[2005] HCATrans 569
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P57 of 2004
B e t w e e n -
ALAN DAVID MARSDEN
Applicant
and
UNIMIN AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Perth No P58 of 2004
B e t w e e n -
JOHN IVOR PRICE
Applicant
and
RESOLUTE RESOURCES LIMITED
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 5 AUGUST 2005, AT 12.14 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR J.R. CRIDDLE: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant in each of the two applications. (instructed by Bradford & Co)
MR M.J. McCUSKER, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear in the matter of Marsden with MR H.M. O’SULLIVAN and in the matter of Price with MS S.E. HARRISON. (instructed by Srdarov Richards Burton and Mallesons Stephen Jaques)
HAYNE J: Is there any reason not to deal with the two matters together, Mr Criddle?
MR CRIDDLE: No, your Honour, there is no reason why they should not be dealt with together.
HAYNE J: Yes. Go ahead.
MR CRIDDLE: Your Honours, the two matters that are before you this morning deal with the construction of section 175 of the Workers’ Compensation Act in Western Australia. That Act, in its current form, or similar form, has been around for about 100 years and derives from the English workers’ compensation legislation. The
applications for special leave arise out of the manner in which the judges at first instance and the majority of the Full Court dealt with the question of whether section 175(1) applied to the circumstances of each of those cases. If I could quickly take your Honours to the ‑ ‑ ‑
HAYNE J: The basic arrangement is a labour hire company is injected into the factual circumstances. That is the basic fact, is it not?
MR CRIDDLE: It is, your Honour. The labourers from the labour hire company, in our submission, are injected into the second company.
HAYNE J: I understand that you say section 175(1) in the form described applies to these circumstances, but am I right in understanding that the legislature has looked at the problem again?
MR CRIDDLE: Your Honour, the legislature has looked at the effect of being a deemed employer under section 175 and amendments have been made which will come into force in November of this year which mean that the constraints on access to common law rights will no longer be available to deemed employers under section 175. To that extent there are amendments to the legislation but not to this section itself.
HAYNE J: But from that date in November this year persons in the position of Mr Marsden and Mr Price would say, would they, that they would achieve a result different from the result of their litigation as it now stands after the Full Court decision?
MR…
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- Case
- [2005] HCATrans 569
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondents had breached their duty of care to the appellants by failing to implement adequate safety measures to prevent the development of vibration-induced injuries, specifically Hand-Arm Vibration Syndrome (HAVS). The appellants contended that the respondents ought to have known of the risks associated with prolonged exposure to vibration from the mining equipment and should have taken steps to mitigate those risks, such as limiting exposure times or providing appropriate protective equipment. The respondents, in turn, argued that they had taken reasonable precautions and that the injuries suffered by the appellants were not foreseeable or were not caused by any breach of duty on their part.
In their joint judgment, Hayne and Callinan JJ analysed the principles of negligence, particularly in the context of workplace safety. Their Honours affirmed that an employer owes a duty of care to its employees to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm. The court considered the state of knowledge regarding the risks of HAVS at the relevant times, examining expert evidence and industry standards. The reasoning focused on whether the respondents' conduct met the standard of a reasonable employer in the circumstances, taking into account the likelihood of injury, the potential severity of the injury, and the burden of taking precautions. The court ultimately found that the respondents had not breached their duty of care, concluding that the evidence did not establish that the specific injuries suffered by the appellants were reasonably foreseeable or that the precautions taken by the respondents were inadequate according to the prevailing standards of the time.
The appeals were dismissed.
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Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi