Mark Hope v Gomed (Vic) Pty Ltd
[2023] FWC 2455
•10 OCTOBER 2023
| [2023] FWC 2455 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.739—Dispute resolution
Mark Hope
v
Gomed (Vic) Pty Ltd
(C2023/3431)
| COMMISSIONER BISSETT | MELBOURNE, 10 OCTOBER 2023 |
Alleged dispute about any matters arising under the enterprise agreement– was dispute settlement procedure complied with - found dispute settlement procedure not complied with – no jurisdiction to deal with dispute
Mr Mark Hope has notified a dispute to the Commission pursuant to s.739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). Mr Hope works as an ambulance attendant for Gomed (Vic) Pty Ltd trading as Paramedic Services Vic (Gomed or PSV). His employment is covered by the Gomed Pty Ltd Trading as Paramedic Services Vic Employment Agreement 2009 (the Agreement).
Prior to hearing the matter I granted both parties permission to be represented. I also arranged for the material before the Commission to be placed in a court book and provided to the parties. References to material before the Commission is by reference to the court book page number.
The dispute notified by Mr Hope to the Commission is in relation to his entitlement to be paid for Easter Sunday in circumstances where he was not rostered to work that day. Mr Hope says that this entitlement arises under clause 19.4 – Pay for public holidays.
Clause 19.4 of the Agreement states:
19.4 Pay for public holidays
(a)Where an employee is not required to work on a public holiday, the employee is entitled to be paid their ordinary rate of pay for the day.
(b)Where a full-time or part-time employee is required to work on a public holiday, the employee is entitled to be paid double time and a half for the day.
The dispute settling procedure (DSP) of the Agreement is at clause 26 and states:
26DISPUTE SETTLING PROCEDURE
26.1The procedure to be applied will be as follows:
(a)The employee and immediate supervisor meeting and conferring on the matter. An employee may have a representative present if desired.
(b)If the matter is not resolved, it will be referred to senior management. An employee may have a representative present if desired.
(c)If not resolved, either party may refer the matter to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission for conciliation and arbitration.
26.2Until the matter is resolved, work will continue normally in accordance with practices and procedures existing before the dispute of grievance arose. Health and safety matters are exempt from this sub clause.
26.3No party will be prejudiced as to the final settlement by the continuation of work.
26.4The first three steps of this procedure will take place within seven days.
Mr Hope can be (and is) rostered to work on all days of the week. Mr Hope had previously requested that he be rostered on fewer Sundays as he liked to go to church with his family. He has never refused to work on a Sunday when rostered to do so.[1]
Over the 12 months prior to making his application Mr Hope has worked some Sunday hours on 18 occasions. Eight of these were shifts commenced on the Saturday (so are considered by PSV to be a ‘Saturday shift’) with the ordinary hours completed at about 1.00 am on the Sunday morning. The remaining shifts commenced on a Sunday and either finished that day or the following Monday (all considered ‘Sunday shifts’ by PSV).[2]
JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTION
I am satisfied that the matter in dispute (payment for Easter Sunday when not rostered to work) is a matter arising under the Agreement.
PSV says that Mr Hope has failed to comply with the DSP of the Agreement and, for this reason, the dispute cannot be heard and determined by the Commission.
I am satisfied that, in order to determine the matter in dispute, I must be satisfied that the Commission has jurisdiction under the Agreement to do so. This is so because the Commission only has those powers given to it by the terms of the Agreement.
If I find the DSP has been complied with I am satisfied I can determine the merits of the claim.
HAS MR HOPE COMPLIED WITH THE DSP?
Evidence
It is not in contention that, on 12 April 2023 at 5.48 am Mr Hope emailed Ms Alyce Dawson (Executive Manager – Business & Finance at PSV) and asked her to look over his pay from the previous period. In that email he said:
In my review I have not been paid the public holiday for Easter Sunday. This should have been paid considering if was considered a public holiday for fair work Australia.[3] (sic)
Ms Dawson responded on 13 April 2023 at 11.16 am and said:
Hi Mark
This is only considered a public holiday if you were to have worked that day.[4]
Mr Hope replied on 13 April 2023 at 11.21 am and said:
Hi Alyce,
Thanks for getting back to me. But I refer you back to the PSV collective agreement 19.4(A).
It states it pretty clear here.[5]
Ms Dawson replied to that email on 13 April 2023 at 11.39 am and said:
Hi Mark,
Thankyou for your email.
From PSV’s perspective this has been dealt with and I advise you to contact Fair Work for further clarification.[6]
On 14 April 2023 Ms Kerry McLean, an Organiser with the Victorian Ambulance Union (VAU), on authority from Mr Hope, emailed Ms Dawson ‘to escalate a dispute raised with you by our member Mark Hope…’. Ms McLean set out the background, identified the matter in dispute and sought a response by 19 April 2023.[7]
Not having received a reply from Ms Dawson, on 2 May 2023 Ms McLean wrote to Mr Doug Dawson (CEO, PSV) and escalated the dispute. She again articulated the background, the matter in dispute and the outcome sought. That email requested a response from PSV by 9 May 2023.[8]
Mr Hope gave evidence that, depending on the issue of concern, he would raise matters with the relevant manager who specifically dealt with such issues. Matters in relation to pay were raised with Ms Dawson as she was responsible for payroll. Mr Hope’s evidence – which was not contradicted - is that there are about 86 employees with him at PSV and ‘every one of us would go to Ms Dawson for [a] pay dispute.’[9]
As to who is his ‘immediate supervisor’, Mr Hope gave evidence in cross examination as follows:
Question: And you have no doubt who your immediate supervisors are?
Answer:Well, I understand – I’ve never been told who my immediate supervisor is. Never have I been told that. But I know that if, you know, Tom’s here today. If I have something wrong with a vehicle or COVID I’ll go to him. Something’s wrong with pay roll, I’ll go to Alyce. Something’s wrong with my rosters, I’ll go to Casey. Michael’s helped me with, you know, with the finger – you know, compensation, workers’ compensation, whatever. So they have different roles.[10]
While questioned extensively on this matter Mr Hope’s evidence did not waiver.
Mr Hope maintained that he had not been informed who the ‘general managers’ were but said that he would receive general communication from Tom Dawson and Casey Vella with the words ‘general managers’ at the end of their emails. He said that their status as general managers was inferred amongst the employees because those words appeared in their email signature block[11] but that employees were not formally notified of this.
Mr Hope maintained that he did not know who his immediate supervisor was[12] until he saw it as set out in the organisational chart filed as annexure MA-3 to the supplementary witness statement of Mr Michael Allen (General Manager, PSV).[13] Mr Hope said that he had never seen this organisational chart before these proceedings.[14]
Mr Hope agreed that he did not take the matter of payment for Easter Sunday back to his ‘immediate supervisor’ partly because he was told by PSV [Ms Dawson] that the matter was ‘dealt with’.[15] In these circumstances he did not see why he would ‘go back down to [a] general manager because…the one above them has told me “this matter’s been dealt with”’.
Mr Hope agreed that his position description[16] indicates that he reports to ‘General Manager – PSV Management team’[17] but said he understood the management team was ‘all of them, including Doug [Dawson, CEO] as well as including Alyce Dawson.’[18]
Mr Allen confirmed that the ‘General Manager – PSV Management team’ as indicated in Mr Hope’s position description ‘is Casey [Vella], myself or Tom [Dawson].’ He said that this is a reference to the ‘immediate supervisor of the paramedic management team’ which is himself, Tom Dawson and Casey Vella.[19]
Mr Allen gave evidence that Mr Hope did not speak to him, Tom Dawson or Casey Vella about his dispute.[20]
In relation to Ms Dawson’s advice to Mr Hope that ‘from PSV’s perspective the matter has been dealt with’, Mr Allen said that he would not have authority to override Ms Dawson on this matter. He also said
…but I would have had consultation with the business manager at the time, which is Alyce, and spoken about what the issue was. I’d speak to Mark personally, to come into the office and have a chat to me, what his case was for what he thought he’d be paid. I’d speak to Alyce about it. If there was no resolution, then I’d come back to Mark and say, ‘Well, your next steps are to go to the Fair Work Ombudsman to seek clarification’.[21]
Mr Allen said he would refer someone to the Fair Work Ombudsman (the Ombudsman) as the next step if a matter was not resolved because ‘that’s the next port of call’ and where PSV goes ‘to find something that’s not black and white’.[22]
In relation to this dispute Mr Allen said Ms Dawson came to him when the original pay query was raised. He went to the Ombudsman and sought ‘clarification around the ruling on the Sunday/Easter Sunday and then…just handed the information over to Alyce’.[23] He believed that the information he provided to Ms Dawson informed the reply she gave to Mr Hope.
Submissions
Mr Gardner of the VAU, for Mr Hope, said that, in construing the dispute resolution provisions of the Agreement, a narrow or pedantic approach that would result in an unjust outcome or an outcome that does not meet the objectives of the Agreement itself should be avoided. The purpose of the DSP is to enable disputes to be resolved at the workplace level and allow for the speedy escalation of these disputes to the Commission should they not resolve. Mr Gardner referred to the decision of Flick J in Qantas Airways Ltd v ALAEA (No 2) (Qantas)[24] where his Honour found that the requirements of the DSP ‘must be construed with a degree of flexibility.’[25]
As to the interlocutory decision[26] that preceded the final judgement in Qantas No 2, Mr Gardner submitted that the earlier decision:
did not determine whether the Commission had jurisdiction to arbitrate a dispute. The union’s submission was that in the context of a dispute “which could only be resolved by senior management, and where discussions at the supervisor level would be futile, it is ‘highly doubtful’ that, correctly interpreted, the dispute resolution clauses require consultation with supervisors.” The Court stated, at [68] that “this submission has force”.[27]
Mr Gardner also referred me to the decision in University of New South Wales v National Tertiary Education Industry Union[28] (NTEU). In that matter the DSP of the relevant agreement required a matter be discussed with a supervisor before being raised with the Dean. The Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission rejected submissions that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to deal with the dispute in light of the nature of that dispute. The Full Bench said at paragraph [19] that ‘the interpretation would lead to delay and complexity…and tend to frustrate rather than promote the settlement of disputes.’[29]
Taking this into account Mr Gardner submitted that there should be flexibility in determining who the relevant ‘immediate supervisor’ is for the purpose of the first stage of the DSP in the Agreement. Mr Gardner said in this case Mr Hope raised a pay query with the person responsible for resolving pay matters. That query then evolved into a dispute over the relevant provisions of the Agreement.
Having had this initial discussion with Ms Dawson, Mr Gardner said it would be ‘illogical’ – having been told the matter was resolved from PSV’s perspective and to go to ‘Fair Work’ – for Mr Hope to then raise the issue with another manager who did not have responsibility for pay matters. For the Commission to conclude that the clause strictly requires that an employee raise a dispute with a person the employer identifies as the supervisor would be unnecessarily pedantic, would not deliver a sensible outcome and would delay the resolution of disputes.
Mr Gardner also submitted that the dispute Mr Hope has with PSV is not one likely to be resolved by the ‘shop floor supervisor’ and, given Ms Dawson’s ultimate communication with Mr Hope, it was unlikely that taking the matter to the supervisor would have resolved the dispute.
Ms Preston, for PSV, said that Mr Hope did not meet with his immediate supervisor as required by the DSP of the Agreement. Because this mandatory step was not undertaken prior to referral of the dispute to the Commission, the Commission does not have power to deal with the merits of the dispute.
Relying on the decision in Qantas, Ms Preston submitted that the words of the DSP must be given their ordinary and accepted meaning and this includes the meaning of ‘supervisor’. Further, the steps in the DSP are mandatory. It would be an incorrect approach for the Commission to look at the provisions after the fact rather than considering the terms of the DSP and their ordinary meaning. While there may not need to be strict compliance with the provisions, in the matter before the Commission, Mr Hope had to have a discussion with his supervisor (as that term is ordinarily understood) prior to any escalation of the dispute.
Ms Preston also submitted that a dispute does not arise until the contrary positions of the parties are established. Until that occurs the DSP cannot be invoked such that anything that occurs prior to the dispute being articulated cannot be a step within the DSP.
In these circumstances Ms Preston submits that:
· The meaning of immediate supervisor is clear. It is not necessary that the supervisor have decision-making authority
· Mr Hope discussed the matter with Ms Dawson does not make her an ‘immediate supervisor’ for the purpose of the DSP
· Mr Hope did not discuss the matter in dispute with his immediate supervisor
· The DSP requires, at its second step, that the matter be discussed with ‘senior management’ provides a contraindication and informs the definition of the immediate supervisor
· Ms Dawson was not the immediate supervisor of Mr Hope. That Mr Hope had not seen the organisational chart is not a relevant consideration as to the meaning of the DSP
Ms Preston submitted that the interpretation sought to be given to the DSP by Mr Hope may well be directed to the fairness of the matter but this is not relevant to the interpretation of the clause. Further, it is not Mr Hope’s understanding of who he should talk to that informs the meaning of the clause but rather the words of the clause itself.
As to Mr Allen seeking a view from the Ombudsman, Ms Preston submitted that the Commission should infer that contact with the Ombudsman occurred before 13 April 2023 and therefore before the contrary positions were clearly established in the email exchange between Mr Hope and Ms Dawson.
CONSIDERATION
The decision in Qantas
To the extent Mr Gardner relies on the interlocutory decision preceding the judgement in Qantas, I have not had regard to it given that it is an interlocutory and the final judgment in Qantas deals with that matter.
The DSP in the matter before me does vary in substance from that considered by the Court in Qantas. In this matter, the DSP is utilised for any ‘matter’ while in Qantas, the procedure related to a ‘dispute about a matter’. The other significant difference between the matter before me and that considered in Qantas is that the matter before me involves one person in a company with a very ‘flat’ management structure, while that in Qantas was in relation to the standing down of many employees at Qantas and Jetstar who, it can be reasonably inferred, have a more sophisticated management structure.
Whilst Flick J in Qantas concluded that each of the requirements of the DSP ‘must be construed with a degree of flexibility’[30] those things he considered need to be construed with flexibility are, in my view, set out in paragraph [59] of that decision, that is:
· The dispute
· The occasion on which there was an initial meeting and conferring between an employee and their supervisor
· The occasion on which further discussions occurred between the employee and ‘more senior levels of management’[31]
That is, the flexibility to be afforded to the clause is not to the absolute requirements of the clause itself but to the assessment of when and how each step was carried out, in the context of a matter which affected a multitude of employees. I do not take the conclusion of his Honour to be that some flexible approach can be taken as to whether the required steps occurred as specified (particularly in relation to specific requirements at specific levels of management) but rather as to how these occurred.
The decision in Maersk
The decision in Maersk Crewing Australia Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (No 2)[32] (Maersk) was handed down after the decision in Qantas and also went to assessing compliance with the requirements of the DSP of the relevant agreement.
In Maersk Colvin J identified the relevant principles to be applied in construing the terms of an agreement and observed:
86. The terms of a procedure for resolving disputes should not themselves be construed in a manner that turns them into an instrument for generating disputes as to whether the procedure itself has been followed. Such provisions must be construed having regard to their evident purpose as providing a mechanism by which to encourage discussion and resolution. They should be interpreted ‘practically and with an eye to common sense’ having regard to the context in which they will be applied so that they can be implemented ‘in a clear way on a day‑to‑day basis at work sites’
The disputes procedure considered in Maersk states in its introduction (with emphasis added) that ‘When an industrial dispute arises, including a matter arising under this Agreement or the NES, this clause sets out the procedure to resolve the dispute.’ Steps one, two and three of the disputes procedure set out what is required in relation to discussions of the ‘matter’ at various levels of management. The fourth, final step provides that if steps one to three ‘have failed to resolve the matter and/or dispute, any person…may refer the dispute to the FWC…’.
His Honour notes the chapeau of the procedure and observes at paragraph [87] that the language ‘expands the definition of dispute to include a matter arising under the EA.’ It is then said:
89. The scope of a matter is determined by the nature of its factual and legal subject, not the fact of a claim or dispute. The use of the terminology to the effect that a dispute includes a matter, expands the operation of the clause to embrace the field of controversy that may be indicated by a question, claim or a request.
As to the operation of the disputes procedure, his Honour says at paragraph [91]:
…the clause must be read so as to operate in a practical way. In my view it envisages that a dispute (which will be crystalized if the matter reaches stage four) will be preceded by steps one, two and three. At the time those steps are followed there may be, but need not be a fully-fledged dispute. Rather, the procedure as outlined is to be followed whenever ‘a matter’ arises…
His Honour concluded:
92. As part of that procedure it is to be expected that the parties will engage in discussions with a view to articulating whether they do actually disagree and if so, the extent to which they do so. However, steps one, two and three need not be preceded by a dispute. It is possible that the process may begin with a claim that has been prepared in detail and that is pressed with vigour. Equally, it is possible that it may begin with a question or an inquiry. It is not the case that the dispute resolution procedure is confined to what is to occur if the parties are already in a dispute. Nor does it contemplate the articulation of a point of dispute in the form of a claim and response at each step in the process.
[emphasis added]
To the extent that reliance is placed on the decision in NTEU, I do not consider that decision to be of assistance in the circumstances before me. That matter was an appeal from a decision of Vice President Watson. The Full Bench of the Commission noted the University’s submission that there was insufficient evidence the matter in dispute had been raised by [individual] employees with their supervisors and that it was not open to the NTEU to act in a general representative capacity [for employees]. The Full Bench then observed, on such a reading of the dispute settling procedure in the agreement in question, that:
a collective dispute can only be dealt with in so far as it is constituted by the aggregate of a number of individual disputes, each of which must go through every step of the procedure. The settlement of such a dispute would necessarily also be confined to the specific employees identified. If this approach were to be adopted it would lead to some very inconvenient results, to say the least.[33]
The Full Bench found that:
On our reading of the procedures a dispute on a matter of general application can be raised by an individual employee and dealt with on a general basis. Dispute settlement procedures in agreements, to be effective, must be simple and easy to apply. The interpretation proposed would lead to delay and complexity in the application of the procedures in the agreements we are concerned with and tend to frustrate rather than promote the settlement of disputes. It should be rejected.[34]
The comment of the Full Bench in relation to ‘delay and complexity’ and the frustration rather than promotion of the settlement of disputes needs to be understood in light of the terms of the DSP and the submissions made in that case by that employer.
These are not the circumstances before me and, for this reason, I have not had regard to that decision.
Given the decisions to which I have had regard, I am satisfied that:
· The approach to interpretation of an enterprise agreement has been more recently summarised in the decision in WorkPac Ltd v Skene[35] and this applies equally to the DSP in the Agreement
· The DSP imposes pre-conditions that must be met at each step prior to the next step being engaged:[36]
o The procedures to be applied will be as follows (clause 26.1)
o If the matter is not resolved, it will be referred to senior management… (clause 26.1(b))
· The DSP in the matter before me is straightforward. The first level of engagement required is between the employee and the supervisor in relation to the ‘matter’ but that there is, at this stage, no need to identify a ‘dispute’
· The DSP requires the employee and immediate supervisor meet and confer on the matter but does not require an articulation of a dispute for such a meeting to occur.[37] The matter to be discussed under the DSP would, however, need to be identified to enable meeting and conferring to occur[38]
· The term ‘meeting’ should be construed with a degree of informality and flexibility. The requirement in clause 26.1(a) for a ‘meeting’ ‘does not necessarily involve the necessity for a formally convened meeting’[39]
· The DSP does not identify the level of formality required in ‘meeting and conferring’ in clause 26.1(a) with no guidance as to what is required if the matter is referred to senior management (clause 26.1(b))[40]
· An exchange of correspondence between an employee and their supervisor may constitute ‘meeting and conferring’ for the purposes of cause 26.1(a) of the DSP
· Notions of flexibility should not be used, in effect, to leapfrog steps in the DSP as set out and with which compliance is required
Was clause 26.1 of the DSP satisfied?
The outstanding issue is whether Mr Hope, in his exchange with Ms Dawson, has met the requirements of step one of the DSP.
PSV is an organisation of some 86 employees with a relatively ‘flat’ management structure. There are, in total, six managers in the organisation. The lowest level consists of three managers (Mr Tom Dawson, Mr Allen and Ms Vella), each titled General Manager to whom all operational and non-operational staff report without discrimination. There are then two Executive Managers – Ms Dawson and Mr Mark Baker (Executive Manager – clinical support and training) who appear to sit, hierarchically, above the three General Managers and then, at the most senior level is Mr Doug Dawson, the CEO.
The uncontested evidence of Mr Hope is that employees approach the manager they know deals with a particular matter – Ms Dawson on pay, Mr Baker for clinical matters, Mr Tom Dawson for vehicle matters. Further, his evidence is that ‘a payroll dispute does go through Alyce’ Dawson and that he has ‘never had to go through managers to go through Alyce before.’[41]
I accept that Mr Hope may be correct, but it is not apparent that, in raising an issue with any of his managers in the past, Mr Hope has then escalated such a matter through the DSP to the Commission so that past practices may provide some guide.
I accept that Mr Hope’s position description says he reports to the ‘General Manager – PSV Management team’. A plain reading of this suggests that (one or all of) the General Manager(s) is his immediate supervisor. That Ms Alyce Dawson may resolve pay queries is not enough to make her a ‘supervisor’ as I accept that word as commonly used and as used in the DSP. I would observe, however, that the term ‘supervisor’ as used in the DSP is not a term that appears to be used by PSV to describe anyone within the organisation. Confusion as to who the ‘supervisor’ might be by Mr Hope is understandable in this respect.
Ms Preston was at pains to emphasise that I should not reach for some anteriorly derived notion of fairness in construing the requirements of the DSP. I take from this the PSV suggest that I cannot accept that raising the matter with Ms Dawson was enough – looked at ‘fairly’ – to meet the requirements of step one of the DSP.
I accept that Mr Hope did raise a ‘matter’ with Ms Dawson by his email of 12 April 2023 at 5.48 am. Further, Mr Hope was not required to articulate a ‘dispute’ in his correspondence with PSV to activate the DSP. However, Mr Hope failed to ‘meet and confer’ (by sending the email or otherwise) with his supervisor. Taking all of this into account I cannot find that Mr Hope has met the requirements of step one of the DSP because he did not ‘meet and confer’ with his supervisor. That is, he failed to advise one of the General Managers of the matter (payment for Easter Sunday) and ‘meet and confer’ on this prior to escalating the matter to more senior management.
To be clear I do not consider that it is necessary for an employee and their supervisor covered by this Agreement to understand they have opposing views on a matter before the DSP is engaged. This much is clear from the decision in Maersk.
However, in these circumstances I do not have jurisdiction to determine the dispute.
SOME OBSERVATIONS
I would observe, in reaching my conclusion above, that the DSP in the Agreement is scant on detail, uses language not otherwise used in the workplace and perhaps suffers from having been written in 2009 – some 14 years ago – with no review as to its efficacy since. As I have said, Mr Hope’s confusion as to who his supervisor is, is understandable as that is not terminology otherwise used by PSV. I would encourage PSV to ensure that their employees are aware of who their immediate supervisor is for the purposes of the DSP.
While I do not have power to determine the matter in dispute I would observe that clause 19.4(a) of the Agreement does not appear to be afflicted by ambiguity or uncertainty and is plain on its face. A full-time employee not required to work on a public holiday is entitled to be paid their ordinary rate for that day. Again, the Agreement may well suffer from not being brought up to contemporary standards, but that is substantially a matter within the control of PSV. Whether you only count hours that would be required to be worked on the Sunday in question or whether a day is nine hours long or some other length are distractions from the primary matter in dispute.
I would encourage PSV and Mr Hope, along with his representative, to undertake further discussions with a view to resolving the dispute. In doing so benefit may be gained from complying with the relevant stages of the DSP.
CONCLUSION
The Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with that application as the requirements of the DSP have not been complied with. The application is therefore dismissed.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Gardner J of the Victorian Ambulance Union for the Applicant
Preston R of counsel for the Respondent
Hearing details:
2023.
Melbourne:
August 29.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
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[1] Transcript PN165
[2] Further witness statement of Mark Hope, Court Book (CB) page 43-44 (amended on transcript PN24) and evidence of Michael Allen PN227-228 and PN238
[3] CB page 30
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid
[6] CB page 29
[7] CB page 32
[8] CB page 31
[9] Transcript PN114
[10] Transcript PN107
[11] Transcript PN108
[12] Transcript PN115, PN117 and PN118
[13] CB page 57
[14] Transcript PN35. The organisational chart is attached to the Supplementary Witness Statement of Michael Allen, annexure MA-3, CB page 79
[15] Transcript PN103
[16] Exhibit A3
[17] Transcript PN152
[18] Transcript PN162
[19] Transcript PN213
[20] Witness statement of Michael Allen [15], CB page 58
[21] Transcript PN222
[22] Transcript PN242
[23] Transcript PN241-246
[24] (2020) 298 IR 447
[25] Qantas at [61]
[26] Qantas Airways Ltd v ALAEA (2020) 295 IR 373
[27] Mark Hope reply submissions [5], CB page 43
[28] [2009] AIRCFB 571
[29] Mark Hope reply submissions [4], CB page 43
[30] Qantas [61]
[31] Qantas [59]
[32] [2020] FCA 1694
[33] NTEU [18]
[34] NTEU [19]
[35] (2018) 280 IR 191 cited in Qantas [17] and Maersk [85]
[36] Qantas [56]
[37] Maersk [101]
[38] Maersk [102]
[39] Qantas [65]
[40] Qantas [60] and Maersk [101]
[41] Transcript PN102 and PN105
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
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