Marin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[1999] FCA 826
•23 JUNE 1999
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Marin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 826
JUAN PABLO MANCERA MARIN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
NO DG 16 OF 1998
O’LOUGHLIN J
23 JUNE 1999
ADELAIDE (Heard in Darwin)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
DG 16 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
JUAN PABLO MANCERA MARIN
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RespondentJUDGE:
O’LOUGHLIN J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JUNE 1999
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE (Heard in Darwin)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs which costs are to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
DG 16 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
JUAN PABLO MANCERA MARIN
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
O’LOUGHLIN J
DATE:
23 JUNE 1999
PLACE:
ADELAIDE (Heard in Darwin)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant, Juan Pablo Mancera Marin (“Mr Mancera”) came to Australia from his native Colombia on 18 July 1995. He applied for a protection visa pursuant to s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), but not until over two years later on 8 August 1997. On 27 November 1997, a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (“the Minister”) came to the conclusion that Mr Mancera was not a refugee; the delegate subsequently decided that the applicant was not entitled to the grant of a protection visa.
Mr Mancera applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for a review of the delegate’s decision. That application was unsuccessful. On 30 September 1998, the Tribunal published its decision and its reasons for affirming the earlier decision of the delegate. The applicant now asks this Court to review the decision of the Tribunal.
The prescribed criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out in subs 36(2) of the Act and cl 866 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations: see subs 31(3) and Reg 2.03. Subsection 36(2) of the Act states that the criterion for the grant of a protection visa is that:
“… the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.”
The terms “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees Protocol” are defined in s 5 of the Act as meaning “the convention relating to the status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951” and “the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967.”
A refugee is defined by Art 1A(2) of the Convention as amended by the Protocol as a person who:
“Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
In determining whether one or more convention reasons applies to an applicant’s circumstances, Black CJ (with whom French J agreed) said in Morato v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 111 ALR 417 at 420:
“The convention definition does not extend to all persons who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in their country of nationality; it requires that there be a fear of being persecuted for one of the specified reasons. Those reasons may of course overlap, but a recognition that this is so should not obscure the fact that a well-founded fear of persecution for a specified reason must be shown.
Each element of the definition must be considered. … . It is not enough to establish only that persecution is feared by reason of some act that a person has done, or is perceived to have done, and that others who have done an act of the same nature are also likely to be persecuted for that reason. The primary focus of this part of the definition is upon an aspect of what a person is – a member of a particular social group – rather than upon what a person has done or does.”
Determining whether an applicant for a protection visa holds a well-founded fear of persecution is essentially a two stage process which requires a subjective and objective examination of the applicant’s circumstances. Subjectively, the Tribunal, as the decision-maker, must determine whether the applicant is actually in fear of persecution, and objectively, the decision-maker must determine whether the applicant’s fear is based in reality: Chan Yee Kin v The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 376.
Mr Mancera, who is now thirty-three years of age, was born in Colombia in the town of Libano in the province of Tolima. In his application for a protection visa he stated that his parents, one brother and two sisters continued to reside in Colombia but that his other brother was now a resident of Canada. There is an instruction to applicants in the application form for a protection visa to attach all relevant documents, such as certified copies of passports, birth certificates and evidence of dependency; the instruction continues that if such documents are not attached, the applicant is asked to list them and explain why they cannot be provided. Mr Mancera, in his answer to this instruction, wrote:
“It has been difficult for me to get in touch with my family and the people who have something to do in the information I’m giving in the application. I will provide them as soon as be possible or when I am asked to.”
(In this and other quoted passages from Mr Mancera’s application, spelling and grammatical errors have been corrected).
In a later section of his application however, Mr Mancera wrote:
“I’m still in contact with my family especially by phone, who keep me updated about my country’s situation which is worsening every day as the communist parties keep spreading every day.”
On 24 September 1997 Mr Mancera wrote the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs stating that he had earlier applied for a protection visa. He said that he had “great difficulty in understanding the questions” and that there were “no support services” to help him with the application (AB 39). This assertion is reasonably obvious from the grammatical construction of the application, but it is also obvious that the letter of 24 September was composed by someone with a good command of the English language. Mr Mancera’s letter concluded by saying that he wished to include additional information as part of his application and that he would send the information to the Department “within the next two weeks”. That statement was not fulfilled and I infer that Mr Mancera did not contact the Department in that two week period seeking an extension of time. He did, however, later forward additional information, the details of which are as follows:
1.A statement from the Mayor of the Municipality of Mistrato - Risaralda dated 24 October 1997 which said in part that:
“due to continuous harassment from the guerillas and pressure from the security forces [Mr Mancera] has needed to leave the country because his life and the lives of his family were in danger.”
2.A letter dated 8 December 1997 from Mr Mancera’s uncle, Oledes Marin Morena, who described himself as “an aspirant for Mayor Mistrato”. This letter was a general plea for help for all his countrymen who had been forced to leave their country because of its internal conflicts. It commenced, however, with the personal statement that:
“Juan Pablo Mancera Marin must not return to Colombia, as the present war between the different conflicting parties (guerillas, the paramilitary and armed forces), place us in a state of uncertainty and defencelessness.”
3.A copy of a letter dated 7 December 1989 from a Dr Jim Sugijama MD to a Canadian legal practitioner, Mr Norman Rogers, concerning their mutual client, Faber Mancera, the applicant’s brother. The letter gave brief details of Faber’s background:
“He was a resident of the city of Apia, east of Bogota. He was a member of the Patriotic Union (or U.P.) – a group that, since 1986, has been victimized by paramilitary killings. Mr. Mancera had been a member of U.P. for approximately three years.
Beginning in late 1988, he describes receiving threats regarding his U.P. involvement. These threats usually were over the telephone, and included threats to his life and warnings to leave Apia or face death.”
The letter then described an incident in April 1989 in which Faber was accosted and beaten by a group of unidentified men. Apparently Faber believed that they were members of the police force; shortly thereafter he left Colombia and has since resided in Canada. According to Dr Sugijama, Faber demonstrated some elements of post-traumatic stress disorder – a condition that the doctor described as “a recognised syndrome commonly seen in survivors of detention and torture …”
Mr Mancera based his application for a protection visa, according to the submissions of his counsel at the hearing of this matter, not only on his fear of persecution at the hands of guerilla forces in Colombia, but also on his fear of persecution from the Colombian authorities. He explained that during 1987 and 1988, when he would have been about twenty two years of age, he was managing a farm for his uncle. That farm, which he called “La Farma”, was located near a village called Mistrato in the State of Risaralda. According to Mr Mancera there were several guerilla groups operating in that area and they used to visit “La Farma” asking for (what he described as) “personal favours”. He explained that sometimes they wanted food or overnight accommodation; on other occasions they would ask him to buy them supplies in the nearby village. Mr Mancera said that he gave in to the guerillas a “couple of times” because he was scared; as he explained it in his application:
“All the time they visited the farm they were carrying firearms with them and it was well known that they used to execute the people who don’t collaborate with them”.
Mr Mancera acknowledged that he was not in any danger from the guerillas whilst he continued to give them the support that they needed. However, it was his claim that he was at risk of persecution at the hands of the guerillas because of his membership of a particular social group. According to the submissions of counsel for the applicant, the social group of which the applicant was and would be a member comprises owners and managers of farms to whom the guerillas could look for meaningful aid and assistance. The particular passage of his evidence which identified his perception of persecution at the hands of the guerillas, was then followed by his identification of his fear of persecution at the hands of the authorities. He continued in his application:
“The police started to visit the farms of the area so I was told by the police that I might go to gaol if they found that I was helping the guerillas.”
He said that when the military increased its presence in his area, he was among local workers who came under suspicion for collaborating with the guerillas; he said that he was warned that he may be imprisoned if he acceded to the demands of the guerillas. Mr Mancera also said that when he was being questioned, the police told him that they knew of his brother’s political involvement with the Union Patriotica (“the UP”).
Mr Mancera wrote in his application that when the guerillas next visited him, asking for overnight accommodation, he refused them. He then went on to say that two days later, two guerillas visited him and threatened him; they told him that they would kill him if he did not leave the farm; they said that he was “a traitor to the country and to the ideas they wanted to impose in that area.” He said that the guerillas did not identify themselves but it was known that they were members of the Ejercito Popular Liberacion (“the EPL”).
The applicant said that he did not seek assistance from the authorities because he could not survive in the area if the guerillas were antagonistic towards him. He also said that it would have been difficult to obtain support from the authorities because of the politics of his brother and his uncle.
Mr Mancera left “La Farma” and went to Venezuela where he lived for five years; but so he said, he did not seek asylum in that country because of the claimed animosity between Colombians and Venezuelans. He then returned to Colombia where he applied for and obtained a visitor’s visa to enter Australia.
This Court’s power to review the Tribunal’s decision is found in ss 475 and 476 of the Act. The first of those sections identifies decisions that are judicially reviewable and a decision of the Tribunal is one such decision. Section 476 provides that an application may be made for review of a Tribunal’s decision by this Court on one or more of the grounds that are set out in subs (1) of that section. In his amended application for an order of review, the applicant relied upon the provisions of pars 476(1)(a) and (e). Those provisions are as follows:
“476(1)Subject to subsection (2), application may be made for review by the Federal Court of a judicially reviewable decision on any one or more of the following grounds:
(a)that procedures that were required by this Act or the regulations to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed;
(b) – (d)…
(e)that the decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the person who made the decision, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision;
(f) – (g)…”
In their final form, the arguments that were advanced by Mr Mancera were two fold. In the first place, he submitted that procedures required by the Act to be observed in the consideration of his application before the Tribunal had not been observed (“the first ground”). He particularised that ground by alleging that:
“The Tribunal did not act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case in the manner in which it assessed the evidence and in particular the manner in which it rejected evidence on the basis of its assessment of the applicant’s credibility.”
This ground is a reflection of the provisions in par 420(2)(b) of the Act which provides that the Tribunal, in reviewing a decision:
“(b) must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.”
As a result of the recent decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] 162 ALR 577, it is now clear that s 420 of the Act does not create rights or grounds of review that are additional to those given in s 476; at 163 per Hayne J. Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, in their joint judgment, explained that provisions, such as s 420, are intended to be facultative, not restrictive:
“Their purpose is to free tribunals, at least to some degree, from constraints otherwise applicable to courts of law, and regarded as inappropriate to tribunals.”(at 588)
Next Mr Mancera argued that the decision of the Tribunal involved an error of law, being either an error involving the incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal. The particulars in support of that ground were as follows:
·“That the Tribunal erred in law in failing to properly assess the applicant’s risk of persecution because of his political opinion, his imputed political opinion or his membership of a particular social group, being either that of his family group or that of “farm managers”.
·That the Tribunal erred in law by concluding that the applicant did not have a political profile or membership of a particular social group such that it could be said that he was at risk of persecution for any Convention ground.
·That the Tribunal incorrectly stated that there was no evidence that the Colombian authorities are generally unwilling to take appropriate action when citizens suffer serious harm or threat of such harm and;
·That the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence of the applicant that the Colombian authorities did not and could not exercise effective authority over that area in which the applicant lived and worked so as to be able to afford the applicant the effective protection of the State.”
The Tribunal, in its reasons for its decision, quoted extensively from the United States Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Practices, 1997. This report sets out, in graphic detail, the extensive civil unrest that presently exists in Colombia. If the contents of the report are accepted as accurate, and I know of no reason why they should be doubted, the enormity of the problems that are confronted by the political and social leaders in the country suggest that the applicant, with his background, would be so insignificant as to attract little or no attention to the various warring factions.
According to the report there are estimated to be between 10,000 and 15,000 full-time guerillas, belonging to three distinct communist rebel armies, operating in more than 100 separate guerilla fronts spread across the nation. In addition to the police and army forces, there are also those who are described as “a diverse collection of regional-based paramilitary forces” who are said to have “assumed a dominant role in the internal conflict, greatly expanding their political and military influence into a number of geographic areas previously dominated by the guerillas.” The status of these paramilitary forces was not made clear but apparently they do not enjoy official Government approval or recognition for the report states:
“The public security forces’ relations with paramilitary groups varied considerably, ranging from noncooperation, to turning a blind eye to paramilitary activities, to some instances of active collaboration. There was no credible evidence of any sustained military action to constrain the paramilitary groups. While the President announced on December 1 a series of measures to combat paramilitary forces, including a task force to hunt down their leaders, these measures had not been implemented by year’s end…”
The report discusses the extensive extra-judicial killings that have occurred throughout Colombia, attributing them, in percentage terms, to the Government forces, the paramilitary and the guerillas. Of the latter two, the report says that they continue to pursue strategies that routinely violate citizens’ rights; it claims that their tactics consistently include extra-judicial killings, kidnapping, torture, targeting of civilian populations and installations, and the forced recruitment of children.
But, so it would seem, the greatest attack is that made by the guerilla forces against political leaders. In their attempts to destabilise the country, the guerillas pursue a policy of personal intimidation against those holding or seeking office. The report claims that the guerillas forced more than 2,000 of the 42,500 candidates nation wide to withdraw, including all four candidates for the Governorship of one province. One group, in August 1997, kidnapped a party that included eight city council members, some aspiring candidates and the town’s treasurer. The report noted:
“The Simiti council members plus 23 candidates were freed on August 26 after being offered a choice; withdraw from politics or die. They withdrew.”
The internal disruptions that are suffered by the population are extremely severe. The breakdown of public order in many rural areas has been sparked by the continuing conflicts between the police and the armed forces and the paramilitary and guerilla forces as well as the very strong narcotics trafficking organisations. The report claimed that such ongoing conflicts “has prompted the internal displacement of more than 525,000 citizens during the years 1995 to 1997”.
One cannot help but feel sympathy for the people of a nation who are suffering under internal disruptions of such magnitude. But those factors, horrendous though they may be, do not make the applicant a candidate for a protection order unless he is able to attract to himself one or more of the five convention reasons as a basis for his claimed fear of persecution.
In Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (see above), the High Court held that there must be a “real chance” of persecution if the person were to be returned to the country of his nationality. The Court observed that the “real chance” test discounts a “far-fetched possibility” (at 429 per McHugh J) and “what is remote or insubstantial” (at 407 per Toohey J).
At 389 Mason CJ observed that:
“… the expression a “real chance” … clearly conveys the notion of substantial, as distinct from a remote chance, of persecution occurring … . If an applicant establishes that there is a real chance of persecution, then his fear, assuming that he has such a fear, is well-founded, notwithstanding that there is less than a 50 per cent chance of persecution occurring.”
The court stated that the term “well-founded fear of being persecuted” denotes that the applicant must have a subjective fear and that the fear must have a basis in reality. At 396 Dawson J stated that:
“The phrase “well-founded fear of being persecuted” … contains both a subjective and an objective requirement. There must be a state of mind – fear of being persecuted – and a basis – well-founded – for that fear. Whilst there must be fear of being persecuted, it must not all be in the mind; there must be a sufficient foundation for that fear.”
In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572 the majority (Brennan CJ Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ) said of the decision in Chan’s case that it was:
“…an important decision of this court because it establishes that a person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent. But to use the real chance test as a substitute for the Convention term “well-founded fear” is to invite error.”
On the following page, the majority explained in further detail:
“Conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well-founded. A fear is “well-founded” when there is a real substantial basis for it. As Chan shows, a substantial basis for a fear may exist even though there is far less than a 50 per cent chance that the object of the fear will eventuate. But no fear can be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention unless the evidence indicates a real ground for believing that the applicant for refugee status is at risk of persecution. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation.”
In Periannan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported: Federal Court, 28 July 1987) Wilcox J said of “persecution” that:
“It is not enough that there be fear of being involved in incidental violence as a result of civil or communal disturbances.”
That passage was referred to with approval by Davies J in the Full Court in Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402 at 405. In the following year, McHugh J wrote on the same subject in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 257-258:
“The Convention is primarily concerned to protect those racial, religious, national, political and social groups who are singled out and persecuted by or with the tacit acceptance of the government of the country from which they have fled or to which they are unwilling to return. Persecution by private individuals or groups does not by itself fall within the definition of refugee unless the State either encourages or is or appears to be powerless to prevent that private persecution.”
Later at p 258 of his judgment, McHugh J added the further comment about the difficulties that may be confronted by citizens of a country that is suffering the horrors of civil war. He said:
“Conduct will not constitute persecution, however, if it is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country of the refugee. A legitimate object will ordinarily be an object whose pursuit is required in order to protect or promote the general welfare of the State and its citizens. The enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law does not ordinarily constitute persecution Yang v Carroll (1994) 852 F Supp 460 at 467. Nor is the enforcement of laws designed to protect the general welfare of the State ordinarily persecutory even though the laws may place additional burdens on the members of a particular race, religion or nationality or social group. Thus, a law providing for the detention of the members of a particular race engaged in a civil war may not amount to persecution even though that law affects only members of that race cf Korematsu v United States (1944) 323 US 214.”
To establish whether the applicant, if he returns to Colombia, will face a real, as opposed to a fanciful, chance of persecution because of his political or imputed political beliefs or because of his social background, it is necessary to examine the whole of his circumstances as they presently exist.
Mr Mancera advanced several claims in support of his application for a protection visa. He listed his and his family’s fear of adverse consequences from the guerillas. As I understand his application, this fear has its source in his refusal at “La Farma” to assist the guerillas back in 1989 or thereabouts. Then he referred to his brother having been tortured by the military authorities because of his association with the UP, an organisation that was described by the Tribunal in its reasons as a “leftist political association”. (I take this to be a reference to the brother upon whom Dr Sugijama reported). According to Mr Mancera, the UP had fought against official corruption. He said that his brother had been involved in recruitment for the party and had taken part in secret meetings.
Mr Mancera said that his fear was exacerbated because of his brother’s politics and the politics of other members of his family (who had many political enemies) and because he had left Colombia. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Mancera had provided occasional assistance to the guerillas whilst he was managing his uncle’s farm; it also accepted that he has a fear for his safety if he is returned to Colombia, but it rejected his claim that he had been questioned by the authorities concerning his brother’s involvement with the UP. The Tribunal came to this conclusion because the applicant had not originally made reference to it in his application. The Tribunal was also critical of his application in other areas where the applicant had supplied further (and seemingly relevant) information subsequent to the lodgment of his original application. I do not understand why the Tribunal should have arrived at conclusions that were adverse to his credibility; the applicant was not familiar with the English language; he did not have professional assistance in completing his application for a protection visa; he would not necessarily have known that the circumstances of his brother would or might play a material part in the Tribunal’s consideration of his application.
However, in the circumstances of this case, it would seem that this error on the part of the Tribunal was of no consequence for the Tribunal found that there was no material before it that would indicate that relatives or associates of members of the UP are targeted by the authorities. I do not think that it could be said that this mistake permeated the decision making process.
The Tribunal was critical of the applicant in other areas – and in my opinion with justification. If, as the applicant claimed, he was questioned by the authorities about the political involvement of members of his family, and if, as he claimed, he was threatened by the guerillas for refusing to help them, these events occurred over ten years ago. In the meantime, he was able to relocate himself in Venezuela without any apparent difficulty and stay there for five years. Why did he not apply for asylum in Venezuela? The Tribunal also noted that he substantially delayed making an application for asylum in Australia; that was not consistent with a person in fear of persecution and seeking the protection of his host country. His explanation that he delayed lodging his application because he was fearful that the Australian authorities would discover that he had paid money in Colombia in order to obtain a visitor’s visa was not accepted by the Tribunal. The delay indicated to the Tribunal that Mr Mancera “did not have a strong fear for his personal safety or future well being when he left Colombia”.
Of course, the rejection of his evidence is not the end of the matter. Mr Mancera does not carry any onus of proof and a failure on his part to make out an affirmative case in respect of any one or more aspects of his claim for refugee status does not mean that his claim must fail. As Gleeson CJ and McHugh J pointed out in their joint judgment in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1 at 25:
“… even if the Tribunal is not affirmatively satisfied that the events deposed to by an applicant have occurred, the degree of probability of their occurrence or non-occurrence is a relevant matter in determining whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.”
Referring to the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (see above) at 576, their Honours went on to say:
“The Tribunal “must take into account the chance that the applicant was so [persecuted] when determining whether there is a well-founded fear of future persecution”.”
The remaining question that the Tribunal had to consider related to Mr Mancera’s claimed fears of the guerillas. As to this the Tribunal came to the conclusion that “the applicant was not threatened by guerillas and that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for any Convention reason when he left Colombia.” In coming to that conclusion the Tribunal was influenced by the fact that the guerillas “clearly had an opportunity to harm the applicant, whether because he was suspected of informing on them or because he withdrew from them the favours he had previously provided.”
These findings by the Tribunal were open to them on the evidence; they can not be classified as errors – let alone errors of law. It would be beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with such findings of fact. This Court will only be entitled to intervene in the event of it being satisfied that the Tribunal, in reaching its decision, made an error of law. Thus, a finding of fact or the drawing of an inference for which there is no evidence is an error of law: Sinclair v Maryborough Mining Warden (1975) 132 CLR 473 at 481 and 483. But if there was evidence before the Tribunal upon which such a finding could be based, the review Court has no right to intervene even though it is satisfied that it would have come to an opposite conclusion if it had been the decision maker: to make a wrong finding of fact is not an error of law: Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 77.
Whilst it is obvious that internal conflict is ongoing in Colombia – particularly in the rural and provincial areas – there was no information before the Tribunal that would justify it coming to the conclusion that there was a real chance that Mr Mancera might face persecution for a convention reason if he were to return to Colombia. The terrors of civil war and internal conflicts can (in some circumstances) be the basis for genuine claims for protection but it still remains necessary for the Tribunal to be satisfied that an applicant’s fear arises because of one or more of the five convention reasons. In the case of Mr Mancera the Tribunal was not so satisfied. In my opinion the decision of the Tribunal was justified. This application must be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice O’Loughlin.
Associate:
Dated: 23 June 1999
Counsel for the Applicant:
Mr M Hardie
Solicitor for the Applicant:
Messrs Dalrymple & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr M Grant
Solicitor for the Respondent:
Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing:
11 - 12 May 1999
Date of Judgment:
23 June 1999
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