Maritime Union of Australia, the

[2013] FWCD 6237

[2013] FWCD 6237

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.512 - Application for a right of entry permit
The Maritime Union of Australia
(RE2013/1120)
MR ENRIGHT	MELBOURNE, 9 SEPTEMBER 2013

[1] On 10 June 2013, an application under s.512 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) dated 10 June 2013 was lodged with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) by the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) for a permit to enter and inspect premises for the following official of the MUA:

Chris Cain: RE2013/1120

[2] The application was supported by declarations (the initial declarations) from Mr Michael Doleman, the relevant Committee of Management member, dated 10 June 2013, and by Mr Cain, the proposed permit holder, dated 10 June 2013. Mr Doleman is the Deputy National Secretary of the MUA. Mr Cain is the Western Australian State Secretary of the MUA.

[3] During the course of considering the application, it came to the attention of the Commission that the MUA and the proposed permit holder had been ordered to pay a penalty under the now repealed Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the WR Act) in Fair Work

Ombudsman v Maritime Union of Australia[1](FWO v MUA).

[1]Fair Work Ombudsman v Maritime Union of Australia [2012] FCA 1521.

[4] The initial declarations which made up part of the application did not disclose the penalty imposed in FWO v MUA.

[5] On 13 June 2013 the Commission wrote to Mr Doleman advising that the initial declarations were incorrect and possibly misleading. The Commission requested an amended application and statutory declarations explaining the reasons for omitting Mr Cain’s previous contravention in the initial declarations.

[6] On 17 July 2013 an amended declaration from Mr Cain was lodged by the MUA,

along with Mr Cain’s previous entry permit RE2009/10831. The permit was returned
approximately 7 months late.

[7] On 23 July 2013 Mr Cain lodged a further declaration disclosing the relevant penalty

imposed in FWO v MUA and provided an explanation for the initial omission. The declaration
was not in the form of a statutory declaration.
[2013] FWCD 6237

[8] On 25 July 2013 a statutory declaration was received by the Commission from Mr

Doleman explaining that his initial declaration was incorrect. This declaration referred to
‘Christy Cain” and added:

“Following correspondence from the Fair Work Commission on 13 June 2013, I realised that my 10 June 2013 declaration was incorrect, and the proposed permit holder was in a Federal Court judgement (Fair Work Ombudsman v Maritime Union of Australia [2012] FCA 1521 (31 October 2012)), found to have contravened s494(5) of the now repealed Workplace Relations Act 1996, and had a $2460 penalty imposed upon him.”

[9] The amount of the penalty imposed on the statutory declaration from Mr Doleman is

$2460 which is different to the penalty imposed by the Federal Court of Australia which was
$2640.

[10] On 30 July 2013, the Commission wrote to Mr Doleman to request that Mr Cain provide his declaration on a statutory declaration.

[11] On 6 August 2013, a statutory declaration was received by the Commission from Mr Cain. The declaration included the following statement:

“On 10 June 2013, I made a declaration in relation to an application by the Maritime Union of Australia for a new Right of Entry Permit for me. That declaration was inadvertently incorrect insofar as I failed to mention some matters that are relevant to the application. My failure to mention these matters was inadvertent and not a deliberate attempt to mislead the decision maker.

I have received the training about the rights and responsibilities of a permit holder.
On 7 June 2013, I received training from the ACTU on Federal Right of Entry.

On 31 October 2012, I was convicted by the Federal Court for a breach of section 494(5) of the now repealed Workplace Relations Act 1996 and was fined $2,640 for this breach.”

[12] I shall refer to the further declarations received from Messrs Doleman and Cain on 25 July and 6 August 2013 respectively as the amended declarations. On 28 August 2013, the Commission wrote to Mr Doleman to clarify further outstanding issues. The correspondence included the following:

Before a Decision by the Delegate of the Fair Work Commission is made in relation to the right of entry permit application for Mr Cain, the following information is required.

1. The statutory declaration dated 30 July 2013 by the proposed permit holder (Chris Cain), was witnessed by Lesley Chamberlain in the capacity of ‘Branch Secretary’. Could you confirm in what capacity Lesley Chamberlain’s qualifications may witness Commonwealth statutory declarations.

2. In your statutory declaration dated 25 July 2013, you have named the proposed permit holder on the statutory declaration as (Christy Cain). Could you confirm that

[2013] FWCD 6237

Christy Cain is the same person as Chris Cain, who you have named on the right of entry permit application dated 10 June 2013? In addition, it appears (in paragraph 2 of your declaration), that the stated amount of the penalty imposed on Chris Cain is $2460 however it appears from the matter referred to below that the penalty was $2640 (Fair Work Ombudsman v Maritime Union of Australia [2012] FCA 1521 (31 October 2012)). Could you confirm that the latter figure is correct?

3. On Mr Cain’s declaration dated 15 July 2013, he states “I have purported to exercise my right to enter premises using my right of entry powers without a valid permit since my permit expired but I have not done so since I became aware I did not have a valid permit”. Could you confirm the number of times and dates Mr Cain entered premises without a valid permit?

4. The Delegate would also like to clarify what were the reason(s) for Mr Cain’s “inadvertent” omission of the penalty as outlined in his declaration dated 30 July 2013.

[13] On 29 August 2013, the Commission received correspondence dated 28 August 2013 from Mr Doleman which stated the following:

I refer to your correspondence of 28 August 2013.

In response to your questions, I advise the following:

1. I am advised that the Statutory Declaration of Chris Cain dated 30 July 2013 was witnessed by a Ms Lesley Chamberlain of the Fremantle Branch of the Maritime, Mining & Power Credit Union. I am advised and believe that she is a Credit Union Office r with more than 5 years continuous service within the meaning of item 210 of Schedule 2 to the Statutory Declarations Regulations 1993.

2. I can confirm that Chris Cain and Christy Cain are the same person and the first names are used interchangeably. I can further confirm that a transposition error occurred in my declaration of 25 July 2013 and the correct figure in the FWO matter was $2640.

3. I have requested information from Mr Cain as to the number of times he purported to exercise his right of entry powers when he had no valid permit before he became aware that his permit had expired. Unfortunately, has not retained those records and so cannot provide these details. I can confirm that Mr Cain has not attempted to exercise his right of entry powers since becoming aware his permit had expired.

4. I understand from my conversations with Mr Cain that the use of the word “inadvertent” is used in the sense of the omission of that material from his declaration was not deliberate or intentional but was rather made through lack of attention.

I trust this resolves your queries.

Legislative Framework

[2013] FWCD 6237

[14] Under s.512 of the Act, the Commission may, on application by an organisation, issue an entry permit to an official of the organisation if it is satisfied that the official is a “fit and

proper person” to hold an entry permit. In deciding this, the Commission must take into

account the “permit qualification matters” set out in s.513(1).

[15]      Section 513(1) of the Act is set out below:

“513 Considering application

(1) In deciding whether the official is a fit and proper person, the FWC must take into

account the following permit qualification matters:

(a) whether the official has received appropriate training about the rights and

responsibilities of a permit holder;

(b) whether the official has ever been convicted of an offence against an industrial

law;

(c) whether the official has ever been convicted of an offence against a law of the
Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or a foreign country, involving:

(i)          entry onto premises; or

(ii)         fraud or dishonesty; or

(iii) intentional use of violence against another person or intentional damage or destruction of property;

(d) whether the official, or any other person, has ever been ordered to pay a penalty
under this Act or any other industrial law in relation to action taken by the official;

(e) whether a permit issued to the official under this Part, or under a similar law of the Commonwealth (no matter when in force), has been revoked or suspended or made subject to conditions;

(f) whether a court, or other person or body, under a State or Territory industrial law or
a State or Territory OHS law, has:

(i) cancelled, suspended or imposed conditions on a right of entry for

industrial or occupational health and safety purposes that the official had under
that law; or

(ii) disqualified the official from exercising, or applying for, a right of entry for industrial or occupational health and safety purposes under that law;

(g) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.”

[16] Sections 512–513 are within Part 3–4 of the Act, entitled ‘Right of Entry’. The objects of Part 3–4 are set out at s.480:

[2013] FWCD 6237

“480 Object of this Part

The object of this Part is to establish a framework for officials of organisations to enter premises that balances:

(a) the right of organisations to represent their members in the workplace, hold discussions with potential members and investigate suspected contraventions of:

(i) this Act and fair work instruments; and

(ii) State or Territory OHS laws; and

(b) the right of employees and TCF award workers to receive, at work,

information and representation from officials of organisations; and

(c) the right of occupiers of premises and employers to go about their business
without undue inconvenience.”

[17] In Re Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia[2], Delegate Nassios made the following observations

[2][2011] FWAD 3518.

regarding the objects of Part 3–4 of the Act with respect to an application for an entry permit:

“[21] The objects of Part 3-4 are set out in section 480 of the Act. The object of right of entry provisions is to establish a framework for officials of organisations to enter premises while balancing competing rights of organisations, employees and occupiers/employers. Organisations have the right to represent their members in the workplace, to hold discussions and to investigate suspected contraventions of relevant laws. Balanced against these rights are the rights of occupiers and employers ‘to go about their business without undue inconvenience’. The objects set out in section 480 of the Act emphasise the mutual rights and responsibilities of participants in the system in much the same way as the objects under the Workplace Relations Act 1996. Earlier decisions regarding the granting of right of entry permits under the Workplace

Relations Act 1996 have made reference to the ‘important contextual issue’ of the

nature of the power that is exercised by permit holders. In Vivienne Daniels v Joe Patti

& Anor, Munro J observed that:

Permit holders exercise a power that causes them to be exercising a public right and duty. Those rights, powers and duty stem from the statute. Due diligence, reasonable civility, and avoidance of unnecessary obstruction in the exercise of the powers under Division 11A are not only to be expected, they are a statutory condition of the powers being retained.

The observations of Munro J apply equally to the granting of right of entry permits under the legislative regime set out in the Fair Work Act 2009.”

[18] Although I am not bound by the above views I find they are a useful context for considering an application for an entry permit.

Permit Qualification Matters
[2013] FWCD 6237

[19]      I will consider each of the permit qualification matters separately.

Training about rights and responsibilities

[20] Section 513(1)(a) of the Act requires me to take into account whether Mr Cain has received appropriate training about the rights and responsibilities of a permit holder. The initial declarations and further declarations state Mr Cain undertook such training on 7 June 2013. The content of the training material was approved by, then, Fair Work Australia on 6 October 2009.

Conviction/s against an industrial law

[21] Section 513(1)(b) of the Act requires me to take into account whether Mr Cain has ever been convicted of an offence against an industrial law. The initial declarations did not disclose convictions against Mr Cain, however, the subsequent declarations and statutory declaration disclosed his conviction and penalty in the Federal Court.

Conviction/s involving fraud, dishonesty or intentional use of violence

[22] Section 513(1)(c) of the Act requires me to take into account whether Mr Cain has ever been convicted of an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or a foreign country involving entry onto premises, fraud or dishonesty or intentional use of violence against another person or intentional damage or destruction of property. Neither the initial declarations nor the further declarations disclose any such convictions against Mr Cain. There is no other evidence before me that suggests otherwise.

Order/s to pay a penalty under an industrial law in relation to action taken by the official

[23] Section 513(1)(d) of the Act requires me to take into account whether Mr Cain, or any other person, has ever been ordered to pay a penalty under the Act or any other industrial law, in relation to action taken by Mr Cain. As noted earlier in this decision, the MUA was ordered to pay a penalty under the WR Act in FWO v MUA in relation to action taken by Mr Cain.

Permit/s revoked, suspended or made subject to conditions under Commonwealth law

[24] Section 513(1)(e) of the Act requires me to take into account whether a permit issued to Mr Cain under Part 3–4 of the Act, or under a similar law of the Commonwealth (no matter when in force), has been revoked, suspended or made subject to conditions. Neither the initial declarations nor the amended declarations disclose that any such permits issued to Mr Cain having ever been revoked, suspended or made subject to conditions. There is no other evidence before me that suggests otherwise.

Right of entry revoked, suspended or made subject to conditions or a disqualification imposed under State or Territory industrial law or State or Territory OHS law

[25] Section 513(1)(f) of the Act requires me to take into account whether a court, or other person or body, under a State or Territory industrial law or State or Territory occupational health and safety (OHS) law has cancelled, suspended or imposed conditions on a right of entry for industrial or OHS purposes that Mr Cain had under that law or disqualified Mr Cain from exercising, or applying for, a right of entry for industrial or OHS purposes under that

[2013] FWCD 6237

law. Neither the initial declarations nor the amended declarations disclose any cancellation, suspension or imposition of conditions on a right of entry Mr Cain has held for industrial or OHS purposes by any court, or other person or body, under a State or Territory industrial law or an OHS law. Further, neither the initial declarations nor the amended declarations disclose that Mr Cain has been disqualified by any court, or other person or body, under a State or Territory industrial law or an OHS law, from exercising, or applying for, a right of entry for industrial or OHS purposes. There is no other evidence before me that suggests otherwise.

Any other matter the Commission considers relevant

[26] Section 513(1)(g) of the Act permits the Fair Work Commission to have regard to

“any other matters that the FWC considers relevant” in determining whether the proposed
permit holder is a ‘fit and proper person’.

[27] As noted earlier of this decision, the initial declarations did not disclose the penalty imposed on the MUA in relation to action taken in FWO v MUA. Following correspondence sent to Mr Doleman by the Commission, the amended declarations filed on 25 July and 6 August 2013 disclosed the penalty imposed in relation to actions taken by Mr Cain.

Penalties imposed under the WR Act

[28] As noted earlier of this decision the MUA and the proposed permit holder were ordered to pay a penalty in relation to action taken by Mr Cain in FWO v MUA for contravention of a civil remedy provision of the WR Act. To be satisfied that this is a penalty relevant to s.513(1)(d), the WR Act must have been an industrial law within the meaning of the Act.

[29]      ‘Industrial law’ is defined at s.12 of the Act:

“12 The Dictionary...

industrial law means:

(a) this Act; or

(b) the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009; or

(c) a law of the Commonwealth, however designated, that regulates the

relationships between employers and employees; or

(d) a State or Territory industrial law.”

[30] The WR Act was the predecessor legislation to the Act and I am satisfied that at the time of the contraventions it was an ‘industrial law’ for the purposes of s.12. The WR Act under which the penalties were imposed was following amendment by the Workplace

Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005.

[31] The relevant provision of the WR Act that was contravened by Mr Cain was s.494(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996. Section 494(1) was a civil remedy provision. The maximum penalty that could be imposed on a body corporate for a single contravention was [2013] FWCD 6237

$33,000. The maximum penalty that could be imposed on an individual for a single contravention is $6,600. Mr Cain was a party to the proceedings and a penalty was imposed on him as an individual.

[32] Section 494(1) the WR Act is set out below:

“494 Industrial action etc. must not be taken before nominal expiry date of collective

agreement or workplace determinations

(1) From the day when:

(a) a collective agreement; or

(b) a workplace determination;

comes into operation until its nominal expiry date has passed, an employee, organisation or officer covered by subsection (2) must not organise or engage in industrial action (whether or not that action relates to a matter dealt with in the agreement or determination).

Note 1: This subsection is a civil remedy provision: see subsection (4).

Note 2: Action that contravenes this subsection is not protected action (see section 440).

[33] FWO v MUA concerned a dispute between the MUA and DP World. The dispute was about industrial action taken before the nominal expiry date of a collective agreement. Mr Cain spoke at a meeting about pending redundancies at DP World. Following this address, a DP World employee proposed a motion to the effect that the DP World employees should strike for 24 hours. Shortly after the meeting, Mr Cain informed a representative or representatives of DP World that the DP World employees were on strike. The action taken by Mr Cain was taken to have been engaging in industrial action within the meaning of s.494(1) of the WR Act. A monetary penalty was imposed on Mr Cain for organising a 24 hour strike at the DP World site in Fremantle, Western Australia on 19 May 2009.

[34] In considering the appropriate penalty Barker J relied on various principles which

have been applied numerous times in an industrial context, including cases involving

contraventions of the WR Act.

[35] The penalty which the parties agreed ought to be paid by the first respondent for contravening s494(1) of the WR Act was $13,200, which represents 40% of the maximum penalty available. The penalty which the parties agreed ought to be paid by Mr Cain for contravening section 494(1) was $2,640, which represents 40% of the maximum penalty available. At paragraph [37] of FWO v MUA:

“The applicant and the respondents submit that the proposed penalties are appropriate and that they are within the permissible range of penalties for contraventions of s494(1) of the Workplace Relations Act. On the basis of a consideration of the factors outlined in Australian Ophthalmic Supplies, I accept this joint submission an so make orders imposing the proposed penalties on the first, second and third respondents. The

[2013] FWCD 6237

level of the agreed penalties sends an appropriate message to the respondents and others affected by the operation of the WR Act that contraventions of the Act will result in significant monetary penalties”[3].

[3][2012] FCA 1521 at [37]

Any other matters that FWA considers relevant

[36] Section 513(1)(g) provides the Commission with a broad discretion to take into account any other matters it considers relevant. Such a discretion should not be taken to mean any matter, but only those that are relevant to determining if the proposed permit holder is a ‘fit and proper person’.[4]The proper construction should be determined by examining the

[4]Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2012] FWAD 2545 at [12].

provision in the context of the Act as a whole. Relevant considerations in this regard include

the context, scope and purpose of the Act.[5]

[5]Ibid at [21]-[30].

Failure to disclose the matter of FWO v MUA.

[37] As noted earlier of this decision, the initial declarations did not disclose the penalty

imposed on the MUA in relation to action taken by Mr Cain in FWO v MUA. The initial
declaration of Mr Doleman provided that:

“(d) I never been ordered to pay a penalty under this Act or any other industrial law in relation to action taken by the official nor has any other person been ordered to pay a penalty in respect of such action.”

[38]      The initial declaration of Mr Cain provided that:

“(d) I have never been ordered to pay a penalty under this Act or any other industrial law in relation to my action nor has any other person been ordered to pay a penalty in respect of such action.”

[39] In “Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU)-Victorian Branch

Delegate Nassios expressed the following view:

“[14] Thoroughness by an applicant in disclosing adverse issues is paramount in assisting a Delegate to make an informed judgment as to whether an applicant for an entry permit is a fit and proper person. Thoroughness however can only be gauged in relation to each individual applicant’s circumstances.”

[40] A recent decision of the Commission also dealt with a failure to disclose penalties relevant to s.513(1)(d) in an application by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union for a permit for Mr Adam Olsen.[6]It stated the following views regarding this issue at paragraph 58:

[6][2013] FWCD 1242.

“[58] The obligation to disclose facts relevant to the permit qualification matters has been defined as a “duty of full and frank disclosure”[7]. Entry permits are issued to officials of organisations on the basis of the contents of the declarations made by proposed permit holders and members of the Committee of Management of the relevant registered organisation.

[7]For example see “Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian

[2013] FWCD 6237

[60] In my opinion, a ‘fit and proper person’ would not deliberately fail to disclose

matters relevant to the ‘permit qualification matters’ when making the declaration in Form F42. Where a failure to make full and frank disclosure in a declaration of the proposed permit holder was not deliberate, reasons may be advanced by the applicant and/or proposed permit holder that the failure to disclose is not representative of the character of the proposed permit holder. Further, where a failure to make full and frank disclosure in a declaration of the relevant Committee of Management member was not deliberate, then reasons may be advanced by the [applicant] and/or relevant Committee of Management member that the failure to disclose should not affect the weight to be given to their declaration that the proposed permit holder is a ‘fit and proper person’.

[61] Given this, I regard Mr Olsen’s failure to disclose the matter of Lend Lease v CFMEU in the declarations, filed with the application on 18 December 2012, to be a

relevant matter for the purposes of s.513(1)(g) of the Act.”[8]

[8]Ibid at [60]–[61].

[41] For similar reasons, I find the failure to disclose the penalties ordered to be paid by the MUA and Mr Cain in relation to action taken by Mr Cain in FWO v MUA to be a relevant matter for the purpose of s.513(1)(g).

[42] The amended declarations of Mr Doleman and Mr Cain, filed on 25 July 2013 and 6 August 2013 respectively, provide reasons for the failure to disclose the penalties ordered to be paid in FWO v MUA.

[43] Mr Doleman’s further declaration, dated 25 July 2013, provides that the declaration dated 10 June 2013 was incorrect, and the proposed permit holder was in a Federal Court judgement of FWO v MUA when making his initial declaration. Mr Doleman declared that it was only when he received the correspondence from the Commission, dated 13 June 2013, that he became aware of the penalty.

[44] It is important here to set out the opening paragraph that follows the personal details of

the declaration required by the Fair Work Australia Rules 2010 (the Rules) to be completed
by a Committee of Management member:

“Declare that, having made proper inquiries (including inquiries of the proposed permit
holder) and having reviewed the records of the organisation, declare that the proposed
permit holder is a fit and proper person to hold a right of entry permit in that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the proposed permit holder...”[9](emphasis added)

[9]Fair Work Australia Rules 2010, Schedule 2, Form F42.

[45] The Rules are the rules of the Commission at the time of issuing this decision and the lodgement of the application.

Consideration

[46]      In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990)[10](Tribunal v Bond) the High

[10]Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321.

Court considered the phrase “fit and proper person” in the context of licensing under the now repealed Broadcasting Act 1942. In that decision, Toohey and Gaudron JJ made the following statement:

[2013] FWCD 6237

“The expression ‘fit and proper person’, standing alone, carries no precise meaning. It takes its meaning from its context, from the activities in which the person is or will be engaged and the ends to be served by those activities. The concept of ‘fit and proper’ cannot be entirely divorced from the conduct of the person who is or will be engaging in those activities. However, depending on the nature of the activities, the question may be whether improper conduct has occurred, whether it is likely to occur, whether it can be assumed it will not occur, or whether the general community will have confidence that it will not occur. The list is not exhaustive but it does indicate that, in certain contexts, character (because it provides an indication of public perception as to likely future conduct) may be sufficient to ground a finding that a person is not fit and proper to undertake the activities in question.”[11]

[11]Ibid at 380 (per Toohey and Guadron JJ).

[47] I accept that the expression ‘fit and proper person’ is coloured somewhat by the context in which it appears and that it should be construed by having regard to the rights and responsibilities associated with the grant of an entry permit. Parliament has expressed an intention that the Commission “must” take into account the permit qualification matters set out in s.513(1) of the Act to “ensure that only appropriate persons are conferred with the significant rights to access premises”.[12]Although previous judicial authorities regarding the

[12]Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008, 2041.

meaning of particular terms applied in legislation, such as the exposition of the term “fit and

proper person” in Tribunal v Bond are binding in similar factual circumstances,[13]care must be

[13]Ogden Industries Pty Ltd v Lucas (1968) 118 CLR 32.

exercised lest such judicial expositions replace the actual statutory text.[14]

[14]Damjanovic & Sons Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1968) 117 CLR 390, 407-409 (per Windeyer J).

[48]      The failure to disclose the penalty imposed in FWO v MUA is also a matter of concern.

[49] The $2640 penalty ordered to be paid, in the permissible range, by the MUA is a matter of consideration.

[50] The proposed permit holder is required to make a clear and unambiguous statement about whether a penalty has been ordered to be paid as a result of action they have taken. The relevant Committee of Management member is required to declare that they have made proper inquiries and referred to the records of the organisation.

[51] I have also taken into account that Mr Cain has since undertaken appropriate training about his rights and responsibilities under Part 3–4 of the Act on 7 June 2013.

Conclusion

[52] I have considered all of the relevant facts and circumstances in general and the failure to disclose the penalties ordered in 2009 to be paid by the MUA and Mr Cain in particular, In addition, I have carefully considered the relevant circumstances surrounding the continued use of an expired permit by the applicant and the explanatory material submitted in response.

[53] Finally, I have considered whether the circumstances of this application are such as to require the imposition of a condition in accordance with s 515 of the Act.

[54] Having carefully considered all of the relevant facts and circumstances I find, on balance, that Mr Cain is a ‘fit and proper person’ to hold an entry permit and that the circumstances of this particular application do not presently require the imposition of a condition in accordance with s 551 of the Act.

[2013] FWCD 6237

[55]      Accordingly, I issue a permit.

DELEGATE OF THE GENERAL MANAGER

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<Price code C, PR540873>

Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) - Victorian Branch [2010] FWAD 10039; Re Communications, Electrical,

Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2011] FWAD 3518.