before he is 14 years of age, as the amount of time is limited and in the safety of supervision, and the only real opportunity for E to get to know the father. Whilst supervised handovers should still be used, this is impractical if the contact is at E’s sport. As the father is unlikely to accept the mother’s reports of the child’s views, it is appropriate to adopt a process whereby the parties engage an appropriate professional to see E when he commences High School to ascertain his views.
Neither parent appears to have a significant capacity to meet the costs of supervised time. The mother bears all of the costs of E’s day to day needs. I am not persuaded to impose the burden of the costs of supervised time upon the mother in this case. It is open to the father to seek variations in his child support assessment if the costs are significant in the context of his income, and if he has no income, it will be necessary for him to seek to have supervised time as provided by a publicly funded contact centre, if that is available.
I am persuaded that it is in E’s best interests that he be able to reside with his mother at Town R and see the father on a supervised basis each month. Town R is some distance from Sydney which makes travel an imposition upon the parties, and more importantly upon E. I am persuaded that it is in E’s best interests that the parties share that travel so that E only has to make the trip to Sydney once each second month. Given the financial circumstances of the mother and that she bears most of E’s expenses, it is appropriate that the father meet the costs of supervision by a professional supervisor, and in the event he is unable or unwilling to do so, the parties will have to rely upon publicly funded centres or contact be suspended.
I am not persuaded that it is in E’s best interests to be forced to see a counsellor or psychologist at this time, rather that it is best for E to be allowed to develop without further interventions by professionals. However, should the mother consider such interventions are necessary it remains open for her to arrange them as she has parental responsibility. The mother ought to be at liberty to provide a copy of these orders and the reasons for judgment to any medical practitioner, psychiatrist, psychologist or counsellor with respect to treatment of E or herself, as should the father to his treaters to enable any treatment or counselling to proceed with a clear understanding of the complex nature of this case.
I am persuaded that the father should have access to school reports and medical information. I am also persuaded that the father should be injuncted from attending at the child’s school, save for when he is specifically invited to do so by E or the mother, and gives the mother notice that he will attend.
Given the difficulties between the parties it is necessary to have Orders providing for a process for choosing supervisors.
Suspension of time for holidays is in E’s best interests, so as to ensure that the contact he has with his father does not become a reason for him being precluded from enjoying reasonable holidays and travel. Should more than one visit per annum be lost to holidays it is in his interests that the mother arrange make-up time for the second or subsequent visits that are missed. Reasonable notice by the mother to the father about such holidays will be necessary for this to be practical.
Orders providing for the method of communication between the parties are needed to ensure that relevant information is exchanged, and the form of communication constrained to relevant material. Notice should be given as soon as reasonably possible in the case of significant illness, accident or injury, or any significant medical treatment for E. It is also in E’s interest that the mother assist him to send letters cards and gifts if he chooses to do so (although with monthly visits most letters and cards will be able to be delivered by E in person). I am not persuaded to permit the father to provide letters cards or gifts other than during supervised contact visits as this would place a burden on the mother to assess the material and potentially lead to further disputes.
Injunctions
E and the mother entitled to live, attend work and school, and attend activities without concerns that the father may appear and attempt to question E or the mother, or otherwise make allegations. It is in E’s best interest that there be clear restraints on the father in this regard.
The father’s conduct has placed considerable burden on the mother. Should he contact her or attend at her residence (other than to return E) or place of employment, it is likely to reduce her parenting capacity and thus an injunction against such actions is for the welfare of E (save for communication for the purpose of implementing or complying with the orders, through a parenting app).
I am persuaded that there is a real risk that the father will make unfounded notifications, allegations or complaints that the mother is harming E or conduct himself in a way that questions her parenting capacity, which would subject E to unwarranted interventions. I am persuaded that there should be an injunction against the father in this regard.
I am not persuaded that there is a real risk the mother would denigrate the father as it appears the mother would not want to distress E, and as such there is no need for an equivalent injunction against their mother.
Nothing in the evidence indicates that there is any risk that the mother would not return E to Australia if she travelled overseas. The mother does not have citizenship in any country other than Australia. Any restriction in this regard would be an unwarranted imposition upon E and the mother, limiting their opportunity to travel or take holidays.
Having regard to the number of reports made by the father and his fixed beliefs concerning the mother, I am persuaded that it is necessary to require the father to provide a copy of the parenting orders and these Reasons to the relevant officer of any agency, or medical practitioner, to which he makes a report concerning E or E’s care. Such an order is necessary to provide E with some degree of protection against systems abuse as it will ensure that the person receiving any future report is aware of the unusual circumstances of this case and alert them to the complex issues and risks to E of systems abuse.
The mother should also be at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders and the Reasons for Judgment to Police, any child protection agency, any medical practitioner, any other government agency, or a mandatory reporting agency that has received a complaint or notification with respect to E.
CONCLUSION
I will therefore make parenting orders accordingly.
At the end of the final hearing during submissions the ICL sought that the mother pay their fees. The ICL could not identify any of the factors in s 117 of the Act that weighed in favour of an order for costs, and in particular was unable to demonstrate that the mother had the capacity to pay costs. I am not persuaded that the mother should contribute to the costs of the ICL in this case.
It is appropriate that the father meet the setting down or hearing fees in this matter as he has not had the expense of representation at the trial as a result of a grant of funding under the scheme supporting cases where orders are made pursuant to s 102NA of the Act and the mother has limited financial capacity and the costs of caring for the child. If he is unable to meet the fees he may seek an exemption pursuant to the relevant regulations.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-eight (148) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Riethmuller. Associate:
Dated: 7 June 2024
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