Master Builders Association of NSW v The Plumbers & Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia

IN THE FEDERAL COURT	OF AUSTRALIA	)
)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY 1

NSW Nos. 7 and 8 of 1987

)

INDUSTRIAL DIVISION

)

(Applicants)

-	And: THE PLUMBERS AND

GASFITTEXS EMPLOYEES'

UNION OF AUSTRALIA

(Respondent)

Coram: Gray J.

D a t e :

23 April 1987

Place: Sydney

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

These proceedings were commenced on 23rd January

1907,

by the filing

of applications pursuant to s.119

of the

Conciliation

and

Arbitration

Act

1904. Each of

the

applicants and the respondent is an organization registered pursuant to that Act. Each applicant alleges that Lhe

respondent is guilty of breaches

of an award made under that

Act, the breaches alleged being the imposition of bans on the

performance of certain kinds of work at various building

sites in New South Wales. The applicants seek the imposition

2 .

of penalties for those breaches.

Points of claim, and points

of defence have been filed

and served, as have affidavits. The matter has now been

fixed for trial on 18th May

1987.

Each of the applicants has

been

called

upon

make,

and

has

made,

discovery

documents.

On 10th March 1987, the respondent caused to be issued

a number of proceeding there is a subpoena directed to the applicant. In

subpoenas

produce

documents.

each

addition,

subpoenas

have

been

directed

a number of

companies, each of which is alleged to

be, or to have been,

contractor or sub-contractor, conducting works on one

or more

of the sites on

which the bans are alleged to have been

imposed. The Court has been told that there are some

subpoenas. They are identical in

form, save for one feature.

Each has attached to it a copy of the points of claim filed in the relevant proceeding, which in turn has attached to it

a schedule specifying the work alleged to be, or to have

been, the subject of a ban at each site to which the proceeding relates, and the dates on which the bans are alleged to have been imposed. In most cases, the bans are

alleged

date

from

25th

September

1986,

and

“continuing“. There are differences between the bans alleged

in the two different proceedings.

Each subpoena requires the production of the documents

and things described in the schedule to the subpoena. It

convenient to set out the contents

of that schedule:

"A. A1 1 letters,

telegrams,

telexes,

photographs,

memoranda,

notes,

records,

reports,

diaries,

minutes,

leaflets,

pamphlets,

newspapers,

journals,papers,

receipts,

accounts

o her

and

documentary material in the files of the

Company relating to:-

1. Any

decision

taken

by:-

(a) The Plumbers

and

Gasfitters

Employees" union of Australia

('the Respondent');

(b)	any branch of the Respondent;
(c)	any officer of the Respondent or any branch thereof;
(d)	any employee of the Respondent or any branch thereof;
or
(e)	any member of the Respondent.

(a) impliment;

(b)

maintain;

(c)

extend;

(d) limit

(e) lift

in the Schedule to the Points of

any of the alleged bans referred to annexed hereto.

2 .

The participation

by:-

(a) The Respondent;

(b)	any branch of the Respondent;
(c)	any officer of the Respondent or any branch thereof;
(d)	any employee of the Respondent or any branch thereof;
or
( e )	any member of the Respondent

in the bans referred to in paragraph

1 or any of them.

h Y authorisation

given

purportedly given by or on behalf

of :

(a) The

Respondent;

(b)	any branch of the Respondent;
(c)	any officer of the Respndent o r any branch thereof;
(d)	any employee of the Respondent

or any branch thereof;

or
(e)	any member of the Respondent

to any other person or persons in

relation to any decisions or conduct

identified	in	paragraphs	1 or 2
above.

The

existence

the

bans

referred

to in paragraph	1 above or any of
them.

Any

meeting

meetings

members

of the Respondent,

or the New South

Wales branch

of the Respondent, held

connection

with

the

mattes

identified in paragraph	1 above or
any of them.

Any meeting or meetings

of employees

of your company or any company with

which your company had a sub-con-

tract held in connection with the

matters identi€ied in paragraph	1
above.

7. The service by the Respondent of any

log of

claims

seeking increases in

wages andlor improvements in working

conditions on your company or any

other

company

with

which

your

company had sub-contract since 1st

January, 1986.

8. The:-

(a) suspension;

(b) dismissal

of any employee of your company or

any other company with which your

company had a sub-contract as a

result of:-

(a) The

participatlon

such

employees or any of

them in

any of the bans referred to in

paragraph 1 above;

(h)	the refusal by such employees

or any of them to perform work

the subject of the said bans;

(c)

the refusal by such employees or otherwise modify, any such bans.

The alleged cost of the said bans

any of the said bans to your company

or any other company with which your

company had a sub-contract including

estlmates and estimates of future

costs.

Copies of all documentary material handed

or otherwise delivered by your company

any company with which your company had

sub-contract to employees referred to in

i	paragraph 8 above on or about the time of their suspension or dismissal or prior to the time of their suspension or dismissal and In connection therewith."

A number of the recipients of

subpoenas desire to apply to

set them aside. On 31st March

1987, when the matter first

came before me,

Mr. Camilleri of counsel who appeared with

Mr. Street of counsel, announced his appearance for the two applicants, and

for 15 companies to which subpoenas had been

addressed. Mr.

Holmes of counsel announced his appearance

for seven companies to which subpoenas were directed.

Mr.

Kenzie Q.C.

appeared with

Mr. Moore of counsel for the

respondent. Some discussion took place as to whether

all

subpoenas had been served, and

s to whether those wishing to

set them aside had complied with earlier directions

as to the

filing of notices of motion for

that purpose. In the result,

the applications of Civil and Civic Pty. Ltd., and White

Industries Limited,

to set aside a subpoena served on each

them in each of the proceedings, has been dealt

with, and it

is to those applications that this judgment relates. Mr.

Holmes appeared for

the companies concerned, and therefore

had carriage of the applications. Further argument was heard

on 1st April, and

22nd April, when Mr. Kimber

of counsel

appeared with Mr. Kenzie. Although Mr. Camilleri's clients

have not yet been heard on their

own

applications to set

aside

subpoenas

addressed

them, Mr.

Camilleri

has

addressed the Court on

behalf of the applicants in relation

to the applications	of Civil and Civic Pty. Ltd. and	mite
Industries Limited.

Certain propositions of

law have been common ground.

It is agreed that

a subpoena to produce documents must

specify with reasonable particularity the documents to

produced: Commissioner for Railwavs v. Small (1938) 38

S.R.

(N.S.W.) 564, 573, Lucas Industries Ltd. v. Hewitt (1978) 18

A.L.R.

555, 570, and Lane v. Resistrar of the Supreme Court

of New South Wales (1981) 18 C.L.R.

245, 259.

It was also

agreed that

subpoena which requires the production of

documents "relating

to" a particular subject matter does not

necessarily infringe the requirement of particularity, even

though the recipient of the subpoena

m y have to search for

documents

and

make

decisions

whether

particular

documents do bear

a relationship to the subject specified:

Lucas at p.570 ,

Spencer Motors Pty.

Ltd. v. LNC Industries

Ltd. C19821 2 N.S.W.L.R.

921, 929 and Southern Pacific Hotel

Services Inc.

Southern Pacific Hotel Corporation Ltd.

C19841 1 N.S.W.L.R.

710, 719. There was also consensus that

the subpoena must

be read sensibly, and

with reference to the

circumstances known to the recipient: Lucas at p.571. There were, of course, differences as to the application of these propositions to the particular subpoenas. Before proceeding

those

differences,

I should

deal

with

some

general

submissions that were made about the subpoenas in the present

case.

Mr.	Holmes attempted to make out a case that the

subpoenas are oppressive, in the sense that compliance with

them would involve the making of searches and inquiries that

would be unduly burdensome. Naturally, a burden will

placed upon a stranger to litigation who

is called upon to

produce documents to a court. It is in the interests of

justice, however, that the parties to litigation should have

the means of

obtaining documentary evidence that is in the

custody of strangers.

It is only when the private interests

of the. stranger can be shown to outweigh the public interest

in the doing of justice that the Court

will set aside

subpoena on the ground of oppression. What

is involved is a

balancing of

the respective public and private interests:

Southern

Pacific

pp.719-720.

The

mere

fact

that

subpoena is in wide terms, which would cover large numbers of more likely to be safe from subpoenas than those with few.

documents, cannot absolve its recipient from compliance.

Nor can the fact that the recipient

of a subpoena is a large

business entity, with many places of business, of itself

i	0 .
!

amount to a ground for setting aside

a subpoena. Otherwise,

large

companies

could

withhold

evidence,

whilst

small

companies would be bound to provide it. Indeed, in the

absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be assumed safely

that a large business entity keeps its records accessible,

reasonably indexed, and controlled by efficient staff, and

that consequently the burden

on it of complying with

subpoena to produce large numbers of documents will be less

than that on

a smaller business entity,

or an indtvidual.

Compare Lucas at p.571.

In the present case, although

Mr. Holmes was permitted

to call oral evidence, very little evidence was given

as to

what would be involved in compliance

with the subpoenas. It

was conceded by Mr. Kenzie that White Industries Limited

operates Australia-wide, is engaged on eighteen building

projects, has four offices in four States, and approximately

2,000 employees.

Civil

and

Civic

Pty.

Ltd.

operates

Australia-wide, is engaged on over 100 building projects, has

eight offices in

five States, and employs approximately

2,000

people.	Each company has documents, records and files	at
each of	its offices and building sites and various other

places throughout Australia. These concessions, however, do

not supply evidence that compliance with its subpoenas would

be oppressive for either company. There is a notable lack of

evidence of the extent to which records are kept, how they

are ordered or collated, whether they are indexed, the likely

numbers of documents involved, the personnel required, and the time needed, to search for them, and the costs to the

I I

9 .

company

concerned

these

tasks.

If the

searches

and

inquiries necessary were likely to entail great labour and

expense, it is to be expected that evidence would be given

those matters. It is not to be supposed that either company keeps documents distributed at random throughout its offices,

project sites and other places. Rather,

I assume that it has

systems

storing

and

retrieving

documents,

and

communicating between offices, project sltes and other places

with respect to them.

this is not

so, evidence of the

true state of

affairs could be given. It is worth noting

'chat Mr.

disavowed any intention of arguing that compliance with the

subpoenas would involve excessively burdensome trouble and

Camilleri, on behalf of his clients, expressly

expense. For these reasons,

I hold that Mr. Holmes has

failed to establish a case

of oppression.

Mr. Holmes also attempted to argue that the subpoenas

were objectionable because compliance with them would involve

the production of documents which have come into existence,

and are in

use, far current legal proceedings. There are

before

the

General

Division

the

Federal

Court

Australian pending proceedings against the respondent under

s.45D

of the Trade Practices Act

1974. Mr. Holmes's clients

are applicants in those proceedings,

a are a number of other

companies. That those proceedings have generated a large

quantity of paperwork cannot be doubted. Evidence was given

of the quantities of documents In the offices of the

solicitors who act for the two companies here concerned, and

for other companies, in those proceedings.

It was said that

the photocopying bill amounts to

$20,000, which is indicative

of the number of documents involved.

In part, the objection

to the subpoena on this ground was based on the quantity of

documents involved.

As I have pointed out earlier, however,

the

number of documents

not

decisive.

In part

the

objection was based on the inconvenience arising from being

deprived of the documents necessary

for the conduct of the

other litigation; for the remainder, it was based on the fact

that legal professional privilege would be claimed for many,

but not all, of the documents involved in the case. There is

no authority which suggests that a party can apply to set

aside a subpoena to produce documents on the ground that the

documents concerned are required in

the conduct of other

litigation.

Such

rule

would

require

too

many

qualifications, so that it would not enable

subpoenaed

person to commence litigation for the purpose of tying up the

documents sought.

It seems

to me that the proper course is

to produce the documents in answer to the subpoena and to ask

the court for directions which will enable such of them

are to be inspected to

be inspected speedily, or by means

copies, and for the rest to be uplifted and used, perhaps

with undertakings

as to their swift return

i€ required.

Similarly, it does not appear that the likelihood of

a claim

for legal professional privilege in respect of some documents

amounts to a ground on which a subpoena can be set aside.

The production of the documents to the court does not amount

to a breach of the privilege, and objection based on the

privilege can be taken if any party applies for leave to

inspect the documents in the custody of the court. See

’,

11.

National Employers’ Mutual General Association Ltd v.

Waind

and Hill C19787 1 N.S.W.L.R.

372.

Another general ground

on which Mr. Holmes attacked

the

subpoenas was the contention that they required the two

companies, who are strangers to the litigation in these

proceedings, to give discovery of documents. Some confusion

appears to have arisen out of a passage

In the judgment of

Jordan CJ

in Commissioner for Railwavs v. Small

(1938) 38

S.R.	(N.S.W.) 564, 573, where his Honour said:

“ A subpoena duces tecum ought not to be issued to

such a

person requiring him to search for and

produce all such documents as

he may have in his

possession or power relating to

particular

subject matter.

It is not legitimate to use

subpoena

for

the

purpose

endeavouring

obtain what would be in effect discovery

documents against

a person who, being a stranger,

is not liable to make discovery.

A stranger to

the cause ought not to be required to go to

trouble and perhaps to expense in ransacking his

records and endeavouring to form

a judgment as to

whether any of his papers throw light

dispute which is to be litigated upon issues

which he is presumably ignorant

: l ’

It is

now well established that there

a distinction

between

requiring a stranger

litigation

produce

documents

relating

a specified

subject

matter,

and

requiring such a person to produce documents relating to the

issues

in a particular

proceeding.

The

latter

course

involves the person in forming

a view as to what issues

arise, or may arise, in the proceeding, and then considering

whether the various documents are relevant

to the issues, and

amounts

eeking

discovery.

The former

course

* I

12.

legitimate and does not amount to seeking discovery, provided

that the subjects to which the documents must relate are

specified with the requisite degree of particularity. See

Waind at pp.381-382, Lucas at p.569, Southern Pacific at pp.

717-718

and

Greyhound

Australia

Ptv.

Ltd.

Deluxe

Couchlines Ptv. Ltd. (1986)

67 A.L.R. 93, 97-98.

the attention to issues in the litigation

present case, the subpoenas do not direct

as such, but to subject

matters. True

it is, much of the subject matter is described

by reference to the bans specified in the schedule to the

points of claim, but at no stage is either of the recipients

obliged to form any view as to what is or may be in issue in

the proceedings. The recipients are not supplied

with points

of defence or affidavlts; their attention is directed to the

bans described in the schedule to the points of claim by way

of specification of the sites and dates of those bans, and

the nature of the work banned. It is as if those details

were set out in the subpoenas themselves. It cannot properly

be said, therefore, that the recipients of these subpoenas

have been called upon to give discovery of documents.

Much discussion took place upon the question of the

relevance of the documents sought to the issues in the

proceedings.

one

sense,

the stranger

who

receives

subpoena to produce documents is not concerned with the

relevance of those documents to any issue in the proceeding

in which the subpoena is issued. The stranger is not called

upon to make

a decision on the question

of relevance, but

only to produce the documents specified. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that courts do have regard to relevance

to the

issues in the proceeding, when asked to set aside

subpoenas: Southern Pacific at p.720. The fact that a large number of plainly irrelevant documents is called for may be

taken into account on the question of oppression.	An attempt
to obtain documents which are plainly irrelevant may be

evidence of fishing, or of

an ulterior motive in seeking the

documents, so as to use them for some purpose other than the

particular

litigation.

seems,

therefore,

that

possible

relevance of the

documents ought

should

considered, especially where,

as here,

it is alleged that

party procuring the issue

of the subpoenas is fishing, or

seeking documents with a view

to using them for an improper

purpose. In this case, it was suggested that the respondent was seeking the documents described in sub-paragraph A9 of

the schedule to the subpoenas in order to obtain

a preview of

evidence which

might be led of

loss and damage in the

proceedings under s.45D of the Trade Practices Act 1974.

The test of

relevance must necessarily be

a generous

one. In many cases, it is difficult to rule on the relevance

of a question asked

of a witness at a trial, since the full

extent of

the issues raised may not become apparent until

final addresses. When the trial has not begun, and the

contents of the documents sought by the subpoena are unknown,

it is even more difficult to decide whether the documents are

relevant to the issues. Only in cases of obvious irrelevance

should a party be deprived

of the right to obtain evidence to

14.

further a case or defence

at a trial.

In the

present

case,

there

such

obvious

irrelevance. The argument

tended

c ncentrate

sub-paragraph A9 of

the

schedule

the

subpoena,

the

submission being that evidence of the cost of the alleged bans could not be relevant to determining whether bans had been imposed by the respondent, and whether, if they have,

they amount to award breaches. Even if this suhrnission

correct, and I am by no means certain that it

is, it does not

exclude the

real possibility that evidence

cost may

admissible on the question of penalty, in the event that the

respondent is found to be in breach of the awards.

As things

stand at present, it would not be proper to set aside the subpoenas on the ground that they are fishing. Nor is the

argument of ulterior motive made out.

The only suggestion of

an ulterior motive arises

from

the terms of the subpoenas

themselves; it is by way of inference, rather than positive

evidence:

If the documents sought may be relevant to the

issues in these proceedings, the fact that knowledge of their

contents may advance the respondent in other proceedings is

of no account.

Before turning to the specific words of the schedule to

thp subpoenas, I

should deal with

one argument advanced by

Mr. Xenzie.

He said that the subpoenaed companies are really

participants

the vents

which

give

rise

to these

proceedings; he pointed to the fact that employees

of Civil

and Civic Pty. Ltd.

have sworn affidavits which have been

15.

filed by one

of the applicants, and to

he involvement of the

two subpoenaed companies in the proceedings under

s.45D

the Trade Practices Act

1974.

There is evidence of

some

overlap between sites the subject of those proceedings and

sites the subject of these. Mr. Kenzie contended that the

subpoenaed companies really know what they are being called

upon to produce, and that objections taken to the words used

in the subpoenas are technical "lawyers' objections", rather

than genuine. It may be that the recipient of

subpoena

will have an idea that certain documents will fall within it.

This core of documents, however, may not be all that the

subpoena requires.

The recipient is entitled to fair notice

of what is demanded, to reasonable specificity, and is not to

be required to make difficult decisions about whether the

subpoena does, or does not, require documents of certain

kinds. Participation in, or knowledge of, the events giving rise to litigation, is not a complete answer to criticism of

expressions used in a subpoena.

It is on this basis that I

approach the arguments as to the specific words used. Nor

does it assist Mr. Kenzie's argument to show that some

companies have produced documents in response to identical

subpoenas. It cannot be known at this stage whether such

production

amounts

a sufficient

compliance

with

the

subpoenas.

The main argument put by

Mr. Camilleri, and

a major

argument of Mr. Holmes, was that the subpoenas were uncertain

or ambiguous in

number of respects. Perhaps the most

important of these arose from the presence of the phrase

"in

16.

the files of the Company" in the opening words of paragraph

of the schedule. Mr. Kenzie conceded that it was possible to

read these words as qualifying three different aspects of

paragraph A , namely, all

of the words precedlng them, only

the words "all other documentary material", or all of the

words

succeeding

them.

submitted,

however,

that

the

meaning of the opening words is clear if

a sensible view is

taken of them. This aspect of the matter

has troubled

me,

but after considering the matter carefully overnight,

accept Mr. Kenzie's argument.

To read the words "in the

files of the Company" as qualifying the succeeding words

would be to give

the subpoenas a strange meaning.

The

recipients would be required to ascertain whether they had

files which

related to any of the subjects listed in the

numbered sub-paragraphs, and to produce all of the documents

in those files. Such a reading would not, in my view, be a

sensible one in the sense referred to by Smithers

J.,

with

whom the other two members of the court agreed in Lucas at

p.571.

To read the words

"in the files of the Company"

qualifying only the words

"all other documentary material"

would be to leave it unclear from what sources the recipients

were to procure letters, telegrams, etc., to comply with the

subpoenas. Again, in my view this would not be

sensible

reading. An ordinary person in the position of an informed officer of a company receiving

a subpoena in this form would

understand that the company was required to produce from its

files all documents answering any of the descriptions in the

opening words of paragraph

A , relating to the subjects listed

the

numbered

sub-paragraphs

that

paragraph.

Some

17.

attempt

was

made

argue

that

the

word

"files"

was

uncertain. I

do not think

so; I am satisfied that the phrase

"the files of

the company" would be understood by an ordinary

person to mean the records kept by

the company, and would not

cause distinctions to be drawn on

the basis of whether or not

a document had been placed within what might be described

a "file"

Other words and phrases were seized upon as being

potentially susceptible

different meanings, or as being

vague and undefined. Mr. Camilleri pointed to "decision"

sub-paragraph Al, "participation" in sub-paragraphs

A2 and 8

and "authorization" in sub-paragraph A3.

No doubt it might

said

that

any

word

the

English

language

lacks

precision, in the sense that debate might take place as

whether a particular

event

object

falls

within

its

meaning. Words may take their meanings from their contexts. out the creation of any legal documents, and particularly any

subpoenas, since no word could ever be found

of such fixed

and precise meaning as

to limit perfectly the command or

agreement concerned.

The

legal system is founded on the

supposition

that

words

convey

meanings.

The words

"decision", "participation" and "authorization" do

so, and

their meanings are reasonably ascertainable in the context of

the subpoenas. For instance, the subpoenas do not require

documents relating to any "decision" in the abstract, but

documents relating to any decision to impliment Csic.1,

maintain, extend, limit or lift any of the alleged bans. It

1s.

would be unwise for me to attempt to give synonyms for the

words. Should there be found to be documents as to which

views might differ on whether they relate to the requisite

decisions, participation and authorisations, the fact that

views might differ would no doubt be

a powerful factor in

mitigation of any suggestion of contempt of court in failing

to produce those documents.

It should also

be pointed out that the subpoenas do not

require

the

recipients

decide

which of

the

sub-paragraphs a particular document should be assigned. If

a document might be said to relate to a "decision" to

implement a ban, or to "participation" in a ban, it must be

produced, without any need to decide whether it relates to

one or both of sub-paragraphs A1

and 2 .

In this sense, the

way in which the subpoena is expressed assists the recipient

to comply with it.

A similar proposition meets the argument of

Mr. Holmes

, that the words "officer" and "employee" in sub-paragraphs

Al,

2 and 3

are uncertain, and that questions of law may enter

into the determination whether

a person is

an officer or

employee. The wording of the subpoenas is such

as to require

production

the

documents

relating

decisions,

participation, or authorisations of any person who is

officer, employee or member of the respondent or one of its

branches, without there being any need to determine into

which of these categories a person falls. If there is real

doubt as to whether a person falls within any of those

19.

categories, such doubt would be relevant

o a

proceeding for

contempt in failing to produce a document.

I do not think

that it can be relied upon to compel the setting aside of the

subpoena. Nor

do I think that there is substance in the

objections made by Mr. Holmes to the word "conduct" in

sub-paragraph A3, or the presence in sub-paragraph

A6 of the

words "or any

of them".

One matter raised by both Mr. Camilleri and Mr. Holmes

arises from the presence in sub-paragraphs

A 6 , 7 8 and 9

and

paragraph R of the words "or any other company with which your company had a sub-contract". In my view, the presence of these words in the subpoenas is a vice. A recipient may have documents which might or might not answer one of the

descriptions

which

these

words

relate.

order

ascertain whether the documents do answer that description, it might be necessary to make inquiries of a sub-contractor without the inquirer having any power to compel answers to those inquiries. Mr. Kenzie conceded that no-one can be

compelled by subpoena to make such inquiries.

He sought to

justify these words on the basis that a recipient was only

bound to answer the subpoena from its

own knowledge. In the

absence of information from

a sub-contractor, however, a

recipient would

be embarrassed in responding to the subpoena;

it would have no relevant knowledge, and therefore no means

of complying with the subpoena.

do not think that the

recipients should be placed in such

a position.

Mr. Xenzie submitted that the words

"or any other

2 0 .

company with which your company had

sub-contract" are

severable,

and

should

severed,

so as

leave

the

subpoenas otherwise intact. Mr. Holmes and Mr. Camilleri did

not attempt

to rebut this argument.

In my view, it is

correct. Incidentally, severance

of those words overcomes

another argument of Mr. Holmes, namely that the words "since

1st

January,

1986"

sub-paragraph

made

that

sub-paragraph uncertain, as it was unclear whether they were

intended to define the period

f service of logs of claims

the period of having sub-contracts.

I therefore propose to dismiss the motions

of Civil and

Civic Pty. Ltd., and White Industries Limited, the subject of

their notices of motion on

20 March 1987, and to order those

companies to comply with the subpoenas served on them,

subject to the deletion of the words

"or any other company

with which your company had a sub-contract" in sub-paragraphs

A6, 7, 8 and 9 and paragraph B.

I shall hear counsel

as to

an appropriate date for compliance.

21.

Mr. B.J. Camilleri and Mr. N.T. Street for

- the

Applicants

Matthew

Hall

Mechanical

- and

Electrical

Engineering Pty. Limited

J.M. Hargreaves and Son Pty. Limited

Thomas Clark and Son Pty. Limited Wildridge and Sinclair Pty. Limlted Bruce and Sowter Pty. Limited

Crawford and Sanuel Pty. Limited

F.R. Coyle Pty. Limited

G.J. Melis Pty. Limited

Wormald International (Australia)

Pty. Limited

Environ Mechanical Services Pty.

Limited

Fire Fighting Sprinkler Services Pty. Limited

Brown and Moodie Pty. Limited

Randwlck Plumbing Pty. Limited

Instructing Solicitors

: Cutler, Hughes and Harris

- Jennings

Construction

Limited

- Barclay

Bros.

Pty.

Limited

Instructing Solicitors	: Collin Biggers and Paisley
Mr. M.F. Holmes for

- Leighton

Contractors

Pty.

Limited

-	Sabemo Pty. Limited

Instructing Solicitors

: Allen Allen and Hemsley

-	White Industries Limited
-	Civil and Civic Limited

Instructing Solicitors

: Freehill, Hollmgdale and Page

- Concrete

Constructions

Pty.

Limited

- Concrete

Constructions (New South

Wales)

Pty.

Limited

-	John Holland Constructions Pty. Limited

Instructmg Solicitors: Westgarth Baldick

Mr. R.C. Kenzie Q.C., Mr. M. Moore and Mr. M. Kimber for the

Respondent

Instructing Solicitors

: R.L. Whyburn and Associates

[1987] FCA 193

23 Apr 1987