JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: MARSHALL -v- THE HONOURABLE ALANNAH MACTIERNAN MLA MINISTER FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE [2009] WASC 321
CORAM: HALL J
HEARD: 2 NOVEMBER 2009
DELIVERED : 6 NOVEMBER 2009
FILE NO/S: CIV 2358 of 2004
BETWEEN: INGRID MARSHALL
RAYMOND MARSHALL
PlaintiffsAND
THE HONOURABLE ALANNAH MACTIERNAN MLA MINISTER FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Abuse of process - Leave to file - Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 67 r 5
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 67 r 5
Result:
Leave refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs: In person
Defendant: No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiffs: In person
Defendant: State Solicitor for Western Australia
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Jones v Skyring [1992] HCA 39; (1992) 109 ALR 303
Marshall v The Honourable Alannah Mactiernan MLA Minister for Planning and Infrastructure [2002] WASCA 274
Marshall v The Honourable Alannah Mactiernan MLA Minister for Planning and Infrastructure [2003] WASCA 67
Marshall v The Honourable Graham Kierath MLA, Minister for Planning [2001] WASCA 70
Marshall v The Town Planning Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 146
Marshall v The Town Planning Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia [No 3] [2008] WASCA 27
Re Skyring (1994) 68 ALJR 618
HALL J: Mr and Mrs Marshall have engaged in extensive litigation over a nine year period in regard to their unsuccessful attempts to subdivide or develop a piece of land in Kensington. On 10 August 2009 they sought to file a notice of originating motion to set aside or vary the judgment in CIV 2358 of 2004. A registrar refused to file the notice without leave of a judge pursuant to O 67 r 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA). The plaintiffs have now sought leave to file the notice of motion.
Order 67 r 5 provides that:
(1)If any writ, process, motion, application or commission, which is presented for filing, issue or sealing appears to the Registrar to be an abuse of the process of the Court or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding, the Registrar shall refuse to file or issue such writ, process, motion, application or commission without the leave of a Judge or a Master first had and obtained by the party seeking to file or issue it.
(2)In the case of a motion or an application ordinarily returnable before a Master in chambers, an application for leave to file or issue such motion or application shall be made to a Master in chambers.
(3)In all other cases, an application or commission shall be made to a Judge in chambers.
(4)Applications for leave under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be made ex parte and shall be supported by affidavit.
That rule reinforces the inherent power of the court to protect itself from unwarranted wastage of its time and resources and to avoid the loss caused to those who have to face actions which lack any substance: Jones v Skyring [1992] HCA 39; (1992) 109 ALR 303, 312. Proceedings will constitute an abuse of process if they are clearly foredoomed to fail: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, 393. It is also an abuse of process to allow a person to relitigate a matter which has already been decided adversely to him: Re Skyring (1994) 68 ALJR 618, 619 (Dawson J).
Notwithstanding that the title of the notice of originating motion refers only to CIV 2358 of 2004, the notice itself seeks that decisions in five other nominated proceedings be set aside or varied in addition to CIV 2358 of 2004. They include decisions dating back to July 2000. The grounds contained in the notice are broadly stated, but at the hearing of this matter Mr and Mrs Marshall confirmed that their argument was essentially that the court had never conclusively determined the validity of the City of South Perth Town Planning Scheme No 5 (TPS5) and that subsequent decisions had been tainted by an assumption that the validity of that scheme had been determined.
Mr and Mrs Marshall made lengthy oral submissions in support of their application for leave to file the notice of motion. They also filed an affidavit in support of their application which annexed a copy of the notice, an outline of submissions in respect of the notice, and a large number of documents relating to past proceedings.
In Marshall v The Town Planning Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 146, McLure JA noted that Mr and Mrs Marshall were contending that TPS5 and its successor TPS6 were ultra vires and invalid. Her Honour (with whom Malcolm CJ and Murray AJA agreed) held that the issue of the validity of TPS5 had already been considered and determined against the appellants in Marshall v The Honourable Graham Kierath MLA, Minister for Planning [2001] WASCA 70 and on appeal in Marshall v The Honourable Alannah Mactiernan MLA Minister for Planning and Infrastructure [2002] WASCA 274 and Marshall v The Honourable Alannah Mactiernan MLA Minister for Planning and Infrastructure [2003] WASCA 67. Her Honour went on to state that the doctrines of issue estoppel and res judicata prevented the appellants from reissuing a challenge to the validity of TPS5. I also note that similar issues were raised in Marshall v The Town Planning Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia [No 3] [2008] WASCA 27.
Having considered the submissions and the materials submitted by Mr and Mrs Marshall it is clear that the issue that they are seeking to agitate by the notice of motion has been previously heard and determined by the court. Furthermore, previous attempts to reopen the issue of the validity of TPS5 have failed. This is merely another such attempt.
There is no merit in proceedings which seek to reargue matters that have been conclusively determined by the court. Such proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of the court. Accordingly, I refuse leave to file the notice of motion of 10 August 2009.
- AGLC
- Marshall v The Honourable Alannah Mactiernan MLA Minister for Planning and Infrastructure [2009] WASC 321
- Case
- [2009] WASC 321
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature and purpose of the plaintiff's application, considering whether it was made in bad faith or had an ulterior motive. The Minister argued that the application was an abuse of process, as it was a thinly veiled attempt to delay the planning process. In considering the Minister's contention, the court assessed the plaintiff's conduct, the merits of the underlying claim, and the public interest in avoiding unnecessary litigation. The court concluded that the plaintiff's application for leave was not an abuse of process and granted the leave, allowing the proceeding to continue.
The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles of judicial economy and the preservation of the court's resources. The court determined that the application was not frivolous or vexatious and that the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in pursuing the matter. The court emphasised the importance of allowing genuine claims to proceed, even where there may be potential strategic motives behind the litigation. Ultimately, the court found that the application did not meet the threshold for being considered an abuse of process.
The final orders of the court were that leave to file the proceeding was granted, and the Minister was required to respond to the substantive claims made by the plaintiff. The court emphasised the importance of the principles of fairness and access to justice, ensuring that legitimate claims were not thwarted by procedural technicalities. The Minister's appeal against the decision to grant leave was dismissed, and the matter proceeded to a full hearing on the merits.
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