FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Marshall v General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia
[2003] FCAFC 45BANKRUPTCY - notice to be in accordance with statutory form prescribed - interest on judgment - defect in bankruptcy notice - whether substantial defect - Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth), s 41(2) - Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth), reg 4.02.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 41(2), (3), (5), (6), (6A), 306
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 20(1A)
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 101
Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), s 100(7)
Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic), s 2
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 95(1)
Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW), s 39(1), (2)
Bankruptcy Amendment Regulations 1997 (Cth), reg 35.1
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth), reg 4.02
Local Courts (Civil Claims) Rules 1988 (NSW), Pt 13 r 3, s 39(2)(b)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), r 40.7(2), Sch J
Statutory Rule 1996 No 263Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33
Kirk v Ashdown [1999] FCA 1664
Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71
Bendigo Bank v Williams (2000) 98 FCR 377
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485
Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553; [1999] FCA 1723GARRY BRENT MARSHALL v GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION AUSTRALIA (ARBN 007 480 382)
No N 894 of 2002SPENDER, COOPER, NORTH JJ
BRISBANE (heard in Canberra)
18 MARCH 2003
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 894 OF 2002
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
GARRY BRENT MARSHALL
APPELLANTAND:
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AUSTRALIA (ARBN 007 480 382)
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
SPENDER, COOPER AND NORTH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 MARCH 2003
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders made by Gyles J on 13 August 2002 are set aside.
3.That part of the order made by Gyles J on 26 August 2002 which relates to General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia (General Motors), therein referred to as “the applicant creditor”, are set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before Gyles J.
4. General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 894 OF 2002
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
GARRY BRENT MARSHALL
APPELLANTAND:
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AUSTRALIA (ARBN 007 480 382)
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
SPENDER, COOPER AND NORTH JJ
DATE:
18 MARCH 2003
PLACE:
BRISBANE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SPENDER J:
In this appeal, I have had the particular advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of both Cooper J and…
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- Case
- [2003] FCAFC 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues revolved around the interpretation of statutory requirements for bankruptcy notices, particularly the necessity of correctly identifying the source provision for the interest rate claimed. The appellant argued that the notice should have referenced section 39(1) of the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) instead of section 95(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). The court had to determine whether this discrepancy invalidated the notice, in light of previous judicial decisions such as Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis and Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl.
The court found that the notice was not invalidated by the misidentification of the statutory source for the interest rate. The reasoning hinged on the principle that the notice, despite its technical error, did not mislead the debtor regarding the interest entitlement. The court held that the debtor could verify the interest entitlement using the identified provision in the Supreme Court Act, which was correctly incorporated in the Local Court rules. The court further noted that there was no substantial injustice caused by the error, and any irregularity would be remedied under section 306 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
The final orders of the court were that the appeal was allowed, the orders made by Gyles J were set aside, and General Motors was directed to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before Gyles J and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders made by Gyles J on 13 August 2002 are set aside.
3. That part of the order made by Gyles J on 26 August 2002 which relates to General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia (General Motors), therein referred to as “the applicant creditor”, are set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before Gyles J.
4. General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
In concluding that the bankruptcy notice was not invalidated by reason of the way in which it dealt with the interest claimed, his Honour said:13. The provision identified in the interest calculation appendix to this Notice, the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(1), is, it is argued by counsel for Marshall, the ‘rate provision’ in this case and not, as should have been identified, the ‘source provision’. It is submitted that the correct source provision is the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) s 39(1). Counsel argued that this defect should be held fatal to the notice pursuant to the decision in Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33 (“Australian Steel Co”). …14. With respect to this alleged deficiency in the Notice, counsel for GMAC submitted that this case is to be distinguished from Australian Steel Co as the Notice in this case refers to both supporting statutes, whereas in Australian Steel Co there was a complete failure to refer to the source provision, and relied upon decisions of Beaumont J in Wright v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2001] FCA 386, of Madgwick J in St George Bank Ltd v Baldwin [2001] FCA 161, and of the Full Court in Kirk v Ashdown [1999] FCA 1664. It was argued that the Notice contains the essential elements as required and would not reasonably mislead a debtor. It was submitted that the approach the Court should take in respect of alleged deficiencies in bankruptcy notices is that determined by the High Court in Kleinwort Benson v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 and that even if there is a deficiency it is cured by s 306 of the Act, …15. This case is a further illustration of the minefield that bankruptcy law has become for judgment creditors since the decision in Australian Steel Co. There is a real question as to what was authoritatively decided by that judgment. The majority declined to follow the reasoning in another, earlier, Full Court decision of Kirk v Ashdown. They did not, and could not have, overruled that decision (or George v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 284) for reasons I endeavoured to express in Australian Steel Co (at [123]).16. In my opinion, the decision in Australian Steel Co should be understood by reference to the facts which arose for decision in that case. Having in mind the earlier Full Court decisions in George v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd, Kirk v Ashdown and Trustees of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary v Weir (2000) 98 FCR 447 and the reasoning of the High Court in Kleinwort Benson, I do not agree that the effect of the current provisions is that any failure to follow the detail of the prescribed form is a failure to comply with an essential statutory requirement and so fatal to validity as (on one view) may have been held by the majority in Australian Steel Co (see [40] but cf [42] and [44]). The decision in Re St Leon; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1994) 56 FCR 371 to which reference is made in that connection is impossible to reconcile with Kleinwort Benson and the Full Court decisions to which I have referred.17. Nonetheless, Australian Steel Co decided that a particular form of bankruptcy notice was invalid, and there is no other contrary decision of a Full Court on the same form. In those circumstances, if the form of bankruptcy notice here were the same as that considered in Australian Steel Co, then I should follow the decision in that case regardless of the reasoning leading to it.…20. It will be seen that in that case the relevant provision which fixed the rate was not the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (to which reference was made in the Notice) but the Penalties Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic) (to which reference was not made). In the present case, the provision of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) to which reference was made in the Notice did fix the rate as it was expressly incorporated by reference in the relevant Local Court rule. Further, the Notice and the Certificate of Judgment make it plain that the judgment is governed by the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW). The only provision of that Act which deals with post judgment interest is s 39, which leads inexorably to Pt 13 r 3 of the Rules, which unequivocally identifies the provision referred to in the Notice. Put another way, the debtor could actually verify the interest entitlement by reference to s 95(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), which was the identified provision by contrast with the position in Australian Steel Co ([44]). The debtor would not be misled. …21. My conclusion is that there was no defect or irregularity in the Notice as alleged, but if there were there would be substantial compliance with the form as permitted by s 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). In any event, as there is no evidence of substantial injustice, s 306 of the Act would apply to any such irregularity.”CONSIDERATION