Marshall v Director General, Department of Transport

The appeal concerned a landowner, Mr Marshall, and the Director-General of the Department of Transport, concerning compensation for injurious affection following the resumption of land for road purposes. The dispute centred on whether compensation for injurious affection, as provided by section 20 of the *Acquisition of Land Act 1967* (Q), was limited to the impact of works on the specific land taken and its use, or if it extended to the effect of those works on the landowner's remaining land, even if the resumed land had not yet been physically used for its intended purpose. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was to determine the scope of compensation for injurious affection under the Act. Specifically, the court had to consider whether a landowner could claim compensation for a diminution in the value of their retained land due to the construction of a public work on resumed land, even if that resumed land had not yet been physically incorporated into the completed public work. This involved interpreting the meaning of "injurious affection" in the context of land resumption and the causal link required between the public work and the alleged damage to the landowner's remaining property.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The court reasoned that compensation for injurious affection under section 20 of the Act was not confined to the physical impact on the resumed land itself or its immediate use. Instead, it encompassed the consequences of the construction of the public work on the landowner's retained land, irrespective of whether the resumed land had been physically used for the statutory purpose at the time of the claim. The court found that the construction of the new northbound lanes of the Bruce Highway, which necessitated the resumption of Mr Marshall's land, had altered the drainage patterns and led to increased flooding on his remaining property. This alteration constituted injurious affection for which compensation was payable. The case was remitted to the Land Appeal Court for determination in accordance with law.