Mark Evans v Total Essential Services Group Pty Ltd
[2023] FWC 1822
•26 JULY 2023
| [2023] FWC 1822 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Mark Evans
v
Total Essential Services Group Pty Ltd
(U2023/4146)
| COMMISSIONER CRAWFORD | SYDNEY, 26 JULY 2023 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy
Background
On 14 May 2023, Mark Evans (Mr Evans) made an application to the Fair Work Commission (Commission) under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) for a remedy, alleging that he had been unfairly dismissed from his employment with Total Essential Services Group Pty Ltd (TESG).
Mr Evans commenced employment with TESG on 4 October 2022. Mr Evans’ employment was terminated on 24 April 2023 on the basis that he did not successfully complete his probationary period.
On 19 May 2023, TESG filed a Form F3 – Employer response to unfair dismissal application which identified a jurisdictional objection to the application on the basis that Mr Evans earned more than the high income threshold.
On 20 June 2023, Mr Evans filed a response to the jurisdictional objection. The response argued that regardless of whether Mr Evans earned more than the high income threshold, his employment with TESG was covered by the Professional Employees Award 2020 (Award).
On 27 June 2023, TESG filed a submission confirming they do not accept the Award covered Mr Evans.
I conducted a case management conference on 28 June 2023 which led to the issuing of directions for the filing of material on 29 June 2023 and the matter being listed for hearing/determinative conference on 20 July 2023 to determine the jurisdictional issue of whether Mr Evans is a person protected from unfair dismissal pursuant to s.382 of the FW Act.
Material filed
On 7 July 2023, TESG filed material in support of its jurisdictional objections. Mr Evans filed material in response on 14 July 2023. A court book was sent to the parties by Chambers on 19 July 2023. Neither party sought to be legally represented. Mr Evans was assisted by Mark Haydon (Mr Haydon).
Given some apparent confusion from the parties about the nature of the hearing and the intermingling of evidence and submissions within the filed material, I prepared a document summarising my provisional views about the status of the filed material prior to the hearing on 20 July 2023 and this was provided to the parties. I also indicated I intended to conduct a determinative conference rather than a hearing.
Mr Haydon represented Mr Evans and TESG was represented by Brad Johannsen (Managing Director) and Louise Potter (HR Manager). At the outset, the parties agreed to the proceeding being conducted as a determinative conference and to initially work through my provisional views to try and reach agreement on the material that should be considered in relation to the jurisdictional objections.
As a result of this process, the parties agreed that the following evidence would be tendered:
TESG
· Exhibit R1: Role Description for the position of Manager – Fire Engineering NSW.
· Exhibit R2: Signed offer letter dated 27 September 2022.
· Exhibit R3: Meeting invite dated 4 October 2022.
· Exhibit R4: Email from Helmut Schwanke to Mr Johanssen dated 17 November 2023.
· Exhibit R5: Meeting notes dated 28 March 2023.
Mr Evans
· Exhibit A1: Termination letter dated 20 June 2023.
· Exhibit A2: Unsigned offer letter dated 20 September 2022.
· Exhibit A3: Undated statement of Mr Evans.
· Exhibit A4: Six Telstra invoices issued to Mr Evans.
· Exhibit A5: Purported statutory declaration of Mr Evans dated 14 July 2023. TESG raised concerns about whether the declaration had been declared in accordance with the Statutory Declarations Act 1959 (Cth). I admitted the document as a statement rather than a statutory declaration.
Mr Evans was cross-examined during the determinative conference. Mr Johannsen and Ms Potter provided additional oral evidence during the determinative conference and were also cross-examined.
The parties relied on the following submissions concerning the jurisdictional objections:
TESG
· Form F3 response dated 20 June 2023.
· Email from Ms Potter dated 27 June 2023.
· Submissions dated 7 July 2023.
Mr Evans
· Form F2 application dated 14 May 2023.
· Submissions dated 20 June 2023.
· Reply submissions dated 14 July 2023.
Mr Johannsen and Ms Potter made oral closing submissions as did Mr Haydon on behalf of Mr Evans. I reserved my decision at the end of the determinative conference.
When is a person protected from unfair dismissal?
Section 382 of the FW Act provides that a person is protected from unfair dismissal at a time if, at that time:
(a)the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and
(b) one or more of the following apply:
(i) a modern award covers the person;
(ii)an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;
(iii)the sum of the person’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold.
TESG’s Form F3 response identified that it employs 50 people. There was no dispute that Mr Evans had completed the relevant minimum employment period of six months in accordance with s.382(a) of the FW Act and no dispute that Mr Evans was dismissed by TESG. There was also no dispute that an enterprise agreement did not apply to Mr Evans’ employment with TESG.
As a result, the issue of whether Mr Evans was protected from unfair dismissal turns on whether a modern award covered his employment to satisfy s.382(b)(i) and whether his annual rate of earnings is less than the high income threshold to satisfy s.382(b)(iii). If Mr Evans succeeds on either of those points, he will be protected from unfair dismissal in accordance with s.382 of the FW Act.
High income threshold
The reference to being protected ‘at a time’ at the beginning of s.382 has been interpreted to mean the time of dismissal.[1] As a result, the relevant high income threshold amount pursuant to s.382(b)(iii) is $162,000.
Deputy President Beaumont provided the following summary of the relevant statutory provisions and authorities regarding the high income threshold in David Paul Lonnie v WA Council on Addictions Incorporated:[2]
“Assessment of the high income threshold involves two considerations. First, consideration needs to be given to the applicant’s annual rate of earnings, which requires an examination of several factors, including those set out in s 332 of the Act, and, because of a reference in that section, potentially factors included in the regulations. Second, and separately, consideration needs to be given to whether there are any amounts to be added to the person’s annual rate of earnings because of factors included in the regulations. The sum of these two considerations is what is compared against the high income threshold.
The word ‘Earnings’ is described at s 332 of the Act, as:
332 Earnings
(1) An employee’s earnings include:
(a) the employee’s wages; and
(b) amounts applied or dealt with in any way on the employee’s behalf or as the employee directs; and
(c) the agreed money value of non-monetary benefits; and
(d) amounts or benefits prescribed by the regulations.
(2) However, an employee’s earnings do not include the following:
(a) payments the amount of which cannot be determined in advance;
(b) reimbursements;
(c) contributions to a superannuation fund to the extent that they are contributions to which subsection (4) applies;
(d) amounts prescribed by the regulations.
Note: Some examples of payments covered by paragraph (a) are commissions, incentive-based payments and bonuses, and overtime (unless the overtime is guaranteed).
(3) Non-monetary benefits are benefits other than an entitlement to a payment of money:
(a) to which the employee is entitled in return for the performance of work; and
(b) for which a reasonable money value has been agreed by the employee and the employer;
but does not include a benefit prescribed by the regulations.
(4) This subsection applies to contributions that the employer makes to a superannuation fund to the extent that one or more of the following applies:
(a) the employer would have been liable to pay superannuation guarantee charge under the Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992 in relation to the person if the amounts had not been so contributed;
(b) the employer is required to contribute to the fund for the employee’s benefit in relation to a defined benefit interest (within the meaning of section 291-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997) of the employee;
(c) the employer is required to contribute to the fund for the employee’s benefit under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.
Whilst no regulations have been made for the purposes of s 332(1)(d) or s 332(2)(d) of the Act, regulation 3.05(6) of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) (Regulations) has been made in respect of s 382(b)(iii) of the Act. Regulation 3.05(6) provides:
If:
(a) the person is entitled to receive, or has received, a benefit in accordance with an agreement between the person and the person’s employer; and
(b) the benefit is not an entitlement to a payment of money and is not a non-monetary benefit within the meaning of subsection 332(3) of the Act; and
(c) the FWC is satisfied, having regard to the circumstances, that:
(i) it should consider the benefit for the purpose of assessing whether the high income threshold applies to a person at the time of the dismissal; and
(ii) a reasonable money value of the benefit has not been agreed by the person and the employer; and
(iii) the FWC can estimate a real or notional money value of the benefit;
the real or notional money value of the benefit estimated by the FWC is an amount for subparagraph 382(b)(iii) of the Act.
The wording of regulation 3.05(6)(c) implies that the Commission has a degree of discretion in deciding whether it should consider a benefit for the purposes of assessing whether the high income threshold applies to a person at the time of dismissal.[3] Once it has been determined that a benefit meets the criteria contained in regulations 3.05(6)(a) and (b), the Commission must consider whether it is satisfied, having regard to the circumstances, that each of regulations 3.05(6)(c)(i), (ii) and (iii) apply.
In these types of cases, it is the Respondent that bears the evidentiary onus to support its objection that the Applicant was not protected from unfair dismissal.[4]”
There was no dispute between the parties that the relevant amounts for assessing Mr Evans’ annual rate of earnings were the following benefits identified in the signed contract dated 27 September 2022:[5]
· $152,000 base salary;[6]
· $15,960 in superannuation;[7]
· $20,000 vehicle allowance;[8]
· $40 per month as a monthly phone allowance; and
· Relocation payment of up to $4,500.[9]
TESG argued all these amounts should be considered earnings for the purposes of s.332 of the FW Act. Mr Evans argued that only the base salary and the private use element of the vehicle allowance fall within the statutory definition. I will consider each amount below.
Base salary
There is no dispute and I find that the base salary of $152,000 falls within the definition of earnings under s.332(1) of the FW Act.
Superannuation
The minimum superannuation guarantee percentage to avoid the super guarantee charge from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2023 was 10.5%. Mr Evans’ annual superannuation earnings are identified in the employment contract as $15,960. This constitutes 10.5% of the base salary rate of $152,000. As a result, I find these contributions fall within s.332(4)(a) of the FW Act and hence are not included in Mr Evans’ earnings calculations for the purposes of the high income threshold in accordance with s.332(2)(c) of the FW Act.
Vehicle allowance
The correct approach to assessing whether or not a vehicle allowance falls within the meaning of earnings for the purposes of s.332(1) of the FW Act was set out in the following terms by the Full Bench in Sam Technology Engineers Pty Ltd v Mr Andrew Bernadou[10] (Sam Technology Engineers):
[72] For the reasons set out above and having regard to the relevant statutory context, we are of the view that a car allowance should be treated in the following way for the purpose of calculating an employee’s "annual rate of earnings" within the meaning of ss.332 and 382(b)(iii) of the Act:
(a) If a car allowance is paid to an employee in circumstances in which there is no requirement or expectation that the employee will have to use his or her car for work purposes, then the whole of the car allowance is, in reality, part of the employee’s wages and is therefore included in their “earnings”; or
(b) If a car allowance is paid to an employee at the time of their dismissal in circumstances in which there is a requirement or expectation that the employee will have to use his or her car for work purposes, then it will be necessary to determine and calculate the private benefit, if any, derived by the employee from the car allowance. To that end, we suggest the following methodology, which is based on the approach taken in Fewings:
1. Determine the annual distance travelled by the car in question. The amount of the annual distance will be as follows:
a. if the car allowance has been paid for at least 12 months prior to the dismissal - the distance travelled by the car over the 12 months immediately prior to the dismissal; or
b. if the car allowance has been paid for a period of less than 12 months prior to the dismissal, determine the distance travelled by the car in the period during which the car allowance has been paid and then extrapolate that distance over a period of 12 months to calculate an annual distance. For example, if an employee moved into a new position with his or her employer 6 months prior to his or her dismissal, received a car allowance during that 6 month period, and drove his or her car for 10,000 km in that 6 month period, the assumed annual distance travelled by the car for the purpose of calculating the employee’s “annual rate of earnings” would be 20,000 km.
2. Determine the percentage of the annual distance travelled which was for business use, which would not include travel between the employee’s home and usual place of work. If the car allowance has been paid for a period of less than 12 months prior to the dismissal, determine the business use percentage of the distance travelled in the period during which the car allowance was paid.
3. Multiply the annual distance calculated in accordance with paragraph 1 above by the business use percentage calculated in accordance with paragraph 2 above. This provides the annual distance travelled for business purposes.
4. Estimate the cost per kilometre for a car of the type used. This information can be obtained from the RACV, NRMA or like motoring organisations.
5. Multiply the annual distance travelled for business purposes by the estimated cost per kilometre. The result is the annual cost of using the car for work purposes. Compare that annual cost with the amount of the annual car allowance. The amount of the annual car allowance will be as follows:
a. if the car allowance was paid for at least 12 months prior to the dismissal - the amount of the car allowance paid to the employee in the 12 months immediately prior to the dismissal; or
b. if the car allowance has been paid for a period of less than 12 months prior to the dismissal, determine the amount of the car allowance paid in that period and then extrapolate that payment over a period of 12 months to calculate an annual amount of the car allowance. For example, if an employee in a business other than a small business was employed in that business for a period of 9 months prior to his or her dismissal, and received a car allowance of $2,000 each month in that 9 month period, the assumed annual car allowance for the purpose of calculating the employee’s “annual rate of earnings” would be $24,000 ($2,000/month x 12 months = $24,000).
6. If the amount of the annual car allowance exceeds the annual cost of using the car for work purposes, the difference is the private benefit to the employee of the car allowance, which forms part of their “annual rate of earnings”.
The employment contract does not specify the purpose of the payment of the vehicle allowance. Mr Evans’ uncontested evidence was that it was paid to compensate him for using his private vehicle for work purposes and to cover other work-related travel expenses, such as Uber trips, taxis, parking, tolls and train tickets.[11]
Mr Evans uncontested evidence regarding his travel was the following:[12]
· Mr Evans travelled 2,500km in his personal vehicle, a Black Audi A4, during his employment with the TESG.
· 1,405km of the 2,500km travelled during this period was work-related travel, equating to 56% of the total kilometres. The remaining 1,095km or 44% was personal travel.
· Mr Evans incurred $941.14 in expenditure for work-related tolls, hire cars, parking, public transport and Ubers/taxis during his employment with TESG.
On the basis of this evidence, Mr Evans submitted that the relevant calculation to determine the proportion of the vehicle allowance that falls within the meaning of ‘earnings’ under s.332(1) of the FW Act is:
· Given 2,500km was travelled in three months, this distance is multiplied by four to give an annual distance of 10,000km.
· The business use of 56% equates to 1,400km which is multiplied by four to give an annual distance of 5,600km.
· The relevant RACV Car Running Costs Survey figure for a comparable Honda Accord VTi-LX 1.5 Turbo CVY Sedan is $19,717.87.
· Applying the 56% business use to this annual cost figure equates to $11,041.52. That leaves a cost of $8,958.48 for personal use.
· The $941 in other business travel expenses is then deducted from this figure.
· The proportion of the $20,000 vehicle allowance that falls within the meaning of ‘earnings’ is therefore: $20,000 - $941.00 - $11,041.52 = $8,017.48.
I am not satisfied these calculations are consistent with the approach set out by the Full Bench in Sam Technology Engineers. Firstly, it is not clear why Mr Evans submitted that the distance of 2,500km was travelled in three months when his evidence was ‘during my employment with TESG, I travelled 2,500km in my vehicle’.[13] The uncontested evidence is that Mr Evans was employed from 4 October 2022 to 24 April 2022. That is a period of approximately 6.75 months. Secondly, Mr Evans’ evidence was that he incurred $941.14 in travel expenditure rather than the $941.00 figure he used for the calculations. Thirdly, no attempt was made by Mr Evans to determine the cost per kilometre for the relevant vehicle and then to multiply this figure by the annual distance travelled for business purposes.
I consider the correct calculations to be:
· 2,500km x 1.78 (12 months/6.75 months) = an annual distance of 4,450 kilometres.
· The business use of 56% equates to 2,492 kilometres per year.
· I am prepared to accept Mr Evans’ submission that the annual cost estimate for a Honda Accord VTi-LX 1.5 Turbo CVT Sedan from RACV’s ‘Car Running Costs Survey 2022’ can be relied upon as a comparator for Mr Evans’ Audi A3 sedan. That annual cost estimate is $19,717.87 which is based on average annual usage of 15,000 kilometres.[14] That equates to a cost per kilometre of approximately $1.31.
· The annual distance travelled for business purposes is 2,492 kilometres which is multiplied by the average cost of $1.31 per kilometre for a total of $3,264.52.
· The annual private use amount is the value of vehicle allowance, which is $20,000.00, minus the annual business use figure of $3,264.52. This equates to $16,735.48.
· I am prepared to further reduce that amount by the figure of $941.14 based on Mr Evans’ uncontested evidence regarding his other travel expenses.
· The value of the vehicle allowance for the purposes of assessing Mr Evans’ earnings is $15,794.34.
Phone allowance
I am prepared to accept the $40 per month phone allowance constitutes a reimbursement based on the Telstra invoices tendered by Mr Evans[15] and because the employment contract identifies the payment as an allowance: ‘to contribute to work related phone calls by you. It is expected that you maintain a working phone for use during office hours.’[16] As a result, the allowance is excluded from the definition of earnings in accordance with s.332(2)(b) of the FW Act.
Relocation payment
I am satisfied the relocation payment is a reimbursement within the meaning of s.332(2)(b) of the FW Act and hence excluded from the calculation of Mr Evans’ annual rate of earnings. The employment contract identifies that the payment will be: ‘up to $4,500 of accommodation costs associated with your relocation from Canberra to Sydney. This is designed to pay for your first two weeks accommodation in Sydney to assist you with a seamless transition to your new location.’[17]
Conclusion
For the reasons outlined above, I have concluded Mr Evans’ annual rate of earnings for the purposes of s.382(b)(iii) of the FW Act is:
· $152,000 base salary, plus
· $15,794.34 being the private use component of the vehicle allowance.
TOTAL = $167,794.34.
I therefore find that Mr Evans’ annual rate of earnings is not less than the high income threshold and s.382(b)(iii) is not satisfied.
Modern award coverage
TESG argued Mr Evans is not covered by the Professional Employees Award 2020 (Award) because he ‘held an executive, senior managerial position’.[18] Although it was not squarely put by TESG, I understand this to be a submission that Mr Evans does not fall within Schedule A – Classification Structure and Definitions of the Award because of the exclusion appearing at the start of Schedule A for an employee employed in a wholly or principally managerial position.
Mr Evans argued he falls within the Level 3 – Professional classification appearing in Schedule A of the Award, or alternatively the Level 4 – Professional classification.[19]
The exclusion identified above for managerial positions was inserted into the Award on 23 March 2023 following an earlier Full Bench decision dated 20 January 2023 in Variation of Professional Employees Award 2020 on Commission’s own motion.[20] The Full Bench stated the following concerning the interpretation of Schedule A of the Award:
[80] Subject to one important limitation, it appears to us that the classifications in Schedule A are drafted on the basis of an assumption that, once a person is engaged to perform duties of the requisite nature, they will fall within one of the classifications. That is, the classifications have the function of determining in what grade an employee covered by the Award will fall rather than whether an employee is covered by the Award in the first place. The limitation is that the classifications do not extend to positions which are principally managerial in nature. Level 4, the highest classification, covers a person performing professional work at a senior or leading level. However, there is no indication that this is intended to cover a managerial position. Clause A.1.11(d), which refers to a Level 4 employee being assigned duties “only in terms of broad objective” which are “reviewed for policy, soundness of approach, accomplishment and general effectiveness”, makes it apparent that a Level 4 employee remains subject to higher managerial control. Further, clause A.1.11(e) provides:
(e) The employee supervises a group or groups including professionals and other staff, or exercises authority and technical control over a group of professional staff. In both instances, the employee is engaged in complex professional engineering or professional scientific/information technology applications.
[81] This provision identifies that the Level 4 employee exercises only supervisory authority and control in respect of professional/technical matters. In short, a Level 4 employee is not a manager, even if the role of manager might in some respects require engineering, scientific, or information technology qualifications.
TESG relied upon the following evidence in support of its argument that Mr Evans was not covered by the Award:
· The title of Mr Evans’ position as identified in the final signed employment contract is ‘Manager Fire Engineering – NSW’.[21] The title was identified as ‘Senior Fire Engineer’ in an earlier version of the contract.[22]
· A Role Description for the ‘Manager – Fire Engineering NSW’ position.[23] Mr Evans gave evidence he had not seen this document during his employment with TESG and this was ultimately accepted by TESG. The Role Description refers to the position as a ‘senior member of the National Fire Engineering team responsible for business development and the oversight of the Fire Engineering Strategy in the NSW region.’
· Mr Johannsen and Ms Potter both gave oral evidence concerning Mr Evans’ position. Mr Johannsen and Ms Potter both referred to Mr Evans being expected to generate business for TESG and to work relatively autonomously. In cross-examination, Mr Johannsen accepted that no TESG employees directly reported to Mr Evans. This is consistent with the Role Description.
Mr Evans relied on a statement dated 14 July 2023 which outlined the following functions he was required to perform in the role of ‘Manager – Fire Engineering NSW’[24]:
· Prepare fee proposals.
· Follow-up with clients on fee proposals.
· Enter project information into TESG’s database.
· Prepare fire engineering advice.
· Attend fire engineering team meetings.
· Attend fire engineering financial meetings.
· Liaise with the accounting team to issue invoices.
· Attend monthly company meetings.
· Organise travel requests.
· Other duties as requested by a director.
Mr Evans gave evidence that he was offered the role of Senior Fire Engineer but negotiated up to the title of Manager – Fire Engineering NSW as reflected in the signed contract dated 27 September 2023. Mr Evans gave evidence no additional duties or remuneration accompanied the title change.[25]
Mr Evans’ employment contract identified that Mr Evans reported to Director, Fire Safety Engineering.[26]
Mr Evans accepted during the hearing he is not currently registered as a Fire Safety Engineer on the National Engineers Register and this meant another TESG employee was required to certify some fire safety documents within Mr Evans’ area of work.
Consideration
I do not consider Mr Evans’ role falls within the description of a ‘wholly or principally managerial position’ and hence the role is not excluded from the classifications appearing in Schedule A of the Award.
I have difficulty classifying Mr Evans’ role as wholly or principally managerial in circumstances whereby the evidence clearly establishes that no other TESG employee reported to him. I consider this evidence is more persuasive in terms of understanding Mr Evans’ role than the label appearing in his employment contract.
I accept TESG expected Mr Evans to show individual initiative, proactively generate work for the business and work relatively autonomously. This is a primary reason for my finding that Mr Evans should not fall within the Level 3 – Professional classification. However, I consider the uncontested evidence from Mr Evans about his duties and the Role Description are indicative of a high-level technical role than a role directed at managing other employees.
I do not consider the Level 4 – Professional classification to be a perfect fit for the role performed by Mr Evans, particularly given the classification description refers to supervisory duties and the evidence in this case establishes Mr Evans had no such duties. However, this also reinforces my conclusion that Mr Evans was not engaged wholly or principally in a managerial position.
On balance, I am satisfied Mr Evans falls within the classification of a Level 4 – Professional in Schedule A.1.11 of the Award, and that as a result his employment with TESG performing professional engineering duties falls within the coverage prescribed in clause 4.1(a) of the Award.
Conclusion
I find that Mr Evans is a person protected from unfair dismissal in accordance with s.382 of the FW Act because the Award covered Mr Evans in relation to his employment with TESG.
Given this finding, Mr Evans is protected from unfair dismissal, despite his earnings not being less than the high income threshold.
I dismiss TESG’s jurisdictional objections.
The determination of the merits of Mr Evans’ unfair dismissal application will now be progressed by the Commission in accordance with its usual processes.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
M Haydon on behalf of the Applicant
B Johannsen and L Potter on behalf of the Respondent
Hearing details:
2023.
Sydney (by video via Microsoft Teams)
20 July.
[1] Zappia v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2012) 225 IR 122, 125 [9].
[2] [2023] FWC 673 at [14] to [18].
[3] Zappia v Universal Music Australia Pty Limited [2012] FWA 3208, [8].
[4] Ibid.
[5] Exhibit R2.
[6] Exhibit R2, Key Terms, Item 6 and clause 5.1.
[7] Exhibit R2, Key Items, Item 6 and clause 5.1.
[8] Exhibit R2, Key Items, Item 6 and clause 5.1.
[9] Exhibit R2, clause 5.1(f).
[10] [2018] FWCFB 1767.
[11] Exhibit A5.
[12] Exhibit A5.
[13] Exhibit A5.
[14] See: Car Running Costs Survey 2022: Victoria’s cheapest cars to own | RACV.
[15] Exhibit A4.
[16] Exhibit R2, clause 5.1(c).
[17] Exhibit R2, clause 5.1(f).
[18] TESG outline of submissions dated 7 July 2023.
[19] Mr Evans’ submission dated 20 June 2023.
[20] [2023] FWCFB 13.
[21] Exhibit R2.
[22] Exhibit A2.
[23] Exhibit R1.
[24] Exhibit A3.
[25] Exhibit A3.
[26] Exhibit R2, Key Terms, Item 5.
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