Held, that the plaintiff was not a person whose services had been dispensed with by the Public Service Board within the meaning of sec. 71 of the Public Service Act 1902, aud therefore was not entitled to a gratuity under sub-sec. (b) of that section.
Decision of the Supreme Court Markham v. Williams, 13 S.R. (N.S.W.),
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
An action was brought in the Supreme Court by Patrick Markham against James Leslie Williams, a nominal defendant on behalf of the Government of New South Wales, in which the plaintiff alleged that on and before 23rd December 1895 he was a person permanently employed in the public service of New South Wales, but was not a contributor to the Superannuation Account, that he continued in such service until 23rd February 1904 when his services were dispensed with by the Public Ser- vice Board under the provisions of the Public Service Act 1902 and that he thereupon became entitled to the gratuity provided, for in sec. 71 (b) of that Act, and that the Government refused to pay him that gratuity. The defendant therefore claimed the amount of such gratuity. The defences were that the plaintiff was not a person permanently employed in the public service before and on 23rd December 1895, and that the services of the plaintiff were not dispensed with by the Public Service Board.
It appeared that in 1877, pursuant to the Sydney Abattoir Act 1850, the plaintiff was appointed by the Governor as a pump driver, and remained in that position until 1902, and thereafter was employed as a labourer at the Sydney Abattoir; that the Sydney Abattoir was administered under that Act and Acts amending the same, and that since the institution of the Board of Health the plaintiff had been under the control of the officers of that Board.
It further appeared that on 15th July 1896 the Public Service Board graded the plaintiff as being an officer of the public service in the general division, and classified his work, and that on 25th February 1904 the Board of Health purported to dispense with his services.
By consent a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for the defendant. The motion was heard by