MASRI & MASRI - [2020] FamCA 730

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MASRI & MASRI

[2020] FamCA 730

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Interim Parenting – Best Interests – Consideration of the “rule” in Rice & Asplund – Where there has not been a significant change in circumstances since interim orders were made in the Federal Circuit Court which varied final parenting orders made in the Family Court and changed the children’s primary residence to that of the father – Where the final parenting arrangements for the children are to be determined following the receipt of the Single Expert Report.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Elmi & Munro (2019) FLC 93-912
Masri & Masri (No. 2) [2017] FamCA 898
Masri & Masri [2019] FCCA 3223
Prewett & Mann [2013] FamCAFC 130
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

APPLICANT:

Mr Masri

RESPONDENT:

Ms Masri

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Ms Dodson

FILE NUMBER:

PAC

5617

2014

DATE DELIVERED:

3 September 2020

PLACE DELIVERED:

Parramatta

PLACE HEARD:

Parramatta

JUDGMENT OF:

Foster J

HEARING DATE:

5 June 2020

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Ms Dart

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Somverville Legal

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mr Hill

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Friend & Co Lawyers

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Ms Dodson of Legal Aid NSW Penrith

Orders

That Orders (1) to (5) inclusive made on 5 June 2020 continue pending further order.
That otherwise all interim applications are dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Masri & Masri has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA

FILE NUMBER: PAC 5617 of 2014

Mr Masri

Applicant

And

Ms Masri

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

In these long running parenting proceedings, Hannam J made final orders following a four-day trial on 9 November 2017.
In summary, the Court ordered that:
a)the mother and father have equal shared parental responsibility for the children D born in 2011 and E born in 2013;
b)that the children live with the mother;
c)that the father have substantial and significant contact with the children including during the school term each alternate weekend and for an overnight day in the other week and half of the school holiday; and
d)otherwise the Court made specific issues orders as to particular occasions and the exchange of information between the parents in relation to the children’s schooling and other issues.
These reasons assume familiarity with the reasons for judgment delivered by the Court on 9 November 2017: Masri & Masri (No. 2) [2017] FamCA 898.
Final property orders were made by consent on 31 January 2018.
Subsequently, on 14 August 2019 the applicant father filed an Initiating Application seeking parenting orders in relation to the two children. In that application, he, in summary, sought orders that he have sole parental responsibility for the children, that the children live with him and that the children spend time with the mother as ordered by the Court.
The father’s application was filed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and was first listed before the court on 15 August 2019. On that day the court made directions for the parties to attend upon a family consultant for the purposes of a Child Inclusive Conference and report to the court. Otherwise, the court ordered that pending further order the father return the children to their school and the mother be prohibited from attending at the school before 5.00 pm on 21 August 2019.
Subsequently and on 22 August 2019, the court ordered that pending further order the mother be prevented by injunction from attending the school, and the father be prevented by injunction from allowing Ms M to attend the school to collect the children.
On 29 August 2019 the court, upon hearing interim proceedings, ordered that pending further order the children live with the father and that the children’s time with the mother be supervised by a professional supervision service. Otherwise, it was ordered that pending further order the mother and any of her agents be prevented by injunction from further attending upon the children’s school or instructing or allowing any other person to do so. These reasons assume familiarity with the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court’s judge delivered 29 August 2019: Masri & Masri [2019] FCCA 3223.
It is to be noted that the Federal Circuit Court did not change the primary residence of the children on a whim but on a considered analysis of the evidence before it. Such evidence resulted in an assessment that the children were at risk of harm in the ongoing care of the mother and her partner, that the mother’s conduct had resulted in significant behavioural issues for the children and the mother had adopted an entirely inappropriate attitude to the concerns of and difficulties experienced by the children’s school as to their behaviour.
Regrettably, the orders made by the court were not prescriptive as to the actual times that the children were to spend in supervised circumstances with the mother.
On 25 September 2019 the mother filed a Notice of Appeal in relation to the interim orders of 29 August 2019. On 30 October 2019 the court ordered that the mother’s application for staying of orders made 29 August 2019 pending determination of her appeal be dismissed. On 26 March 2020 the mother filed a Notice of Discontinuance of her appeal.
On 17 February 2020 a judge of the Federal Circuit Court, in summary, made orders as follows:
a)that the parties be restrained from physically disciplining the children;
b)that the parties be restrained from denigrating the other parent or a member of that parent’s family in the hearing or presence of the children or causing or permitting any third party to do so;
c)that Dr N, Child and Family Psychologist, be appointed as a single expert in the proceedings for the purposes of preparing a report for the court; and
d)that the proceedings be transferred to the Family Court of Australia.
Subsequently, on 27 February 2020 proceedings were before a registrar of this Court. It was noted that single expert interviews would take place in April and proceedings were adjourned pending release of the Single Expert Report.

The current applications

On 25 March 2020 the father filed an Application in a Case seeking orders as follows:
a)that pending further order the children’s time with the mother pursuant to order 3 of orders made 29 August 2020 be supervised by S Services; and
b)that the children’s time with the mother pursuant to the previous order shall be each Tuesday from 3.30 pm to 5.30 pm and each Saturday from 10.30 am until 12.30 pm unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing.
On 27 March 2020 the mother filed an Application – Contravention asserting that the father had breached the then current interim orders by failing to make the children available for supervised time with the mother.
On 26 April 2020 the father filed a further Application in a Case. The application sought the issue of a recovery order in respect of the children so as to facilitate the children being returned to the father’s care, it being asserted by him that the mother had retained the children in her care contrary to current orders.
The father’s application was granted leave to proceed ex parte and on 27 April 2020 the Court made the following orders:
(1)That the application proceed ex parte.
(2)Pursuant to s 67Q of the Family Law Act 1975 a recovery order issue directed to the Marshal of the Family Court of Australia, all officers of the Australian Federal Police and all officers of the Polices Forces of all the States and Territories of Australia requiring them to find and recover the children D born in 2011 (female) and E born in 2013 (male) and to return or deliver the said children to the father Mr Masri born in 1977 or the father’s nominee and for that purpose to stop and search any vehicle, vessel or aircraft and to enter and search any premises or place in which there is at any time reasonable cause to believe that the said children may be found.
(3)That the mother, Ms Masri, her servants or agents, be and are hereby restrained from again removing or causing the removal of the children from the care of the father.
(4)Pending further order, that order 3 of orders made on 29 August 2019 be suspended.
(5)Pending further order, that the children spend no time with the mother.
(6)The Application in a Case filed 26 April 2020 be adjourned for further judicial case management or possible interim hearing, if necessary, to 12.00 pm on Thursday, 30 April 2020.
On 28 April 2020 the mother filed a Response to the father’s Application in a Case. That Response, in summary, sought the following orders:
a)that pending further order orders made 29 August 2019 be suspended;
b)that pending further order the children live with the mother;
c)that pending further order the children spend time with the father supervised by a professional supervising service,
d)that each party be restrained from physically disciplining the children; and
e)that each party be restrained from denigrating the other parent or a member of the other parent’s family in the hearing or presence of the children or allowing, causing or permitting any third person from doing so.
On 30 April 2020 the proceedings were again before the Court and the Court made the following orders and directions:
(1)That the Independent Children’s Lawyer is granted leave to provide the Single Expert, Dr N with a copy of the Single Expert report of Dr K dated 1 August 2016 which was released in previous parenting proceedings relating to the children D and E.
(2)That the Independent Children’s Lawyer is granted leave to provide the legal representatives with a copy of the Tender Bundle of Documents to be provided to Dr N, such Tender Bundle inclusive of material produced under subpoena by NSW Police, Dr Q, the Department of Communities and Justice (formerly known as the Department of Family and Community Services), Mr P – R Services, AA School, BB Services, Dr Q, T Medical Centre, Department of Education).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT
(3)The proceedings be adjourned for judicial case management to 10.30 am on Tuesday, 26 May 2020.
(4)Leave is granted to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to re-list the matter on short notice by application to the Court in Chambers in appropriate circumstances.
(5)Leave is granted to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to have photocopy access to all documents produced on subpoena in these proceedings.
THE COURT NOTES THAT
(6)It is the Court’s intention on the adjourned date to list the interim applications for hearing promptly and make directions for the purposes of tender bundles with photocopy access to subpoena material.
On 26 May 2020 all applications were before the Court. It was ordered that the father’s Application in a Case be adjourned for interim hearing to 5 June 2020 and that the mother’s Application – Contravention be adjourned for judicial case management on that day.
On 5 June 2020 proceedings came on for interim hearing.
In circumstances where the orders made in the Federal Circuit Court were somewhat vague and non-prescriptive as to implementing the children’s supervised time with the mother, the Court made the following orders and directions:
PENDING FURTHER ORDER AND WITHOUT ADMISSION AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE INTERIM ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION, IT IS ORDERED THAT
(1)Order 3 of orders made 29 August 2019 is suspended pending further order.
(2)That the subject children, D born in 2011 and E born in 2013 shall spend time with the mother on a supervised basis as follows:
(a)For a minimum of two (2) hours each fortnight or in the event that the supervision service can accommodate weekly time two (2) hours per week at such times as is nominated by the supervision service.
(b)That such supervision be able to be taken at either the W Contact Centre or the Z Contact Centre with the parties to utilise the service which is available soonest or such other contact service as agreed between the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer in writing.
(c)The mother and father shall pay equally for the cost of such supervision service.
(3)For the purposes of the previous order and within seven (7) days from this date the mother and father shall do all things necessary to attend an intake assessment with the W Contact Centre and Z Contact Centre and to be placed on the waiting list for supervised time.
(4)The mother shall be and is hereby restrained by injunction from:
(a)Discussing these proceedings, the contents of these proceedings and/or outcome of these proceedings with the children;
(b)Making any derogatory remarks in respect of the father or the paternal family to the children or in the presence of the children;
(c)Taking any electronic devices or notepads into the supervised time; and
(d)Whispering to the children during the supervised time.
(5)The mother and father do all acts and things necessary to comply with all reasonable directions of the director of or a member of staff of either of the contact centres.
(6)The Applicant father file and serve any further short supplementary submissions to be relied upon by no later than Friday, 12 June 2020.
(7)The Respondent mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer file and serve any further short submissions to be relied upon by no later than Thursday, 18 June 2020.
(8)Judgment is reserved to chambers to a date to be fixed.

The father’s evidence

It is of note that the father seeks to maintain the children’s circumstances substantially as ordered by the Federal Circuit Court after a detailed consideration of the evidence before it.
The father asserts that he has “lost confidence” in BB Services that was retained by the parties following the orders in the Court below. He further complains that following the conclusion of a supervised visit on 24 April 2020 the children were retained by the mother contrary to the then current orders. That circumstance was addressed by urgent orders made by this Court on 27 April 2020 as referred to above.
The father says that arrangements were made for the children to spend time with the mother each Tuesday for two hours and each Saturday for three hours at her residence. It appears that, otherwise, the father has afforded to the mother further supervised time with the children.
The father expresses concern as to the BB Services supervisor not properly undertaking their supervision obligation, including leaving one or other of the children unsupervised with the mother. The father engaged with the supervision agency as to his complaints, particularly the mother whispering to the children during periods of supervised time. The father was not satisfied with the responses from the supervision agency and proposed an alternate agency, being S Services.
The children spent supervised time with the mother supervised by the new agency throughout April 2020. The father makes complaint that after supervised time on Tuesday, 21 April 2020 the child D informed the father that the mother had typed words on the mother’s phone to the effect of “daddy told me to tell the doctor that mum hits me but she doesn’t”. It appears that the mother informed the child that if she did not make that complaint the mother would go to jail. Upon returning to the father’s home the child made a similar complaint as to the mother’s conduct to the father’s partner Natalie.
The father subsequently sought the mother’s consent to injunctions that sought to restrain the mother’s whispering or non-verbal communication with the children and the mother’s questioning of the children as to their time with the father.
The father spoke to the children’s treating therapist Dr V in relation to the mother’s conduct. The therapist confirmed that the child D had made the same disclosure to her.
Subsequently, on 24 April 2020 the child D repeated in front of the supervisor the words described above that were placed on the mother’s phone.
On 25 April 2020 the children were spending supervised time with the mother when the father received a phone call from the supervisor informing the father that “there had been a disclosure about the children during the week. [The mother] is refusing to let the children leave and has called the Police”.
The father then attended nearby to the mother’s home and made certain enquiries that revealed that during the period of purported supervision the supervisor left the children alone with the mother while the supervisor moved her motor vehicle. The police attended at the home and informed the father that there had been serious allegations of assault raised by the children. Curiously, the police informed the father that the mother did not wish to pursue the issue criminally. The police informed the father that they had observed no markings on the children’s bodies or any bruising. As requested by the police, the father left the area.
As referred to above, ex parte orders were made on 27 April 2020 returning the children to the father’s care and pending further order suspending the children’s time with the mother. The father asserts that the children willingly returned to his care and a settled well back into his household.
Otherwise, the father makes complaint the mother has had made various complaints to the New South Wales Police resulting in various “welfare check” attendances at his home. The father further makes complaint that the mother has made various notifications to the Department of Community and Justice asserting concerns for the welfare of the children at the hands of the father. As a consequence, the police have attended at the father’s home and spoken to the children. As a consequence, no action was taken by the police and no action has been taken by the Department of Community and Justice.
The father further complains that the mother has refused to allow the children to attend upon their dentist without her consent with the mother’s conduct resulting in that surgery refusing to treat the children further.
Curiously on 11 May 2020 the father received a communication from the Child Support Agency informing him that on 26 April 2020, the day after the mother unlawfully retained the children, the agency had received advice from the mother that she now had 100 percent care of the children. Such a course is not now the circumstance.
The father in his supporting affidavit proposes that the mother’s contact with the children be in a close supervision service being the W Contact Centre at Suburb Y in Sydney rather than the present community supervision arrangements.
The mother for her part seeks to reopen the question of the children’s interim circumstances in effect by rerunning the matter that was determined in the court below.

The mother’s evidence

The mother’s affidavit sets out her assertions as to the children complaining on 25 April 2020 that the father had administered physical discipline to both of the children, striking the child E on the head and smacking the child D on her back.
The mother asserts that she calmed the children down and later called the police. The police attended her home at about 2.00 pm that day. The mother refused to allow the children to speak to the attending police officers. The police COPS record notes:
Police are not applying for an AVO…as they have no statements from the children, no details of the alleged assaults other than (hit to head), no time and date or location and the mother declined to have police speak to the children about the assaults.

The mother’s conduct in not permitting the police to speak to the children in circumstances where she alleges that they are at risk is perplexing.
The children thereafter remain with the mother until they were returned to the father’s care subsequent to orders made 27 April 2020.
The mother gives detailed evidence of her conversations with the children clearly engaging them inappropriately in the issues as between herself and the father in these proceedings. The mother complains that the father is punishing the children physically as a result of the child D’s disclosure on 21 April 2020.

The Independent Children’s Lawyer

The Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”), representing the interests of the children D and E in the context of the present application, sought orders that, in summary, provided for the supervision orders made on 29 August 2019 to be discharged, that the children spend supervised time with the mother for two hours each fortnight or each week if it can be provided by the service and that such supervision be at the W Contact Centre or the Z Contact Centre.
The ICL, otherwise, sought injunctive orders restraining the mother from:
a)discussing these proceedings, the contents of these proceedings and/or outcome of proceedings with the children;
b)making any derogatory remarks in respect of the father or the paternal family to the children or in the presence of the children;
c)taking any electronic devices or notepads into the supervised time; and
d)whispering to the children during supervised time.
The ICL refers appropriately to portions of the reasons for judgment of 29 August 2019 particularly at [113], [122] and [124] of those reasons where the court expressed significant concern as to the mother’s conduct.
Otherwise, the ICL correctly argues that circumstances relating to the mother’s unilateral retention of the children on 25 April 2020 in breach of orders cannot be said to be a substantial and significant change in the children’s circumstances. Indeed, the mother’s refusal to permit the children to be interviewed simply prevented the mother’s assertions from being tested by the police at that time.
The ICL expresses concern that notwithstanding the children’s right to have a meaningful relationship which each of their parents, that right is secondary to the consideration of protecting the children from ongoing harm from psychological abuse that is represented by the mother’s conduct.
The ICL argues that injunctive orders are necessary to deal with the mother’s inappropriate dialogue with the children and her engagement of the children in the parental conflict. Fortunately, from the children’s point of view, their time with the mother whilst under supervision has mostly been of benefit to them. Time being supervised in a contact centre will ensure as best as can be managed that the mother no longer engages inappropriately with the children in relation to the issues before this Court.
The ICL provided to the Court Exhibit “H” being the Single Expert Report of Dr K dated 1 August 2016 that was relevant to the earlier proceedings determined by her Honour Justice Hannam referred to above. In that report Dr K says at [108]: “The children’s exposure to recurrent high‑level parental conflict had been a source of psychological harm…This exposure to conflictual interactions should be regarded as a cause of significant psychological harm to the children”. It appears that not much has changed in relation to this long-term conflictual parental relationship.
Dr K continued at [118]:
…Although both parents were identified to have vulnerabilities with regard to their parenting capacity, it was evident that they both loved their children. The mother had emotional and psychological vulnerabilities dating back to her disrupted early development. She was unable to acknowledge her exposure to an unstable home environment characterised by mistrust, hostility and recurrent experiences of separation and loss. This had contributed to her vulnerable personality, which had impact upon her capacity to attend to the children’s emotional needs. Core issues related to ability to trust the father and the paternal extended family were seen as the Seroquel I of these developmental experiences. In this context it was probable that she had pursued a range of vexatious claims against him.
Yet Dr K commented at [129]:
…The mother was seen to have significant personality vulnerabilities dating back to her childhood. It was likely that she was suffering from a personality disorder, as alleged by the father. She was reluctant and inconsistent historian, repeatedly providing misinformation during the course of the assessment. This was consistent with this diagnosis but impaired the capacity of the report writer to make a diagnosis. She had suffered from anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder symptomology in the context of unstable developmental experience including separation and loss and rape. She had previously experienced postnatal depression. She alleged that the father was the primary cause of her emotional vulnerability. It was likely that the conflictual and controlling relationship with the father had exacerbated her vulnerable mental health. This had previously impacted upon her parenting capacity.
In considering other relevant matters Dr K said at [135]: “…Further abuse allegations should be considered as a form of emotional abuse and if unsubstantiated should result in a transfer of primary care to the father”.
Such was the circumstance that primarily lead to the children’s change of residence to the father by the Federal Circuit Court on 29 August 2019.

Discussion

The children have remained in the primary care of the father following the orders of 29 August 2019 although in the context of the present interim application the mother seeks an order that their residence once again be changed such that they live with her.
The children have been residing primarily with the father for almost 12 months. The mother makes no complaint as to the father’s ability to provide for the children on a day-to-day basis.
At present the Court awaits the provision of the single expert report from Dr N and the receipt of that report is imminent.
The Court is required to consider whether in the current context it should again consider the question of the children’s primary residence. The ICL argues that the Court should not do so as there has been no significant change in the circumstances of the children.
The children remain regrettably in the midst of significant inter-parental conflict with a final hearing to await the imminent release of the Single Expert Report. It is readily apparent, particularly having regard to the observations above in relation to aspects of the report of Dr K, that there are significant issues for determination in the context of a new final hearing.
The threshold issue more often referred to as the “rule” in Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 requires that there be a significant change in the circumstances of the children before the Court should again enter into a substantial hearing in relation to the children’s circumstances.
In Prewett & Mann [2013] FamCAFC 130 the Full Court succinctly considered the “rule” as follows:
THE RULE IN RICE & ASPLUND
7.The “rule” in Rice & Asplund refers to remarks made by Evatt CJ in that case at [78,905-06]:
The principles which, in my view, should apply in such cases are that the court should have regard to any earlier order and to the reasons for and the material on which that order was based. It should not lightly entertain an application to reverse an earlier custody order. To do so would be to invite endless litigation for change is an ever present factor in human affairs. Therefore, the court would need to be satisfied by the applicant that … there is some changed circumstance which will justify such a serious step, some new factor arising or, at any rate, some factor which was not disclosed at the previous hearing which would have been material …
8. Evatt CJ continued:
These are not necessarily matters for a preliminary submission, but they are matters that the judge should consider in his reasons for decision. It is a question of finding that there are circumstances which require the court to consider afresh how the welfare of the child should best be served. These principles apply whether the original order is made by consent or after a contested hearing. The way they apply and the factors which will justify the court in reviewing a custody order will vary from case to case.
9.The rule is a manifestation of the best interests’ principle and founded on the notion that continuous litigation over a child or children is generally not in their interests (Langmeil & Grange [2013] FamCAFC 31). The application of the rule is connected to the nature and degree of change sought to the earlier order (SPS & PLS (2008) FLC 93-363).
10.As to the application of the rule, the Full Court in Marsden v Winch (2009) 42 Fam LR 1 said:
50.Nevertheless, there are significant changes that occur and which do require a court to reconsider decisions previously made. Whether in a particular case a court should be willing to embark upon another hearing concerning the child and parent, or whether to do so would itself be demonstrably contrary to the best interests of the child, is a decision to be made in each particular case. How is that decision to be made? The court must look at:
(1)The past circumstances, including the reasons for the decision and the evidence upon which it was based.
(2)Whether there is a likelihood of orders being varied in a significant way, as a result of a new hearing.
(3)If there is such a likelihood, the nature of the likely changes must be weighed against the potential detriment to the child or children caused by the litigation itself. Thus, for example, small changes may not have sufficient benefit to compensate for the disruption caused by significant re-litigation.
11.Although the provisions of Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), which governs determination of the applications before his Honour, have, subsequent to Rice & Asplund, undergone significant amendment, there is no doubt that the principles established in that case and the subsequent line of authority applied to these proceedings.
The law as cited above was confirmed recently by the Full Court in Elmi & Munro (2019) FLC 93-912:
24.There is no scope for doubting the correctness of Rice and Asplund in any event. It has been explained and applied in many Full Court decisions, including Langham & Langham (1981) FLC 91-014; Newling and Newling (1987) FLC 91-856 (“Newling”); Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191; Miller & Harrington (2008) FLC 93-383 (“Miller & Harrington”); SPS and PLS (2008) FLC 93-363; Marsden & Winch (2009) 42 Fam LR 1; Langmeil & Grange [2013] FamCAFC 31; Poisat & Poisat (2014) FLC 93-597 (“Poisat”); Carriel & Lendrum (2015) FLC 93-640; Tindall & Saldo (2016) FLC 93-727.
25.In Poisat, the Full Court (Strickland, Murphy & Austin JJ) said at [13] that the principle “is intended to apply universally in the sense of applying to every case in which final parenting orders are sought to be discharged or varied subsequently”.
Notwithstanding that the current applications before the Court are interim applications, final orders made by this Court by her Honour Justice Hannam were the subject of detailed consideration in the Federal Circuit Court in August 2019 in circumstances at that time where there had been a substantial change in the circumstances of the children. As a consequence, the court below changed the children’s primary residence to that of the father.
The children, notwithstanding the ructions of April 2020, remain in the father’s primary care and continue to spend supervised time with the mother. There has been no significant change in the children’s circumstances that would give rise to this Court once again looking at issues as to the children’s primary residence. Such a question must await a final determination following the receipt of the Single Expert Report.
For the reasons outlined above, it is appropriate and in the best interests of the children that the interim orders clarifying arrangements for the children’s supervised time with the mother and injunctions pertaining to the mother remain in force and not be varied.
Accordingly those orders will remain and, otherwise, all pending interim applications before this Court will be dismissed noting that proceedings will be relisted shortly after receipt of the Single Expert Report.
Orders will be made accordingly.

I certify that the preceding sixty seven (67) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Foster delivered on 3 September 2020.

Associate:

Date: 3 September 2020