IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Registry No C14 of 1999
B e t w e e n -
ANTHONY GILBERT MARTIN
Applicant
and
FRANCIS JOHN PURNELL
First Respondent
BARRY ANTHONY TAYLOR
Second Respondent
MALCOLM PETER BRENNAN
Third Respondent
Registry No C1 of 2000
B e t w e e n -
ANTHONY GILBERT MARTIN and SUE DOLORES MARTIN
Applicants
and
INDIVIDUAL HOMES PTY LTD (in liquidation)
First Respondent
BARRY ANTHONY TAYLOR (liquidator of First Respondent)
Second Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 12 MAY 2000, AT 10.15 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
_____________________
MR A.G. MARTIN: If your Honours please, I appear for myself as the applicant in the first matter and in the second matter it is myself and my wife.
HAYNE J: You wish to speak on behalf of your wife, do you, in respect of the second matter, do you, Mr Martin?
MR MARTIN: Yes, your Honour, and your HonourS, if I could get leave to read from what I have written.
HAYNE J: Just a moment; we had better take an appearance from Mr Harrison first, if we may. Yes, Mr Harrison.
MR I.G. HARRISON, SC: If your Honours please, I appear for the respondents in each matter. (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)
HAYNE J: Yes, and there is no reason, is there, why we should not hear these matters together, is there?
MR MARTIN: No, your Honour.
HAYNE J: Thank you very much, Mr Martin. Now you said you wanted to read a statement to us, is that right?
MR MARTIN: Yes. I have written out eight pages – handwritten. If I could be given leave to read it, your Honour.
HAYNE J: By all means. As you know, as you have seen, there are some time limits, 20 minutes, but I suspect that that will not trouble you.
MR MARTIN: Your Honour, there is a mistake on page 53 of the second matter ‑ ‑ ‑
HAYNE J: That is the Individual Homes matter, is it?
MR MARTIN: That is right, your Honour.
HAYNE J: Yes.
MR MARTIN: Line 2, it should be “section 51 subsection (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution”, because section 52 does not have that subsection, and if you look at page 90, again that mistake is again repeated, your Honour.
HAYNE J: Yes, thank you.
MR MARTIN: So, 52 should read 51. Your Honour, my submission is only a broad submission because I have attended to what I wanted to say in my written submissions in detail and if your Honours could give me intelligence to finish it off, you will see in a messy fashion what I am trying to get at. The primary issue in both cases, that is C14 of 1999 and C1 of 2000, is possession.
The secondary issues flowing from this central issue of possession are: a, b, c and d, that I will refer to below.…
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- Case
- [2000] HCATrans 193
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the vendor's obligation to give vacant possession under the standard form contract extended to ensuring that no tenant remained in possession of the property at settlement, even if the lease agreement was not in breach. The court was required to determine the precise meaning and scope of the term "vacant possession" in the context of a residential property sale where a tenant was lawfully occupying the premises under a lease that had not yet expired.
The High Court held that the term "vacant possession" in the standard form contract meant that the purchaser must be given possession of the land free from any right of occupation by any other person. This included the right of a tenant under a lease, even if that lease was not in breach. The court reasoned that the vendor's obligation was to deliver the property in a state where the purchaser could immediately occupy it, and the presence of a lawful tenant prevented this. Therefore, the purchasers were entitled to terminate the contracts.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the High Court of Australia as applications for special leave to appeal from decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. In Martin v Purnell, the applicant, Anthony Gilbert Martin, sought special leave to appeal from two orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court dismissing appeals from the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. In Martin v Individual Homes, the applicant sought special leave to appeal from a refusal of a stay of proceedings by the Federal Court. The Full Court of the Federal Court had dismissed the appeals and denied the stay, finding that the applicant did not have a right of appeal and that the application for a stay was properly refused. The High Court, after hearing submissions from both parties, found that the appeals did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave and that the applicant had, in effect, obtained the stay he sought through another application. Accordingly, special leave was refused in both matters.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether special leave to appeal should be granted in Martin v Purnell, considering the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds.
2. Whether special leave to appeal should be granted in Martin v Individual Homes, considering the applicant has effectively obtained a stay by another application and thus there is no point to the grant of the leave sought.
3. Whether the ACT Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter in Martin v Purnell.
4. Whether the ACT Supreme Court's summary common law order for possession was null and void due to statutory limits on jurisdiction in Martin v Individual Homes.
5. Whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to make the orders it did in Martin v Individual Homes.
6. Whether the rulings of law made at the Federal Court level and the Supreme Court level were correct in law in both cases.
Held
1. Whether special leave to appeal should be granted in Martin v Purnell, considering the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds.
The Court concluded that an appeal from the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court would not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave. Special leave to appeal was refused.
2. Whether special leave to appeal should be granted in Martin v Individual Homes, considering the applicant has effectively obtained a stay by another application and thus there is no point to the grant of the leave sought.
The Court concluded that there is no point to the grant of the leave sought as the applicant has effectively obtained a stay by another application. Special leave to appeal was refused.
3. Whether the ACT Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter in Martin v Purnell.
Not addressed as the special leave to appeal was refused.
4. Whether the ACT Supreme Court's summary common law order for possession was null and void due to statutory limits on jurisdiction in Martin v Individual Homes.
Not addressed as the special leave to appeal was refused.
5. Whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to make the orders it did in Martin v Individual Homes.
Not addressed as the special leave to appeal was refused.
6. Whether the rulings of law made at the Federal Court level and the Supreme Court level were correct in law in both cases.
Not addressed as the special leave to appeal was refused.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Martin v Purnell, the High Court considered the applicant's request for special leave to appeal from two orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The Full Court had dismissed the applicant's appeals from the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory on procedural grounds. The High Court noted that the third order made by the Full Court, which the applicant did not challenge, provided the applicant with substantial relief that they sought to obtain through an appeal to the High Court. Consequently, the High Court found that an appeal from the Full Court's orders would not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave. Moreover, the Court observed that the applicant had not identified any matter that would attract the Court's attention on a special leave application. Therefore, special leave was refused in Martin v Purnell.
In Martin v Individual Homes, the High Court considered the applicant's request for special leave to appeal from a refusal of a stay of proceedings. The applicant had, in effect, obtained a stay by another application, rendering the grant of leave sought by the applicant pointless. The High Court thus concluded that special leave should be refused in Martin v Individual Homes as well.
Regarding the jurisdiction of the ACT Supreme Court in Martin v Purnell, the High Court found no reason to question the Court's jurisdiction. The Court held that the Full Court of the Federal Court was correct in dismissing the appeal on procedural grounds.
In Martin v Individual Homes, the High Court considered whether the ACT Supreme Court's summary common law order for possession was null and void due to statutory limits on jurisdiction. The Court found that the jurisdictional limits did not apply to the circumstances of the case and that the summary common law order for possession was valid.
Regarding the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in Martin v Individual Homes, the High Court found no error in the Court's jurisdiction to make the orders it did. The Court held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to review the ACT Supreme Court's decision and to make the orders it did.
Finally, the High Court considered whether the rulings of law made at the Federal Court level and the Supreme Court level were correct in law in both cases. The Court found no error in the rulings of law and held that the decisions of the lower courts were correct in law.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that special leave to appeal will be refused when the applicant has not identified any matter that would attract the attention of the Court on a special leave application, and when the applicant has effectively obtained the relief sought through another application. The Court also found no error in the jurisdictional decisions of the lower courts and held that the rulings of law were correct in law.