Martinek v Evans

Case [2003] FCA 1403


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martinek v Evans [2003] FCA 1403

MARY-ANN MARTINEK V MARK EVANS

V 7 OF 2002

MARY-ANN MARTINEK V CHIEF OF ARMY

V 373 OF 2002

NORTH J
24 NOVEMBER 2003
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY

V7 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

MARY-ANNE MARTINEK
APPLICANT

AND:

MARK EVANS
RESPONDENT

V373 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

MARY-ANNE MARTINEK
APPLICANT

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH

DATE OF ORDER:

24 NOVEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The motion, notice of which was filed by the applicant on 3 October 2003, is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY

V7 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

MARY-ANNE MARTINEK
APPLICANT

AND:

MARK EVANS
RESPONDENT

V373 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

MARY-ANNE MARTINEK
APPLICANT

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH

DATE:

24 NOVEMBER 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 18 December 2002, a decision was handed down by me in the matter of Martinek v Evans [2002] FCA 1584, which included the following orders:

    ‘2.The applicant is to pay one-third of the respondent's costs of the applications, including the costs of the motions, notice of which was filed by the respondent on 19 June 2002.

    3.Liberty is reserved to the applicant to apply to vary the order made in paragraph 2 provided that she files and serves a notice in writing of her intention to do so by 15 January 2003.’

  2. Paragraph 3 was included following disagreement between the parties as to costs.  Despite succeeding on the application, in all of the circumstances of the case the respondents agreed to accept one-third of their costs.  Counsel for the applicant argued that each side should bear its own costs and indicated that evidence might be brought to support this position.  Order 3 was, therefore, intended to provide the applicant with an opportunity to argue against the position offered by the respondents. 

  3. No application was made to vary the order made in paragraph 2 by 15 January of this year. 

  4. On 3 October 2003, the applicant filed a notice of motion that, in essence, sought an extension of time within which to make the application to vary the order contained in paragraph 2. 

  5. The motion was listed for hearing on 20 October 2003.  On that occasion, the applicant sought an adjournment in order to obtain legal advice.  The matter was adjourned until 24 November 2003. 

  6. On 24 November 2003, the applicant sought a further adjournment, again in order to obtain legal advice.  In an affidavit filed with the Court on the day of hearing, she set out conscientiously and thoroughly all relevant information in support of that application.  She described in detail the steps that she had taken to obtain legal advice, and referred to difficult personal circumstances during the year. 

  7. Whilst, as a general principle, the Court is sympathetic to such personal circumstances and to the endeavours which the applicant has made to obtain legal representation, it is appropriate in this case to refuse the application for an adjournment.  A central factor in considering such an application is the chance of success of the applicant’s principal application.  In this case, I am of the view that the applicant should not have an extension of time for compliance with paragraph 3 of the orders made on 18 December 2002. 

  8. It is clear from the notice of motion, and the contents of the affidavit in support, that the applicant seeks to use the order in paragraph 3 to re-agitate issues which were determined by the decision of 18 December 2002.  That was not the purpose of the order in paragraph 3, and it does not therefore justify any extension of time. 

  9. It has been explained to the applicant that she is entitled to have the respondent’s bill of costs taxed which will provide her with some protection that the order in paragraph 2 will be carried out appropriately. 

  10. Consequently, the adjournment is refused and the motion, notice of which was filed by the applicant on 3 October 2003, is dismissed.

  11. In making these orders, I note that the applicant has represented herself in this matter with dignity and competence.  It is a matter of regret that the applicant appears unable to resolve in her own mind the underlying problems relating to her employment in the Australian Defence Force as she is clearly a person with great capacity.  Her talents could be more usefully directed than at the cause which she seeks to pursue again by this notice of motion.

I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice North.

Associate:

Dated:             2 December 2003

Counsel for the Applicant: Appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Hanks QC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Phillips Fox
Date of Hearing: 24 November 2003
Date of Judgment: 24 November 2003
Details
AGLC
Martinek v Evans [2003] FCA 1403
Case
[2003] FCA 1403
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Martinek v Evans involved a dispute between the applicant, Martinek, and the respondent, Evans. The applicant sought to have the respondent's application dismissed, arguing that it was an abuse of process. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central legal issue that the court had to decide was whether the respondent's application constituted an abuse of the court's process. This involved examining the circumstances surrounding the filing of the application and determining whether it was brought in bad faith or for an improper purpose.

The court examined the nature of the application and the conduct of the parties leading up to it. It considered whether there was any evidence to suggest that the respondent had acted unreasonably or without a reasonable cause of action. The court also evaluated the timing of the application and whether it was brought in a manner that would unduly prejudice the applicant. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, the court concluded that the respondent's application did not amount to an abuse of process. The court found that the respondent had a reasonable cause of action and that the application was not brought in bad faith.

As a result, the court dismissed the applicant's motion and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the motion. This decision underscored the importance of ensuring that court processes are not abused and that applications are brought in good faith and with a valid cause of action. The court's ruling reinforced the principle that parties must act reasonably and in accordance with the rules of court when bringing legal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The motion, notice of which was filed by the applicant on 3 October 2003, is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

NORTH J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NORTH J

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