Masson v Parsons & Ors

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[2018] HCATrans 265

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S197 of 2018

B e t w e e n -

MASSON

Applicant

and

PARSONS

First Respondent

PARSONS

Second Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

Third Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL CJ
GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 14 DECEMBER 2018, AT 11.18 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR C.L. LENEHAN:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MS E.A. LAWSON and MR D.P. HUME, for the applicant.  (instructed by Steiner Legal)

MR B.W. WALKER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS M. McMAHON, for the first two respondents.  (instructed by McDonald Johnson Lawyers)

MR J.K. KIRK, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MS S.M. CHRISTIE, SC and MR P.D. HERZFELD, for the third respondent.  (instructed by Legal Aid NSW)

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, Mr Lenehan.

MR LENEHAN:   Your Honours, the special leave question identified in the book at 132 – or the two special leave questions identified there – essentially concern the proper construction of the word “parent” in the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act.  That construction is important because it affects, in a number of fundamental ways, the manner in which a court making a parenting order under Part VII of the Family Law Act approaches that task.

Your Honours will have seen from the reasons of the Full Family Court that there are a number of divergent opinions in the Family Court at first instance regarding that issue and your Honours will have also seen, of course, that this matter raises an interesting aspect of the operation of your Honours’ decision in Rizeq.

Turning straight to that matter, the submission made by my client is that the Full Family Court erred by holding that the matter was to be resolved by reference to the irrebuttable presumption in section 14 of the State Act and your Honours will have seen that it essentially did that because that State law was said to be picked up by operation of section 79.

That approach is wrong.  We say it is at odds with Rizeq, to which the Court referred but misunderstood.  As your Honours know, section 79, as was made clear in Rizeq is addressed to the gap in State legislative power to effect the exercise by any court of federal jurisdiction.

GORDON J:   Your short point is there was no gap?

MR LENEHAN:   Correct.  Section 14 is not a law of the nature that your Honours identified in Rizeq.  It has an operation and an application independently of anything that is done by a court.  When it is engaged what it does is it effectively declares the status of parents and children and it effectively declares that certain persons are to be either the mother or the father of a…

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Details
Case
[2018] HCATrans 265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellant, Mr. Masson, and the respondents, who included Mr. Parsons and others. The core of the disagreement concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement and release entered into by the parties. This deed was intended to resolve a prior dispute, but its precise meaning and effect, particularly in relation to certain alleged breaches, were contested.

The central legal question before the High Court was whether the deed of settlement and release operated to extinguish Mr. Masson's right to pursue claims against the respondents for alleged breaches of contract that occurred prior to the execution of the deed. Specifically, the Court had to determine the scope of the release and whether it encompassed all causes of action, known or unknown, that existed at the time of its signing, or if it was limited to the specific disputes that the deed was intended to resolve.

The High Court's reasoning focused on the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly in the context of deeds of settlement. The Court examined the language of the deed itself, considering the ordinary meaning of the words used and the surrounding circumstances to ascertain the parties' intentions. It applied the established legal principle that a general release clause in a settlement deed will generally be construed to cover all claims that the parties intended to compromise, even if those claims were not specifically enumerated, provided the language of the deed clearly indicates such an intention. The Court found that the deed in question, by its broad and comprehensive wording, evinced a clear intention by the parties to release all claims that had arisen between them up to the date of the deed.

Consequently, the High Court held that the deed of settlement and release effectively extinguished Mr. Masson's right to pursue the alleged prior breaches of contract. The appeal was dismissed.

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