Marilyn Jeilles v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
[2007] AATA 36
•24 January 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 36
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2006/407
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re MARILYN JEILLES Applicant
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Dr KS Levy, Senior Member Date24 January 2007
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
.................[Sgd].............................
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – Disability Support Pension – lump sum compensation payment – compensation affected payment – preclusion period – special circumstances – decision affirmed
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Social Security Act 1991(Cth) ss 17, 1169, 1170, 1178, 1184K
Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Haidar v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 52 ALD 255
Re Ivovic & Director-General of Social Services (1981) 3 ALN 61
Proberts and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] AATA 567
Re Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Doyle (2002) 70 ALD 130
Secretary, Department of Social Security and Thompson (1994) 36 ALD 563
ReKrzywak and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 15 ALD 690Re Zaccardi and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 760
REASONS FOR DECISION
24 January 2007 Dr KS Levy, Senior Member Introduction
1. On 19 June 2006, Marilyn Jeilles made an application under section 29(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to appeal the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“the SSAT”) of 28 March 2006. That decision affirmed the original decisions by Centrelink which determined that Ms Jeilles was to be subject to a preclusion period, that a charge was appropriate to be recovered against her and that no special circumstances existed to ameliorate the application of those decisions under the provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”).
2. The applicant was self represented. The respondent was represented by its advocate, Ms Jasmine Forsyth.
Background
3. Ms Jeilles was the recipient of Newstart Allowance and Sickness Allowance for the period 25 June 1991 until 7 January 1998. From 8 January 1998 to 20 April 1999, Ms Jeilles was entitled to receive Disability Support Pension.
4. On 6 July 1995, the applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and an amount of $3,000 compensation was to be treated as her fortnightly income (T7, folio 39). That amount was paid in six instalments of $500 per month from August 1995 until 29 January 1996 (T9, folio 43). On 23 April 1997, the applicant was involved in a second motor vehicle accident. She was ultimately awarded damages in respect of this accident amounting to $138,101.34. This award of damages has resulted in a compensation charge being raised and a preclusion period being determined as a consequence of statutory disentitlement to receiving both a Disability Support Pension and civil damages.
Issues
5.The issues in this case for determination by the Tribunal are as follows:
(i)Is Ms Jeilles subject to a preclusion period under the Act?
(ii)Have the legal provisions been correctly applied in respect of the calculations for the preclusion period and the compensation charge?
(iii)Are there any “special circumstances” which would justify regarding payments made by Centrelink, as not having been made?
Legislation
6. The following statutory provisions from the Act are relevant in considering the issues for determination in this matter:
“Sect 17 - Compensation recovery definitions
17(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:
compensation has the meaning given by subsection (2).
Note: See also section 1163B.
"compensation affected payment" means:
…
(a) a disability support pension; or
…
where, in order to be qualified for the allowance, payment or supplement, a person must be receiving, or receiving at a particular time, another kind of payment and that other kind of payment (the underlying compensation affected payment) is a compensation affected payment to which any of paragraphs (aa) to (k) applies; or
…
"income cut-out amount", in relation to a person who has received a compensation payment, means the amount worked out using the formula in subsection (8), as in force at the time when the compensation was received.
Compensation
17(2) Subject to subsection (2B), for the purposes of this Act, compensation means:
(a)a payment of damages; or
(ba payment under a scheme of insurance or compensation under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law, including a payment under a contract entered into under such a scheme; or
(c)a payment (with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim for damages or a claim under such an insurance scheme; or
(d)any other compensation or damages payment;
(whether the payment is in the form of a lump sum or in the form of a series of periodic payments and whether it is made within or outside Australia) that is made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn resulting from personal injury.
17(2A) Paragraph (2)(d) does not apply to a compensation payment if:
(a)the recipient has made contributions (for example, by way of insurance premiums) towards the payment; and
(b) either:
(i)the agreement under which the contributions are made does not provide for the amounts that would otherwise be payable under the agreement being reduced or not payable because the recipient is eligible for or receives payments under this Act that are compensation affected payments; or
(ii)the agreement does so provide but the compensation payment has been calculated without reference to the provision.
17(2B) A payment under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that provides for the payment of compensation for a criminal injury does not constitute compensation for the purposes of this Act.
17(2C) The reference in subsection (2B) to a criminal injury is a reference to a personal injury suffered, or a disease or condition contracted, as a result of the commission of an offence.
Compensation part of a lump sum
17(3) Subject to subsection (4), for the purposes of this Act, the compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment is:
(a) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment is made (either with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(ii) the claim was settled, either by consent judgment being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(ab) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment represents that part of a person's entitlement to periodic compensation payments that the person has chosen to receive in the form of a lump sum; and
(ii)the entitlement to periodic compensation payments arose from the settlement (either with or without admission of liability) of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(iii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgment being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(b)if those circumstances do not apply--so much of the payment as is, in the Secretary's opinion, in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn, or both.
17(3A) Paragraph (3)(d) does not apply to a compensation payment if:
(a) the recipient has made contributions (for example, by way of insurance premiums) towards the payment; and
(b) the agreement under which the contributions are made does not provide for the amounts that would otherwise be payable under the agreement being reduced or not payable because the recipient is eligible for or receives payments under this Act that are compensation affected payments.
17(4) Where a person:
(a) has received periodic compensation payments; and
(b)after receiving those payments, receives a lump sum compensation payment (in this subsection called the LSP ); and
(c)because of receiving the LSP, becomes liable to repay an amount (in this subsection called the Repaid Periodic Compensation Payment -- RPCP ) equal to the periodic compensation payments received;
then, for the purposes of subsection (3), the amount of the lump sum compensation payment is:
17(4A) For the purposes of this Act, a payment of arrears of periodic compensation payments is not a lump sum compensation payment.
…
Insurer
17(8) For the purposes of the definition of income cut‑out amount in subsection (1), the formula is as follows:
where:
“maximum basic rate” means the sum of the amount specified in column 3 of item 1 in Table B in point 1064-B1 and the amount of pension supplement worked out under point 1064-BA2 for a person who is not a member of a couple.
Note: Point 1064‑BA2 refers to maximum basic rate. Maximum basic rate depends on a person's family situation. The rate used here is the rate for a person who is not a member of a couple.
"ordinary free area limit" means the amount specified in column 3 of item 1 in Table E-1 in point 1064-E4.
"pharmaceutical amount for a single person" means the amount specified in column 3 of item 1 in the Pharmaceutical Allowance Amount Table in point 1064-C8.
SECT 1169
Compensation affected payment not payable during lump sum preclusion period
1169(1) If:
(a) a person receives or claims a compensation affected payment; and
(b) the person receives a lump sum compensation payment;
the compensation affected payment is not payable to the person in relation to any day or days in the lump sum preclusion period.
1169(2) In this section:
"lump sum compensation payment" does not include a lump sum payment:
(a) to which section 1164 applies; or
(b) that relates only to arrears of periodic compensation payments.
Sect 1170
Lump sum preclusion period
1170(1) Subject to subsection (2), if a person receives both periodic compensation payments and a lump sum compensation payment, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the day following the last day of the periodic payments period or, where there is more than one periodic payments period, the day following the last day of the last periodic payments period; and
(b) ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(2) If a person chooses to receive part of an entitlement to periodic compensation payments in the form of a lump sum, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the first day on which the person's periodic compensation payment is a reduced payment because of that choice; and
(b) ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(3) If neither of subsections (1) and (2) applies, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the day on which the loss of earnings or loss of capacity to earn began; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(4) The number of weeks in the lump sum preclusion period in relation to a person is the number worked out using the formula:
1170(5) If the number worked out under subsection (4) is not a whole number, the number is to be rounded down to the nearest whole number.
Sect 1178
Repayment of amount where both lump sum and payments of compensation affected payment have been received
1178(1) If:
(a) a person receives a lump sum compensation payment; and
(b)the person receives payments of a compensation affected payment in relation to a day or days in the lump sum preclusion period;
the Secretary may, by written notice to the person, determine that the person is liable to pay to the Commonwealth the amount specified in the notice.
1178(2) The amount to be specified in the notice is the recoverable amount under section 1179.
Sect 1184K - Secretary may disregard some payments
1184K(1) For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:
(a) not having been made; or
(b) not liable to be made;
if the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case.
1184K(2) If:
(a)a person or a person's partner receives or claims a compensation affected payment; and
(b)the person receives compensation; and
(c)the set of circumstances that gave rise to the claim for compensation is not related to the set of circumstances that gave rise to the person's or the person's partner's receipt of, or claim for, the compensation affected payment;
the fact that those 2 sets of circumstances are unrelated does not alone constitute special circumstances for the purposes of subsection (1).
Evidence
7.The following documents were admitted into evidence:
·Exhibit 1 T documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975;
·Exhibit 2 Payments summary;
·Exhibit 3 Letter from osteopath, Mr Peter Carter, dated 10 October 2006;
·Exhibit 4 Letter from osteopath, Mr Peter Carter, dated 24 August 2005;
·Exhibit 5 Letter from osteopath, Mr Peter Carter, dated 20 May 2001;
·Exhibit 6 Insurance Commission of Western Australia, letter dated 5 September 2006;
·Exhibit 7 Letter from Jan Anderson dated 3 December 2004;
·Exhibit 8 Report from Queensland X-Ray dated 16 April 2003;
·Exhibit 9 Radiology report by Dr Paul L. Sprague dated 27 November 1996;
·Exhibit 10 Letter from Queensland X-Ray dated 16 April 2003;
·Exhibit 11 Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 7 October 2006;
·Exhibit 12 Applicant’s letter dated 12 September 2006.
8. The applicant is 57 years of age, having been born on 20 June 1949. She currently lives in a granny flat and pays rent of $350 per month. While she spends approximately $1,000 per fortnight on alternative medicine, she also has large veterinary bills - she has one dog and eight cats. She spends $70 per week on food.
9. In her oral evidence, the applicant stated that she previously did work as a belly dancer. She danced at weddings and other activities, but for her “students” she danced publicly. She stated that these activities helped some older women to learn to live without pain.
10. As a result of the second motor vehicle accident on 23 April 1997, and the subsequent damages payout, a compensation charge of $14,411.40 was determined to be applicable and that a lump sum preclusion period from 23 April 1997 to 20 April 1999 should apply.
11. Letters were sent from Centrelink to Murphy Schmidt, Solicitors on 18 December 2001, 19 June 2002 and 11 December 2002, seeking updated information about the applicant’s claim for damages. No response was received in relation to these letters.
12. On 20 March 2003, Centrelink was requested to provide an estimate of preclusion period and the applicable charge, if the claim was settled for $125,000. On 21 March 2003, Centrelink responded that the likely applicable charge would be $13,531.60, and it was estimated that there would be a preclusion period from 23 April 1997 to 30 March 1999.
13. A further request was made of Centrelink on 24 March 2003 seeking an estimate of compensation charges and preclusion periods if the applicant’s claim was settled for (a) $85,000; and (b) $50,000. On the same day, 24 March 2003, Centrelink responded that if the claim settled for $85,000 an amount of $6,563.50 would be the relevant charge and the estimated preclusion period would run from 23 April 1997 to 18 August 1998. On 25 March 2003, Centrelink advised that if the amount settled for $50,000, the relevant charge would probably be $741.40 and the relevant preclusion period was estimated to be 23 April 1997 to 27 January 1998.
14. On 21 April 2004, Centrelink wrote to Murphy Schmidt, Solicitors requesting advice as to whether the claim had been finalised. Advice was subsequently received that the claim was settled for $138,101.34 and a judgment for this amount was made in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory on 19 May 2005. That judgment included economic loss of approximately $25 per week for her former street entertainment activity as a belly dancer.
15. On 2 June 2005, Centrelink decided that Ms Jeilles was liable for a compensation charge of $14,411.40 in respect of the period 8 January 1998 to 20 April 1999 in respect of which she had received a Disability Support Pension. It also determined that she was to be subjected to a lump sum preclusion period from 23 April 1997 until 20 April 1999.
16. Under cross-examination she was referred to the SSAT decision where her evidence indicated that she had about $5,000 remaining at the time of that hearing. The applicant said she probably did get a letter from Centrelink about an obligation to pay back Disability Support Pension monies if she received a lump sum settlement. She also was referred to the SSAT decision where she had provided evidence to that Tribunal that she did recall receiving a letter from Centrelink advising that she might have to pay money back. However, she stated that her solicitor told her that depending on the settlement amount, she might not have to pay back any amount to Centrelink. (See T3, folio 11).
17. She was also referred to a letter from Ward Keller, Lawyers to the Department of Social Security dated 27 May 2005 wherein it indicates that that firm had included in the settlement amount a calculation for economic loss of $25 per week to age 65, including a 3% multiplier, to cover loss of income as a belly dancer. (See T30, folio 82). The applicant did not agree that she was paid $25 per week for economic loss although she agreed that she had signed a statement to that effect and in fact, signed all documents prepared by her solicitor.
18. The applicant was also referred to the letter from Ward Keller, Lawyers, dated 8 August 2005 and a summary of the disbursement of the settlement amount of $138,101.34. (See T42, folio 108). The applicant provided evidence that, consistent with what she had told the SSAT, she spends approximately $700 to $800 per fortnight on osteopathic and herbal treatments and a “pranic” healer. In response to a question from the respondent’s advocate, she stated that she had considered pharmaceutical benefits available through conventional medicine, but she is extremely reactive to drugs and does not take conventional medication because of a genetic thyroid problem. She stated that she almost died at one time when previously on some prescribed medical treatment. She also indicated however, that she does go to her general practitioner for normal medical issues, eg X-rays. The applicant had been to an osteo specialist and had received four treatments which were covered by Medicare. However, she did not think that that treatment had been useful for her.
19. Attachment A to the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions (Exhibit 11), showed that as at 18 October 2006, the applicant was in receipt of a Disability Support Pension of $621.10 per fortnight (gross amount). She agreed that that was the last payment she had received and that the amount shown was correct.
20. In response to cross-examination, the applicant stated that she thought that her expenses were approximately $1,000 per fortnight on petrol and other expenses associated with her rehabilitation (rather than $700 – $800 per fortnight as previously stated).
Consideration and Findings of Fact
21. I have considered all the relevant statutory and case law as well as all of the evidence presented by both the applicant and the respondent, in formulating a determination in this matter.
22. Having considered and weighed all of the evidence the following findings of fact are made:
(i)The applicant is 57 years of age and has a long history of health conditions.
(ii)Ms Jeilles has been in receipt of Disability Support Pension since 8 January 1998.
(iii)Ms Jeilles has been involved in two motor vehicle accidents in the past decade or so. The second accident occurred on 23 April 1997 and a dispute in this matter arises from the settlement of that accident.
(iv)The applicant settled the claim for damages for her second motor vehicle accident for the sum of $138,101.34, inclusive of legal costs.
(v)After payment of legal costs, outstanding loans and other legitimate charges, Ms Jeilles received $31,292.18.
(vi)Ms Jeilles has a preference for osteopathic and herbal treatment as opposed to drug therapy offered by conventional medicine.
(vii)Ms Jeilles spends approximately $800 - $1,000 per fortnight on osteopathic and other herbal treatments.
23. In relation to Issue 1 – whether Ms Jeilles is to be subject to a preclusion period, i.e. where she is not entitled to social security payments, s 1169 provides that where a person receives a compensation affected payment, and in addition receives a lump sum compensation payment, then the compensation affected payment is not payable for the “lump sum preclusion period”. The “lump sum preclusion period” is defined in s 1170(1). Therefore as a matter of law, Ms Jeilles is subject to a preclusion period.
24. In relation to Issue 2 – whether the amount of any consequential compensation charge and the preclusion period, has been correctly calculated, the “compensation affected payment” includes a Disability Support Pension (see s 17(1)). Ms Jeilles received “compensation” in accordance with a scheme of insurance or compensation envisaged by s 17(2) of the Act.
25. Under s 17(3) of the Act, 50% of the total lump sum received is deemed to be the “compensation part of the lump sum” or in other words 50% of $138,101.34. Therefore, the compensation part of the lump sum is $69,050.67.
26. The lump sum preclusion period is defined in s 1170(1), and is determined by the formula as set out in s 1170(4). Using the formula set out in s 1170(4), the length of the preclusion period is therefore:
Compensation part of lump sum
__________________________
Income cut out amount
= $69,050.67
_____________
$663.63
This results in a preclusion period of 104 weeks. (See section 1170(5)).
27. The period is defined in section 1170(3) and begins on the day on which the loss of earnings began that is the date of the accident, or 23 April 1997. One hundred and four weeks from that date ceases on 20 April 1999. Therefore the preclusion period 23 April 1997 to 20 April 1999 has been correctly calculated.
28. Has the amount of compensation charge been correctly calculated? Section 1169(1) specifies that the person who receives a lump sum compensation payment is not entitled to receive a “compensation affected payment” on any day during the lump sum preclusion period. As the applicant received a Disability Support Pension from 8 January 1998 to 20 April 1999, she is not entitled to receive a Disability Support Pension for that period. That amounts to $14,411.40.
29. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that both the preclusion period and the consequential compensation charges have been correctly calculated.
30. In relation to Issue 3 – the Tribunal must determine whether there are any “special circumstances” which can ameliorate compliance with these requirements, so that all or part of the compensation payment could be regarded as “not having been made"?
31. In answering this question, the Tribunal must consider whether its discretion should be exercised in the applicant’s favour, in light of the Tribunal’s decision that prima facie, a compensation charge and a preclusion period are applicable to the applicant in accordance with the statutory provisions. A discretion recognising “special circumstances” is empowered by another statutory provision, s 1184K of the Act.
32. In considering whether the circumstances submitted by the applicant are “special” the Tribunal must examine the submissions in light of case law, as the term “special circumstances” is not defined in the Act.
33. It has been a principle well established by the courts that the term “special circumstances” is not explicable in terms of precise rules (Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225). The presence of this statutory provision recognises that the legislature saw fit to provide for “special circumstances” where the strict application of the law might otherwise result in an unfair or unjust result (Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56 per Von Doussa J). Further, in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545, Kiefel J provided further guidance as to the meaning of “special circumstances” and said that it “….would require something to distinguish [the] case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. … It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary”.
34. However, it is apparent that the purpose of the legislation is to avoid a claimant having access concurrently to both social security benefits as well as significant recompense through lump sum payments (Haidar v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 52 ALD 255 per Hill J).
35. The applicant in this case argued that her health problems and extraordinary treatment costs are “special circumstances”. The advocate for the respondent referred the Tribunal to a number of decisions of the Federal Court and of this Tribunal to support the Secretary’s contrary submissions.
36. The Tribunal was referred to Re Ivovic & Director-General of Social Services (1981) 3 ALN 61 at N97 where the Tribunal there referred to the fundamental principle of the Act that an applicant should be precluded from “double dipping”. However, the Tribunal also said that a decision maker “…must nevertheless be prepared to respond to the special circumstances of any particular case by reason of which strict enforcement of the liability created by the section would be unjust, unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate”.
37. The respondent also referred the Tribunal to authorities which were relevant to the applicant’s claim that she did not accept that she had been recompensed for economic loss. The respondent also referred the Tribunal to Proberts and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] AATA 567 where reference was made to an applicant who subsequently disagreed with a settlement agreement which the applicant had signed. The Tribunal, in that case, followed Re Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Doyle (2002) 70 ALD 130 where Senior Member McCabe said that it would not be appropriate to go behind the settlement agreement. The Tribunal agrees that that principle is applicable to Ms Jeilles’ case.
38. But in assessing “special circumstances” in an objective manner, I am mindful of the comments of Einfeld J in Secretary, Department of Social Security and Thompson (1994) 36 ALD 563 where, in deciding that the Tribunal should not be overly mechanistic in justifying a reduction in the preclusion period, His Honour said that “…would in my opinion take legalism and bureaucratic pedantry too far, especially in a socially beneficial legislative framework where intuitive justice will often be as fair a criterion and as faithful to the legislative intention as any other approach” (at p. 569).
39. The Tribunal has given consideration particularly to the service provided by Ms Jeilles’ solicitors. However, when considering that the applicant was served by three different firms of solicitors, one of whom was in the Northern Territory, and the fact that there is no evidence that the applicant was not aware of the preclusion period – indeed there were a number of requests made to Centrelink in relatively quick succession before settlement to determine estimates of compensation charges and preclusion periods, the Tribunal accepts that the legal practitioners had competently performed their role and that adequate communication must have occurred with the applicant prior to her signing the settlement agreement. The Tribunal also noted the significant costs incurred by the applicant in non-traditional health care treatments. That, in part, reflects the applicant’s attitude or preference for health care arrangements and must be a matter for her own choice as to priority of expenditure. The Tribunal was not satisfied that conventional medical and related treatment would not assist the applicant, even without drug therapy.
40. In the end, “special circumstances” must reveal a circumstance or an event or a condition, or the likelihood of an event or fact or condition which is highly unusual or out of the ordinary. There must also be an unintended or unjust result which essentially must have occurred in circumstances which were not contributed to or controlled by the applicant. Here, the applicant has been unfortunate to suffer from various health conditions for a very long time and it is acknowledged that she is in extremely difficult circumstances. The extent of pain and frustration over a very long time cannot be underestimated. But here, despite those circumstances and the principle set out in Ivovic as well as the other authorities considered above, the Tribunal cannot find that there are “special circumstances” which would attract the benefit of s 1184K. I note the SSAT has suggested that Ms Jeilles might wish to consider utilising conventional medical advice and treatment where Medicare cover would be more financially attractive. I acknowledge that that is a matter which has contributed significantly to a drain on her financial resources but that has been guided by her philosophical views and her judgment about her tolerance for drug therapy. It is also a matter for the applicant to decide how to allocate her available financial resources. Her past decisions about health care services have been heavily influential on her present financial position, but this is not a matter which has created “special circumstances”. In this respect, the Tribunal has also considered the decisions of ReKrzywak and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 15 ALD 690 and Re Zaccardi and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 760.
41. As a result, the Tribunal determines that the decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the 41 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr KS Levy, Senior Member
Signed: .....................................................................................
Legal Research OfficerDate/s of Hearing 18 October 2006
Date of Decision 24 January 2007
The Applicant self represented
For the Respondent Ms J Forsyth, Departmental Advocate
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