Marshall v General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 48 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Marshall v General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia
[2003] FCAFC 45

BANKRUPTCY - notice to be in accordance with statutory form prescribed - interest on judgment - defect in bankruptcy notice - whether substantial defect - Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth), s 41(2) - Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth), reg 4.02.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 41(2), (3), (5), (6), (6A), 306
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 20(1A)
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 101
Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), s 100(7)
Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic), s 2
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 95(1)
Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW), s 39(1), (2)
Bankruptcy Amendment Regulations 1997 (Cth), reg 35.1
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth), reg 4.02
Local Courts (Civil Claims) Rules 1988 (NSW), Pt 13 r 3, s 39(2)(b)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), r 40.7(2), Sch J
Statutory Rule 1996 No 263

Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33
Kirk v Ashdown [1999] FCA 1664
Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71
Bendigo Bank v Williams (2000) 98 FCR 377
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485
Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553; [1999] FCA 1723

GARRY BRENT MARSHALL v GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION AUSTRALIA (ARBN 007 480 382)
No N 894 of 2002

SPENDER, COOPER, NORTH JJ
BRISBANE (heard in Canberra)
18 MARCH 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 894 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

GARRY BRENT MARSHALL
APPELLANT

AND:

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AUSTRALIA (ARBN 007 480 382)
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, COOPER AND NORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 MARCH 2003

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal is allowed.

2.        The orders made by Gyles J on 13 August 2002 are set aside. 

3.That part of the order made by Gyles J on 26 August 2002 which relates to General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia (General Motors), therein referred to as “the applicant creditor”, are set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before Gyles J. 

4.        General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 894 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

GARRY BRENT MARSHALL
APPELLANT

AND:

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AUSTRALIA (ARBN 007 480 382)
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, COOPER AND NORTH JJ

DATE:

18 MARCH 2003

PLACE:

BRISBANE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. In this appeal, I have had the particular advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of both Cooper J and…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Marshall v General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Marshall v General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia involves the appellant, Marshall, who sought to challenge the validity of a bankruptcy notice issued by General Motors. The dispute primarily concerns the correctness of the interest calculations in the bankruptcy notice, specifically whether the notice accurately identified the statutory source of the interest rate. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The key legal issues revolved around the interpretation of statutory requirements for bankruptcy notices, particularly the necessity of correctly identifying the source provision for the interest rate claimed. The appellant argued that the notice should have referenced section 39(1) of the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) instead of section 95(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). The court had to determine whether this discrepancy invalidated the notice, in light of previous judicial decisions such as Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis and Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl.

The court found that the notice was not invalidated by the misidentification of the statutory source for the interest rate. The reasoning hinged on the principle that the notice, despite its technical error, did not mislead the debtor regarding the interest entitlement. The court held that the debtor could verify the interest entitlement using the identified provision in the Supreme Court Act, which was correctly incorporated in the Local Court rules. The court further noted that there was no substantial injustice caused by the error, and any irregularity would be remedied under section 306 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was allowed, the orders made by Gyles J were set aside, and General Motors was directed to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before Gyles J and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders made by Gyles J on 13 August 2002 are set aside.

3. That part of the order made by Gyles J on 26 August 2002 which relates to General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia (General Motors), therein referred to as “the applicant creditor”, are set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before Gyles J.

4. General Motors is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, COOPER, NORTH JJ (dissent)
Section 95(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) provided:“95 Interest on debt under judgment or order(1)Where judgment is given or an order is made for the payment of money, interest shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be payable at the prescribed rate from the date when the judgment or order takes effect on so much of the money as is from time to time unpaid.”Rates have been prescribed from time to time since 27 May 1993. There is no suggestion that the rates set forth in the interest calculations in the bankruptcy notice are not as prescribed. The undisputed facts are that the statement of the amount due is correct, that interest was properly payable on the judgment sum of $4,978.16, and that the calculations of interest are correct, both as to rates and the relevant periods. The naming of the source of the provision under which the interest was being claimed was, at the worst, merely incomplete. The contention of the appellant, both below and on the appeal, was that the statement “Interest pursuant to Section 95(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970” is not the “source provision” which should have been identified, the correct “source provision” being s 39(1) of the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW), and that this error should be held fatal in reliance on the decision of a majority of a Full Court of the Federal Court in Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33 (“Australian Steel”). Australian Steel was a matter heard by a Full Court of five judges convened pursuant to s 20(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) which provides:“If the Chief Justice considers that a matter coming before the Court in the original jurisdiction of the Court is of sufficient importance to justify the giving of a direction under this subsection, the Chief Justice may direct that the jurisdiction of the Court in that matter shall be exercised by a Full Court.”As Gyles J noted in the judgment under appeal, the binding quality of the majority judgment in that case is conjectural. What is clear to me is that this Court is bound by the judgment of the High Court in Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 (“Kleinwort Benson”), rather than the majority judgment in Australian Steel, which judgment is inconsistent with that of the High Court in Kleinwort Benson. The majority in Australian Steel (Black CJ, Heerey and Sundberg JJ) held not only that the statement of the provision under which interest is being claimed was a requirement made essential by the Act, but further, that the provision had to be correctly stated: that too was a requirement made essential by the Act. Specifically, their Honours held at 42:“… Having regard to the purpose behind the requirement that the provision under which interest is being claimed, and correctly claimed, be included in the notice, that requirement is made essential by the Act, and a notice issued in breach of the requirement will be invalid.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

In concluding that the bankruptcy notice was not invalidated by reason of the way in which it dealt with the interest claimed, his Honour said:13. The provision identified in the interest calculation appendix to this Notice, the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(1), is, it is argued by counsel for Marshall, the ‘rate provision’ in this case and not, as should have been identified, the ‘source provision’. It is submitted that the correct source provision is the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) s 39(1). Counsel argued that this defect should be held fatal to the notice pursuant to the decision in Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v Lewis (2000) 109 FCR 33 (“Australian Steel Co”). …14. With respect to this alleged deficiency in the Notice, counsel for GMAC submitted that this case is to be distinguished from Australian Steel Co as the Notice in this case refers to both supporting statutes, whereas in Australian Steel Co there was a complete failure to refer to the source provision, and relied upon decisions of Beaumont J in Wright v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2001] FCA 386, of Madgwick J in St George Bank Ltd v Baldwin [2001] FCA 161, and of the Full Court in Kirk v Ashdown [1999] FCA 1664. It was argued that the Notice contains the essential elements as required and would not reasonably mislead a debtor. It was submitted that the approach the Court should take in respect of alleged deficiencies in bankruptcy notices is that determined by the High Court in Kleinwort Benson v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 and that even if there is a deficiency it is cured by s 306 of the Act, …15. This case is a further illustration of the minefield that bankruptcy law has become for judgment creditors since the decision in Australian Steel Co. There is a real question as to what was authoritatively decided by that judgment. The majority declined to follow the reasoning in another, earlier, Full Court decision of Kirk v Ashdown. They did not, and could not have, overruled that decision (or George v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 284) for reasons I endeavoured to express in Australian Steel Co (at [123]).16. In my opinion, the decision in Australian Steel Co should be understood by reference to the facts which arose for decision in that case. Having in mind the earlier Full Court decisions in George v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd, Kirk v Ashdown and Trustees of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary v Weir (2000) 98 FCR 447 and the reasoning of the High Court in Kleinwort Benson, I do not agree that the effect of the current provisions is that any failure to follow the detail of the prescribed form is a failure to comply with an essential statutory requirement and so fatal to validity as (on one view) may have been held by the majority in Australian Steel Co (see [40] but cf [42] and [44]). The decision in Re St Leon; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1994) 56 FCR 371 to which reference is made in that connection is impossible to reconcile with Kleinwort Benson and the Full Court decisions to which I have referred.17. Nonetheless, Australian Steel Co decided that a particular form of bankruptcy notice was invalid, and there is no other contrary decision of a Full Court on the same form. In those circumstances, if the form of bankruptcy notice here were the same as that considered in Australian Steel Co, then I should follow the decision in that case regardless of the reasoning leading to it.…20. It will be seen that in that case the relevant provision which fixed the rate was not the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (to which reference was made in the Notice) but the Penalties Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic) (to which reference was not made). In the present case, the provision of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) to which reference was made in the Notice did fix the rate as it was expressly incorporated by reference in the relevant Local Court rule. Further, the Notice and the Certificate of Judgment make it plain that the judgment is governed by the Local Courts (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW). The only provision of that Act which deals with post judgment interest is s 39, which leads inexorably to Pt 13 r 3 of the Rules, which unequivocally identifies the provision referred to in the Notice. Put another way, the debtor could actually verify the interest entitlement by reference to s 95(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), which was the identified provision by contrast with the position in Australian Steel Co ([44]). The debtor would not be misled. …21. My conclusion is that there was no defect or irregularity in the Notice as alleged, but if there were there would be substantial compliance with the form as permitted by s 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). In any event, as there is no evidence of substantial injustice, s 306 of the Act would apply to any such irregularity.”CONSIDERATION