Mason & Mason and Anor

This matter concerned the interpretation of provisions within the *Family Law Act* relating to parentage, specifically in the context of children born as a result of artificial conception procedures. The case involved the application of presumptions of parentage and the implications of these presumptions in proceedings under the Act.

The central legal issue before the court was the operation and effect of section 60H of the *Family Law Act*, which addresses children born as a result of artificial conception procedures. The court was required to determine how this section interacts with general presumptions of parentage and the significance of biological parentage in light of statutory deeming provisions.

The court referred to the High Court's decision in *G v H* (1994) 181 CLR 387, which discussed parenting presumptions and declarations of parentage. It was noted that determinations of parentage under the Act, while serious, are not declarations of paternity in the traditional sense. The presumptions operate in the interests of the child to establish parental duties and responsibilities, unless rebutted by proof on the balance of probabilities. Section 60H specifically deems a child to be the child of a woman and her partner if certain conditions are met regarding consent to artificial conception procedures, irrespective of biological parentage. The court highlighted that subsection (5) of section 60H creates a presumption of consent to the procedure, which can only be rebutted by proof on the balance of probabilities.