Marsh v Pine Hills Football Club

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Marsh v Pine Hills Football Club & Anor [2025] QDC 130

PARTIES:

Violetta Marsh

(plaintiff/ respondent)

v

Pine Hills Football Club

(first defendant/applicant)

and

Samantha Mawdsley

(second defendant/applicant)

FILE NO:

2215 of 2024

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane District Court

DELIVERED ON:

19 September 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

3 June 2025

JUDGE:

Byrne KC DCJ

ORDERS:

1.   The defendants’ application for summary judgment is refused.

2.   The defendants’ application to strike out the whole of the Statement of Claim is granted.

3.   The plaintiff has leave to re-plead the Statement of Claim within 28 days.

4.   The plaintiff is to pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to the application on the standard basis.

5.   Liberty to apply on the costs order within 7 days.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – where the plaintiff was a football player registered with the first defendant – where the second defendant is a member of the first defendant’s management committee – where the plaintiff seeks damages in defamation for asserted publications made by each defendant – where the defendants applied for summary judgement or the striking out of the whole of the Statement of Claim – whether the court should give judgement for the defendants against the plaintiff or order that the whole or any part of the pleading be struck out.

LEGISLATION:

Associations Incorporation Act 1981, s 60.
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 171, 293.

CASES:

Castafiore v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust [2018] NSWDC 83.
Jessup v Lawyers Private Mortgages Ltd [2006] QSC 3.
Jones v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 364.
LCR Mining Group Pty Ltd v Ocean Tyres Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 105.
Mohareb v Jankulovski [2013] NSWSC 850.
State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Currububula Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor [2001] NSWCA 47.
Traztand Pty Ltd v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1984) 2 NSWLR 598.
Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331.

COUNSEL:

Mr J.M. Manner for the plaintiff/respondent.

Ms. R.M. de Luchi for the defendants/applicants.

SOLICITORS:

McCarthy Durie Lawyers for the plaintiff/respondent.

Barry Nilsson for the defendants/applicants.

Introduction

  1. In 2021, 2022 and 2023 the plaintiff played (soccer) football as a player registered with the first defendant, an associated incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981. As such, the first defendant’s business and operations are controlled by its management committee.[1]

    [1]Section 60 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981.

  2. On 22 August 2023 the first defendant issued a notice to the plaintiff stating that it would not accept any future applications for registration of her as a player. In response to her request for an explanation, an email was sent on 24 August 2023 (“the 24 August email”), purporting to represent the response of the whole of the committee. It was sent from the first defendant’s general email…

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Details
Case
[2025] QDC 130
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved a defamation claim brought by a football player, Marsh, against Pine Hills Football Club and one of its committee members. The plaintiff sought damages for alleged defamatory publications made by the defendants. The defendants applied for summary judgment or for the striking out of the whole of the Statement of Claim. The court was required to decide whether the plaintiff's claim was legally sufficient and whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment or the striking out of the plaintiff's pleadings.

The court considered that the plaintiff's Statement of Claim was vague, ambiguous or misleading to an extent that it had the tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding. The plaintiff had pleaded that the 24 August email was only published to them, which could not amount to a publication actionable in defamation. However, the plaintiff argued that the publication was in fact an inferred publication by the club's committee to its constituent members prior to the email being sent to the plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiff's receipt of the 24 August email was pleaded early in the Statement of Claim, and that the contents of the email were pleaded in 13 separate sub-paragraphs. The court found that the pleadings did nothing to detract from the plain reading of an allegation of publication to the plaintiff alone.

The court refused the defendants' application for summary judgment but granted the application to strike out the whole of the Statement of Claim. The plaintiff was granted leave to re-plead within 28 days and was ordered to pay the defendants' costs of and incidental to the application on the standard basis. The plaintiff was given liberty to apply on the costs order within 7 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The defendants’ application for summary judgment is refused.

2. The defendants’ application to strike out the whole of the Statement of Claim is granted.

3. The plaintiff has leave to re-plead the Statement of Claim within 28 days.

4. The plaintiff is to pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to the application on the standard basis.

5. Liberty to apply on the costs order within 7 days.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced an action seeking, inter alia, damages in defamation based on the asserted publications by each defendant. Part of the allegations are that the publications were motived by improper or unjustifiable purposes, or by ill-will or malice. The pleadings have closed and certain, limited, disclosure has been performed. The defendants now apply for summary judgment[2] or, alternatively for the Statement of Claim (“SoC”) to be struck out.[3][2]Rule 293 of the UCPR.[3]Rule 171 of the UCPR.Consideration The two applications are substantially inter-twined. The defendants complain that the SoC asserts that the publication of the 24 August email was only to the plaintiff. The plaintiff agrees that publication of allegedly defamatory material only to a plaintiff cannot amount to a publication actionable in defamation.[4] The plaintiff explains, through Counsel other than that who drafted the SoC, that the act of publication of the 24 August email is in fact an inferred publication by the first defendant’s committee to its constituent members prior to the 24 August email being sent to the plaintiff. It is also explained that the second defendant publication, the one alleged against the second defendant, is a separate publication by the second defendant, probably before the asserted publication by the first defendant. The first defendant’s liability is said to arise as a participant in the publication of both allegedly defamatory statements, on the basis of liability for the conduct of one or more members of the committee. The second defendant’s liability is said to arise as the actual published of the second defendant’s publication. [4]Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331, 363; Mohareb v Jankulovski [2013] NSWSC 850, [74]. It is submitted that these acts of publication are clear on the pleadings.[5] I do not agree. While it is possible, with the assistance of the explanations now provided, to see how the plaintiff may have intended to covey the allegations now explained, that is not the plain reading of the SoC. In my view, the SoC is vague, ambiguous or misleading to an extent that has the tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding.[5]Plaintiff’s outline of submissions at [21]. The plaintiff’s receipt of the 24 August email is pleaded early in the SoC, and under the heading “The defamatory publication”.[6] The contents of the email are then pleaded in 13 separate sub-paragraphs, each of which are sequentially headed “Publication Number (1-13)”.[7] The SoC then alleges that the first defendant was comprised of both a Board and a committee, that the Board “approved (and therefore had actual or constructive knowledge of)” the defamatory statements as well as “ready access” to the first defendant’s general email account, and that the committee had actual or constructive knowledge of the defamatory statements as well as “ready access” to the first defendant’s general email account.[8] Those pleadings do nothing to detract from the plain reading of an allegation of publication to the plaintiff alone.[6]Paragraph 4 of the SoC where it appears the second time.[7]Paragraph 5 of the SoC where it appears the second time.[8]Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the SoC (where they each appear the second time) and paragraph 8 of the SoC.